Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September on the physical protection of nuclear installations and materials, and radioactive sources, arises from the need to comply with the international commitments undertaken. for Spain in this field-the main object of which is to prevent such installations or materials from being subject to sabotage, theft or diversion for misuse-as well as the desirability of taking advantage of the experience gained in the Application of Royal Decree 158/1995 of 3 February 1995 on the physical protection of materials

Among the aforementioned inter-nation commitments are the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, approved in July 2005; ratification in January 2007 of the International Convention for the repression of acts of nuclear terrorism; UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, march after the G8 Summit in June 2006; or the Code of Conduct on the technological security and physical security of radioactive sources, approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 2003.

The Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September, in Article 2 (2), defines the "design base threat" as " the attributes or characteristics of potential internal adversaries, external adversaries or both in the collusion, which could attempt the unauthorised withdrawal of nuclear material or radioactive sources or acts of sabotage, which are taken as the basis for designing and evaluating the physical protection systems of such materials, sources and installations "

In addition, this royal decree, in Article 8 (1), states that " the Ministry of the Interior and the Nuclear Safety Council, with the necessary cooperation of the competent authorities, shall, from the results obtained in the state assessment of the threat, shall determine the threat to be taken as a basis for the design of the systems for the physical protection of nuclear installations and materials and of the radioactive sources included in the scope of application of this royal decree and will notify the interested parties in accordance with the forecasts in paragraph 2. '

order to comply with this mandate, an inter-ministerial working group was established within the Interior Ministry, which approved the definition of the so-called "base design threat" for nuclear power plants and the Centralised temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-activity radioactive waste (ATC), from which the need to amend Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September 2011 was concluded for, inter alia, implementing a new environment for the protection of such facilities by establishing a A permanent system of adequate response to neutralise or mitigate the possible damage that would result from the materialisation of the threat.

In accordance with the provisions of Articles 11.1, paragraphs (a), (c) and (e) and 12.1 (d) of the Organic Law 2/1986 of 13 March of the Security Forces and Forces, this system shall be composed of members of the Corps of the Civil Guard, which shall constitute permanent units of response.

In addition to the above, the IAEA published in 2012 revision 5 of the INFCIRC 225 document, "Nuclear Physical Safety Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities", in which, other things, recommendations on cybersecurity are introduced.

Just as in most areas of economic activity, information and communications technologies are becoming increasingly important in the nuclear industry, so it is necessary to make the necessary the adoption of a series of measures of an integral nature, from the physical and logical point of view, both by the administration and by the operators of the nuclear and radioactive installations, in order to deal with possible threats cyber.

To this end, in 2013, in Spain the National Cybersecurity Strategy was developed, having among its objectives to boost the security and resilience of the information and telecommunications systems used by the sector business in general and critical infrastructure operators in particular.

Likewise, and with regard to the area of protection of critical infrastructures, the nuclear industry is a strategic sector of society, so that, in order to guarantee the integral security of the nuclear and radioactive installations, it is necessary to establish a homogenisation and compatibility between the Physical Protection Plans required by Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September and the Specific Protection Plans provided for in the Law 8/2011 of 28 April 2011 laying down measures for the protection of infrastructure criticisms.

All the above, after four years since the publication of Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September, the need to proceed with its updating is linked, in order to take into account not only the legislation approved after its entry into force, such as Law 19/2013, of 9 December, of transparency, access to public information and good governance, but also the experience acquired in this time regarding the processing of the document Protection Plan The Commission's proposal for a directive on the use of nuclear power plants and the Specific protection provided for in Royal Decree 704/2011 of 20 May 2011 approving the Regulation on the protection of critical infrastructures and establishing the procedure for this.

For the reasons set out above, it has been considered necessary to proceed with the review of Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September 2011.

On the other hand, with respect to the background of this royal decree, reference is also made to the final seventh provision of Law 34/2015, of 21 September, of partial amendment of Law 58/2003, of December 17, General Tax, whereby the state levy is created for the provision of response services by the Civil Guard, within the nuclear power stations or other nuclear facilities, whose taxable persons shall be the holders of the facilities required to have the Civil Guard Response Units and whose tax base is determine the number of agents assigned to each central or installation.

This royal decree, which has its legal basis in Article 36 of Law 25/1964 of 29 April, on nuclear energy, provides that " the competent authorities and the holders shall adopt the measures of prevention and the protection necessary to maintain the appropriate physical security conditions in these facilities "and in Article 94 of the said legal text, which authorizes the Government" to establish the precise regulations for its implementation and "development" is agreed with the Nuclear Security Council and after consulting the sectoral and social economic operators, as well as the autonomous communities.

In its virtue, on the proposal of the Minister of Industry, Energy and Tourism and the Minister of the Interior, with the prior approval of the Minister of Finance and Public Administrations, in agreement with the State Council, and deliberation of the Council of Ministers at its meeting on 4 December 2015,

DISPONGO:

Single item. Amendment of Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September 2011 on the physical protection of nuclear installations and materials and radioactive sources.

Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September 2011 on the physical protection of nuclear installations and materials and radioactive sources is amended as follows:

One. Article 2 is modified, adding two new definitions.

" 21. ' Response Unit: Unit of the Civil Guard permanently located within the nuclear power stations and those nuclear facilities determined by law in accordance with the threat of design, to provide a response of appropriate entity in case of materialisation of anti-social threats of human origin that may determine or raise the risk of theft or sabotage.

22. " Adapted entity response: opposition reaction to an attack or intrusion, to neutralise or contain it mitigating its effects. For the hypothesis raised in the design threat, its scope will depend, among other factors, on the number and configuration of the vital areas to be protected, the physical characteristics of the site and the design of the installation itself. "

Two. Article 5 (1) is amended as follows:

" 1. Actions, communications, archives, registers and documents relating to the design, establishment and implementation of measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations, as well as radioactive sources falling within the scope of this royal decree, or any other type of information that would compromise the physical protection of the affected materials and facilities, will have the consideration of information affecting national security for the purposes of provided for in Article 14 (1) of Law 19/2013 of 9 December 1999, transparency, access to public information and good governance. "

Three. Article 6 (3) (b) is amended, the wording of which shall be as follows:

" b) The elaboration, implementation and maintenance of the plans for external action and response, as well as the plans for preventive information on the physical protection of nuclear installations and materials and, where deemed necessary, of radioactive sources. '

Four. Article 8 (1) is amended as follows:

" 1. The Ministry of the Interior and the Nuclear Safety Board, with the necessary cooperation of the competent authorities, shall determine the threat to be determined by the results obtained in the state assessment of the threat. to be taken as a basis for the design of the physical protection systems of nuclear power plants and those nuclear installations and radioactive sources deemed necessary, taking into account the consequences of an act (a) the Commission shall be notified to the Commission of its intention to the provisions of paragraph 2. '

Five. Article 14.e is worded as follows:

" e) The physical protection plan of the installation, which must contain at least one description of:

1. The different social, economic, environmental, meteorological, topographic and any other factors that in any way condition, or can condition, in any sense, the physical protection of the nuclear materials and installation.

2. The potential threats against the installation or the material.

3. The human, technical, computer and organizational means available to address potential threats.

4. The actions planned for special situations of operation or for contingencies or emergencies related to physical protection.

5. The criteria used for the authorization of personnel access to nuclear materials or systems, equipment and components vital to the security of the facility.

This Plan is part of the information referred to in Article 5 and any modification of the plan must be approved by the General Directorate of Energy Policy and Mines, prior to the mandatory reports of the Ministry of Energy. Internal and the Nuclear Security Council. "

Six. The final point of paragraph (d) of Article 19.2 is amended, as follows:

" This Plan is part of the information referred to in Article 5, and any modification of it must be approved by the General Directorate of Energy Policy and Mines, prior to the mandatory reports of the Ministry of Energy. Internal and the Nuclear Security Council. "

Seven. Article 30 is amended, as follows:

" Article 30. General measures for the physical protection of nuclear power plants and nuclear installations to be determined by law.

Nuclear power plants and, where appropriate, nuclear installations which are determined by law in accordance with the basic design threat, shall have a physical protection system that ensures the existence of:

a) Protection elements that deter a potential adversary from materializing threats against it.

b) All the organizational, human, computer, technical and material means necessary and compatible with the normal development of the operation of the facility, which contribute to address the basic design threat and which ensure coordination and collaboration with the Response Unit.

(c) The personnel, technical and computer equipment or a combination of the two, which shall be used to promptly detect any attempt to break into security areas of the same, as well as to assess the conditions, circumstances and capabilities with which such an intrusion attempt is occurring and, where appropriate, to maintain continuous monitoring of its progression within the facility.

(d) Physical barriers and redundant access controls that delay the entry of unauthorised persons and vehicles into protected areas and prevent such entry into vital areas or places where the material is located until the response and action of the Response Unit, during the scenario corresponding to its design base threat.

e) A private security service with appropriately trained, trained, equipped and structured personnel with sufficient and proportionate capacity to maintain effective access control and perform the communications established in the Physical Protection Plan, up to the response and action of the Response Unit, as indicated by the private security regulations.

f) The means and procedures necessary to ensure that information can be communicated and exchanged in an appropriate manner to coordinate response actions.

g) A record of the staff of the facility, as well as the staff of the contracted companies who, for the performance of the tasks entrusted, need access to areas of the facility or to sensitive information from the point of view In view of the physical protection, the holder is obliged to keep it updated and to inform the Ministry of the Interior, through the Response Unit, prior to any registration or discharge in the Register, for the necessary checks with regard to the objectives of the physical protection of nuclear and nuclear material the installation.

(h) contingency plan, in which the response to the unauthorized withdrawal or sabotage of materials in nuclear facilities will be performed in coordination and under the operational direction of the Response Unit. In such cases, the Unit will assume the direction of the public and private resources that will form the first response to the aggression.

i) Means of protection and submission to confidentiality criteria of all information related to the physical protection of nuclear materials and the installation.

j) Indicators to ensure the implementation of an appropriate physical security culture in the facility.

k) The establishment and implementation of a specific and ongoing training and training program for personnel involved in the physical protection of the facility, with the participation of the Response Unit.

Information about all of these elements is part of the information referred to in Article 5. "

Eight. The title of Article 31 is amended and a new paragraph (d) is inserted in paragraph 1, with the following redactions:

" Article 31. General physical protection measures in nuclear installations not covered by Article 30. "

" d) Maintain a staff register for the installation, as well as those of the contract staff who, for the exercise of the duties entrusted, need access to areas of the facility or to sensitive information from the point of view of the physical protection, the holder being obliged to keep it updated and to inform the Ministry of the Interior prior to any registration or discharge in the Registry, in order for the necessary checks to be carried out in relationship to the physical protection objectives of the nuclear material and the installation. '

Nine. A single additional provision is introduced, with the following wording:

" Single additional disposition. Integration of Physical Protection Plans and Specific Protection Plans.

Nuclear and radioactive installations that are considered critical, will be integrated into the Physical Protection Plan, in cases where it is established in the regulatory implementing regulations, the Specific Protection Plan in the field of for the protection of critical infrastructure, in accordance with the provisions of Article 29.2 of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Regulation, approved by Royal Decree 704/2011 of 20 May 2011. The processing and supervision of the document resulting from such integration will be coordinated by the National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and the other departments involved. "

Single additional disposition. Implementation of the Response Unit.

Within the maximum period of four years, in accordance with the basic design threat and the singularities of each case, the Ministry of the Interior will organize the deployment and implementation of the Answer, according to the adequacy of the organic structure, the necessary endowment in the staff and the media, in the Directorate General of the Civil Guard.

Final disposition first. Update of the references made to Law 54/1997, of 27 November, of the Electrical Sector.

The references made in Articles 22.1 and 28.4 of Royal Decree 1308/2011 of 26 September 2011 on the physical protection of nuclear installations and materials and from radioactive sources to the additional provision Third of Law 54/1997, of 27 November, of the Electrical Sector, will be understood to be made to the additional provision third of Law 24/2013, of September 26, of the Electrical Sector.

Final disposition second. Entry into force.

This royal decree shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the "Official Gazette of the State", except as regards the computer media provided for in Article 30 (b) and (c), and the Register of staff of the facility provided for in Article 31 (d), which shall be implemented within a period of four months from the entry into force of this royal decree.

Given in Madrid, 4 December 2015.

FELIPE R.

The Vice President of the Government and Minister of the Presidency,

SORAYA SAENZ DE SANTAMARIA ANTON