Key Benefits:
Council Directive 96 /82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of the risks inherent in major accidents involving dangerous substances was incorporated into our legal system by means of a directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member States. of Royal Decree 1254/1999, of 16 July, which came to repeal Royal Decree 886/1988 of 15 July, which regulated this matter.
Royal Decree 1254/1999 establishes, in its final disposition, the need for revision of the basic guideline for the elaboration and approval of the special plans of the chemical sector, approved by the Council of Ministers of 23 November 1990, developed in accordance with the royal decree repealed, and published by Resolution of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior of 30 January 1991.
The fundamental objective of this review is to incorporate the changes introduced by the aforementioned royal decree into such important aspects as the adoption of policies for the prevention of serious accidents, the establishment of safety management, the development of self-protection plans, the development of safety reports, the consideration of the domino effect, the carrying out of inspections, the spatial planning taking into account the risk of these accidents and the information to the public. All this, without prejudice to the provisions of the basic regulations on the prevention of occupational risks (Law 31/1995 of 8 November, Prevention of Occupational Risks, and Royal Decree 39/1997 of 17 January, on the adoption of the Regulation of the prevention services), as well as in the specific legislation (Royal Decree 374/2001 of 6 April 2001 on the protection of the health and safety of workers against the risks related to chemical agents at work).
After the approval and publication of the aforementioned basic guideline, the Royal Decree 407/1992 was published, of 24 April, approving the basic standard of civil protection, which constitutes, in the development of the law 2/1985 of 21 January on Civil Protection, the fundamental framework for the elaboration and integration of the various civil protection plans and provides for the chemical risk as a special planning object.
Therefore, the adequacy of the basic guideline to the provisions of the Basic Civil Protection Standard is also necessary. In this respect and as an element to be highlighted in this aspect of the review, there is the incorporation into this new basic guideline of criteria for the elaboration of the state civil protection plan against this risk.
In addition, pursuant to Article 15 (2) and (3) of Royal Decree 1254/99, the standard formats for the notification of serious accidents to the Commission are included as Annex II to this basic guideline. European, which the competent bodies of the Autonomous Communities must send to the Directorate-General for Civil Protection, through the relevant Government Delegation.
In its virtue, prior to the report of the National Commission on Civil Protection, on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior and after deliberation of the Council of Ministers at its meeting on 19 September 2003,
D I S P O N G O:
Single item. Approval of the Basic Guideline.
The basic civil protection guideline for control and planning is approved for the risk of major accidents involving dangerous substances, the text of which is inserted below.
Single transient arrangement. Adaptation of the safety reports.
The competent bodies of the autonomous communities may require that within a period not exceeding one year, counted from the date of entry into force of this royal decree, the industrialists who have submitted the report security, in accordance with Article 9 of Royal Decree 1254/99 of 16 July, adapting or modifying certain contents of that Directive, in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Guideline for the control and planning of the risk of serious accidents in those involved in dangerous substances.
Single repeal provision. Repeal of the previous basic guideline.
The basic guideline for the preparation and approval of the chemical sector's special plans, approved by the Council of Ministers of 23 November 1990 and published by the Council of Ministers, is hereby repealed. Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, 30 January 1991.
Final disposition first. Regulatory enablement.
By the Minister of the Interior, prior to the report of the National Civil Protection Commission, this basic guideline may be modified when one of the following circumstances is present:
(a) Changes in international regulations which have been published in the "Official State Gazette", the content of which refers to the prevention and control of serious accidents involving the use of dangerous substances.
(b) deemed necessary, on a proposal from the competent bodies of public administrations involved in the management of the external emergency plans referred to in the guideline, as a result of the experience acquired in its application or the development of scientific knowledge on the adverse effects of dangerous substances on persons, property or the environment.
Final disposition second. Entry into force.
This royal decree and the basic civil protection guideline for control and planning in the event of the risk of serious accidents involving dangerous substances which are approved shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the "Official State Gazette".
Given in Madrid, 19 September 2003.
JOHN CARLOS R.
The Minister of the Interior, ANGEL ACEBES PANIAGUA
BASIC CIVIL PROTECTION GUIDELINE FOR CONTROL AND PLANNING FOR THE RISK OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES
INDEX
Article 1. Fundamentals.
1.1 Object and Scope.
1.2 Definitions.
Article 2. Concepts of risk, damage and vulnerability.
2.1 Nature of risk.
2.2 Nature of damage.
2.2.1 Hazardous mechanical phenomena.
2.2.2 Hazardous thermal phenomena.
2.2.3 Hazardous chemical phenomena.
2.3 Analysis of the vulnerability of people and goods.
2.3.1 Dangerous variables for people and goods.
2.3.1.1 Variables for mechanical phenomena.
2.3.1.2 Variables for thermal type phenomena.
2.3.1.3 Variables for chemical-type phenomena.
2.3.2 Analysis of Consequences.
2.3.3 Definition of the zones planning object: threshold values.
2.3.3.1 Threshold values for the intervention zone.
2.3.3.2 Threshold values for the alert zone.
2.3.3.3 Threshold values for domino effect.
2.4 Analysis of the vulnerability of the environment.
Article 3. Self-protection.
3.1 Serious accident prevention policy.
3.2 Security Management System.
3.2.1 Organization and personnel.
3.2.2 Identification and assessment of the risks of serious accidents.
3.2.3 Control of the holding.
3.2.4 Adaptation of the modifications.
3.2.5 Planning for emergency situations.
3.2.6 Monitoring of the objectives set.
3.2.7 Audit and review.
3.3 Self-protection plans.
3.3.1 Minimum content of self-protection plans.
3.3.1.1 Risk analysis.
3.3.1.2 Measures and means of protection.
3.3.1.3 Emergency Action Manual.
3.3.1.4 Implementation and maintenance.
Article 4. Safety report.
4.1 General considerations.
4.2 Basic information for the development of external emergency plans (IBA).
4.3 Information about the security management system and the policy for the prevention of serious accidents.
4.4 Risk analysis.
4.4.1 Identification of Hazards of Serious Accidents.
4.4.2 Calculation of consequences.
4.4.3 Vulnerability calculation.
4.4.4 Quantitative Risk Analysis (ACR).
4.4.5 Serious accident ratio.
4.4.6 Prevention, control and mitigation measures.
4.5 Evaluation of the security report.
4.6 Waiver of content in the security report.
4.7 Public information and confidentiality.
Article 5. Inspections.
5.1 Objectives.
5.2 Inspection system.
5.2.1 Development of the inspection program.
5.2.2 Post-inspection report.
5.2.3 Monitoring of the inspection.
5.3 Content of an inspection.
5.4 Post-crash inspection.
5.5 Coordination between competent authorities in the field of inspections.
Article 6. Spatial planning and restrictions on the location of establishments.
Article 7. The autonomous community plans.
Foreign emergency plans.
7.1 Concept.
7.2 Basic Functions.
7.3 Minimum content of stand-alone community plans.
7.3.1 Object and scope.
7.3.2 Bases and Criteria.
7.3.3 Areas object of scheduling.
7.3.4 Definition and planning of protection measures.
7.3.4.1 Protection measures for the population.
7.3.5 Structure and organization of the plan.
7.3.5.1 Plan address.
7.3.5.2 Coordination centres.
7.3.5.3 Advisory Committee.
7.3.5.4 Information Cabinet.
7.3.5.5 Action Groups.
7.3.6 Operational of the external emergency plan.
7.3.6.1 Accident notification criteria and channels.
7.3.6.2 External emergency plan activation criteria.
7.3.7 External emergency plan action procedures.
7.3.7.1 Staff Alert under the Foreign Emergency Plan.
7.3.7.2 Take action from the first moments of the emergency.
7.3.7.3 Action Groups Take Action.
7.3.7.4 Coordination of action groups.
Advanced command post.
7.3.7.5 Track event development. End of the emergency.
7.3.8 Information to the population during the emergency.
7.3.9 Media and Resource Catalog.
7.3.10 Implementation of the external emergency plan.
7.3.11 External emergency plan maintenance.
7.3.11.1 Regular checks.
7.3.11.2 Training exercises.
7.3.11.3 Simulations.
7.3.11.4 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the information to the population.
7.3.11.5 External emergency plan reviews and distribution procedures.
7.3.12 Foreign Emergency Plan Elaboration Exemptions.
7.3.13 Approval and approval of plans for autonomous communities.
7.3.14 Municipal action plans.
7.3.14.1 Basic Functions.
7.3.14.2 Minimum content of municipal action plans.
Article 8. The State Civil Protection Plan against the risk of serious accidents in certain establishments with hazardous substances.
8.1 Concept.
8.2 Basic functions.
8.3 Minimum state plan content.
8.3.1 Object and scope.
8.3.2 Emergency management and coordination.
8.3.3 State coordination committee.
8.3.4 Coordination and support plans.
8.3.5 Toxicological information system.
8.3.6 Technical advice and support system.
8.3.7 General Information System.
8.3.8 National catalogue of resources and resources.
8.4 Integrated Organ of Coordination between the State Plan and the Autonomous Community Plans.
8.5 Allocation of state ownership resources and resources to plans for autonomous communities and local plans.
8.6 Approval of the State Plan.
Annex I. Basic information content (IBA).
A. Information on the area of influence.
A. 1 Information and data to be provided by the industry.
A. 1.1 Geography.
A. 1.2 Topography.
A. 2 Information and data to be complemented by the Competent Administration.
A. 2.1 Demography.
A. 2.2 Elements of historical, cultural or natural value.
A. 2.3 Road network.
A. 2.4 Geology.
A. 2.5 Hydrology.
A. 2.6 Water and soil uses.
A. 2.7 Ecology.
A. 2.8 Meteorology.
A. 2.9 Healthcare Network.
A. 2.10 Sanitation Network.
A. 2.11 Other public services.
A. 2.12 Unique installations.
B. Information on the industrial estate.
B. 1 Planting plane.
B. 2 Mutual aid agreements or covenants.
C. Information about the establishment.
C. 1 Establishment Identification.
C. 2 Description of facilities and activities.
C. 3 Establishment Services.
C. 4 Planes of implantation.
D. Information on hazardous substances.
Annex II. Accident notification formats.
Article 1. Fundamentals.
1.1 Object and Scope.
The entity of the possible consequences of major accidents involving dangerous substances makes them liable to cause emergency situations in which the coordinated mobilization of resources and resources is necessary. means of different ownership for the protection of persons, property and the environment, as well as the application of procedures for their prevention and control.
This is considered in the Basic Civil Protection Standard, which, in Chapter II, paragraph 6, determines that the risk arising from activities involving this type of substance will be subject to special emergency plans in the territorial areas that require it, and that they shall be drawn up in accordance with a specific basic planning guideline.
The most important or fundamental core of this type of risk is the scope of those establishments where significant quantities of dangerous substances are manufactured, stored or handled by the Royal Decree. Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 16 July 1999 laying down measures for the control of the risks inherent in major accidents involving dangerous substances, the priority being given to action in such cases as regards the planning of the civil protection.
The purpose of this basic guideline is to establish the minimum criteria to be observed by the various public administrations and the holders of establishments for the prevention and control of the risks of accidents. serious substances in which dangerous substances are involved.
The Ministry of the Interior, through the Directorate General of Civil Protection, will review the bases and criteria of this basic guideline and, if necessary, propose its extension or modification in the light of the evolution of knowledge (a) scientific advice and the incorporation of future administrative or legal provisions applicable to it.
1.2 Definitions.
For the purposes of this basic guideline, the following definitions apply:
Damage: loss of human life, bodily injury, material damage and serious deterioration of the environment, as a direct result or indirect, immediate or deferred, of the toxic, flammable properties, explosive, oxidant or other natural substances, dangerous substances and other physical or physicochemical effects resulting from the development of industrial activities.
Establishment: the entire area under the control of an industrial site where dangerous substances are found in one or more facilities, including common or related infrastructure or activities.
Installation: a technical unit within an establishment where dangerous substances are produced, used, manipulated, transformed or stored. It includes all equipment, structures, pipes, machinery, instruments, special railway branches, docks, loading or unloading docks for use of the installation, spikes, tanks or similar structures, whether or not they are afloat, necessary for the operation of the installation.
Industrial: any natural or legal person who exploits or holds the establishment or facility, or any person who has delegated, in relation to technical functioning, an economic power determining.
Dangerous substances: the substances, mixtures or preparations listed in Royal Decree 1254/1999 of 16 July 1999 laying down measures for the control of the risks inherent in serious accidents in which they are involved dangerous substances, in Part 1 of Annex I or meeting the criteria set out in Part 2 of Annex I, and which are present in the form of raw materials, products, by-products, residues or intermediate products, including those of which can be reasonably thought to be generated in the event of an accident.
Serious accident: any event, such as an emission in the form of leakage or discharge, major fire or explosion, resulting from an uncontrolled process during the operation of any establishment to which it is application of Royal Decree 1254/1999 of 16 July 1999, which poses a situation of serious risk, immediate or deferred, to persons, property and the environment, either inside or outside the establishment, and in which they are involved one or more dangerous substances.
For purposes of this guideline, accidents are classified into the following categories:
Category 1: Those for which material damage is foreseen in the accident establishment as a single consequence and no damage of any kind on the outside of the establishment.
Category 2: those for which possible victims and material damage to the establishment are foreseen; whereas the external impact is limited to minor damage or adverse effects on the environment; environment in limited areas.
Category 3: those for which victims are expected to be affected, serious material damage or serious environmental damage in large areas and outside the establishment.
Self-protection plan: control and security management system in the development of corporate activities. It includes the analysis and evaluation of the risks, the setting of prevention objectives, the definition of the corporate, human and material resources necessary for their prevention and control, the organization of these and the procedures of action in emergencies to ensure immediate evacuation and/or confinement and intervention, as well as their integration into the public civil protection system.
Danger: the intrinsic capacity of a substance or the potentiality of a physical situation to cause harm to people, property and the environment.
Risk: the likelihood of a specific harmful effect occurring over a given period of time or in particular circumstances.
Storage: the actual or possible presence of a certain amount of hazardous substances for storage purposes, custody or reservation.
domino effect: the concatenation of risk-causing effects that multiplies the consequences, because dangerous phenomena can affect, in addition to the external vulnerable elements, other containers, pipes or equipment of the same establishment or other nearby establishments, in such a way as to produce a new leak, fire, explosion in them, which in turn causes new dangerous phenomena.
AEGL Index (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels):
AEGL 1: concentration a/or above which the general population is predicted, including susceptible individuals but excluding the hypersusceptible, may experience noticeable discomfort.
Concentrations below the AEGL 1 represent levels of exposure that produce light odor, taste, or other mild sensory irritation.
AEGL 2: concentration to/or above which the general population, including susceptible individuals but excluding hypersusceptible, is predicted to experience serious or irreversible long-term effects or to see prevent their ability to escape.
Concentrations below the AEGL 2 but above the AEGL 1 represent levels of exposure that may cause noticeable discomfort.
AEGL 3: is the concentration to/or above which the general population, including susceptible individuals but excluding hypersusceptible, is predicted to experience life-threatening or death effects. Concentrations below AEGL 3 but above AEGL 2 represent levels of exposure that can cause long-term, serious or irreversible effects or impede the ability to escape.
ERPG Indexes (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines):
ERPG 1: is the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed that almost all individuals may be exposed up to an hour experiencing only slight and transient adverse effects or perceiving a clear odor defined.
ERPG 2: is the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed that almost all individuals may be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing serious or irreversible effects or symptoms that may prevent the possibility of carrying out protective measures.
ERPG 3: is the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed that almost all individuals may be exposed up to an hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening effects. However, they may have serious or irreversible effects and symptoms that prevent the possibility of carrying out protective measures.
Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEEL) indexes:
TEEL 0: threshold concentration below which most people would not experience appreciable health effects.
TEEL 1: Maximum air concentration below which it is believed that almost all individuals would experience light and transient health effects or would perceive a clearly defined odor.
TEEL 2: maximum concentration in air below which it is believed that almost all individuals may be exposed without experiencing or developing serious or irreversible health effects, or symptoms that may prevent the possibility of carrying out protective measures.
TEEL 3: Maximum air concentration below which it is believed that almost all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing life-threatening effects. However, they may have serious or irreversible effects and symptoms that prevent the possibility of carrying out protective measures.
Article 2. Concepts of risk, damage and vulnerability.
2.1 Nature of risk.
Understood as the probability of a given damage, of physical-chemical origin, due to unforeseen events in the establishments affected by Royal Decree 1254/1999.
In order to determine the risks so understood, a hazard identification shall be carried out, followed by an assessment of the risks.
2.2 Nature of damage.
Monitoring and planning for the risk of a major accident for an establishment must be based on the assessment of the consequences of the dangerous phenomena which may result from serious accidents which may be the activity in question, on the vulnerable elements, in the territorial scope of the plan.
The various types of serious accidents to consider in establishments can produce the following dangerous phenomena for people, the environment and goods:
(a) Mechanical type: pressure waves and projectiles.
b) Thermal type: thermal radiation.
c) Chemical type: toxic cloud or environmental pollution caused by the uncontrolled leakage or discharge of dangerous substances.
These phenomena can occur in isolation, simultaneously or sequentially.
2.2.1 Hazardous mechanical phenomena.
Pressure waves and projectiles are included here.
The pressure waves are caused by explosions or rapid equilibrium between a mass of high pressure gases and the atmosphere surrounding it. In the event that the energy required for the expansion of the gas comes from a physical phenomenon, the explosion is said to be physical and the product is required to be confined to a watertight container (known as burst). By contrast, if the energy comes from a chemical reaction, it is a chemical explosion (or explosion, simply). In this case the explosion may occur even if the product is not confined.
A contained explosion, or explosion, can cause fragments of the continent, and a non-contained one, of solids from the vicinity of the point at which the explosion occurred. These fragments or projectiles are endowed with a lot of movement and their dimensions and scope are varied but limited.
The effects of the pressure wave can be classified as follows:
a) Primary effects: the primary effects of the pressure wave have their origin in the compressions and expansions of atmospheric air that can produce deformation and vibratory phenomena affecting the structures of the buildings and facilities and living organisms.
b) Side effects: the side effects of the pressure wave take place when the dynamic deformations and stresses produced exceed the strength characteristics of the structures and these fail. The failure or breakage of the structures results in the formation of fragments which, due to the impulse received from the pressure wave, act in turn as projectiles, the impact of which causes additional mechanical damage.
c) Tertiary effects: the tertiary effects of the pressure wave consist of damage caused by the displacement of the body of living beings and the impact of the body against the soil or other obstacles.
Being the pressure wave and the projectiles propagative phenomena, the protection by obstacles of adequate rigidity (resistant walls, fortines) is effective.
However, damage can still occur due to reflected waves, the suppression of which offers greater difficulty. Both maximum overpressure and momentum decreases with the distance to the origin.
2.2.2 Hazardous thermal phenomena.
They are caused by fast, non-explosive oxidation of combustible substances, producing flame, which can be stationary (fire of puddle, fire dart) or progressive (flare, fireball), but in all cases dissipates the energy of mostly radiation combustion that can affect living beings and material installations.
If the material on which the flow of thermal radiation has an effect cannot dissipate at the same speed as it receives, it causes an increase of its temperature.
If this increase is not limited, irreversible and catastrophic alterations occur, which can culminate in the combustion or fusion and volatilization of the exposed matter.
In the vicinity of the point where the flame is developed, heat transmission is carried out both by convection and by radiation and conduction. The only way to avoid or mitigate their effects is therefore the use of individual protective equipment in the face of heat or fire or adequate protection. In contrast, from a certain distance from the focus of the fire, the heat transmission is performed exclusively by radiation, decreasing its intensity by increasing the distance. This makes any opaque screen for thermal radiation a highly effective protection measure.
2.2.3 Hazardous chemical phenomena.
Toxic clouds or environmental pollution due to uncontrolled leakage or discharges of dangerous substances for humans and the environment referred to in Parts 1 and 2 of Annex I of the Royal are included here. Decree 1254/99.
These chemicals, directly or indirectly, through immediate or deferred secondary reactions, may produce very different effects depending on the category of the hazardous substance in question.
The damage will depend, for each environment, on the orographic characteristics of the terrain, the concentration of the toxic and the time of exposure.
The essential feature of all toxic products and substances is that in order to produce consequences, they must be disseminated through a medium, which requires time and sometimes allows for the implementation of measures. The Commission has been able to take the necessary steps to ensure that the safety of the environment and the environment are not fully met. The Commission has also been able to take the necessary steps to ensure that the incorporated.
Uncontrolled release of polluting products carries associated risks whose consequences are deferred on most occasions. It is for this reason that, in the context of the areas affected by these events, knowledge of the circumstances, in its broadest sense, under which the accident takes place, as well as the nature of the product in question, is necessary. Pollutant capacity is concerned.
With regard to substances which are dangerous to the environment, changes in the environment can be caused by different events, which are the result of uncontrolled development of industrial activity. Such events can include:
(a) Vertid of pollutants in surface water, which can result in the contamination of drinking water or serious damage to the environment and people.
b) Filtering of polluting products on the ground and groundwater, which render them unusable for their agricultural, livestock and consumption exploitation.
c) Emission of pollutants into the atmosphere that determine the air quality causing severe disturbances in the receiving ecosystems with possible incorporation after the trophic chain.
In general, the establishments covered by this guideline are regulated, in terms of their implementation and operation, by the legislation in force in the field of environmental protection, which imposes limits and conditions to prevent their impact from exceeding certain levels regarded as tolerable.
2.3 Analysis of the vulnerability of people and goods.
2.3.1 Dangerous variables for people and goods.
For each of the hazardous phenomena listed in the previous paragraph, we establish physical-chemical variables whose magnitudes can be considered sufficiently representative for the assessment of the scope of the dangerous phenomenon considered. The areas potentially affected by the hazardous phenomena resulting from the potential accidents of the establishments covered by this guideline are determined on the basis of the distances to which certain physical-chemical variables are representative of the dangerous phenomena reach certain threshold values as set out below.
2.3.1.1 Variables for mechanical phenomena:
Integrated local value of momentum, in explosions and deflagrations.
Static local pressure wave, also in explosions and deflagrations.
Maximum range of projectiles with a boost of more than 10 mbar. (a), produced in the explosion or explosion of certain industrial installations or originating in other adjacent ones, as a result of said fene less, or by detachment of fragments due to a pressure wave.
2.3.1.2 Variables for Thermal-Type Phenomena:
Radiation Dose, D, received by humans from flames or incandescent bodies in fires and explosions, expressed by:
(SEE IMAGE, PAGE 36434)
D = Im 4/3 texp
where Im is the average intensity received, in kW/m2, and texp the exposure time, in seconds. This expression is valid for intensities greater than 1.7 kW/m2; for values lower than the previous, the exposure time is practically irrelevant, that is, it is considered that in these conditions, the majority of the population may be exposed for long periods of time without suffering damage.
For the purposes of planning, in short-lived fires, less than one minute, the time of exposure is matched with the duration of fires; for the longer duration, it is established as the time of exposure until the affected area reaches a protected area against radiation or where the thermal intensity is less than 1.7 kW/m2.
For the latter case and in order to determine the distances that delimit the intervention and alert zones, it is recommended to follow the model of response of the population to the genesis of fires, proposed by TNO, in which establishes a first reaction period of about five seconds, where the population remains static, and then the flight takes place, away from the fire at an average speed of 4 m/s.
[TNO (1989); Methods for the determination of possible damage, "The green book," CPR 16E. CIP-data of the Royal Library. The Hague, The Netherlands.]
2.3.1.3 Variables for Chemical-Type Phenomena:
For this type of phenomena the variable representative of the immediate damage caused by the release of toxic products is the concentration of toxic or the dose, D, defined by:
D = Cn max texp
where Cmax is the maximum concentration of the substance in the air, texp the exposure time and n an exponent that depends on the chemical.
The following indices are used: AEGL (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels), initially proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States of America, defined for three levels of damage (1, 2 and 3), For each level, the following reference periods are considered: 30 minutes, 1, 4 and 8 hours and, in some cases, also established for a period of 10 minutes.
If the substance does not have the above index defined, the so-called ERPG (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines) published by the American Industrial Hygiene Association, and/or the TEEL (Temporary Emergency Exposure) will be used. Limits) developed by the U.S. Department of Energy.
These last two indexes are defined for the same damage levels as those set for the AEGLs but, in each case, for a single reference period: 1 hour for the ERPGs and 15 minutes for the TEEL.
Considerations for index utilization:
1. All indexes represent maximum concentrations that should not be exceeded at any time during their respective reference time, so they can be considered as "ceiling values".
2. AEGL indices can be interpolated for cloud-to-tp-distinct cloud pass-through times.
To do this, the dose, D, and the exponent, n, of the above equation, are previously determined using the indices whose reference times comprise the mentioned step time; with said data the new data is calculated maximum concentration, Cmax, by:
(SEE IMAGE, PAGE 36434)
Cmax = (D/tp) l/n
3. AEGL indices should not be extrapolated for cloud pass-through times to the lowest available reference period; therefore, the maximum concentration would correspond to the EGL defined for the lowest reference period. On the contrary, extrapolations can be made for times of passage above the greatest available reference time, although this situation is very unlikely given that the AEGLs are usually defined for periods of up to 8 hours.
4. When ERPG indexes are used, the maximum concentrations are set as follows:
4.1 The appropriate ERPG values (level 1 or 2), if the pass time is equal to or less than 60 minutes.
4.2 For more than 60-minute pass times, extrapolate the indexes by using the Haber law:
(SEE IMAGE, PAGE 36434)
60 Cmax = ERPG
() tp
5. If only the TEEL indexes are available, it is verified:
5.1 If the cloud pass time is less than 15 minutes, use the corresponding TEEL concentrations directly.
5.2 For more than 15 minutes, extrapolate the indexes by using the Haber law:
15 Cmax = TEEL
() tp
In all the above equations, the time of passage is expressed in minutes.
2.3.2 Analysis of Consequences.
It is understood by analysis of consequences the calculation, spatial and temporal, of the variables representative of the dangerous phenomena described in paragraph 2.2 of this guideline and its possible effects on the people, the environment environment and property, in order to estimate the nature and extent of the damage.
The methodology adopted for assessing the consequences for planning purposes should be based on risk zoning and the application of calculation models, which will be of proven scientific effectiveness and recognition. "
2.3.3 Definition of the zones planning object: threshold values.
In particular, the following zones are defined:
(a) Intervention zone: is the one in which the consequences of accidents produce a level of damage that justifies the immediate application of protective measures.
b) Alert zone: is the one in which the consequences of the accidents cause effects that, although perceptible by the population, do not justify the intervention, except for the critical groups of population.
2.3.3.1 Threshold values for the intervention zone.
The threshold values to be adopted for the delimitation of the intervention zone are as follows:
1. An integrated local value of the boost, due to the pressure wave, of 150 mbar.sec.
2. A static local overpressure of the pressure wave of 125 mbar.
3. The maximum range of projectiles with a pulse greater than 10 mbar.sec at a value of 95%.
Produced by explosion or explosion of continents.
4. A dose of thermal radiation of 250 (kW/m2) 4/3 s, equivalent to the combinations of thermal intensity and exposure time shown below.
(VIEW IMAGE, PAGE 36435)
I, kW/m2 7 6 5 4 3
texp, s 20 25 30 40 60
5. Maximum concentrations of toxic substances in the air calculated from the AEGL-2, ERPG-2 and/or TEEL-2 indices, following the criteria set out in paragraph 2.3.1.3.
2.3.3.2 Threshold values for the alert zone.
To delimit the alert zone, the following threshold or circumstance values are considered:
1. An integrated local value of the boost, due to the pressure wave, of 100 mbar.sec.
2. A static local overpressure of the 50 mbar pressure wave.
3. The maximum range of projectiles with a pulse greater than 10 mbar.sec at a value of 99,9%.
Produced by explosion or explosion of continents.
4. A thermal radiation dose of 115 (kW/m2) 4/3 s, equivalent to the combinations of thermal intensity and exposure time shown below.
(VIEW IMAGE, PAGE 36435)
I, kW/m2 6 5 4 3 2
texp, s 11 15 20 30 45
5. Maximum concentrations of toxic air substances calculated from the AEGL-1, ERPG-1 and/or TEEL-1 indices, following the criteria set out in paragraph 2.3.1.3.
2.3.3.3 Threshold values for domino effect.
For the determination of a possible domino effect of a major accident in surrounding or nearby facilities and/or in a neighboring establishment, the following threshold values are set:
Thermal radiation: 8 kW/m2.
Overpressure: 160 mbar.
Maximum range of projectiles produced by explosion or explosion of continents (distance is calculated based on the accidental assumptions considered).
In any event, other threshold values may be used, provided that they are supported by technical references and the circumstances established for those securities are duly justified in relation to the nature of the material affected, duration of exposure, geometry of the equipment, content, presence of insulation and coating, etc.
2.4 Analysis of the vulnerability of the environment.
The industry will provide an analysis based on the identification, characterization and systematic and objective assessment of each of the relevant components and factors of the risk system.
The analysis will be based on the assessment and parameterization of the four components that constitute the risk system:
Sources of risk.
Primary control systems.
Transport systems.
Vulnerable recipients.
Sources of risk.
The assessment should include, among other aspects, the potential hazard of the substance, the factors that condition its environmental behavior and the potential amount involved.
Primary control systems.
The primary control systems are the control equipment or control measures arranged by the operator in order to maintain a certain risk source under conditions of permanent control, so as not to affect significantly to the environment.
The assessment should describe the willing control systems and their effectiveness for each risk source, estimating how much risk source can reach the medium and under what conditions.
Transport systems.
The assessment should describe in which cases the sources of risk can reach the receiving medium and estimate whether transport in this (air, surface water or underground, soil) can put the source of risk in contact with the receptor and the extent of the possible condition.
Vulnerable recipients.
The assessment should include an assessment of the natural environment, the socioeconomic environment, and the condition.
The industry must provide sufficient information on the above aspects and parametrize each of the components of the different risk systems (risk source, primary control systems, systems of vulnerable transport and receivers), with the aim of associating with each risk situation a value or an index of danger.
Article 3. Self-protection.
Royal Decree 1254/1999 of 16 July 1999 laying down measures for the control of the risks inherent in serious accidents involving dangerous substances, provides that the operators of the establishments are to be They define in a document their policy for the prevention of serious accidents and, where appropriate, their security management system *.
* In connection with this article, the European Commission has drawn up the Guidelines on a Major Accident Prevention Policy and Safety Management System, as required by Council Directive 96 /82/EC (SEVESO II). Joint Research Centre. European Commission, 1998, as an instrument of support in the interpretation of Articles 7 and 9 of Royal Decree 1254/1999.
In addition, manufacturers are obliged to draw up and submit to the competent authority a self-protection plan, called an internal emergency plan, comprising the analysis and risk assessment, the establishment of the of prevention objectives, the definition of the human and material resources necessary for the prevention and control, the organization of these and the procedures for action in emergencies that guarantee the evacuation and/or confinement and immediate intervention as well as their integration into the public protection system civil.
3.1 Serious accident prevention policy.
The industrialist affected by the aforementioned Royal Decree 1254/1999 is obliged to define its policy of prevention of serious accidents in a document that contemplates the objectives and principles of action to guarantee a high level of security for people, their goods and the environment.
This policy should cover and reflect the objectives and general principles of action established by the industry in relation to the control of the risks of serious accidents, with regard to the elements envisaged for continuation:
Organization and personnel.
Identification and risk assessment of serious accidents.
Control of the operation.
Adaptation of the modifications.
Planning for emergency situations.
Tracking the targets set.
Audit and review.
While this document has a general character, it is necessary to indicate the criteria of organization, structure and management systems for each of the areas mentioned. Its scope in each case should be clearly defined and should be consistent with its impact on the risk of major accidents.
In any case, the industry will establish in its policy document on the prevention of serious accidents the human and material resources necessary and the available, as well as the guidelines adopted to achieve a high level of security in their establishment in order to avoid, as far as possible, situations which could lead to serious accidents and to limit their possible consequences both in their own facilities and in the environment. This document represents the commitment of the industry to the fulfillment of the objectives for the control of the risks of serious accidents and the protection of the people, the goods and the environment.
3.2 Security Management System.
Security management can be defined as the part of the overall management function of an establishment that determines and implements its security policy. The safety management system involves a wide range of activities, initiatives, programmes and other elements, mainly of a technical, human and organisational nature of the individual activities within the organisation which have to do with security.
The document defining the security management system will develop the main elements identified in the policy of prevention of serious accidents, reflecting the commitment and safety culture of its organization, taking into account the resources and the direct responsibilities of the staff involved in the field of safety and the management of the risks of major accidents.
The document defining the security management system may, by way of reference, cover the contents referred to in paragraphs 3.2.1 to 3.2.7 below.
3.2.1 Organization and personnel.
Description of the functions and responsibilities of the organizational structure and detail of the operating procedures that affect the security of their facilities and their production processes.
Definition of the training needs of personnel associated with the prevention and risk management of major accidents at all organizational levels, as well as the organization of training activities and participation of the personnel.
Identification, by the holder of the establishment, of the necessary skills and abilities of its personnel, ensuring continuous training for workers and subcontractors on the procedures, instructions and working methods.
Description of the organization chart, development of the chain of command and responsibility, as well as their interrelations, especially with regard to lines of communication, between their departments and with the staff of the establishment.
Definition of the functions, responsibility, accountability, authority and interrelationship of all establishment personnel carrying out work affecting security, especially as regards the provision of resources for the development and implementation of the security management system, knowledge of risks and compliance with security policy, corrective actions or improvement, control of anomalous situations, training needs and the management of their effectiveness, and the coordination of the implementation of the system including the submission of the necessary reports.
Definition of procedures to ensure employee participation, contractors or others who may be present in their facilities, both in the determination of the security policy and for their implementation.
3.2.2 Identification and assessment of the risks of serious accidents.
Detail of the methodology developed for the identification and systematic assessment of the risks arising from the activity of the establishment and of the substances and materials handled or produced, the analysis of their possible the consequences of the accident and its border areas, including the procedures for the definition of measures, both for the prevention of accidents and for the control of their effects.
Development of a procedure to determine the elements likely to cause risks, which may be the source of serious accidents, and provide for the means for the constant identification of potential new sources of danger not initially envisaged or the modification of the existing ones.
Assessment of the skills, knowledge and resources needed to develop and implement appropriate procedures in the framework of the security management system.
Risk identification and assessment is considered at all stages of establishment, from your project to your withdrawal of service, including the potential hazards that occur or identify in those, the operating conditions of the processes (routine or non-routine operations, in particular the starting-up, maintenance and stops), incidents and possible emergencies, failures of the security management system, risks of withdrawal of service or evacuation and other external risks, such as natural hazards (weather conditions, floods, earthquakes), transport operations, etc.
It is necessary to establish a procedure to review the methodology for the identification and assessment of the risks according to the results of the study of incidents and accidents that may take place, of the experience acquired in the operation of both its own and similar facilities, as well as the conclusions of the security inspections or audits.
3.2.3 Control of the holding.
Development of the necessary procedures and instructions to ensure the safe design and operation of facilities, processes, equipment and temporary stops. Determination of the necessary working practices for all major safety activities, at least in the operational stages described in the previous paragraph.
In determining the procedures, instructions and working methods, the cooperation between the persons to be carried out, expressing them in such a way that they are easily understood by them and assuring which are carried out in practice.
Written procedures will be available for the entire template and all persons involved, evaluating them periodically to ensure their operability.
3.2.4 Adaptation of the modifications.
Development of procedures that are necessary for the planning and control of changes affecting the establishment, both of persons and facilities, and considering the external circumstances that may arise. affect the risk control of serious accidents.
Prior to the realisation of a change, its nature, the assignment of responsibilities, the identification and associated documentation, the preliminary risk analysis that may be involved, the definition and the implementation of the security measures and the subsequent evaluation procedures and the monitoring mechanisms.
These change management procedures will be considered during the design and construction of new installations or processes.
3.2.5 Planning for emergency situations.
Includes procedures for their development and implementation, evaluation and review.
These procedures determine the necessary skills and abilities of the personnel and resources necessary to carry out these procedures, taking into account the risk identification process and the necessary measures to communicate plans to all those who could be affected by an emergency. Measures to ensure the integration of the emergency plan into the organisational structure of the establishment, affecting the processes and the overall content of the security management system are generally included.
3.2.6 Monitoring of the objectives set.
Development of procedures for monitoring the operation of security and for the verification of established security objectives. They will determine whether plans and measures for risk control are being developed, and will ensure the identification, communication and investigation of incidents or accidents that may take place.
This monitoring includes the necessary inspections of the facilities and also covers training, organization and procedures.
Active supervision requires an effective communication system and a complete system of investigation of incidents and accidents, which will allow the analysis of all aspects that are related to those, and makes it possible to verification of the safety measures in place and the verification of the established surveillance process.
Defining responsibilities for initiating the investigation and corrective actions to be taken, including, where necessary, the review of procedures or systems to avoid failures. It shall be taken into account that the information obtained by the oversight of the operation should be an important contribution to the audit and review processes.
3.2.7 Audit and review.
The object of an audit is to ensure that the organization, processes and procedures in place are consistent with the security management system. It must be carried out independently and with sufficient objectivity.
Apart from routine monitoring, regular audits will be carried out, for which the establishment holder will develop an audit plan covering the previous six paragraphs, and provide for the identification of the areas. and audited activities, their frequency in each case, the responsibilities, resources and personnel required according to the level of knowledge appropriate and the necessary objectivity, the protocols to be used, the procedures for the information of its conclusions and those affecting its monitoring.
The review is the study to check whether the security management system is appropriate to meet the policy and objectives determined, and its outcome may be necessary to introduce changes in that policy.
At regular intervals, the industry will review the overall policy and strategies regarding the control of major accident hazards, as well as all aspects of the safety management system, to ensure their consistency. This review will cover the allocation of resources for their development and will consider changes in organization, scientific-technical development, standards and legislation.
3.3 Self-protection plans.
In addition to the prevention measures put in place by industrialists to avoid major accidents, it is necessary to establish the lines of action in the event of incidents or situations of risk that may arise. a serious accident in order to take measures to enable them to be monitored quickly and in a coordinated manner and to limit their consequences.
Among the actions relating to the control of major accidents are, in the first place, the measures that industrialists can take in their establishment to prevent their damage, to keep under control, and to provide for a Coordinated response with a rational use of existing resources and resources to deal with possible emergency situations caused by serious accidents at their facilities.
The self-protection plan, referred to as the internal emergency plan; an establishment shall provide for the identification of accidents which justify its activation, based on a risk analysis according to its degree of affectation or the safety report (in the case of establishments affected by Article 9 of Royal Decree 1254/99).
The criteria for the activation of the plan will also be described, and the general and specific procedures for action and operational procedures will be developed as well as specific ones that are necessary for each of the scenarios. (a) accidental exposure to the risk analysis. These procedures for action may be grouped together for those cases in which the guidelines for action are envisaged.
The general rules to be used in the event of an emergency, such as those relating to detection and warning, evacuation of dangerous areas and action by intervention teams, will be defined.
In addition, specific procedures should be considered for the following possible events:
Fire.
Explosion.
Leakage of toxic gases.
Uncontrolled dumping of dangerous products.
These procedures should include concrete measures regarding the allocation of human and material resources, as well as the most efficient actions that contribute to the control of every possible accident, through operations (a) to ensure that the current and external coordination procedures which are necessary are necessary.
In the establishments affected by Article 9 of Royal Decree 1254/1999 of 16 July 1999, the content of the self-protection plan will be developed more widely, according to its highest level of risk. In greater detail, the specific actions for each potential serious accident identified in the safety report.
3.3.1 Minimum content of self-protection plans.
The self-protection plan of an establishment affected by Royal Decree 1254/99 will have at least the following content:
1. Risk analysis.
Overview.
Risk assessment.
Situation Plans.
2. Measures and means of protection.
Material media.
Human teams.
Risk corrective measures.
Specific plans.
3. Manual of action in emergencies.
Object and scope.
Response organizational structure.
Link and coordination with the external emergency plan.
Classification of emergencies.
Take action and information procedures.
4. Implementation and maintenance.
Responsibilities and organization.
Deployment program.
Training and training program.
Maintenance program.
Review program.
3.3.1.1 Risk analysis.
3.3.1.1.a) Overview.
The description of the site, constructive characteristics and occupation, accessibility and escape routes, location of external media, in addition to the study of the facilities and areas where substances may be present dangerous.
3.3.1.1.b) Risk assessment.
A brief description and justification of the principles and methodology used for risk assessment and the determination of possible accidents that may trigger the self-protection plan shall be included, indicating their possible consequences.
3.3.1.1.c) Planes.
All those elements that contribute to the risk, including all vulnerable elements that are considered to be of interest, will be located at an appropriate scale. The different plans should be a homogeneous set in terms of scale, orientation and other aspects that facilitate their understanding.
3.3.1.2 Measures and means of protection.
3.3.1.2.a) Material media.
The characteristics of the means of prevention and protection available in the establishment, such as detection facilities, fire, containment, signalling, etc., will be detailed and their possible deficiencies in operation or design.
In this case, the material means of new implantation that are necessary in accordance with the applicable regulations shall be described.
3.3.1.2.b) Human equipment.
Human resources and those most directly related to emergency actions will be identified, indicating organizational dependence and mobilization procedures, taking into account all situations. possible (regular working days, holidays, working shifts and other possible variations).
In case of mutual aid agreements between establishments, the integration of the media of the organizations and companies that are signatories of the pact will take place.
3.3.1.2.c) Risk mitigation measures.
Existing prevention and protection measures that could directly contribute to preventing accidents and, where appropriate, mitigating the effects of accidents will be identified.
It will describe the means available for the control and containment of the consequences of the possible accidents and the degree of effectiveness depending on the different operational situations and work shifts.
3.3.1.2.d) Specific Planes.
Appropriate means and protective equipment shall be located at an appropriate level of detail in the event of an accident, as well as possible evacuation routes.
3.3.1.3 Emergency Action Manual.
3.3.1.3.a) Object and scope.
In terms of the procedures for action in emergency situations, the object and scope of the plan will be defined according to the level of risk in the establishment.
3.3.1.3.b) Organizational response structure.
The composition and missions of the different emergency teams will be identified, an internal coordination center will be designated, and the organization will be determined for intervention and evacuation. The relationship and updating of the permanent effective means for the location of the responsible personnel and the external resources deemed necessary in each case must be extreme.
3.3.1.3.c) Link and coordination with the external emergency plan.
The organization of the emergency establishment must be such that, at all times, the presence of an officer in the facility, who can assume the functions of director of the emergency in the location. There must also be a system of permanent location for those responsible who could be involved in the actions, according to a chain of command planned for all possible working hours and working hours.
The charges for those responsible will be detailed as well as the form of permanent location.
The director of the emergency at the site, or the designated responsible person, shall be the interlocutor of the establishment with the competent authority abroad.
It will include reporting of accidents and also incidents that may cause social alarm, or may be noticeable from the outside of the facility.
3.3.1.3.d) Emergency classification.
Possible accidents and risk factors will be classified according to their possible severity.
3.3.1.3.e) Procedures for action and information.
The action procedures and actions to be developed by the members of the plan will be indicated. Information sheets or procedures shall be drawn up for emergency situations, both internal and external, affecting the establishment.
In each event that may cause a major accident, the actions and measures to be taken to control the event or event and to limit its consequences, including the description of the equipment, shall be described. security and the available resources.
In this respect, the appropriate training of staff for the tasks to be carried out and coordination with external resources should be taken into account.
The conditions under which the activation of an emergency situation can be considered, its change of classification of gravity and the conditions to be completed shall be clearly specified. Actions to quickly alert the incident to the authority responsible for implementing the external emergency plan, the type of information to be provided immediately and the measures to be provided shall be included. more detailed information as it becomes available.
3.3.1.4 Implementation and maintenance.
3.3.1.4.a) Responsibilities and organisation.
The organization and allocation of responsibilities necessary for the implementation and maintenance of the plan for each of its phases will be detailed.
3.3.1.4.b) Implementation programme.
The stages planned for implementation will be described, considering the adequacy of deficiencies and incorporation of means, where appropriate, and the training actions necessary for their proper functioning (norms for the employees, visitors, maintenance groups, contractors).
3.3.1.4.c) Training and training programme.
It will establish the training and training programming to be developed to ensure the operability of the plan, based on the missions assigned to the staff assigned to it and all workers in general, including the programming and execution of drills and drills. For each self-protection plan, a simulation shall be carried out with a minimum frequency of 3 years.
3.3.1.4.d) Maintenance program.
A facility maintenance plan will be established so that they maintain adequate protection and operability at all times.
3.3.1.4.e) Review programme.
The review mechanisms of the plan will be included, further establishing procedures and responsibilities for the incorporation of technological improvements and experiences acquired during its implementation and in the lessons learned. learned from accidents/incidents.
Article 4. Safety report.
4.1 General considerations.
According to Article 9 of Royal Decree 1254/1999, manufacturers of establishments in which dangerous substances are present in quantities equal to or greater than those in column 3, parts 1 and 2 of the Annex I to that royal decree, have an obligation to provide the competent authority with a safety report (IS).
The safety report shall include sufficient information on the establishment, its environment, facilities and substances, in order to enable the competent authority to know its purpose, location characteristics, intrinsic activities and hazards, as well as technical services and equipment for safe operation. In addition, this information should clarify as far as possible the interrelations between the different facilities and systems within the establishment, both in terms of the common services, and in terms of their overall management.
The information shall be sufficient to enable the competent authority to assess the suitability of the controls. In any case, reference may be made to other documents at the disposal of the authorities when they so request.
The security report will include the following contents:
Basic information for the development of external emergency plans (IBA).
Information about the serious accident prevention policy and the security management system.
Risk analysis.
In the following headings, the criteria for the development of these contents are specified.
Likewise, in accordance with Royal Decree 1254/1999, the competent authority may require manufacturers of establishments in which dangerous substances are present in quantities equal to or greater than that of the Column 2 of Annex I to that royal decree, the development and presentation of some of the contents of the safety report, where justified by the specific vulnerability of the elements of the environment, to the the possibility of a domino effect due to the presence of nearby industries, or inspections carried out in the establishment.
4.2 Basic information for the development of external emergency plans (IBA).
It will be obligatory to present, on the part of the industrialists, a general information about the environment, facilities, processes and products related to the dangerous industrial activity of the establishment.
Information regarding the setting up of the establishment will be completed by the competent administration for the development of the external emergency plan (EEP).
In Annex I the detailed content of the basic information for the development of external emergency plans (IBA) is specified, both in terms of contributions from the industry, as well as the information that it should complement the competent administration.
4.3 Information about the security management system and the policy for the prevention of serious accidents.
As part of the safety report, the person responsible for the affected establishment will include the document on their serious accident prevention policy as well as the one describing the safety management system put in place. In accordance with the criteria set out in Article 3 of this guideline.
4.4 Risk analysis.
The objectives of the risk analysis are to identify the serious accidents that may occur in the establishment, as well as the calculation of the consequences and damages produced by those. In this way, it will be determined that they can be classified as category 2 and 3 accidents, according to the classification contained in Article 1 of this guideline.
Risk analysis will explicitly present the following content *:
Identification of Hazards of Serious Accidents.
Calculation of consequences. Risk zones according to threshold values.
Vulnerability calculation.
Identified serious accident relationship.
Prevention, control and mitigation measures.
4.4.1 Identification of Hazards of Serious Accidents.
Conditions that threaten the safe operation of the establishment or facility may be defined as hazard sources. These sources must be analysed at all stages of operation (start-up, normal operation, stopping, loading/unloading, transport inside the establishment, etc.).
Serious accident hazards linked to:
a) Operations, that is, possible human errors during the same, technical and operating failures of the equipment, failure of containment, parameters of the process outside the limits set, deficiencies in the supply of services, etc.
b) External events, such as impact of upcoming activities, transportation, natural hazards, etc.
c) Surveillance, i.e. unauthorised interventions.
d) Other causes related to design, construction and safety management, such as design errors, operational procedures, modifications of inappropriate processes or equipment, failures in the work permit system, inappropriate maintenance, etc.
* In this respect, the criteria contained in the Technical Guidelines on Risk Analysis methodologies, edited by the Directorate General of Civil Protection, can be used without binding character.
This section will identify potential accidental scenarios and the characteristics of the scenarios, including a description and justification of the principles and methodology used *.
It will be considered the accidental scenarios and scenarios that may occur with domino effect, as well as those that have environmental consequences and those that may arise in the context of uncontrolled reactions.
It may be possible to discard those accidental hypotheses which, because of a very remote probability of occurrence, are considered very unlikely to be materialised.
These scenarios will be justified by sufficiently specific and detailed fault trees (in accordance with paragraph 4.4.4 of this Article), relying on technical references and all of this with the acceptance of the competent authority.
4.4.2 Calculation of consequences.
The calculation of consequences will be based on the estimation of the values that can be achieved, space and time, the variables representative of the dangerous phenomena, including the environmental parameters, derived from serious accidents postulated, applying appropriate calculation models for this purpose.
Calculation methodologies will be based on internationally accepted scientific and scientific models.
A description and justification of the calculation methods used, including the assumptions assumed in them, will be presented.
They will also be considered to be those accidents that may occur with a domino effect, and those with environmental consequences.
To facilitate their understanding, the results of the consequences analysis will be graphically represented according to the model used, for each accidental hypothesis, at scale 1/5,000 or more detailed, indicating the areas of intervention and alert in accordance with the threshold values set out in Article 2 of this Guideline.
4.4.3 Vulnerability calculation.
Once estimated, for each major accident, the magnitudes of the dangerous phenomena, an analysis of the vulnerability that these values assume for the people, the environment and the goods will be carried out.
For this purpose, probabilistic methodologies of the Probit Analysis (Probability Unit) type will be used, depending on the availability and development of these.
For each of the accidental hypotheses, the vulnerability of people will be expressed in terms of victims and injuries of different types.
4.4.4 Quantitative Risk Analysis (ACR).
The competent authority in each case may require a quantitative risk analysis (ACR), where appropriate, depending on the specific circumstances of the environment, facilities, processes and products of the activity. The Commission has taken the necessary steps to ensure that the Community's financial resources are available. One of these purposes may be the decision making in the area of urban planning in the surroundings of the establishments concerned, in accordance with the content of Article 12 of Royal Decree 1254/1999 and Article 6 of this guideline, and without
* For the purposes of this paragraph it is recommended to use the criteria contained in the document Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report to Meet the Requirements of Council Directive 96 /82/EC (SEVESO II), drawn up by the European Commission.
prejudice to the alternative or combined use of other recognized international prestige methodologies.
Quantitative Risk Analysis (ACR) will have the following content:
1. Identifying the initiators events.
2. Determining the causes and frequencies of these initiating events.
3. Determination of the evolution of the initiating events to the final accidents. Quantification of the frequencies of the final accidental events.
4. Determination of the lethal consequences of the final accidents.
5. Determination of risk.
6. Comparison of the risk with the criteria of acceptability.
The object of the ACR is to determine the risk to persons in the surroundings of the establishments concerned which is related to the presence of dangerous substances and for various purposes, some of which have been mentioned above in this section.
In Chapter 1, initiating events will be identified, understanding as such external events, operational failures, humans, or loss of inventory of hazardous substances by generic or specific causes. Special importance will be given to those who can contribute to the risk to the outside of the establishment.
In Chapter 2, the causes of these events will be analyzed and their frequencies will be determined by application of the most appropriate methods according to the case (direct standard values, fault trees, etc.).
In Chapter 3, the evolution of the initiators will be analyzed until the accidents occur, depending on the type of substance and the conditions of the environment. The most suitable techniques, such as the event tree, will be used for this purpose. The frequency of accidents shall be determined by product of the frequencies of the initiators and the probabilities of the conditioning factors.
In Chapter 4, the lethal consequences of accidents will be determined, using the relevant calculation models for this purpose.
Chapter 5 will include a map of individual risk isolineas (defined as the probability, referred to a period of one year, that a person permanently located in a given location and without specific protection, is the victim of an accident, determined by multiplying, at each point, the frequency of each accident by its lethal consequences.
In Chapter 6, the individual isoriesgo curves are compared with the criteria for the acceptability of the risk. The competent authority in each case shall lay down these criteria which, in any case, shall be comparable to internationally adopted standards.
However, a new content may be established for the ACR provided that it is contrasted with internationally accepted scientific and scientific models and in accordance with the competent authority.
4.4.5 Serious accident ratio.
Finally, the IS will include the category 2 and 3 accident ratio, and the event tree schemes that can lead to each of them.
When a Category 2 or lower accident of an establishment can cause a Category 3 accident in another contiguous establishment, or trigger its associated event tree, the competent body will also assign it to you. Category 3.
4.4.6 Prevention, control and mitigation measures.
For each of the related serious accidents, information on technical parameters and technological safeguards will be included to avoid and mitigate their consequences, as well as the procedures foreseen in the self-protection for that event.
4.5 Evaluation of the security report.
The evaluation of the security report (IS) will consist of:
Confirm that it contains the sufficient data and information developed in this article.
Determine whether they meet the objectives of Article 9 of Royal Decree 1254/99.
The results of this evaluation will be used for the development and content of the inspections to be carried out on the establishment in question.
4.6 Waiver of content in the security report.
For the granting of exemptions or limitations to the content of a safety report, the competent authority shall comply with the harmonised criteria set out in Annex IV to Royal Decree 1254/99 *.
In any safety report whose information has been limited as a result of an exemption, reference shall be made to the said exemption.
4.7 Public information and confidentiality.
As set out in Articles 13 and 21 of Royal Decree 1254/1999, the competent authority in each case shall ensure that the content of the safety report in this article is made available to the public.
However, those contents that affect the situations described in Article 21 of the aforementioned royal decree, as well as other possible aspects that the industry considers necessary, may be confidential. prior to agreement with the competent authority.
For this data, the competent bodies of the different Administrations, which receive them, analyze, process, or use for the purposes of this guideline, shall be responsible for their custody in records of classified information.
Likewise, where there is an exemption limiting the content of the safety report, the competent authority shall ensure access to the information by which such a limitation was authorised. In any event, the provision of this information will be subject to the confidentiality restrictions described above.
Article 5. Inspections.
5.1 Objectives.
Article 19 of Royal Decree 1254/1999 provides that the competent bodies of the autonomous communities must carry out a system of inspections and control measures appropriate to the establishments affected by the said system. royal decree.
The recommendation of the European Parliament and Council 2001 /331/EC of 4 April 2001, which provides the minimum criteria for environmental inspections in the Member States, is also considered.
* In this respect, the criteria and references set out in the document "Explinations and Guidelines for the Application of the Exemption Referred to in Article 9 (6) of Directive 96 /82/EC" are recommended. by the European Commission.
These inspections will include a systematic and planned examination of the systems established in the establishment, both of a technical and organizational nature and of safety management, so that the industrial sector can demonstrate:
a) That it has taken appropriate measures to prevent serious accidents, in accordance with the activities carried out in the establishment.
b) That it has taken the necessary measures to limit the consequences of serious accidents inside and outside the establishment.
(c) That the data and information provided in the safety report or any other report or notification presented accurately reflects the security of the establishment.
d) That it has established programmes and informed establishment staff on prevention, protection and action measures in the event of an accident.
5.2 Inspection system.
5.2.1 Development of the inspection program.
The competent bodies of the Autonomous Communities shall develop an inspection programme which shall take into account the legislation applicable to the industry and shall contain at least the following information:
Identification of all establishments covered by the program.
Definition of the time period covered by the program.
Planned relationship with inspections for each establishment.
Scope of planned inspections for each establishment.
Forecast details and procedures for program review, when deemed necessary.
To establish the scope and priorities of each inspection, account may be taken of the nature and magnitude of the risks present in the establishments and their antecedents on accidental situations.
With the independence of scheduled inspections, the competent authorities shall carry out inspections in the following circumstances:
a) To investigate complaints regarding serious accident risks.
b) To investigate serious accidents, incidents and situations of non-compliance with current regulations.
5.2.2 Post-inspection report.
After each inspection, the competent authority shall draw up a report. This will reflect the level of compliance with serious accident regulations and the results of the assessment of safety systems. The report will contain at least:
(a) Scope of the inspection and the parts of the establishment concerned.
b) Evaluation of the systems inspected in the establishment.
c) Analysis of the compliance of the industry with the requirements of the national and regional legislation related to the regulations of serious accidents.
(d) Identification of such anomalous situations for which corrective action is necessary, including the time-limits and plan for the implementation of such measures.
5.2.3 Monitoring of the inspection.
When the report of an inspection reflects the need to implement corrective actions, the procedures necessary to verify the implementation and effectiveness of these actions will be carried out in accordance with the deadlines. registered in the inspection report.
To carry out this verification, various procedures may be adopted, such as notifications issued by the industrialist on the progress of their actions, certificates of correction of deficiencies and/or inspections of on-site monitoring.
5.3 Content of an inspection.
Inspection in an establishment should be directed to the following aspects *:
1. Check that the industry has taken appropriate measures for the prevention of major accidents and the limitation of its consequences.
2. The confirmation of the data and information contained in the security report and other reports.
3. Confirmation that there is an emergency planning for action.
5.4 Post-crash inspection.
After a major accident, the competent bodies of the Autonomous Communities shall carry out an inspection at the establishment and a report of the establishment, which shall contain the information necessary for a complete analysis of the accident in the technical, organisational and management aspects.
The competent bodies will ensure that the necessary palliative measures are adopted and make recommendations on future prevention measures.
Both information and lessons learned from accidents should be disseminated in order to prevent similar accidents and be taken into account in the inspection program review.
5.5 Coordination between competent authorities in the field of inspections.
In the inspections carried out in the establishments covered by this guideline, the necessary measures will be put in place to ensure that there is adequate coordination and cooperation between all the relevant sectoral authorities in inspections: quality and industrial safety, hygiene and occupational safety, civil protection, environmental protection, environmental health and land management, among others, and extend to all phases of the inspection process (programming, inspection at the establishment, subsequent report and monitoring).
These coordination and cooperation measures will be established taking into account the following objectives:
1. To achieve maximum efficiency in the execution of inspections.
2. Make optimized and rational use of resources.
3. Avoid conflicts in conclusions and resolutions.
4. Facilitate improvements in standards and regulations.
5. To improve transparency between competent authorities.
As part of the mechanisms for effective coordination, competent authorities may establish:
(a) A clear division of tasks, with the identification of roles and responsibilities in the various aspects of inspections.
* For the development of these aspects it may be taken into account as specified in the document Guidance on Inspections as Required by Article 18 of the Council Directive 96 /82/EC (SEVESO II), drawn up by the European Commission.
b) Regular consultations between authorities on relevant aspects of inspections, including legal instruments, policies and procedures.
c) Coordinated training activities.
(d) Joint Inspections.
e) Specific procedures for dealing with conflict or contradiction situations; and (f) Clear lines of communication allowing for the maximum exchange of information on experience of inspections, such as databases (a) shared, and new developments in the field of inspection techniques or any other useful information in this field.
In order to facilitate the exchange of information between competent authorities in the field of inspections in various fields and to encourage, as well, the knowledge of the evolution of inspections over time, the Competent authorities may develop standardised protocols and formats allowing for a structured approach to inspections and subsequent reports.
Article 6. Spatial planning and restrictions on the location of establishments.
Article 12 of Royal Decree 1254/1999 highlights for all affected establishments the need on the part of the competent authorities of the autonomous communities to take into account in their policies of land allocation the establishment or modification of the establishments concerned and, on the other hand, the creation of new works in the area of territorial influence of those establishments. The competent authority may also require a technical opinion on the risks linked to the establishment, prior to the taking of decisions.
The need to maintain adequate safety distances, on the one hand, between the establishments concerned, and on the other hand, the housing areas, areas frequented by the public and areas with a natural interest, should be integrated into all policies requiring consideration of the possible use of areas adjacent to these establishments.
In defining these safety distances different assessment methods may be followed, always at the discretion of the competent authority *.
In general, the method based on the consequences is established, which evaluates those that can be derived from a number of conceivable accidental events, without quantifying their probability.
The competent authority, if required, or at the discretion of the operator, prior to agreement with that authority, may establish the use of the risk assessment method, in which an analysis of the risks is carried out. consequences of potential accidents and the likelihood of such accidents occurring.
Article 7. The autonomous community plans. External emergency plans.
7.1 Concept.
Special plans for an autonomous community in the face of the risk of serious accidents in establishments where dangerous substances are found * In relation to this article has been prepared by the European Union Guidance on land use planning as required by Council Directive 96 /82/EC (SEVESO II), serving as a support instrument in the interpretation of Article 12 of Royal Decree 1254/1999.
will undermine foreign emergency plans (PEE). These plans shall establish the prevention and information measures, as well as the organisation and procedures for action and coordination of the means and resources of the autonomous community itself, of other public administrations assigned to the plan. and public and private entities with the aim of preventing and, where appropriate, mitigating the consequences of these accidents on the population, the environment and the goods which may be affected.
In the following sections of this article, the basic functions and the minimum contents of these plans are collected.
7.2 Basic Functions.
These are basic PEE functions:
a) Determine the intervention and alert zones.
b) Previewing the organizational structure and intervention procedures for emergency situations for serious accidents.
c) Previewing the coordination procedures with the state plan to ensure their proper integration.
d) Establish the systems of articulation with the organizations of the municipal administrations and define the criteria for the elaboration of the municipal action plans of those.
e) Specify the procedures for informing the population about the safety measures to be taken and the behaviour to be taken in the event of an accident.
f) Cataloging the specific resources and resources at the disposal of the planned actions.
g) Ensure the implementation and maintenance of the plan.
7.3 Minimum content of stand-alone community plans.
7.3.1 Object and scope.
The PEE shall record its object and scope in its content, which shall at least ensure that the basic functions set out in paragraph 7.2 of this Article are complied with.
A general description of the establishment object of planning, as well as its geographical environment, must be performed.
7.3.2 Bases and Criteria.
In the EEP, the scientific and technical foundations on which the plan is based must be adequately described and referenced, both in terms of identification and assessment of the risk and the establishment of the zones and planning criteria. Set as minimum content to consider the following:
a) Justification and description of the methodology used for the identification of the risk.
b) Justification and description of the methodology used for risk assessment.
c) Defining the scheduling object zones.
d) Justification and description of the planning criteria used.
7.3.3 Areas object of scheduling.
Taking into account the vulnerability criteria contained in Article 2 (2.3), the values obtained for each of the variables in each of the accidental scenarios and scenarios set out in the report security and the consequences which the environment and the goods are estimated to have for the people, the environment and the goods will be established in each of the two areas of planning (intervention and alert) which have been defined in Article 2. The competent authority may rule out any accidental scenario of the planning Presenting a frequency of extremely low occurrence is considered very unlikely to be materialised, justifying it conveniently.
It should be noted that the definition of intervention and alert zones presupposes the existence of vulnerable elements in them, so that the areas affected by an accident that do not match vulnerable elements do not require more planning measures than isolation or signaling.
An inventory of vulnerable elements (people, environment and goods) located in the areas will be performed. This inventory shall at least contain the nature, status and extent of all vulnerable elements located in the areas under planning.
The overlap of the intervention and alert zones with the content of the inventory of vulnerable elements will make it possible to determine the extent of the risk in the areas under planning.
7.3.4 Definition and planning of protection measures.
The procedures, actions, resources and resources provided for in the EEPs are considered to be protective measures in order to avoid or mitigate the consequences of serious, immediate and deferred accidents for the population, staff of the action groups, the facilities themselves concerned, the environment and the material goods.
For the implementation of the protection measures, the EEPs should take into account the values of the physical quantities, the characteristics of the environment and the population that may be affected and the extent of the consequences that they define. the risk of serious accidents which have been used to define the areas under planning.
Protection measures will be selected on the basis of their effectiveness in mitigating or preventing the adverse effects of accidents considered in the EEP, ruling out superfluous and other dubious results, as well as measures and procedures for action which may lead to changes in the environment, in accordance with experience and international practice.
7.3.4.1 Protection measures for the population.
a) Warning systems.
The system of warning to the population is intended to alert the population and inform it about the most appropriate action in each case and the application of other protective measures.
The alert to the population will be performed preferably by the installation of a network of sirens and/or fixed public address. The National Civil Protection Commission shall establish the sound characteristics of the alert systems by means of sirens in order to ensure that they are the same throughout the national territory. The reception shall be ensured in each of the municipalities in the area under planning. Complementary use of other warning systems, such as mass telephone notices, mass media, mobile public address, etc., may be considered.
The PEE will provide for the possibility of addressing the population through radio stations and, where appropriate, television stations. These broadcasters and their frequencies will be explicitly included in the EEP and will be reported to the population through the dissemination campaigns foreseen in the implementation of the EEP.
By means of an additional fixed or mobile public address system, the population can be informed of the protective measures that they are appropriate to adopt, as well as protection measures of imminent application.
b) Access control.
Consists of controlling the inputs and outputs of persons, vehicles and material from the areas under planning, following the activation of the EEP.
c) Confinement.
This measure consists of the shelter of the population in their own homes, or in other buildings, enclosures or nearby dwellings at the time of the announcement of the adoption of the measure.
By confinement, the population is protected from overpressure, the impact of projectiles, the consequence of possible explosions, the flow of thermal radiation, in case of fire, and the toxicity in case of emission of toxic substances.
This measure must be complemented by so-called personal self-protection measures, defined as those simple measures that can be implemented by the population itself.
d) Away.
Estrangement consists in the transfer of the population from positions exposed to safe places, generally a little distant, using their own means.
This measure is justified when the dangerous phenomenon is rapidly attenuated, either by distance or by the interposition of obstacles to its spread. It presents the advantage over the evacuation that the population moved is much lower, at the same time that the transfer is made with the population's own means. As a result, the logistical needs of the measure are practically reduced to those arising from the warnings to the population.
On the other hand, the utility of the measure is null and void when the dangerous phenomenon of which the population is to be protected is slowly attenuated.
e) Evacuation.
The evacuation consists of the mass movement of the population in positions exposed to safe areas. This is a definitive measure, which is justified only if the danger to which the population is exposed is sufficiently large. On the other hand, it can be counterproductive, especially in cases of dispersion of toxic gases or vapours, when people evacuated, if they are during the passage of the toxic penacho, may be subject to higher concentrations than those which they would be able to stay in their usual residences, even without taking personal self-protection measures.
f) Personal self-protection measures.
Personal self-protection means a set of actions and measures, usually within the reach of any citizen, in order to counteract the adverse effects of an accident.
Experience shows that these measures, although they are of extreme simplicity, are highly effective if they are properly implemented, constituting an essential complement to the remaining protective measures provided for in the plans.
7.3.5 Structure and organization of the plan.
The structure and organisation of the EEPs should include at least in their composition and regulation, the elements and criteria set out in the following sub-sections.
7.3.5.1 Plan address.
The PEE will clearly establish who exercises the management functions of the plan.
In emergency situations in which the national interest is declared to be in any of the circumstances contained in Chapter I (Section 1.2) of the Basic Civil Protection Standard, or when requested by the Community These tasks shall be carried out within the appropriate steering committee set up by a representative of the Ministry of the Interior and by the representative of the autonomous community to determine the plan. The representative appointed by the Ministry of the Interior shall direct the external emergency plan in coordination with the bodies of the autonomous communities and local authorities in these cases.
The declaration of this situation corresponds to the Minister of the Interior, either on his own initiative or at the request of the affected autonomous community or the Government Delegate in the latter.
These are the basic functions of the plan address:
a) Declare the activation of the PEE.
b) Determine the category of the accident.
c) To decide at any time and with the advisory committee's advice the most appropriate actions to deal with the emergency, and the application of the measures of protection to the population, the environment, the goods and the staff attached to the EEP.
d) Determine the information to be provided to the population, during the emergency, through the own resources of the PEE and those of social communication. This includes both the information intended to take protective measures, and the general information about the event.
e) Ensure the maintenance of PEE operability.
(f) Ensuring, even in those circumstances that do not require the establishment of the integrated operational coordination centre (CECOPI), procedures that guarantee the maximum information flow to the organization of the state plan, In particular as regards the occurrence of accidents, their possible development, their impact on the safety of persons, property and the environment, and any other circumstances which may be decisive in the development of the emergency. For these purposes, the operational coordination centre (CECOP) of the autonomous community shall report at the time of news of a major accident or incident which may give rise to a serious accident, to the Government Subdelegation. corresponding to the territory where the establishment is situated. In the case of uniprovincial autonomous communities, this information will be made to the Delegation of the appropriate Government. The CECOP of the autonomous community shall forward as soon as possible to the Subdelegation of the Government or Delegation of the relevant Government the notification referred to in the Protocol set out in paragraph 7.3.6.1.
g) Ensure that the notification, as soon as possible, is made to the city council or municipalities concerned, both in case of accidents and other events with perceptible effects capable of causing alarm outside.
h) Declare the end of the emergency.
7.3.5.2 Coordination centres.
The PEE will have an operational coordination center (CECOP) that will be installed in a local with sufficient capacity and with the necessary equipment to be able to receive the information about the situation and to transmit the decisions to apply to be determined by the director of the external emergency plan. Its location will be determined in the plan and an alternative location will be provided for the case that the first one could not be used for any cause.
The CECOP will have redundant power supply and an auxiliary generator that guarantees its operability in any circumstance. It shall also dispose of the material of transmission and computer equipment intended to ensure the performance of its functions.
The CECOP will receive in the first instance the notification of accident by the director of the emergency in the establishment. Next, the CECOP should implement the sequence of notices and calls that are established in the PEE, as well as receive the information and transmit the orders of the director of the foreign emergency plan.
The most appropriate advanced command post (PMA) will be set up as the coordination centre for the action groups with permanent communication with the director of the external emergency plan through the CECOP. The plan will determine who will assume the leadership of the WFP and ensure that it has communications teams to ensure communication with the director of the foreign emergency plan and the heads of the action groups.
In situations declared of national interest, CECOP is constituted as an integrated operational coordination center (CECOPI), assuming the functions of the CECOP.
The municipal coordination centres, which are set out in paragraph 7.3.14.2, corresponding to the municipal plans, will also be considered as coordination centres.
7.3.5.3 Advisory Committee.
To assist the management of the plan, in the various aspects related to the plan, an advisory committee will be set up where at least the following will be incorporated:
Representatives of the Government Delegation or Subdelegation of the Government.
Representatives of the affected municipalities.
Representatives of the action groups.
Representatives of the affected establishments.
Other whose presence is created necessary at the discretion of the foreign emergency plan director.
7.3.5.4 Information Cabinet.
Depending directly on the director of the external emergency plan, the information cabinet will be set up. Through this cabinet, all information will be channeled to the social media during the emergency. Their basic missions will be:
(a) Spread the orders, slogans and recommendations issued by the director of the emergency plan through the social media provided for in the EEP.
b) Centralize, coordinate and prepare general information on the emergency, according to the director of the external emergency plan, and facilitate it to the social media.
c) Report on the emergency to how many people or agencies request it.
d) Obtain, centralize and facilitate all information regarding the possible affected, facilitating family contacts and the location of persons.
7.3.5.5 Action Groups.
For the development and implementation of the planned actions, the EEP will consider the organisation of action groups, whose names, functions, composition and structure will be determined in the plan itself, according to its needs and characteristics. The organisation of the groups shall ensure that the following functions are performed:
(a) Intervention functions: to assess and combat the accident, to assist victims and to implement the most urgent protective measures within the intervention zone.
b) Functions of monitoring and controlling dangerous phenomena:
1. To evaluate and adopt the relevant field measures at the accident site in order to know the actual situation, at any time, of the establishment.
2. Follow the evolution of the accident and environmental conditions.
3. To carry out, as far as possible and on the basis of the data of the establishment, environmental data, meteorological data and any other available data, an assessment of the situation and its foreseeable evolution.
4. To recommend to the director of the external emergency plan the most suitable protective measures at every moment for the population, the environment, the goods and the groups of action.
5. All other aspects related to the monitoring and control of dangerous phenomena.
c) Health functions:
1. To provide emergency health care to the injured who may eventually be in the intervention zone.
2. Proceed to the classification, stabilization and evacuation of those injured who, because of their special gravity, so require.
3. Coordinate the transfer of accidents to the receiving hospital centers.
4. Arrange the hospital reception infrastructure.
5. All other aspects related to health action (environmental health, identification of victims, etc.).
d) Logistics, support, citizen security and access control functions:
1. It will provide all the means that the management of the plan and the action groups will need to fulfill their respective missions, and mobilize the aforementioned means to fulfill the overall purpose of the PEE.
2. Develop and implement actions aimed at ensuring citizen security and access control.
3. Run the warnings to the population during the emergency.
4. Set and ensure plan communications.
5. All those aspects related to logistics, support to the current and affected population, citizen security and access control.
7.3.6 PEE Operativity.
7.3.6.1 Accident notification criteria and channels.
The director of the emergency in the establishment, in which an accident is classified as category 1, 2 and 3, will notify the CECOP of the plan as a matter of urgency.
For the notification, the fastest medium that is available will be used. In cases where the means used does not permit registration, the notification shall be doubled by another means in which it is recorded. The existence of an alternative means to be used only in the event of failure of the principal is also envisaged. The description of the means to be used should be clearly collected in the EEP.
The PEE will establish the protocol to be used for the notification and it must also be incorporated into the self-protection plan of the corresponding establishments. The model that is used must contain at least the following information:
Name of the establishment.
Category of the accident.
Installation where affected installations and installations occurred or that might be affected by a possible domino effect.
Substances and amounts involved.
Type of accident (spill, leak, fire, explosion, etc.).
Consequences caused and likely to be caused.
Measures taken.
External support measures needed for the control of the accident.
Those events that without being a serious accident produce noticeable effects on the outside susceptible to alarm the population (noise, emissions, alarm tests, fire extinguishing practices, etc.), will be notified using the same means used in accidents and using a reporting model to be established by the EEP.
7.3.6.2 External emergency plan activation criteria.
As mentioned in the previous section, the notification from the establishments affected by the accident is received at CECOP.
Depending on the category of the accident, the director of the external emergency plan proceeds with the activation of the PEE. This shall be activated provided that the accident is of category 2 or 3. The level of response will be determined by the director of the external emergency plan according to the characteristics and evolution of the accident.
Category 1 accidents do not justify the activation of PEE. In situations where the effects of the accident are noticeable by the population, the performance of the EEP would be limited to information work.
The director of the emergency in the establishment can request, through the CECOP, outside assistance without the PEE being activated if the magnitude or nature of the accident justifies it.
From the point of view of environmental impact, emergency plans will be activated only when it is foreseen that, due to a serious accident, a serious disturbance of the environment may occur. require the immediate application of certain protective measures.
7.3.7 External emergency plan action procedures.
The PEE will contain at least well defined procedures for action both regarding the notices of the CECOP for the activation of the members of the plan and the action of the different action groups according to the criteria set out below.
7.3.7.1 Staff Alert under the Foreign Emergency Plan.
The PEE will contain the procedures for activation.
As far as possible, the calls will be made in parallel with the aim that the activation of the EEP and the formation of the action groups will be done as quickly as possible.
Once the action groups have been established, they are put into operation, following the guidelines defined in their action procedures.
7.3.7.2 Take action from the first moments of the emergency.
From the first moments of the emergency and until the complete activation of the plan will be the most suitable place the position of advanced command, that will be the base of coordination of all the means that are being made in the face of the emergency.
The head of the advanced command post will be defined in the plan. The plan will be able to provide for the criteria for the replacement of the leadership in the first moments, and in its absence will be the director of the external emergency plan that determines who performs these functions until the planned incorporation of the head of the an advanced command post designated in the plan.
7.3.7.3 Action Groups Take Action.
The action of each of the action groups will be clearly defined for each establishment, accidental hypothesis and its corresponding scenario in convenient procedures for action. These procedures for action, where possible, may be grouped in those cases where the action guidelines are expected to coincide.
7.3.7.4 Coordination of action groups.
Advanced command post.
CECOP will coordinate the actions of the various action groups through the advanced command post in order to optimize the use of the means, humans and materials available.
7.3.7.5 Track event development. End of the emergency.
Those responsible for the various action groups, through the head of the advanced command post, will advise the director of the external emergency plan on the necessary measures at any time to mitigate the effects of the major accidents. For this purpose, an associated computer system may be used, the recommendations and predictions of which shall be contrasted with observations on the ground.
In addition, these people will advise the director of the emergency plan on the advisability of the emergency situation, with the corresponding deactivation of the PEE.
7.3.8 Information to the population during the emergency.
The PEE will contain all that useful information for the population to take appropriate conduct during emergencies. The EEP shall determine the criteria for collaboration with the industrial or industrial establishment or establishments on which it applies, in order to ensure that persons who may be affected receive the information on the risk to are exposed, the warning systems established, the safety measures to be taken and the procedure to be taken in the event of an accident. These instructions to the population will be collected for each hypothesis and accidental scenario in convenient procedures of action. These action procedures may be grouped in those cases where the action guidelines are expected to coincide *.
* For the establishment of the strategy for the elaboration of this information to the population in the framework of the PEE, the aid of the criteria contained in the Guide for the Communication of Industrial Risks is counted Chemicals and Emergency Plans, edited by the Directorate General of Civil Protection.
7.3.9 Media and Resource Catalog.
The PEE will have a database on usable resources and resources. This database will gather all possible information on these and at least contain information about their location in the territory, availability in emergency conditions, mobilization procedure and their ownership.
The codes and terms to be used in this cataloging will be those produced by the National Civil Protection Commission.
On this basis, the means or resources of the Armed Forces, or of the State Security Forces and Corps, will not be included.
For the proper implementation of the PEE, it is considered that the PEE must be provided or provided through an appropriate endowment and/or improvement program to be developed during its implementation of the following means:
Systems for the acquisition and transmission of meteorological and pollutant data.
Systems and data processing.
Warning systems to the population.
Communications systems.
Specific media for action groups and other plan members.
Other means of exceptional use, if necessary.
7.3.10 Implementation of the external emergency plan.
It is understood by the implementation of the PEE the realization of those actions that the plan provides as suitable to progress in the effectiveness of its implementation during its period of validity. The programme and content of these actions should be clearly defined in the PEE itself and at least include the following:
Endowment and/or improvement of resources and resources programs.
Training programs continue to the members of the action groups.
Information programs for the population.
7.3.11 External emergency plan maintenance.
It is understood by the maintenance of the PEE the set of actions aimed at ensuring that the procedures of action foreseen in it are fully operational, as well as its updating and adaptation to future modifications in the territorial scope of planning. The EEP shall specify the procedures for the maintenance of its operation.
In this sense, the maintenance of the plan's operability will have:
Regular checks.
Training Exercises.
Drills.
Assessment of the effectiveness of the information to the population.
Revisions of the PEE and the procedure for distributing them.
The director of the foreign emergency plan will promote the necessary actions for the maintenance of its operation. In particular, it will establish a planning of activities to be carried out, both in terms of checks and shortcomings, drills and exercises, as in the case of the dissemination of the EEP to the population and the evaluation of the familiarisation of this with the personal protection measures.
It will therefore be considered necessary to establish at least the following actions for the maintenance of the EEP.
7.3.11.1 Regular checks.
A check is the verification of the perfect state of use of a team attached to the PEE. These checks shall be carried out on a regular basis, in accordance with the programme established by the director of the external emergency plan and with the recommendations of the supplier of the equipment.
The staff whose use is intended for the checked equipment shall be responsible for carrying out the operational verification, as well as for the maintenance of a register in which it shall record the checks carried out and any the incident that occurred in them. The plan should establish the minimum periodicity of the checks.
7.3.11.2 Training exercises.
A training exercise consists of the alert of only a part of the staff and means attached to the PEE. It is more understood as an activity aimed at familiarizing participants with the equipment and techniques to be used in the event of a serious accident.
Those responsible, in each case, of staff and the media shall prepare in accordance with the annual plan of activities an exercise in which their participants must employ all or part of the necessary means in the event of an accident.
The exercise will be performed at the specified date and time, following the evaluation of the effectiveness of the actions. After the exercise, participants will exchange views and suggestions with a view to improving the operation of the EEP. Those which, in the opinion of the director of the external emergency plan, could constitute a substantial improvement will be incorporated into the EEP as soon as possible.
7.3.11.3 Simulations.
A simulation consists of the simulated activation of the PEE in its entirety in order to assess its operability with respect to the intended performance and to take appropriate corrective action or to review the plan. The procedures for their implementation and evaluation should be laid down in the plan.
A drill must be performed per PEE for each review. The time between two drills may not exceed three years.
7.3.11.4 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the information to the population.
After the information campaigns among the population, the competent body will carry out an evaluation of its effectiveness in order to improve future actions.
7.3.11.5 External emergency plan reviews and distribution procedures.
A maximum time period will be established between revisions for PEEs that will not exceed three years. In addition, it will be considered appropriate to carry out the review prior to the expiry of that period when the results of the exercises and drills suggest, the development of trends in the assessment and combating of major accidents, changes in establishments, alterations in the services involved or any other circumstances which substantially alter the effectiveness of their application.
A system of distribution of the reviews must be provided to ensure that they reach all the participants of the plan.
7.3.12 Foreign Emergency Plan Elaboration Exemptions.
The competent authority in the autonomous community may decide, in the light of the information contained in the safety report, that the PEE should not be drawn up, provided that the impact of the expected accidents is shown in the security report has no consequences on the outside.
7.3.13 Approval and approval of plans for autonomous communities.
The plans drawn up, in addition to being approved by the competent bodies of the autonomous communities, must be approved by the National Civil Protection Commission.
The purpose of the approval is to ensure that the plans are in line with the contents of this article.
7.3.14 Municipal action plans.
The plans for municipal action will be based on the guidelines of the external emergency plan, in terms of the identification of the risk, the analysis of consequences, areas subject to planning, measures of protection for the population and Planned actions. These plans are part of the PEE and will have to be approved by the Civil Protection Commission of the autonomous community.
The plans for municipal action will be adapted to the specific characteristics of each municipality in terms of demography, urbanism, topography and socioeconomic aspects.
7.3.14.1 Basic Functions.
The main objective of the municipal action plans will be to protect and inform the population.
In this sense, the main missions of the municipal actions will be as follows:
(a) Support and integration where appropriate in the action groups provided for in the EEP.
b) Collaboration in the implementation of the measures to protect the population under the external emergency plan and under the direction of the plan.
c) Collaboration in the application of the system of notices to the population at the request of the director of the emergency plan and under the direction of the emergency plan.
d) Collaboration on dissemination and dissemination among the affected population of the EEP.
7.3.14.2 Minimum content of municipal action plans.
The municipal action plans shall present at least the following content:
a) Structure and organization of human and material resources.
b) Coordination between the municipal action plan and the ESP, through a municipal coordination centre.
c) Description of the municipality. Updated demographics and maps. Communication channels.
d) Analysis of the characteristics of the areas under planning in each municipality.
e) Definition of the specific protection measures for each municipality, with special consideration for those referred to the critical population groups, and the buildings that can host them, such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, etc.
f) Main routes and evacuation procedures, if any.
g) Identification of the places of confinement and/or accommodation for the affected population, if any.
h) Take action procedures.
i) Information and training programmes (ICPs), in accordance with the EEP guidelines.
j) Program of exercises and drills.
k) Regular reviews of the municipal action plan and its distribution.
Article 8. The state civil protection plan against the risk of serious accidents in certain establishments with dangerous substances.
8.1 Concept.
The state plan will establish the organization and procedures for the actions of those resources and services of the State that are necessary to ensure an effective response from the public administrations as a whole. emergency situations by major accident, in which the national interest is present, as well as the mechanisms for supporting the plans of autonomous communities in the cases that require them.
8.2 Basic functions.
The following are basic state plan functions:
(a) Previewing the organizational structure that allows the management and coordination of all public administrations, in situations of emergency for serious accidents, in which the national interest is present.
b) To provide for mechanisms for the provision of state resources and resources for intervention in cases where the provision of the corresponding plans is insufficient, through the state coordination committee.
c) Previewing coordination procedures for supra-regional support, in cases where the safety report may result in damage outside the limits of the autonomous community where the establishment is located.
d) Establish and maintain the national media and resource catalog for major accident emergencies.
e) Previewing the mechanisms for requesting and receiving international assistance to alleviate the effects of serious accidents.
f) Establish coordination and support plans and information systems needed in emergencies caused by major accidents.
8.3 Minimum state plan content.
The state plan must conform to the requirements set out in the following sections:
8.3.1 Object and scope.
The purpose of the State plan shall be to establish the organisation and procedures for the effective development of the functions listed in paragraph 8.2.
The scope of the plan will cover the entire national territory.
8.3.2 Emergency management and coordination.
The state plan will specify for each autonomous community the authority or authorities that, on behalf of the Ministry of Interior, will be part of the steering committee that can be constituted for each case and will exercise the the management of all public administrations to deal with emergencies which are declared in the national interest.
The representatives of the Interior Ministry will also be responsible, at the request of the representative of the autonomous community in the steering committee, to order or promote the incorporation of state-owned media. prior to the autonomous community plan when they are necessary for the support of the actions of the Autonomous Community. The resources and resources allocated to the autonomous community plan shall be mobilised in accordance with the rules laid down in their allocation.
In cases where the intervention of military units is authorized to deal with the emergency situation, a representative of the Ministry of Defense will be included in the advisory committee.
The Directorate General for Civil Protection, in relation to the organs of the State Administration that in each case corresponds, will coordinate the measures to be adopted in support of the integrated operational coordination centers (CECOPI) In order to do so, it is necessary to be employed and resources of state ownership located outside the territorial scope of those.
The Directorate-General for Civil Protection will also coordinate, in support of CECOPI's request, the contribution of means by the Administrations of other autonomous communities or by local entities not belonging to the scope territorial of the autonomous community concerned.
The request for international assistance, when the exhaustion of the possibilities of incorporation of state resources, will be foreseen, will be carried out by the Directorate General of Civil Protection, in accordance with the procedures established for the implementation of the Resolution of the Council of the European Communities of 8 July 1991 on the improvement of mutual assistance between Member States, in the event of natural or technological disasters, and of conventions Bilateral and multilateral agreements signed by Spain on civil protection.
8.3.3 State coordination committee.
1. A state coordination committee (CECO), under the Ministry of the Interior, will be set up with the following composition:
President: the Director General of Civil Protection.
Vocals: a representative of each of the following organs:
Institute of Toxicology.
Directorate General of Public Health.
Environmental Quality and Evaluation Directorate General.
Directorate General of the Police.
Directorate General of the Civil Guard.
Directorate General of Defense Policy.
Infrastructure and Tracking Department for Crisis Situations.
Secretary: the Deputy Director General of Plans and Operations of the Directorate General for Civil Protection.
When circumstances so require, representatives of any organs of the General Administration of the State, companies, entities, bodies and associations may be present. Suitable estimate. Those representatives shall attend the meetings as experts, with a voice but no vote.
2. The CECO functions shall be as follows:
1. Coordinate the measures to be taken for the mobilization of the resources and resources that, located outside the territorial scope of the autonomous community in which the accident occurred, are necessary for the attention of the emergency situation, where the situation has been declared of national interest or circumstances of exceptional seriousness so require.
2. Support and provide technical advice when required by the steering committee formed in each
case, maintaining a direct contact with the activated CECOP.
3. To coordinate the action of international foreign support in the event of being required.
4. Conduct studies, reports and proposals for the elaboration of the state plan and its successive revisions.
5. To analyze and evaluate the organizational and operational status of the state plan, as well as the coordination systems with the plans of the autonomous communities, in order to propose the improvements that will result. required.
3. Without prejudice to the particularities provided for in this basic guideline, the legal system and the action of the ECCO shall be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Title II of Law No 30/1992 of 26 November 1992 on the Public administrations and the Common Administrative Procedure.
8.3.4 Coordination and support plans.
In order to implement them in emergencies of national interest or in support of the plans of autonomous communities, the following action plans will be structured in the State plan:
Operational support plan through the NBQ groups of the state administration.
Plan for coordination and health support.
Procedures for coordination and support for the plans of autonomous communities, for establishments that may cause serious accidents outside the autonomous community or the border of our country.
In the organization of these action plans, they will be able to integrate, in addition to services, resources and resources of state ownership, those that have been included in the plans of autonomous communities and local action for the performance of the same activities, as well as those available to other public and private entities.
8.3.5 Toxicological information system.
The state plan will establish the organization and procedures to provide information, as immediately as possible, about the toxicological characteristics and other parameters indicative of the danger of the substances involved in accidents, and which can serve to guide the actions of the intervention services in the emergency situations that may arise.
The Institute of Toxicology and the National Network for the Surveillance, Inspection and Control of Chemicals in the Directorate General of Public Health will be part of this information system, in coordination with the Directorate General Civil Protection. They may also form part of the aforementioned information system, under the conditions laid down in the State plan, all entities, public and private, which, by virtue of the activities they carry out, may provide useful information. for the purposes mentioned above *.
8.3.6 Technical advice and support system.
(a) Through the IT application "AIDA" of aid to the interpretation of Annex I of Royal Decree 1254/1999. Conceived by the Directorate General of Civil Protection in order to facilitate interpretation
* As a consultation guide, account should be taken of the publication "Manual of emergency toxicological data sheets of the substances listed in Annex I to Directive 96 /82/EC (SEVESO II)", published by the Institute of Toxicology and the Directorate General for Civil Protection in 1998.
from the scope of application of Royal Decree 1254/1999, to the competent bodies of the various public administrations, to the industrialists responsible for the establishments referred to in the aforementioned royal decree, as well as to other interested users, providing them with information on whether or not the establishment concerned is affected, as well as the obligations to be met by the amounts of dangerous substances declared in each case.
b) Through agreements with major associations and industrial federations.
8.3.7 General Information System.
The Directorate-General for Civil Protection will have a system to promote the dissemination and exchange of information obtained either through the competent bodies of the autonomous communities or the competent bodies. of the European Commission or other bodies, in relation to the development of Royal Decree 1254/1999, as well as Directive 96 /82/EC and its successive amendments.
8.3.8 National catalogue of resources and resources.
The Directorate-General for Civil Protection will establish a database on state resources and resources, available for action in emergency cases for serious accidents, as well as on those that integrate the coordination and support provided for in this basic guideline.
8.4 Integrated Organ of Coordination between the State Plan and the Autonomous Community Plans.
When the emergency caused by a major accident is declared of national interest or when requested by the affected autonomous community, the functions of management and coordination shall be exercised within a steering committee to through the appropriate operational coordination centre (CECOP), which has been established as an integrated operational coordination centre (CECOPI).
The steering committee shall be composed of a representative of the Ministry of the Interior and a representative of the corresponding autonomous community, and shall count for the performance of its functions with the assistance of an advisory committee and a information cabinet.
In the advisory committee representatives of the different administrations will be integrated, as well as the technicians and experts who in each case consider necessary the steering committee.
The representative of the Ministry of the Interior shall direct the actions of all public administrations when the emergency is declared of national interest, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI, paragraph 9, of the Basic Civil Protection Standard, in coordination with the competent bodies of the Autonomous Communities and local authorities in these cases. For these purposes, provision should be made for the possibility that, in the case of emergencies requiring the steering committee, it is a provincial area.
8.5 State ownership resources and resources allocation to stand-alone community plans and local scope plans.
The rules for the allocation of state resources and resources to the plans of autonomous communities and local action, in the face of the risk of serious accidents, will be those approved by the Council of Ministers ' Ministers of 6 May 1994 on criteria for the allocation of state resources and resources to the territorial plans for civil protection, published by Resolution of 4 July 1994,
of the Secretariat of State of the Interior, in the "Official State Gazette" of July 18, 1994.
8.6 Approval of the State Plan.
The state plan will be approved by the government, on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior, prior to the report of the National Civil Protection Commission.
ANNEX I
Basic information content
The content of the basic information (IBA) referred to in Article 4 of this guideline will be the one specified below.
A. Information on the area of influence.
It is intended to describe the geographical, geological, ecological, meteorological, demographic and building characteristics, uses and equipment of the area of influence of the establishment, necessary for the preparation of the EEP.
A. 1 Information and data to be provided by the industry.
A. 1.1 Geography.
a) Location of the site, indicating its rounded longitude and latitude to the nearest second arc and its UTM coordinates. It shall also indicate the municipality or any other necessary political division, as well as the relationship of the site with respect to any notable element, natural or human work (such as rivers or lakes).
b) Map of the placement environment on a convenient scale containing at least:
1. º Demarcation of the limits of ownership of the industrial plant and indication of its surface.
2. Place and orientation of the main structures of the industrial plant, duly identified.
3. Indication of the geographical north.
4. º Roads, railway lines and water currents passing through the area.
A. 1.2 Topography.
A topographic plane at scale 1/ 10,000 or above will be included, where the level curves are indicated with an appropriate equidistance. At least one point of the map will be referenced in the UTM coordinate system.
A. 2 Information and data to be complemented by the Competent Administration.
They basically relate to the description and location of the vulnerable elements present in the area of influence.
A. 2.1 Demography.
a) Population resident in the area of influence, determined from the studies of analysis of consequences, considering for this the most unfavourable situation. The population accumulations, such as towns, cities, etc., which exist in concentric circles around the establishment, will be reflected on a map at an appropriate scale. The population data included in each of the zones shall be collected in the form of a table.
(b) If significant travelling population flows exist in the area of influence, these shall be recorded in the demographic maps and tables.
A. 2.2 Elements of historical, cultural or natural value.
Location and brief description of the elements of historical, cultural or natural value in the area of influence.
A. 2.3 Road network.
Indication of the routes of communication (roads, railways, canals, ports, etc.), located in the area of influence, highlighting those that are particularly important in terms of their traffic density.
A. 2.4 Geology.
a) Description of the nature of the land on the site and its environment, in addition to the soil typology, which will be reflected in geological maps at an appropriate scale.
b) Localization of the aquifer in the area, to a suitable depth according to the risk.
c) Estimation of the flow rate carried by the aquifer, degree of exploitation, as well as pumping points and their uses.
A. 2.5 Hydrology.
(a) Physical-chemical, biological and hydrological characteristics of the water channels located in the area of influence.
(b) Typical rules for these channels and, where appropriate, significant seasonal variations shall be indicated.
A. 2.6 Water and soil uses.
On the topographical drawings, at a convenient scale, it must be indicated in the area of influence:
1. Perimeter of the establishment.
2. Official classification of soil types (industrial, urban, urbanizable ...), according to the existing management plans.
3. Residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural, livestock, recreational or any other public facilities.
4. Location of buildings and structures closest to the industrial establishment, including a brief description of those dedicated to the concentration of public, regular or occasional, as well as those of major vulnerability, such as schools, residences, telephone exchanges, etc.
5. º Localization and uses of water sources.
A. 2.7 Ecology.
Brief description in the area of influence of flora, fauna, wooded areas, landscape units, etc., with special emphasis on those species that due to their undoubted biological value can be susceptible of impact by industrial accident.
A. 2.8 Meteorology.
a) Information regarding the annual frequencies of wind speed and its direction, and of the category of atmospheric stability (highlighting the situations of thermal inversion). The wind speed will be defined in 4 classes and the direction in 8 sectors. In terms of stability, the classification of Pasquill will be used in seven categories.
b) Statistics on site rainfall.
c) Statistics on other meteors of interest.
A. 2.9 Healthcare Network.
An inventory of the care centres located in the territorial area of the establishment and area of influence shall be included, with an indication of their capacity and, where appropriate, their specialties.
A. 2.10 Sanitation Network.
The main characteristics of the following equipment, located in the area of influence, shall be described briefly:
Sewerage network.
Water supply network.
Debug systems (if any).
Dumps (controlled, uncontrolled).
Others deemed necessary.
A. 2.11 Other public services.
Overview of major services, in the area of influence, that could be affected by the consequences of an accident, such as:
Electrical supply.
Gas supply.
Telephone facilities.
A. 2.12 Unique installations.
The main characteristics and location of those facilities, located in the area of influence, which have a significant strategic character or potential risk, such as:
High voltage installations.
Nuclear power stations and thermal power plants.
Gas stations, etc.
B. Information on the industrial estate.
This information will be applicable in cases where the establishment in question is part of an industrial estate, containing its description, industrial census and existing mutual aid pacts between industrial.
This documentation will be jointly and jointly developed by all the industrialists who are part of the polygon and will therefore be common to all of them.
For the new installation industries, the industry will provide only the additional specific data that you need to add to those defined above.
B. 1 Planting plane.
A plane (or planes) of implantation of the polygon will be presented, at a scale between 1/2,000 and 1/5,000. If the polygon is described by a collection of planes it will contain all the information requested.
In the case of partial plans, all will have the same scale (including those indicated). In this case, a set plan will also be included, at a lower level, even if it does not contain such detailed information. The following values shall be expressly stated in the implementation plan (or plans):
a) Level courses, at an appropriate distance.
b) Limits and identification of the establishments that integrate it.
c) Polygon input and output access:
1.
2. Cams.
3.
4. Port areas.
d) Natural and artificial barriers:
1. Zings and channels (width, depth).
2. º Vallas and walls (height, characteristics).
3. The Control Buildings in the accesses.
4. Other.
e) Pipeline networks between establishments, indicating:
1.
2. Flow, pressure and temperature.
3. Points of possible isolation (valves, pumping stations, etc.) 4. Dieter.
5. Situation (aerial, underground, open sky) and elevation.
f) Seismicity of the polygon zone, according to the seismic-resistant construction standard.
At least one point in each plane will be referenced in the UTM coordinate system.
B. 2 Mutual aid agreements or covenants.
Information regarding existing mutual aid agreements (PAM) between companies will be included, specifying in each of these the following information:
1. Companies that subscribe to it.
2.
3. Human and material media.
4. ° Structure and operability.
C. Information about the establishment.
You must contain the following information regarding the facilities, persons, and processes involved in the industrial activity that takes place in the establishment. It shall be provided by the industry to the competent authority in the preparation of the EEP.
C. 1 Establishment Identification.
You will understand the following information:
1. Social Reason and its address.
2. The complete management of industrial establishments.
3. Activity or activities, according to the national classification of economic activities (CNAE).
4. Total template and shift work.
C. 2 Description of facilities and activities.
This information is directly related to the implementation plans contained in section C. 4, so the references between the two will be consistent.
The description will contain the following information:
a) Summary of the manufacturing process or processes, with the express indication of:
1. Substance involved, including intermediate ones.
2. The operations that constitute the process and its characteristics.
b) Relation of substances and/or classified products, indicating for each of them:
1. Process or processes in which the substance or product is involved.
2. º Pressure and temperature, in process and in storage.
3. Physical Transformations that may generate risks.
4. Chemical Transformations (secondary reactions) that can generate risks.
5. ° Maximum amount retained between isolable sections, susceptible to accidental escape, with indication of pressure and temperature.
(c) Mechanical specifications of storage tanks for substances or classified products, indicating:
1. Nominal And Useful Volume.
2. th Pressure and temperature (nominal and design).
3. Dimensions, material and thicknesses.
4. Type and quality of heat.
5. º Enumeration and safety valve characteristics, indicating whether they discharge into the atmosphere or the
torch collector or other hazardous waste disposal system, if any.
6. º Eumbering and situation of remote control valves.
d) Description of the cubetos, indicating type, capacity and existence of escape routes.
e) Seismicity considered in the design of each of the facilities.
f) Bans of pipes and fluid pipelines, own of the plant or interconnection with others. The following information will be required:
1. Nature of the fluid.
2. º Pressure and temperature.
3. Points of possible isolation (valves, pumping stations, etc.) 4. Dieter of the conductions.
5. Situation (aerial, underground, open sky) and elevation.
Part of this information (interconnections between establishments) would be included in paragraph B. 1, in the case of polygons.
g) Pressure, temperature and flow of classified products, at points of reception and expedition.
C. 3 Establishment Services.
The most important features of the following services will be indicated, indicating which ones are common for several or all installations and those that are specific to a particular facility. In addition, the most important reserve systems will be included.
a) External Supplies:
1. External supply of electricity and other energy sources.
2. º External water supply.
3. External supply of other liquid or solid substances.
b) Supplies within the establishment:
1. Internal production of energy, fuel supply and storage.
2. The internal electrical distribution network.
3. Emergency electrical supply.
4. Hot water and other liquid distribution networks.
5. Communication Systems.
6. Air for instrumentation.
c) Other services:
1. Waste Treatment Systems.
2. Sewerage network and wastewater disposal systems.
3. Control and collection devices for fire water.
d) Surveillance services:
1. ° Weather stations.
2. Access monitoring and intrusion detection services.
C. 4 Planes of implantation.
This is the following drawings and information:
a) General plan of the plant, at a recommended scale of 1/2,000 (between 1/500 and 1/5,000). The elements described in paragraph C. 2 shall be clearly referred to therein. This plane will contain the following information:
1. The receiving and issuing zones of classified substances or products, pointing out the loading and unloading points.
2. º Processing Units.
3. Deposits of storage, with an indication of their capacity and content.
4. Lines of pipes and fluid pipelines, proper to the establishment or interconnection with others.
5. General services, connection and waste collection and treatment systems.
6. Access to the plant.
7. Natural and artificial barriers.
8. North of the plant and geographical north.
b) Partial (sub-divisions of the previous), at a recommended scale of 1/250 (not less than 1/500), necessary to represent more in detail the storage tanks and processing units, described in the plan previous. For further information, it shall be indicated:
1. Level courses with a maximum distance of two meters.
2. Elevations of the various elements.
In each of the planes, at least one point will be referenced in the UTM coordinate system.
D. Information on hazardous substances.
It should contain information regarding the physical and chemical properties of all the hazardous substances involved in the industrial activity taking place in the establishment.
(a) A list of dangerous substances shall be submitted, indicating their EEC number and the category to which they belong, including:
1. Raw Material.
2. Auxiliary Product.
3. The intermediate product.
4. The finished product.
5. Subproduct and/or residue.
6. A product that can be formed as a result of loss of control over chemical processes.
(b) As information on these substances, the following aspects shall be included:
1.
2. Composition.
3. Hazard Identification.
4. First aid.
5. Fire-fighting measures.
6. No Measures in case of accidental dumping.
7. º Manipulation and storage.
8. Exposure/individual protection controls.
9. Physical and chemical properties.
10. º Stability and reactivity.
11. Toxicological Information.
12. Environmental Informations.
13. No Considerations regarding elimination.
14. Transport Information.
15. ° Regulatory information.
16. Other information of interest.
These contents correspond to the headings of the "safety data sheets for substances and preparations", according to Royal Decree 363/1995 of 10 March, Royal Decree 1078/1993 of 2 July, and its subsequent amendments.
ANNEX II
Accident Notification Formats
A) Identification of the accident.
In it, the basic information that identifies the accident is collected unequivocally: establishment, type of activity, date and time of the accident, etc.
This single page report should accompany both the immediate and detailed report.
The fields to be filled in are the non-shaded fields.
B) Immediate report.
This single-page report should be sent as your name indicates as soon as possible (1 to 3 days after the accident).
Its purpose is to collect the basic and concise information describing the most important characteristics of the accident in terms of: type of accident, substance involved, direct source, alleged causes, immediate effects, emergency measures taken, immediate lessons learned.
It is very important that the information be completed, with a description in the free text spaces that appear after each data of the accident.
C) Detailed report.
This report contains the most relevant information regarding the analysis of the accident, and it is of great importance that it be completed. Your referral should be made within a maximum of 1 month after the accident.
The report is subdivided into three parts:
A. Event: Detailed description of the accident itself.
B. Consequences: description of the consequences on persons, goods and the environment.
C. Answer: description of the measures taken both emergency and legal.
For this part, the most assistance required by the large number of fields to be filled and the number of technical terms used, and in order to homogenize reports, a set of codes and notes is accompanied Explanatory notes that facilitate their completion.
REPORT:
(SEE IMAGES, PAGE 36455 TO 36471)
