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On The Amendment Of The Convention Of Physical Protection Of Nuclear Material In

Original Language Title: Par Grozījumu Kodolmateriālu fiziskās aizsardzības konvencijā

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The Saeima has adopted and the President promulgated the following laws: on the amendment of the Convention of physical protection of nuclear material in article 1. 8 July 2005, in Amendment of the Convention of physical protection of nuclear material (hereinafter referred to as the amendment) with this law is adopted and approved.
2. article. The Ministry of the Interior, in cooperation with the Ministry of Environment coordinated the amendment provided for in the commitments.
3. article. Amendments shall enter into force on the physical protection of nuclear material in article 20 of the Convention within the time and in order, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall notify the newspaper "journal".
4. article. The law shall enter into force on the day following its promulgation. With the law put an amendment in English, and its translation into Latvian language.
The law adopted by the Parliament in 2010 7 October.
President Valdis Zatlers in Riga V 2010 October 27. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1. The title of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material adopted on 26 October 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention") is replaced by the following title: CONVENTION ON the PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR facilities 2. The preamble of the Convention is replaced by the following text: the States parties TO this CONVENTION, RECOGNIZING the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purpose and their interests is legitimat in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, CONVINCED of the need to facilitat international co-operation and the transfer of nuclear technology for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy , BEARING IN MIND that physical protection is of vital importanc for the protection of public health, safety, the environment and national and international security, HAVING IN MIND the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of good ighbourlines and not friendly relations and co-operation among States, CONSIDERING that under the terms of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations," RECALLING the Declaration on International Terrorism the "Eliminat annexed to General Assembly resolution, 49/60 of 9 December 1994, it (MENU RNGTON LINE4) aver the potential dangers posed by the illicit trafficking the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material and the sabotages of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, and noting that physical protection against such acts has become a matter of increased national and international concern, DEEPLY CONCERNED by the escalation of acts of worldwide terrorism in all its forms and manifestation, and by the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime , BELIEVING that physical protection play an important role in supporting nuclear nonproliferation and counter-terrorism objective, through this Convention (MENU RNGTON LINE4) to contribute to strengthening the physical protection worldwide of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purpose, CONVINCED that the nuclear material and relating of the offenc nuclear facilities with a matter of grave concern and that there is an urgent need to adop a appropriate and effective measure in the , or the existing measure, ensur it strengthen the prevention, detection and punishment of such, it further strengthen offenc (MENU RNGTON LINE4) international co-operation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measure for the protection of nuclear materials and nuclear physical facilities, CONVINCED that this Convention should be the complemen safe use, storage and transport of nuclear material and the safe operation of nuclear facilities , RECOGNIZING that there are internationally formulated physical protection recommendations that are updated from time to time which can provide guidance on contemporary means of achieving an effective level of physical protection, RECOGNIZING also that effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for military purpose of the development of the is a State possessing such nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and understanding that such materials and facilities with and will continue to be accorded the stringen physical protection , have AGREED as follows: 1. In article 1 of the Convention, after paragraph (c), two new paragraphs as follows: with added (d) "nuclear facility" means a facility (including the associated building and equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of, if damage to or interference with such facility could lead to the release of non significant of radiation or radioactive material;
(e) "sabotages" means any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of personnel, the public or the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances.
4. After article 1 of the Convention, a new article 1A is added as follows: article 1 the purpose of this Convention is to achieve and maintain the worldwide effective physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purpose and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purpose; to prevent and combat such material and relating of the offenc facilities worldwide; as well as to facilitat co.-operation among States parties to those ends.
5. Article 2 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. This Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purpose in use, storage and transport and their nuclear facilities used for peaceful purpose, provided, however, that articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 4 of article 5 of this Convention shall only apply to such nuclear material while in international nuclear transport.
2. The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that Party State.
3. Apart from the commitment to expressly undertaken by States parties under this Convention, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as regimes by the sovereign rights of a State.
4. (a) Nothing in this Convention shall be affec others rights, obligations and responsibilities of States parties under international law, in particular the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law.

(b) the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.
(c) Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as a lawful authorization to use or threaten to use force against nuclear material or nuclear facilities used for peaceful purpose.
(d) Nothing in this Convention condon or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, nor of prosecution under other law preclud.
5. This Convention shall not apply to nuclear material used or retained for military purpose or to a nuclear facility containing such material.
6. After article 2 of the Convention, a new Article 2A is added as follows: Article 2A 1. Each State Party shall establish, and maintain an appropriate implementations that physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction, with the aim of: (a) protecting against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear material in use, storage and transport;
(b) ensuring the implementation of rapid and comprehensive measure to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material; When the material is located outside its territory, that State Party shall act in accordanc with article 5;
(c) protecting nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage us gold; and (d) mitigating or minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage us gold.
2. In implementing paragraph 1, each State Party shall: (a) establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection;
(b) establish or a competent authority or designat authorities responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework; and (c) take other appropriate measure not cessary for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
3. In implementing the obligation under paragraphs 1 and 2, each State Party shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Convention, apply insofar as is reasonable and practicabl the following Fundamental principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear facilities.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: (A) Responsibility of the State the responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State.
FUNDAMENTALS PRINCIPLES B: responsibilities During International transport the responsibility of a State for ensuring that nuclear material is adequately protected the extend to the international transport thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to another State, as appropriate.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of legislative and Regulatory Framework (C): the State is responsible for establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection. This framework should provide for the establishment of applicable physical protection requirements and include a system of evaluation and licensing or other procedures to grant authorization. This framework should include a system of inspection of nuclear facilities and transport it to verify compliance with applicable requirements and conditions of the license or other authorizing document, and to establish a means to enforce applicable requirements and conditions, including effective sanctions.
FUNDAMENTALS PRINCIPLES of D: Competent Authority the State should establish or a competent authority designat which is responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, and is provided with adequat authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities. The State should take steps to ensur an effective independence between the functions of the State's competent authority and those of any other body in charge of the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: the Development of the E-license holders the responsibilities for implementing the various elements of physical protection within a State should be clearly identified. The State should ensur that the prime responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the holder of the relevant licenses or of other authorizing documents (e.g., operator or shipper).
FUNDAMENTALS PRINCIPLES F: Security culture All organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, the it development and maintenance of the cessary ensur it not effective implementation in the entire organization.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of G: threat the State's physical protection should be based on the State's current evaluation of the threat.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of Physical protection requirements (H): Graded Approach should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractivenes of the nature of the material and the potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and with the sabotages against nuclear material or nuclear facilities.
FUNDAMENTALS PRINCIPLES I: defence in Depth the State's requirements for physical protection should be (a) in the concept of reflec several layers and methods of protection (structural or other technical, personnel and organizational) that have to be circumvented by an adversary or overcom in order to achieve his objective of.
FUNDAMENTALS of Quality assurance PRINCIPLES: J A quality assurance policy and quality assurance programmes should be established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to their physical protection are satisfied.
FUNDAMENTALS PRINCIPLES of Contingency plans Contingency K: (emergency) plans the unauthorized removal of nuclear material it responds or sabotages of nuclear facilities or nuclear material, or attempts thereof, should be prepared and appropriately exercised by all license holders and authorities concerned.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of L: Confidentiality the State should establish requirements for protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could set the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
4. (a) the provision of this article shall not apply to any nuclear material which the State Party reasonably decide-does not need to be subject to the physical protection regime established pursuan to paragraph 1, taking into account the nature of the material, its quantity and relative attractivenes and the potential radiological consequences and others associated with any unauthorized act directed against it and the current evaluation of the threat against it.

(b) Nuclear material which is not subject to the provision of this article to subparagraph (a) pursuan should be protected in accordanc with prudent management practice.
7. Article 5 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. States parties shall identify and make known to each other directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency their point of contact in relations to matters within the scope of this Convention.
2. In the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or the threat thereof, credibl States parties shall, in accordanc with their national law, provide the co-operation and assistance to the maximum feasibl in the recovery of the exten and protection of such materials to any State that so requests. In particular: (a) a State Party shall take the appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other States, which appear to it to be concerned, of any theft, robbery or other unlawful taking of nuclear material or the threat thereof, and credibl shall, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations;
(b) in doing so, as appropriate, to the States parties concerned shall exchange information with each other, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear material, verifying the integrity of the shipping container or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material and shall: (i) co-ordinat-their efforts through diplomatic channels and others agreed;
(ii) render assistance, if requested;
(iii) the return of ensur recovered nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequences of the above-mentioned events.
The means of implementation of this co-operation shall be determined by the States parties concerned.
3. In the case of a credibl of the threat of nuclear materials or a sabotages the nuclear facility or, in the case of a thereof, sabotages the States parties shall, to the maximum of the exten, in accordanc feasibl with their national law and consistent with their relevant obligations under international law, cooperate as follows: (a) if a State Party has knowledge of the threat of a credibl of nuclear materials or a sabotages the nuclear facility in another State , the former shall decide on appropriate steps to be taken in order to keep that Status as soon as possible and, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations of that threat, with a view to preventing the sabotages;
(b) in the case of nuclear material or sabotages the of a nuclear facility in a State Party and if in its view other States are likely to be radiologically affected, the former, without prejudice to its other obligations under international law, shall take the appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible the State or the States which are likely to be radiologically affected and to inform , where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to minimizing or mitigating the radiological consequences thereof;
(c) if in the context of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), (a) the State Party requests assistance, each State Party to which a request for assistance is directed shall promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency, whethers it is in a position to render the assistance requested and the scope and terms of the assistance that may be rendered;
(d) the co-ordination of the co-operation under sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) shall be through diplomatic or other agreed channels. The means of implementation of this cooperation shall be determined bilaterally or multilaterally by the States parties concerned.
4. States parties shall co-operate and consult, as appropriate, with each other directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to obtaining guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in international transport.
5. A State Party may consult and co-operate, as appropriate, with other States parties directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to obtaining their guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of its national system of physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities.
8. Article 6 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. States parties shall take the appropriate measure of consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provision of this Convention from another State Party or through participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States parties provide information to international organizations or to States that are not parties to this Convention in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensur that the confidentiality of such information is protected. A State Party that has received information in confidence from another State Party may provide this information to third parties only with the consent of that other State Party.
2. States parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate their national law or pursuan which would jeopardiz the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material or nuclear facilities.
9. Paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. The intentional commission of: (a) an act without lawful authority which constitut the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment;
(b) a theft or robbery of nuclear material;
(c) an embezzlemen or the obtaining of nuclear material; fraudulen
(d) an act which the constitut carrying, sending, or moving of nuclear material into or out of a State without lawful authority;
(e) an act directed against a nuclear facility, or an act interfering with the operations of a nuclear facility, where the offender intentionally causes, or where he knows that the Act is likely to cause, death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances, unless the Act is undertaken in conformity with the national law of the State Party in the territory of which the nuclear facility is situated;
(f) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any other form of intimidation;
(g) (a) threat:

(i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment or to commit the offenc is described in sub-paragraph (e), or (ii) to commit an offenc is described in sub-paragraph (b) and (e) in order to compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or to refrain from doing any act;
(h) an attempt to commit any of the offenc described in sub-paragraph (a) to (e);
(i) an act which the participation in any of the offenc constitut described in sub-paragraph (a) to (h);
(j) an act of any person who organizes or directs others to commit an offenc it is described in sub-paragraph (a) to (h); and (k) an act which contribute to the commission of any of the offenc described in sub-paragraph (a) to (h) by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such act shall be intentional and shall either: (i) be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involv the commission of an offenc is described in sub-paragraph (a) to (g), or (ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offenc is described in sub-paragraph (a) to (g) shall be made (a) by each of the offenc punishabl State Party under its national law.
10. After article 11 of the Convention, two new articles, article 11 and article 11B, with the added as follows: Article 11a none of the offenc's set forth in article 7 shall be regarded for the purpose of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political or as an offenc offenc is connected with a political or as an offenc offenc is inspired by political motivated. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offenc» may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political or an offenc offenc is connected with a political or an offenc offenc is inspired by political motivated.
Article 11B Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to afford mutual extradit or their legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for the set forth in offenc article 7 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such of the offenc has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons.
11. After article 13 of the Convention, a new article 13A is added as follows: article 13A Nothing in this Convention shall be affec the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purpose that is undertaken to strengthen of the protection of nuclear materials and nuclear physical facilities.
12. Paragraph 3 of article 14 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 3. Where an Office of nuclear material involv offenc in domestic use, storage or transport, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material remains in the territory of the State Party in which the offenc was committed, or where an offenc is a nuclear facility and involv the alleged offender remains in the territory of the State Party in which the offenc was committed nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring that State Party to provide information concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offenc.
13. Article 16 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. A Conference of States parties shall be convened by the depositary five years after the entry into force of the amendment adopted on 8 July 2005 to review the implementation of this Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annex in the light of the then prevailing situation.
2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of the States parties may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective.
14. of Annex II footnote b/of the Convention is replaced by the following text: b/Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 gray/hour (100 rad/hour) at one metre unshielded.»
15. of Annex II footnote e/of the Convention is replaced by the following text: e/Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissil materials content is classified as Category I and II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 100 1 gray/hour (100 rad/hour) at one metre unshielded.»
 
 
Amendment of the Convention of physical protection of nuclear material of 1.26 October 1979 in the physical protection of nuclear material adopted by the Convention (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) name is replaced with the following: nuclear material and the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear facilities, 2. the preamble of the Convention is replaced by the following: countries that are Contracting Parties to this Convention, recognizing the right of all countries to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interest in the potential benefits resulting from the peaceful use of nuclear energy, convinced that it is necessary to facilitate international cooperation and the transfer of nuclear technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that the physical protection is vital to the public health, safety, environment, and national and international security, taking into account the protection of the United Nations Charter objectives and principles relating to international peace and security, conservation and good neighbourly and friendly relations, and the promotion of cooperation given that the United Nations Charter article 2, paragraph 4: "all the Member States in their international relations shall refrain from threats or force it to run as against any national territorial integrity or political independence, it also in any other manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations", the General Assembly of 9 December 1994, resolution 49/60 added a declaration of measures to eliminate international terrorism Desiring to prevent, potential danger posed by the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, check out and use of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and sabotage, and noting that the physical protection against such action has become a nationally and internationally important issue, seriously concerned about the increase in the number of acts of terrorism throughout the world, in all forms and manifestations of terrorism and the threat posed by international terrorism and organized crime, believing that the physical protection is of central importance to the nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism in support of the objectives of the ,

Desiring to contribute to the Convention of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities use in strengthening peaceful purpose, convinced that the offences relating to nuclear materials and nuclear installations is a very important issue and that there is an urgent need to implement appropriate and effective measures or strengthen existing measures to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment, desiring to strengthen further international cooperation, according to the laws of each Member State, and this Convention establish effective measures of nuclear and physical protection of nuclear installations , convinced that this Convention should be complementary to the nuclear material safe use, storage and transport, and safe operation of nuclear installations, and that there are internationally formulated recommendations for physical protection, which are updated from time to time, and which can provide guidance on contemporary means of effective physical protection levels, recognizing also that nuclear material used for military purposes and the physical protection of nuclear installations is the responsibility of the State, which is the nuclear material and nuclear facilities and understanding that material and equipment is and will continue to be severely physically protected, have agreed as follows: 1. Article 1 of the Convention is added after point (c), with two new paragraphs by the following: (d) "nuclear installation" means a plant (including related buildings and equipment), producing, processing, nuclear materials are used, handled, stored or disposed of, if any system damage or interference it could cause considerable radiation or release of radioactive materials;
(e) "sabotage" means any deliberate action that is directed against a nuclear facility or the use, storage or transport of nuclear material and in which ionizing radiation or radioactive substances could directly or indirectly endanger personnel, the public or environmental health and safety.
4. Article 1 of the Convention has been added to the new article 1A the following: article 1 for the purposes of this Convention is to achieve and maintain the peaceful purposes of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes and the use of effective physical protection of nuclear installations all over the world, to prevent and combat offences with respect to such materials and facilities around the world, as well as to facilitate cooperation between Member States to achieve this purpose.
5. Article 2 of the Convention is replaced by the following: 1. this Convention shall apply to nuclear material for peaceful purposes to be used, stored and transported, for peaceful purposes and use its nuclear facilities, provided, however, that this Convention, article 3 and 4, and article 5, paragraph 4 shall apply to such materials only as long as they are in international transport of nuclear material.
2. the physical protection regime for the creation, implementation, and maintenance is responsible in the Member State, the Member State concerned.
3. except for the obligations entered into by Member States clearly in accordance with this Convention, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of the State.
4. (a) Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations of the Member States and the responsibility under international law, in particular the United Nations Charter and the principles and international humanitarian law.
(b) this Convention does not define the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, according to the understanding of this term in international humanitarian law, which regulates such activities, and that the Convention does not define the actions that, in the performance of their official duties, the national armed forces, in so far as their respective responsibilities determined by other rules of international law.
(c) Nothing in this Convention shall not be considered as legal permission to use or threaten the use of force in relation to nuclear material or nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.
(d) Nothing in this Convention does not condone or make lawful otherwise unlawful conduct and does not prevent the prosecution of offences under other legislation.
5. this Convention does not apply to nuclear materials used for military purposes or keep, or nuclear installations that contain such material.
6. Article 2 of the Convention is to add a new Article 2A the following: 2. (A) article 1 each Member State shall establish, implement and maintain appropriate physical protection regime that suits its jurisdiction existing nuclear materials and nuclear installations, with the aim of: (a) to protect against theft and other unlawful check-out nuclear materials that are used, stored and transported;
(b) to ensure the rapid and comprehensive implementation of the measures to determine the location and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material; If the materials are located outside its territory, that Member State shall proceed in accordance with article 5;
(c) to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities against sabotage; and (d) to soften or reduce to a minimum the radiological consequences of sabotage.
2. the implementation of paragraph 1, each Member State shall: (a) establish and maintain a legal and regulatory framework for the management of physical protection;
(b) establish or appoint the competent authority or authorities responsible for the legal and regulatory basis; and (c) carry out other nuclear material and nuclear facilities of physical protection measures required.
3. in carrying out the duties under paragraph 1 and 2, each Member State shall, without prejudice to the other provisions of this Convention, shall apply, as far as is reasonable and practicable, the following of physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.
(A) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. State responsibility for physical protection regime to the establishment, implementation and maintenance of the country fully is a national responsibility.
(B) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. Responsibility during international transport responsibility for State security to nuclear material would be protected, also apply to the carriage of its international until the liability is properly transferred to another country.
(C) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. The legal and regulatory framework

The State is responsible for the legal and regulatory framework for the establishment and maintenance of physical protection for regulation. Be made applicable physical protection requirements and include the assessment and licensing system or other procedures for the granting of authorisation. This framework should include nuclear and transport inspection system to check the license or other permissive document in compliance with the applicable requirements and conditions, and to create the conditions of the applicable requirements and the means of enforcement, including effective sanctions.
(D) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. The competent authority the State should establish or designate the competent authority responsible for the legal and regulatory framework and the implementation of its responsibility for the implementation of the mandates is ensured by appropriate, competence and financial and human resources. The State must take measures to ensure the effective independence between national competent authorities and other features on the promotion of the use of nuclear energy or structure responsible for functions.
(E) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. The responsibility of the holder of the licence must be clearly defined responsibility for physical protection in the implementation of the various components. The State must ensure that the main responsible for the nuclear material or nuclear facilities would be the implementation of physical protection of relevant licences or other permissive document holders (for example, operators or shippers).
(F) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. Security culture all organizations involved in the implementation of physical protection, due priority should be given to safety culture, its development and retention, which is necessary in order to ensure its effective implementation throughout the organization.
(G) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. Threat to national physical protection should be based on the country's current risk assessment.
(H) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. Differentiated approach physical protection requirements should be determined by the differentiated approach, taking into account the current risk assessment, relative attractiveness, material characteristics and possible consequences in relation to the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material by or relating to nuclear installations.
(I) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. Enhanced protection of State requirements for physical protection should reflect the concept of multiple levels and methods of protection (structural or other technical, organisational and personnel), the opponent has to overcome or bypass him to achieve their goals.
(J) PRINCIPLE. Quality assurance to ensure that the requirements laid down for all physical protection of important activities have been met, is to establish and implement a quality policy and quality assurance programs.
(K). The contingency plan for all licence holders and the relevant authorities must draw up a contingency plan (emergency situations) and should be properly carried out exercises to respond to unauthorized removal of nuclear material or nuclear facilities or nuclear material or sabotage, attempts to do.
L. Privacy State requirements should be developed to protect the confidentiality of that information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could jeopardize the nuclear material and the physical protection of nuclear facilities.
4. (a) the provisions of this article shall not apply in relation to nuclear material, on which the Member State on the basis of a substantiated justification, that they should not be extended in accordance with paragraph 1 the creation of a physical protection regime, taking into account the nature of the material, the quantity and relative attractiveness and the potential radiological and other effects associated with unauthorized action against them and their current risk assessment.
(b) nuclear material, not subject to the provisions of this article shall, subject to subparagraph (a)), should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice.
7. Article 5 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: ' 1. Member States shall adopt and, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to each other the focal point for issues covered by the scope of this Convention.
2. Theft, burglary or other unauthorized nuclear or check-out following threats, Member States in accordance with their national law to the maximum extent practicable ensure cooperation and assistance in the recovery of materials and protection in every country that requests it. In particular: (a) the Member State shall take the necessary measures as soon as possible, to inform the other States to which, as it seems, this applies, on the nuclear theft, robbery or other unauthorized check-out or a reliable threat and, where applicable, inform the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations concerned;
(b) in doing so, the Member States concerned shall, depending on the circumstances, Exchange information mutually, with the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organisations, in order to protect the animals of the nuclear materials, check the shipping container integrity or not recover unauthorised nuclear materials and observed: i) coordinate their actions through diplomatic and other channels;
II) provides assistance where it is requested;
III) provides a stolen or the above events missing nuclear material is recovered, return.
Specify the implementation of cooperation is determined by the Member States concerned.
3. Nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear installations reliable threat or nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear installations in the Member States in the event the maximum grade in accordance with their national law and in accordance with their respective obligations in accordance with international law, cooperate as follows: (a) where a Member State is aware of nuclear material or nuclear threats of sabotage credible in another country, the first in that State shall decide on the appropriate measures to be taken so as soon as possible inform the State concerned and, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, said threats to sabotage the fix;

(b) nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities in the event of a Member State and if, in its view, other countries could be affected in the first nuclear State, without prejudice to their obligations under international law, take the necessary measures to inform the public as quickly as possible, or countries that are likely to be radiologically affected and to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations in order to minimize or alleviate the consequences of radiological sabotage;
(c) if (a) and (b) in the context of the requesting Member State, each Member State to which a request for assistance is addressed shall promptly decide and the request expressed in the Member States, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform you whether it is able to provide the requested assistance, as well as inform you about the help that it can provide, the amount and terms;
(d) coordination and cooperation in accordance with (a) to (c) occurs through diplomatic or other channels. The Member States concerned establish bilateral or multilateral implementation of that cooperation.
4. Member States shall cooperate with each other or, if necessary, consult each other, either directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, to obtain guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear material, the structure of the system, maintenance and improvement of international transport.
5. a Member State may be consulted and, where appropriate, to cooperate with other Member States directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, to seek their guidance on their national nuclear physical protection system design, maintenance and improvement of the domestic use, storage and transport, and in relation to its nuclear facilities.
8. Article 6 of the Convention is replaced by the following: 1. Member States shall in accordance with their national legislation, take the necessary measures to protect the confidentiality of information received in confidence by countries from other Member States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention or by participating in the activities undertaken by the implementation of this Convention. Where Member States provide information in confidence international organisations or countries which are not Contracting Parties to this Convention, they shall take steps to ensure the confidentiality of such information. The Member State which has received confidential information from another Member State, appropriate information may be provided to third parties only with the consent of that other Member State.
2. This Convention does not require the Member States to provide any information which they are authorised to provide in accordance with national law or which would endanger national security or nuclear material or the physical protection of nuclear facilities.
9. Article 7 of the Convention, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following text: 1. Intentional: (a) conduct that is not legal and is allowed to receive nuclear material, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal and which causes or is likely to cause someone's death or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or the environment;
(b) the theft or robbery of nuclear material;
(c) nuclear embezzlement or fraudulent acquisition;
(d) action that is handling nuclear materials, send or transfer to or out of the country without legal authorization;
(e) action that is directed against a nuclear facility, or conduct which interferes with the operation of nuclear facilities, if the offender intentionally causes or if he knows that the action may result in someone's death or serious personal injury, or substantial damage to property or the environment, the exposure to radiation or radioactive substances out, unless the action is carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Member State in whose territory the nuclear installation is located;
(f) action that is requesting, using nuclear material threat or force, or any other form of intimidation;
(g) threats: i) use nuclear material to cause someone's death or serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or the environment or to e) describes the offence; or (ii)) do (b) and (e) the offence described in order to compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or refuse to do any act;
(h) attempts to commit any of (a) to (e) describes the offence;
(i) action to have any participation in (a) to (h) offences described in subparagraph;
(j) conduct by any person who organizes or directs others to commit (a) to (h) above described offence; and (k) action to contribute to any (a) to (h) above described offence made by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such action is intentional and: (i)) carried out with the aim of promoting the Group's criminal activities or criminal purpose, if the activities or purposes shall include (a) to (g) describes the offence; or (ii)) by knowing about the Group's intention to do so (a) to (g) offences described, is an offence that is punishable in every Member State, in accordance with national legislation.
10. After article 11 of the Convention is to add two new subparagraphs (A) and 11 (B) article 11: article 11 A picking or for mutual legal assistance for the implementation of article 7, none of the offences set out in is not considered a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. Thus, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused solely on the basis that it concerns a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.
Article 11b nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted in such a way that an obligation to extradite or to provide mutual legal assistance, if the requested Member State has received reasonable grounds to believe that a request for extradition relating to article 7 the offences set out in are expressed to make the prosecution of the person or persons convicted of its race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion, or that the consent requirement would cause damage to the situation of the person concerned of any of the above reasons.
11. Article 13 of the Convention is to add a new article 13: article 13A

Nothing in this Convention shall not affect the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes conducted of physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities building.
12. Article 14 of the Convention, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following text: 3. If the offence is related to the nuclear material used, stored or transported within the country, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material remains in the territory of a Member State of which the criminal offence, or if the offence is related to the nuclear and the alleged offender remains in the territory of a Member State of which the criminal offence, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted in such a way that requires the Member State concerned to provide information on the criminal arising from such crime.
13. Article 16 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. The depositary shall convene a Conference of the Member States five years after 8 July 2005 adopted by the date of entry into force of the amendment, to review the implementation of this Convention and its conformity to the operative part of the preamble, in General and in the annex, taking into account the prevailing situation at that time.
2. Then, at intervals of not less than five years, the majority of Member States can achieve the convening of further conferences with the same objective, by submitting a proposal to the depositary for this purpose.
14. Annex II to the Convention [2], the reference is replaced with the following text: [2] material that is not irradiated in a reactor, or material that is irradiated in a reactor, but the radiation level is equal to or less than 1 gray hour (100 causes an hour) at a distance of one meter without a screen.
15. In annex II of the Convention [5], the reference is replaced with the following text: [5] the Other fuels that its original fissile content is classified as category I and II before irradiation may be reduced one category level, if the level of radiation from the nuclear fuel is greater than 1 gray hour (100 causes an hour) at a distance of one meter without a screen.