Key Benefits:
President of the Republic,
On the report of the Prime Minister and the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs,
Considering the Constitution, in particular articles 52 to 55;
Vu le Decree No. 53-192 of 14 March 1953 amended on the ratification and publication of international commitments undertaken by France;
Vu le Decree No. 69-352 of 4 March 1969 publishing the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 26 October 1956, as amended on 4 October 1961;
Vu le Decree No. 92-110 of 3 February 1992 publishing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, open for signature at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980;
Vu le Decree No. 92-1019 of 21 September 1992 publishing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done in Washington, London and Moscow on 1 July 1968;
Vu le Decree No. 2009-1326 of 28 October 2009 issuing the agreement between the governments of the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on cooperation in the area of centrifuge technology (two annexes), signed at Cardiff on 12 July 2005,
Decrete:
The agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the four governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany on the creation, construction and operation in the United States of America of uranium enrichment facilities using the gas centrifugation technology, will be published in the Official Journal of the United States of America.
The Prime Minister and the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, are responsible, each with regard to him, for the execution of this decree, which will be published in the Official Journal of the French Republic.
A C C O R D
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
The Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as "the Government of the United States") and the Four Governments of the French Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the French Government"), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as "the British Government"), the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter referred to as "the Government of the Netherlands") and the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "the Government")
Considering the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on cooperation in the development and operation of the centrifugation process for the production of enriched uranium, concluded at Almelo on 4 March 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the "Almelo Treaty");
Considering the Agreement between, on the one hand, the Three Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands and, on the other hand, the Government of the United States of America, concerning the establishment, construction and operation in the United States of an enrichment facility of the uranium, concluded in Washington on 24 July 1992
Considering the Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on Cooperation in the Field of Centrifugation Technology, concluded at Cardiff on 12 July 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the "Cardiff Treaty");
Taking note of the existence of a joint venture called Enrichment Technology Company Ltd (ETC), established under the legislation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to carry out research and development activities in the area of centrifuge technology and the manufacture of gas centrifuges, as well as to carry out activities and apply related technologies defined and held at 50% by Urenco and at
Noting that the centrifugation technology originally developed by Urenco was licensed to ETC and is available to Urenco under the Treaty of Almelo and the Treaty of Cardiff, as well as to Areva under the Treaty of Cardiff;
Taking note of the intention of Urenco and Areva to use ETC centrifugation technology to produce enriched uranium (for purposes other than the production of enriched uranium for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices) and their intention to create in the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "United States of America") centrifugation facilities
Desirous of establishing an intergovernmental framework applicable to one or more facilities in the United States using ETC centrifuge technology to produce enriched uranium for exclusively peaceful and non-explosive purposes;
Considering that the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in their capacity as parties to the Cardiff Treaty, have made international commitments with regard to the use and handling of information, equipment and special raw materials or fissile materials related to centrifuge technology;
Considering that Parties have introduced measures to protect information relating to centrifuge technology;
Considering the accession of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the NPT") and to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the IAEA"), and considering that each Party has entered into safeguards agreements with the IAEA and additional protocols to such safeguards agreements;
Considering that the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are parties to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community entered into in Rome on 25 March 1957;
Aspiring to ensure that all future activities of United States facilities are consistent with Parties ' nuclear non-proliferation policies and international obligations in this area,
The following provisions were agreed:
Article 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this Agreement, unless otherwise specified:
(a) The term "Areva" means Areva SA, including its subsidiaries and their potential legal successors, but excluding ETC;
(b) The term "centrifugation technology" refers to gas centrifugation and associated technologies, including information and know-how, as well as information used in the design of gas centrifugation equipment and components or derived from such equipment and components;
(c) The term "classified information" means information that must be protected from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with national legislation and regulations relating to classified information. It includes documents, information or materials containing classified information and all information integrated into centrifuge equipment or components, regardless of their mode of communication;
(d) The term "ETC" refers to Enrichment Technology Company Ltd, a joint venture created by Urenco and Areva to conduct research and development activities in the area of centrifugation technology and the manufacture of gas centrifuges and to carry out activities and apply related technologies, and includes its subsidiaries and successors in law;
(e) The term "TEC centrifugation technology" refers to centrifugation technology as defined in paragraph (b) above which has been licensed to ETC on the part of Urenco, which is owned or owned by ETC, or that is derived or derived from ETC activities or the use of ETC centrifugation technology
(f) The term "the Four Governments" refers to the French Government, the British Government, the Dutch Government and the German Government;
(g) The term "installation" means a uranium enrichment facility that uses ETC centrifugation technology, to be built in the United States and owned by Urenco or Areva (although not the uranium enrichment facility located in Eunice [New Mexico] and held by Urenco);
(h) The term "licensor(s)" means a subsidiary of Areva or Urenco active in the field of enrichment and holder of a valid ETC licence for use of ETC centrifuge technology outside the United States;
(i) The term "GFN" refers to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a forum that brings together the supplier countries that strive to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and exports of dual-use nuclear goods;
(j) "Nuclear material" means (i) "gross material", i.e. uranium containing the mixture of isotopes existing in the natural state and impoverished uranium in isotope U 235, and (ii) "special fissile products", namely plutonium, uranium 233 and uranium enriched in isotopes U 233 or U 235;
(k) The term "operator" means the holder of the licence granted by the United States Agency in relation to the Installation;
(l) The term "operating technology" means the centrifugation technology held by an operator or by a licensee and implemented in the creation, construction and operation of or arising from the installation;
(m) The term " Quadripartite Agency" means the Agency established under the Cardiff Treaty and acting in turn on behalf of the agencies designated by each of the Four Governments in accordance with Article VIII of the Cardiff Treaty and charged with ensuring the application of a common security and classification policy under the said Treaty;
(n) The term "restricted access data" refers to restricted access data (restricted Data) as defined by the United States Atomic Energy Act 1954 and its amendments;
(o) The term "Three Governments" refers to the British Government, the Dutch Government and the German Government;
(p) The term "United States Agency" refers to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
(q) The term "information relevant to the national security of the United States" refers to information classified by the Government of the United States pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 13 526 and its amendments or any presidential decree to replace it;
(r) The term "United Kingdom" refers to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
(s) The term "Urenco" means the industrial joint venture established under the Almelo Treaty, including its subsidiaries and their potential legal successors, but excluding ETC.
Article II
Scope
1. This Agreement sets out the conditions under which:
(a) The Four Governments ensure, to the extent permitted by the applicable treaties and their respective laws and regulations, the transfer to the United States and the use in the United States of ETC centrifuge technology and operating technology in order to create, build and operate one or more Installations;
(b) The United States Government ensures, to the extent permitted by applicable treaties and its legislation and regulations, the transfer to the United States and the use in the United States of ETC centrifuge technology and operating technology in order to create, build and operate one or more facilities;
(c) The Four Governments and ETCs, as well as, where appropriate, Urenco and Areva, under the supervision of the Four Governments, are authorized to have access, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article and in accordance with the procedure set out in the Annex, to the data produced in a Installation and qualified as restricted access data. The Annex is an integral part of this Agreement;
(d) The Four Governments and ETCs, as well as, where appropriate, Urenco and Areva, under the supervision of the Four Governments, are authorized to have access, as appropriate and subject to applicable international agreements and the laws, regulations and practices of the United States, to information relevant to the national security of the United States (excluding restricted access data) related to a Installation and in relation to its security and security systems.
2. No restricted access data may be provided under this Agreement by the United States under section 144 a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its amendments. It is understood that access under paragraph 1 (c) of this section does not constitute a communication by the United States of restricted access data under section 144 (a) of that Act.
3. Nothing in this Agreement hinders the implementation of the Almelo Treaty between the parties to the Treaty when acting under the said Treaty.
4. Nothing in this Agreement hinders the implementation of the Cardiff Treaty between the Four Governments, as parties to the Treaty, when they act under the said Treaty.
5. This Agreement shall not apply to the uranium enrichment facility located in Eunice, New Mexico, and held by Urenco, and no provision of this Agreement shall hinder the application of the Washington Agreement between the parties to the Agreement, when acting under this Agreement.
Article III
Peaceful use
ETC centrifugation technology, operating technology, equipment and components transferred to the United States under this Agreement, each facility, nuclear material of a facility, special fissionable products produced through the use of this technology and special fissionable products produced from the said special fissionable products, as well as the data used exclusively in a Installation and qualified as data for restricted access to any Government
Article IV
Application of international guarantees
l. The nuclear material to which the commitment to peaceful use in Article III applies and which is in the territory of the United States is subject to the application of international safeguards. In this regard, the implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA with a view to the application of safeguards in the United States entered into in Vienna on 18 November 1977 (INFCIRC/288) (hereinafter referred to as "the United States/IAEA safeguards agreement") is deemed to meet this obligation.
2. The United States Government will, in accordance with the United States/IAEA safeguards agreement, have to add the Facilities to the list of facilities to which IAEA safeguards apply.
3. The Four Governments and the Government of the United States consider that the Plants must be and remain subject to IAEA safeguards equivalent to those applied to commercial uranium enrichment facilities by gas centrifugation under the jurisdiction of the Four Governments, to the extent consistent with the application of safeguards in the United States under the United States Agreement of Guarantees (Add.88/IAEA) and its Additional Protocol
Article V
Physical protection
Each of the Facilities and Nuclear Materials under Article III shall be subjected at any time to physical protection measures ensuring at least the level of protection recommended by the IAEA (document of the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 [revised] on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities or its subsequent revisions accepted by the Government of the United States and by the Four Governments) or any other level of physical protection agreed between the Parties.
Article VI
Transfers
1. Nuclear substances under Article III may only be exported from the United States if the Government of the United States receives assurances from the government authority of the consignee at least equivalent to the provisions of Article III, Article IV, paragraph 1, first sentence, Article V and this Article. For any export to non-nuclear-weapon States within the meaning of the NPT, the Government of the United States applies (i) the principles set out in the NGG Guidelines for the transfer of nuclear items and their annexes as contained in the IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part. 1 or their subsequent revisions, and (ii) any relevant decision adopted by the GFN by consensus.
2. ETC centrifugation technology and operating technology transferred to the United States under this Agreement may only be transferred between the United States and the Parties to this Agreement as set out below. Furthermore, without prejudice to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) below, the data produced in a Installation and qualified as restricted data cannot be transferred to a country not party to this Agreement.
(a) The ETC centrifugation technology and the operating technology transferred to the United States under this Agreement may be transferred between the United States and one or more of the following States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, if originally transferred to the United States from one of these States, or between the United States and the French Republic if
(b) The data produced in a Installation and described as restricted data may only be transferred between the United States and the United Kingdom, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany or the Kingdom of the Netherlands, or nationals of those States, in accordance with the provisions of Article II, paragraph 2, of this Agreement and its Annex; they cannot be transferred by any of them to any State other than the United States without the prior written agreement of the United States Government. The Government of the United States hereby consents to these transfers between the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the French Republic, subject to compliance with the provisions of Article II, paragraph 2, of this Agreement and its Annex.
Article VII
Responsible agencies
1. The Government of the United States is represented by the United States Agency, and the Four Governments are represented by the quadripartite Agency, for the purpose of applying Articles VIII to X of this Agreement.
2. Consultations shall be held as necessary between the United States Agency and the quadripartite Agency on any matters relating to the application of Articles VIII to X of this Agreement.
Article VIII
Safety classifications
and transfer of classified information
1. The United States Agency and the Quadripartite Agency shall, within the framework of their respective laws and regulations, apply agreed common principles and procedures with respect to security classifications and transfers of information classified under this Agreement.
2. The classified information transferred to the United States under this Agreement shall receive a security classification in accordance with Appendix II of the Cardiff Treaty. Except as otherwise agreed by the parties, they are first transferred to the United States Agency, which applies a security classification of the United States and provides them with a degree of protection equal to that provided to them by the quadripartite Agency, within the framework of U.S. legislation and regulations and in accordance with the common principles and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and intended to ensure their protection. The U.S. classification levels may not be reduced below the level required to ensure a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the quadripartite Agency or deleted without the agreement of the quadripartite Agency. This information may also benefit the United States from additional protection in accordance with U.S. legislation and regulations.
3. When such classified information is returned to the Four Governments, ETC or, where appropriate, Urenco or Areva under the supervision of the Four Governments, is given a higher level of classification than that assigned to them when they are transferred to the United States, such information may be subject to a new classification in accordance with Appendix II of the Cardiff Treaty in order to grant them the degree of protection that the Quadrant Agency considers appropriate. With respect to the processing of classified information produced in the United States and transferred to the Four Governments that benefit from a higher level of classification than the similar information held by the Four Governments, the United States Agency and the Quadripartite Agency agree on the rules of reclassification consistent with good information protection practices.
4. Any classified information transferred under this Agreement to or from the United States shall be transmitted by the diplomatic suitcase, by approved means of encrypted electronic transmission or by any other secure means agreed between the Four Governments and the Government of the United States.
Article IX
Protection of classified information
1. The Government of the United States and the Four Governments shall take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of classified information transferred under this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "classified information transferred") and those resulting from the implementation of classified information transferred (hereinafter referred to as "derived classified information"). These security measures must, in particular, allow the information to be protected as it should be and only have access to it, subject to the provisions of Article VI, paragraph 2, of this Agreement, persons empowered by their national authorities to have access in their own country to information relevant to the minimum level of classification (not below, however, to the level "confidential") and whose access to classified information has been approved by the Quadrant Agency. Notwithstanding the above provisions, no national of a country other than the United States or any of the Four Governments may have access to classified information produced in the United States and qualified as restricted data without the prior written consent of the Government of the United States and the Four Governments.
2. The Four Governments shall ensure, within the framework of their respective legislation and regulations, that the authorities under the Government of the United States have the information and assistance required to implement the legislative and regulatory provisions of the United States so that the classified information referred to in paragraph 1 is protected in accordance with the laws and regulations of the United States.
Article X
Loss of classified information
1. If classified information transferred or derived is lost after transfer or disclosed without authorization, or if there is a reasonable suspicion of unauthorized disclosure, the United States Agency (if the loss occurs in the United States) or the quadripartite Agency (if the loss takes place outside the United States) immediately informs its counterpart. However, the quadripartite Agency is not required to inform the United States Agency of the unauthorised loss or disclosure of classified information not originating in the United States (i.e. not created in the United States or derived from classified information created in the United States).
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, the investigation to determine whether the act constitutes an offence to the laws or regulations of the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands or the French Republic and the prosecutions are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State in which the offence occurred and are carried out in accordance with its legislation and regulations. However, except in the circumstances of the exception referred to in the last sentence of paragraph (l) above, the Party in whose country the alleged offence took place does everything in its power so that the United States Agency or the Agency quadripartite, as the case may be, has the opportunity to communicate to the appropriate authorities of the Government concerned responsible for prosecution or monitoring any information relating to the undertaking of proceedings in relation to the facts. The Four Governments or the Government of the United States, as the case may be, are informed in a timely manner of the undertaking or non-commitment of the proceedings and their outcome.
Article XI
Protection of property rights information
1. Where the Government of the United States receives information transferred under this Agreement, it may not use it for any purpose, including but not limited to commercial purposes, other than the purposes set out in this Agreement without the prior written agreement of the Four Governments.
2. The information transferred or the information produced in a facility located in the United States that constitutes information relating to the right of ownership under the laws and regulations of the United States, including factory secrets and commercial information, is processed and protected in accordance with the laws and regulations of the United States. The United States Government must therefore respect the privileged nature of such information under the right to property.
3. In particular, with respect to the information transferred under this Agreement for the purposes of the exercise of the powers of the United States Agency in the granting of licences and supervision, such information is, as appropriate, treated and protected as subject to the right of ownership under the laws of the United States and the rules of the United States Agency applicable as a general rule to information under the law of ownership originating in the United States.
4. If the United States Government is of the opinion that it is no longer in a position to protect information transferred under property rights under U.S. legislation and regulations, the appropriate notification is provided immediately by the United States Agency. The Government of the United States and the Four Governments subsequently consult in order to define the appropriate means to achieve the objectives of this article.
Article XII
Treaty establishing the European Community
of Atomic Energy
The obligations set out in this Agreement shall not affect the obligations that arise for the Four Governments of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.
Article XIII
Consultations
The Government of the United States and the Four Governments shall consult as appropriate on matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement.
Article XIV
Entry into force and validity period
l. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of receipt of the last of the notes to the depositary by the Parties to this Agreement and attesting to the fulfilment of all the procedures required for its entry into force. The Government of France shall be depositary of this Agreement, including its Annex and the Minutes. In this context, it will send to the other Parties a diplomatic note that will inform them of the notifications of the Parties mentioned in this paragraph and of the date of entry into force, and will retain the original text of this Agreement. This Agreement shall remain in force for thirty years. It will be tacitly renewed every fifteen years unless, at least one year before the date on which it would be tacitly renewed, the Government of the United States, the Government of France or each of the Three Governments notify the depositary of its intention not to renew it. The depositary shall send a diplomatic note to the other Parties to inform them of such notifications. In this case, this Agreement shall expire on the date on which it would have been tacitly renewed, on the understanding, however, that if the notification comes from a Party other than the Government of the United States, the Agreement shall not end with respect to the remaining Parties if the Parties agree in writing to renew it.
2. Notwithstanding the denunciation or expiry of this Agreement, the provisions of Articles III to VI and Articles VIII to XI shall remain in force as long as a technology or as materials, equipment or components governed by the said Articles shall remain in the United States or shall remain under their jurisdiction or authority, wherever it is, or until such time as the Government of the United States and the Four Governments have established such mutual safeguards
In faith, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done in Paris on 24 February 2011 in an original copy, in French, English, Dutch and German, all texts being equally authentic. The depositary shall issue certified copies in accordance with each Party.
A N N E X E
PROCEDURE FOR THE CONTROL AND EXAMEN OF DATA PRODUCTS IN ANY INSTALLATION AND QUALIFIED DATA TO RESTREINT ACCESS, INSTALLATION TO THEIR COMMUNICATION ULTIR TO ETC, URENCO AND AREVA
1. This procedure will be implemented to monitor and review the data produced in a Installation and described as restricted data, in order to confirm that they contain only information that does not constitute a novelty for ETC or, where applicable, for Urenco or Areva, i.e. information whose technological content is already known and available for ETC or, where applicable, for Urenco or Areva, as a result of their respective activities outside the United States.
It will be applied in order to identify the data produced in a Installation and described as restricted data that would constitute a novelty for ETC or, where applicable, for Urenco or Areva, and to protect these data from any transfer, considered unlikely, to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany or the French Republic or their nationals. It will be implemented in two phases: at first, a specialist in the classification of derivative information, having obligatoryly the nationality of the United States, approved by the United States Agency and employed by the Institution or bound by contract with it, will carry out to the extent possible the examination of the data produced in a Installation and qualified of restricted data to which British, German or Dutch nationals, This procedure will require the following:
(a) To determine whether the data produced are restricted access data (hereinafter referred to in this Annex "restricted access data originating in the United States");
(b) Identifying restricted data originating in the United States that constitute a novelty for ETC, Urenco or Areva (in view of the experience gained outside the United States as addressed by the technology guides defined below);
(c) In the event of identification of restricted data originating in the United States that constitute a novelty for ETC, Urenco or Areva, to proceed immediately with consultations between the Government of the United States, the Government or those of the Four Governments that is or are concerned and/or ETC and, where applicable, Urenco or Areva, including to assess the probability of recurrence of aberrant data as well as to establish the feasibility
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article VI, paragraph 2, and Article IX, paragraph 1, to transfer or transfer to Urenco and to authorized nationals of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany or the Kingdom of the Netherlands restricted data originating in the United States of which it has been established by this procedure that Are not a novelty for Urenco, and to transfer or retransfer
(e) Subject to the provisions of Article VI, paragraph 2, and Article IX, paragraph 1, to transfer or transfer to ETC restricted data originating in the United States of which it has been established by this procedure that they do not constitute a novelty for ETC, provided that access to restricted data originating in the United States transferred or transferred to ETC is not granted (i)
2. The procedure includes, in particular, the following:
(a) Through ETC and, where applicable, from Urenco or Areva, the Four Governments will provide for each Installation, subject to review and approval by the Government of the United States, a guide (hereinafter referred to as "Technological Guide") to be used by the United States Institution and Agency and re-pertain the classified data they consider to be used by the Center of Technology Depending on the actual level of experience, each technology guide will need to specify (with respect to ETC centrifuge technology and the operating technology to be implemented within the facility):
(ii) Classified data types (e.g. descriptions of operating conditions and performance expressed in encrypted form and descriptive elements on performance) as well as the full range of possible performance parameters in each category (maximum and minimum encrypted data and descriptions of the categories of malfunctions and equipment failures, for example);
(iii) As part of the full range of parameters, the amplitude of average operational performance, specifying as complete as possible the nature of the differences between the average amplitude and the limit values of the complete range;
(iv) Any other possible parameters of the performance of the essential equipment of the facility that put in place information that is qualified for restricted access (e.g., centrifuges), to determine the extent to which ETC, Urenco or Areva, as the case may be, are aware of the data that may be produced in the Installation, including information contained in the deficient centrifuges;
(v) Any other data that may be described as restricted access data under the Installation Classification Guide developed jointly by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the United States Department of Energy.
These technology guides will be supported by data produced in other facilities where ETC centrifuge technology and operating technology are being implemented, including data on the most serious and rare incidents experienced by these facilities. Supporting data performance parameters from prototypes and computer simulations for testing technology can also be provided. Technological guides may be updated at any time by the Governments considered by ETC and, where appropriate, by Urenco or Areva, subject to review and approval by the Government of the United States, to take into account the complementary experience acquired outside the United States, the updated entries corresponding only to the data produced subsequently;
(b) Before data are provided to nationals of one of the Four Governments, a specialist in the classification of derivative information, who is obligatoryly a U.S. national, approved by the United States Agency and employed by the Institution or bound by contract with it, will carry out in good faith an evaluation of such data in order to confirm that they correspond to the parameters of the appropriate technology guide. It is expressly understood that this condition is subject to limitations depending on the presence within the TEC Technical Assistance Personnel Facility or, where applicable, Urenco or Areva;
(c) If this evaluation by the specialist in the classification of derivative information reveals a discrepancy between, on the one hand, specific data produced within the Installation and qualified as restricted access data and, on the other hand, the parameters of the expected data in the appropriate technology guide, the specific data will not be reported but will be submitted for evaluation to the Government of the United States through the United States Agency. If the Government of the United States reaches the conclusion that these data are likely to be new, it will, without disclosing the data itself, consult with that or those of the Four Governments that is or are concerned in order to allow them, if they can, to demonstrate that this discrepancy in relation to the parameters does not contain any element that would constitute a novelty for ETC or, where applicable, for Urenco or Areva;
(d) The U.S. Agency will have access to all data produced in the Facilities and qualified as restricted data that have been transferred to nationals of one of the Four Governments and will conduct audits on an annual or other basis. During these audits, it will compare, on the one hand, a large random sample of data produced in the Installation and qualified as restricted access data and, on the other, technology guides. If the United States Agency finds a dissimilarity between, on the one hand, specific data produced within the Institution and qualified as restricted access data and, on the other hand, the parameters of the expected data in the technology guides, the United States Government will assess whether or not the data are likely to be new. If it reaches the conclusion that they are likely to be, consultations will be initiated immediately between the Government of the United States and the Government or those of the Four Governments that is or are concerned in order to allow them, if they can, to demonstrate that the data in question does not contain any element that constitutes a novelty for ETC or, where applicable, for Urenco or Areva;
(e) If, as a result of the consultations conducted in one of the above two cases, it is determined that new data will not be provided to ETC or, where applicable, to Urenco or Areva. Consultations between the Government of the United States and the Government or those of the Four Governments that is or are concerned will also be conducted to assess whether or not the existence of aberrant data suggests that there may be unanticipated incidents that could result in additional data that could be described as restricted data and a novelty within the meaning of paragraph 1 above;
(f) If so, the Government of the United States (i) will determine, in consultation with that or those of the Four Governments that is or are concerned, whether there are effective means to prevent the transfer of these new specific data and any other new data produced in the facility and qualified as restricted data, or (ii) will endeavour to conclude an agreement under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act to the United States.
Done on March 5, 2012.
Nicolas Sarkozy
By the President of the Republic:
The Prime Minister,
François Fillon
The Minister of State,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and European,
Alain Juppé
