In The Case Of A Proposal To Cancel. The Word "final" In The From No. 106/1999 Coll.

Original Language Title: ve věci návrhu na zruš. slova "pravomocných" v z. č. 106/1999 Sb.

Subscribe to a Global-Regulation Premium Membership Today!

Key Benefits:

Subscribe Now

Read the untranslated law here: https://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/download?idBiblio=70910&nr=123~2F2010~20Sb.&ft=txt

123/2010 Sb.



FIND



The Constitutional Court



On behalf of the Republic of



The Constitutional Court ruled on 30 November. March 2010 in plenary in the composition of Stanislav

Package, Francis Skinner, Vlasta Formankova, Turgut Güttler, Pavel

Holländer, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Crust, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jiří Mucha,

Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Výborný, Eliška

April Wagner and Michael about the design of Mgr. f. k. Ph.d., cancellation

the word "final" in section 11 (1) 4 (b). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on the

free access to information, as amended,

United with constitutional complaints against the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court

of 29 April 2004. 4.2009 No. 8/2008 As 50-75,



as follows:



The provisions in section 11 (1) 4 (b). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free

access to Information Act, as amended, is deleted in

the word "final" on the date of publication of this finding in the statute book.



Justification:



(I).



The progress of the proceedings and a recap of the proposal



1. On 17. 7.2009 received the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court of the petitioner,

the annulment of the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 June.

4.2009 No. 8/2008 As 50-75, for violation of their fundamental right to

information according to art. 17 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms (hereinafter referred to as

"The Charter").



In the former case municipal court in Prague, by judgment of 18 March 2004. 6.2008, no.

j. 9 Ca 4/2007, 43, dismissed the complainant against the decision of the Minister

Finance of the day 30. 10.2006, no. 10/99 897/2006-RK, which was

rejected the complainant's breakdown against a decision of the Treasury Department

29 April 2004. 9.2006, no. 22/92219/2006/3341IK-255, and at the same time confirmed

This decision on the partial refusal of information or failure to provide

the judgments of the courts in legal actions against the purchasers of the property for valuable consideration

converted by the Fund of children and youth in the "disposal" pursuant to Act No. 367/2000

Coll. repealing Fund children and youth and on changes of some acts, in

as amended, which did not enter into legal force. Against this

the judgment of the municipal court, the complainant filed an appeal in cassation, which, however,

was the judgment under appeal rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court. The highest

Administrative Court ruled, with regard to the judgments of the nepravomocné, to the

decision-making activity of courts is necessary to accommodate even these judgments (if they are

the final judgments of the decision-making activities of the courts, there is no reason to

This activity also judgments have not been nepravomocné, and vice versa). The provisions of the

§ 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Information Act therefore clearly prevents

the compulsory subjects in the provision of any information about the decision-making

judicial activities (with the exception of the provision of information in the form of final

judgments). This rather then the provisions of this Act prevents the provision of

information about the decision-making activity of courts in the form of judgments which have not yet

did not enter into legal force. The Supreme Administrative Court further stated that he

It is not for the courts to carry crucial to whether adjustment of the provisions of § 11

paragraph. 4 (b). (b)), in the version information Act effective from 23. 3.2006,

He is happy or not, the Court held, however, that is not in conflict with the law on

information, guaranteed the constitutional order, and in particular article. Article 17(1). 5

The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms. Restrictions on the right to information about

decision-making activity of courts is in principle based on the denial of

public access to any information on the decision-making activity

the courts (cf. the provision of information in the form of final judgments). This

the restriction is limited by the requirement not to intervene in the process-in the

the interest of objectivity and impartiality of the assessment of each case-to own

the decision-making activities of the Court (including the decision-making activities in the form of

judgments), and further is limited and necessary measures

in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public

safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or

morality, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, prevent the disclosure of confidential

information or maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary [article 10

paragraph. 2 Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (also

"the Convention")]. The exercise of freedom of expression and the right to information can be

therefore limited by law. in the interest of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the

of the judiciary.



2. The core of the constitutional complaint is a matter of interpretation of the provisions of § 11 (1) 4

(a). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free access to information, in

as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the law on free access to

the information "or" information ") for the use of the law of constitutional principles and

the limits referred to in article 14(2). 17 and article. 4 (4). 4 of the Charter of fundamental rights and

freedoms, in particular the case of the request the complainant to provide

judgments of the courts. The Ministry of finance denied to provide

the complainant copies of judgments in matters concerned with the position of the participant

took part in the proceedings, by pointing to their nature of res judicata.

The complainant considers that the judgments as the results of activities

the courts are the exceptions laid down by law closely-public. Referred to

applies all the more if the information required about them from the authority of

public authority which acted in the proceedings preceding them in the dispute about the

the property of the State. The question of the judgment itself is not, in the opinion

the complainant, a criterion that would be able to fill material

the conditions of the restrictions on the right to information referred to in article 25(2). Article 17(1). 4 of the Charter of

fundamental rights and freedoms. Such a restriction is not only he could be unfaithful

a basic political right of the complainant, but also historical sense, and

the purpose of the public adjudication, which is to contribute to the long term

confidence in the predictability, transparency and justice itself

the system of justice.



3. together with the constitutional complaint, the complainant submitted the proposal to repeal section

the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to

information, and specifically the word "final".



4. the first Chamber of the Constitutional Court did not find the reason for the rejection of the constitutional

the appellants ' complaints pursuant to section 43 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the constitutional

the Court, in the wording of later regulations (hereinafter referred to as the "law on the constitutional

the Court "), since the application of the contested provisions of the occurrence of the event

that is the subject of a constitutional complaint. The formal prerequisites of its

hearing pursuant to § 43 para. 1 are fulfilled and the constitutional complaint was not

found to be manifestly unfounded pursuant to § 43 para. 2 (a). and) cited

the law. Therefore, the first Chamber within the meaning of § 78 para. 1 of this Act, the procedure for

a constitutional complaint (interrupted by order of the busiest SP. zn. I. ÚS

1885/09, available on http://nalus.usoud.cz/Search/Search.aspx) and the draft

on cancellation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Act, forward the full Court

The decision of the Constitutional Court according to article. 87 para. 1 of the Constitution of the United

Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution").



II.



Recap of the observations of the parties



5. The Constitutional Court has requested, in accordance with the provisions. section 69 of the Act on the Constitutional Court

representation of the parties-both houses of Parliament.



6. The Chamber of deputies in its observations on the draft just zrekapitulovala

the course of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the law zakotvujícího

the contested provisions and indicated that the legislature acted in

the belief that the law is adopted in accordance with the Constitution and with our legal

of procedure. In conclusion, it expressed agreement with the abandonment of the oral proceedings.



7. The Senate in its observations on the draft legislative progress recounted

the process leading to the adoption of the law zakotvujícího the contested provisions.

Among other things, stated that the objective of section 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the

free access to information was approved by the Senate amendment,

that the present legal template expanded so that, in substance,

applicants for information could be instead of the proposed final

the judgments provided by all final decisions of the courts. In any of the

newsgroup messages, which were in the course of the hearing of the Senate to the content

the draft law, challenging the constitutionality of the papers presented in the classroom procedure

restrict the provision of judicial decision only, which has acquired a legal

power. The Senate discussed the Bill containing the appellant contested

the part of the designated section 11 para. 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to

information within the limits of the Constitution laid down the competence and constitutionally established by the

way. The contradiction of the legal provisions of the Namítaný with the article. 17

paragraph. 4 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms of the Senate when acting on it

did not find. The Senate agreed with the abandonment of the oral proceedings.



8. The Constitutional Court has requested (according to the provisions of section 48 (2) and § 49 paragraph 1.

1 of the law on the Constitutional Court) and the representation of the Ministry of Justice,

that, however, did not respond within the specified period.



III.



The diction of the contested provisions of the Act



9. The provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to

information added: incumbents do not provide further information about the

decision-making activity of courts, with the exception of final judgments. "



IV.



The appellants ' locus standi



10. Standing of the applicant to submit a proposal is under consideration

dovoditelná to the provisions of section 74 of the Act on the Constitutional Court. The petitioner thus

meets the defined terms of locus standi for Administration of the

proposal to the Constitutional Court.



In the.



The constitutional conformity of the legislative process




11. Pursuant to § 68 para. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court-in addition to

assessment of compliance of the contested law with constitutional law – checks whether the

the law was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down the competence and

constitutionally prescribed way.



12. given that the applicant did not defect to the legislative

process, or exceeding the Constitution laid down the competence of the legislature, is not

having regard to the principles of procedural economy to examine this question more closely

and it is sufficient, in addition to taking into account the observations submitted by the

the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, formal verification during the legislative process of the

publicly available information sources on http://www.psp.cz.



13. the contested the wording of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) was inserted into the law on

free access to information by the amendment made by Act No 61/2006

Coll., amending Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free access to

information, as amended, law No. 121/2000 Coll., on the

Copyright, rights related to copyright and on the amendment

certain laws (Copyright Act), as amended by Act No. 81/2005 Coll., and

Act No. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities (municipal establishment), as amended

rules (print no. 991). This law was adopted by the

House of the day 14.10.2005. The Chamber of Deputies, the Senate returned the law with

amendments (resolution No. 250), but the Chamber of Deputies

She remained on the original draft law (resolution No. 2153). The law has been

declared in the collection of the Act in the amount of 26 under the number 61/2006 Coll., Constitutional

the Court therefore finds that the law was enacted and issued within the limits of the Constitution

set out competences and constitutionally prescribed way.



Vi.



Reviews of the Constitutional Court



Vi. a)



14. the appellant first submits an alternative to the Constitutional Court, that section 11

paragraph. 4 (b). (b)) of the law on free access to information could be

regarded as vyložitelné in the sense that it does not prohibit the provide

nepravomocné judgments of the courts. The opposite interpretation (espoused by mj. The highest

the Administrative Court in a judgment dated dated 29.4.2009 No. 8/2008 As 50-75)

your rapporteur considers it "too restrictive".



15. the applicant has submitted the first control, so the question of the interpretation of the

the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to

the information in the sense that it prohibits or does not prohibit

nepravomocné judgments of courts provide.



16. The Constitutional Court has come to the conclusion that the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))

the law on free access to information is not ústavněkonformně

vyložitelné when it comes to the ability to provide information to nepravomocné

judgments of courts. The legislator in section 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the

free access to information used to enumerate exhaustively. Therefore,

provide information about the decision-making activity of courts can be only in the form of

final judgments. Of arg.



converse

(indirectly) implies a prohibition to provide information about other activities,

i.e.. including judgments. Otherwise, textuálně

enshrined permission to provide information about the decision-making activity of courts

only in the form of final judgments to lose any reasonable sense.

The opposite interpretation would could not be accepted or application of constitutional rules

to interpret national law, for as it follows from the case law of the constitutional

[cf. e.g. find SP. zn. PL. ÚS 73/06 dated 29/1 (N 23/48

SbNU 263; 297/2008 Coll.) *, point 31]-this rule is applicable to the

the situation of double (or vícerého) possible interpretation of legislation; otherwise,

should no longer logically there was no interpretation of the law, but about the creation of the law. For

the completeness of the Constitutional Court States that this (the only possible) interpretation cannot be

interpretation of the restrictive (as the appellant wrongly), as

on the contrary, based on the literal (and exhaustively formulated) the wording of § 11 (1) 4

(a). (b)) of the law on free access to information. The restrictive interpretation

means that speaking is refraining from the legislature with a narrower range than

corresponds to the text of the literal, expression used to indicate more than

the legislature actually intended.



17. in this context, refers to the relevant part of the Constitutional Court

the preamble above cited judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court: "on

23.3. 2006 came into effect the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))

Information Act, in the version in force at the material time, according to which

incumbents do not provide information about the decision-making activity of courts, with the

the exception of the final judgments. The amendment of the Information Act (Law No.

61/2006 Coll.) join the original text, the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b).

(b) of the Act (information) "compulsory bodies do not provide further information about the

decision-making activity of courts ") compulsory subjects with effect from 23. 3.

2006 a unique obligation to, make a final judgment.

But this is not a trivial clarification of the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))

Information Act only in that direction, that incumbents must

make final judgments of courts. This amendment has serious implications

for a definition of "the decision-making activity of courts" in relation to the scope of

information obligations of the competent bodies. Written copies of the judgments

are always outputs the decision-making activity of courts, bearing the necessarily information

about this their activity in a specific case (operative part and grounds of the judgment).

For the decision-making activity within the meaning of the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))

information law is therefore to be considered not only the procedure of the courts in

proceedings and their acts to establish the facts of the case and to

its law, but also its own adjudication, respectively.

decision on the merits. From the diction "mandatory entities do not provide further

information about the decision-making activity of courts, with the exception of final

judgments "then it follows that the final judgments, or the results of the

decision-making activity of courts in the form of final judgments, they are as

exceptions to this activity directly from the law a necessary part of the decision-making

the activities of the courts (in the decision-making activity of courts, therefore, by definition, include the

final judgments). If then for judgments nepravomocné, be (i)

here to conclude that in the decision-making activity of courts is necessary to accommodate and

these judgments are the final judgments (the decision-making activity of courts,

There is no reason that this activity was not also the judgments in nepravomocné,

on the contrary). The provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the information act

clearly prevents the compulsory subjects in the provision of any

information about the decision-making activity of courts (with the exception of the provision of information

in the form of final judgments). This rather then the provisions of this Act

prevents the provision of information about the decision-making activity of courts in the form of

the judgments that have not yet have legal power. This is because, if

are subject to statutory exclusions for information about the decision-making activity of courts

as such (with the exception of final judgments) cannot be provided, or

information about this activity, as enshrined in judgments nepravomocných

(argumentum converse, which reveals the meaning of legal norms by

the rules of formal logic) ... "



Vi. (b))



18. In terms of the content of the proposal the applicant so the question arose of the constitutional

conformance to the standards, which prohibits the granting of nepravomocných

judgments, but permits the granting of final judgments

(hereinafter referred to as "the contested norm").



19. The Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment that deduced the constitutional

souladnost contested the legal standards.



20. on the contrary, the appellant in support of his conclusion on the unconstitutionality

the contested States essentially the following standards. The requirement to provide

judgments that the claimant planned to use as a source

interpretation of the law, and the source of the legal arguments, it could not in any way

cause interference with the course of the judicial process or to its own decision-making

the activities of the Court. If disclosure of the nepravomocných decision should

compromise the decision-making activities of the Court, it did not and could not be such

the decision for the same reason, or publicly announced. If you could

actually lead to conflict with the right to protection of personality, with the right to

protection of personal data and privacy, it is necessary to find solutions to the first

using other less restrictive legal institutions, legal standards, and

only after this failed to apply the provisions of restrictive

the right to information. In the case of eg. the right to protection of personal data or

privacy includes a provision providing sufficient protection for these

the rights of the law on free access to information in section 8a, which

refers to the legal provisions governing their protection. For more

adequate protection or "insurance policy" includes the provisions of § 12 of the Act on

free access to information. The argument of the Supreme Administrative Court,

that this decision can be varied nepravomocná as a result of their review of the

major changes, it's relevant, but it is a fact that the applicant must

count and with information. The applicant must in this

the case to know that nepravomocné is not immutable and the decision is not

the final, but it can't be a reason for refusing to grant this

decision as information. As a source of interpretation of law

published not only the final decisions, but for example. even different views whether

I headed to the Court. The European Court of human rights.

In addition, a final judgment may not be the final decision on the matter,


Since it can be canceled for example. by the decision of the Supreme Court or Constitutional

the Court. If it is ruled by the principle of public court proceedings and the judgment shall

without exception, announces the public, data concerning the RES

neskončeného of the control of the de facto published are (whether during the

control itself, or the announcement of the judgment), and the judgment is no longer

only a written copy of what has already been published.



Vi. (c))



21. The Constitutional Court-the justification for the proposal nevázaje, but merely his

Petite-the examination of the constitutionality of the contested stepped up to the standards.



22. According to the article. Article 17(1). 1 of the Charter, that "freedom of expression and the right to

information are guaranteed. " According to the article. Article 17(1). 2 of the Charter, "Each

has the right to express their opinions by Word, print, printing, image or

in another way, as well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart

ideas and information regardless of frontiers. " According to the article. Article 17(1). 5

Of the Charter, "State bodies and territorial self-government bodies are

required to adequately provide information about their activities.

Conditions and the implementation of the law. "



23. According to the article. 10, paragraph 1. 1 of the Convention, that "everyone has the right to freedom of

speech. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and

impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and without

regardless of frontiers. "



24. The provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to

the information does not allow to provide the information about the decision-making activity of courts

in the form of judgments. This interferes with the fundamental right of

of the individual to information (under article 17 of the Charter) and the fundamental freedoms

individuals receive information (under article 10 of the Convention) and limits.



25. In this context, it is appropriate to point out, even on the more general case law of the

The European Court of human rights regarding the right to information.

To refer to the decision on admissibility of the complaint, the Association of the South Bohemia

Mothers in the United States. of 10.7.2006 no. 19101/03,

the explicit recognition of applicability lies in article 10 of the European Convention

in cases of refusal of a request for access to public or administrative

documents (cf.. Parliamentary Institute: the Access of non-governmental non-profit

the Organization of the courts in selected EU Member States in cases where the

It is a larger number of people vulnerable to discrimination, available at

http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/kps/pi/prace/pi-5-269.pdf). You can also

quote for example. judgment in case Campos of Daâmaso against Portugal

4, no complaints 16115/05, in which the reproduction of the indictment

journalist granted protection having regard to (among other things) the right

(the public) receive the information according to art. 10 of the Convention.



26. After all, or the Supreme Administrative Court in that judgment

does not deny that the contested norm is the intervention into the article. and article 17 of the Charter. 10

Of the Convention.



27. But not every restriction on a fundamental right of the individual is

unconstitutional. Specifically it predicts article. Article 17(1). 4 of the Charter: "the freedom to

of expression and the right to seek and disseminate information may be limited by law if it is

about the measure in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others, national security, public safety, the protection of

public health and morals. " Similarly, the talk article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention:

"The exercise of these freedoms, since it includes the duties and responsibilities, may

be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties, which

prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

national security, territorial integrity or public safety,

protection order and prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals,

the protection of the reputation or rights of others, to prevent leakage of confidential information

or maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. "



28. Thus, the intervention of the rights arising from article. 17 of the Charter and of the article. 10, paragraph 1. 1

The Convention violates the Charter and the Convention if it does not comply with the requirements

laid down in article 4(1). Article 17(1). and in article 4 of the Charter. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention. Must be

therefore found that the intervention was "provided for by law", whether watching a

or more of the legitimate aims set out in these provisions and whether the

"necessary in a democratic society" to reaching these goals.



29. with regard to the existence of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free

access to information is not in dispute that the intervention is "determined by law" in the

meaning of article 87(1). Article 17(1). 4 of the Charter and article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention.



30. Also condition the Constitutional Court considers that the legitimate objective for

filled with. The intervention may be seen as serving to protect the

the values quoted in the article. Article 17(1). and in article 4 of the Charter. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention.

In so far as the Constitutional Court agrees with the reasoning of the cited judgment

The Supreme Administrative Court.



31. However, the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the challenged standard does not meet the

the condition of the necessity of the restriction on the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in

of a democratic society.



32. the European Court of human rights considers that permanently in article 10

paragraph. 2 the Convention contained the adjective ' necessary ' incorporates the

the existence of a "pressing social need" [see Lingens judgment,

1986, cited. in the resolution of the Constitutional Court, SP. zn. IV. ÚS 606/03

of 19 December 2003. 4.2004 (23/33 SbNU 453)].



33. The key is the proposition that (naturally) cannot be a priori excluded that

the specific case will prevail over the protection of the fundamental rights of the

the cited values. that will be determined by the existence of "urgent

societal needs "to limit the basic rights (hereinafter referred to as" this

the proposition "). This is why it is necessary to examine in each case (according to the

the circumstances of the particular case) condition of the necessity of the restrictions

the basic rights and freedoms of individuals in a democratic society.



34. Indeed, this proposition follows from the case-law of the Constitutional Court. For example, the

in finding SP. zn. IV. TC 154/97 of 9 December 1996 on 2. the 1998 (N 17/10 SbNU 113)

The Constitutional Court stated that "in the face of basic political rights

the information and its dissemination to the law on the protection of the personality and the private

life, therefore, of fundamental rights, which stands at the same level, it will always

Affairs of independent courts, that taking into account the circumstances of each

individual case carefully consider whether one law was not

no reason given priority over other law. ".



35. After all, this thesis also spoke to the issue of the Administrative Court,

specifically, the municipal court in Prague, in the judgment of 23 March. 2.2007, SP. zn.

10 Ca 144/2005 (available in the system ASPI), while the Supreme Administrative

the Court in the judgment quoted. Municipal Court in this context

has stated that "Any conflict of the right to information with another

a fundamental human right ... must be due to a specific case

to assess which of these rights in the specific case is to be given

prefer ... Request to provide anonymised final

the judgments in the cases of some kind therefore cannot be rejected in General with

the fact that information about "the decision-making activity of courts" ... but it is necessary to

the need for and the specific reason leading to the restriction of the right to such

information to uniquely identify and assess whether in the present case is

restriction of this right is necessary. "



36. this proposition follows from case-law European Court of human rights.

For example, in the judgment in case Campos of Daâmaso against Portugal

4, no complaints 16115/05 (available in the system ASPI) [řešícím

the case of the publication of the text of the indictment a journalist before her official

the ordinary balance sheet within a specific management] it was noted: "32. Court

so it must now determine whether the disputed action corresponds to the ' urgent social

the need for "whether it was proportionate to the pursued legitimate objectives and whether the reasons

which is invoked by the national authorities for the purpose of its rationale,

seems like a "relevant and sufficient". 33. with regard to the circumstances of the

in the present case, the court first observes that article

the basis of the complainant was convicted, apparently dealt with the question of General

interest. ... 35. it is necessary to determine whether in the particular circumstances

the particular case of interest prevailed over the public information

"duties and responsibilities" ... " In this judgment, the European Court of

human rights at the outset of its review sets out that "31. In particular, you cannot

consider that the courts cannot be the subject of the present

earlier or at the same time ongoing debates elsewhere, whether in professional

magazines, the national press or in public as such. The Mission of the

media to disseminate such information and ideas corresponding to the right of the public

It is to receive. " This view can be applied to this case, since souzenou

This is merely about the assignment of judgment of the applicant for a simple nepravomocného

information (



converse

its publication in the newspaper and the subsequent debate, which concerned the

cited the judgment in case Campos Daâmaso against Portugal). Can be

to quote the famous judgment of the European Court of human rights in the case

The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (cf. e.g. 26.4.1979.

Berger, m.: jurisprudence of the European Court of human rights, 1.

Edition, IFEC, Prague, 2003, pp. 477-482), which concerned the prohibition

post information about ongoing civil proceedings,

saved the periodical. The European Court of human rights in this


the judgment of the deduced that an interference with the freedom of expression did not match the urgent

social need, which would have exceeded the public interest which are

associated with the freedom of expression; basing itself, in terms of article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention

on reasonable grounds and was not proportionate to the objective of, or

necessary in a democratic society to preserve the authority of the judiciary.

The last cited case designed by the European Court of human rights

turns out this rather well on souzenou thing now, when it is-as already mentioned

-only about the assignment of nepravomocného judgment the applicant for information

(as opposed to its publication in a newspaper, and possibly there the assessment judgment).



37. this argument has also been made, for example, in the recommendations of the Committee

of Ministers of the Council of Europe Rec (2003) 13 on the provision of information related

prosecution through the media (see for example: "... After

consideration of possible conflicting interests protected by articles 6, 8 and 10

The Convention and the need to ensure a balance between those rights with regard to the

the circumstances of each particular case, without being neglected inspection

the function of the European Court of human rights in ensuring commitments

arising out of the Convention ... "-retrieved from the above judgment in

things Campos Daâmaso against Portugal).



38. With this thesis, however, challenged the standard manifestly incompatible. Does not allow

namely to examine in each case (look the

things) the existence of a "pressing social need" to restrict the basic rights

(hence the necessity for the restriction of the Basic Law). Challenged the standard indicates that

always (automatically)-in the case of the existence of the law and the legitimate objective

the restriction of the fundamental right of the individual to information (to provide

nepravomocného of the judgment), that is, the values quoted in the article. Article 17(1). 4

Of the Charter and article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention-will be given preference these values

compared to the fundamental right of the individual to freedom of expression in the form of rights

on the information; Therefore, in any contested case (



a priori

the fundamental right of the individual is articulated). This also (strictly speaking) denies

notorietu [mj. resulting from the case-law of the Constitutional Court, cf. for example.

find in case SP. zn. PL. ÚS 15/96 dated 9.10.1996 (N 99/6 SbNU

213; 280/1996)], that the constitutional values (including constitutional rights) are



prima facie

equivalent. Standard conditions of challenged the necessity of the restrictions

the basic rights and freedoms of the individual in a democratic society in

essence is the postulate, for its assessment of the nepřezkoumatelný-

taking into account the circumstances of a particular case-has consistently taken.



39. In this context, it should be recalled that freedom of expression-

including in it according to the article. 10, paragraph 1. 1 of the Convention included freedom to receive

information-is one of the most important foundations of democratic

of the company; they are therefore particularly important warranty. You cannot see that

the right to information as a collection of information is an essential preparatory step

(among others.) first of all, in journalistic activity and is inherent in the protected

part of the freedom of the press. The functioning of the press involves the creation of a forum for the

public discussion. The implementation of this function, however, is not limited to media

and on the professional journalists. In which case it creates a space for

public discussion. in relation to non-governmental organisations, but also to

individuals. The purpose of the activity, i.e.. collect the information, you can therefore

regarded as one of the essential elements of an informed society.

The important role played by civil society in the discussion of public

issues. There is no doubt that judgment res judicata may address

matters of public interest; applicants for information are, or at least

may be involved in the legitimate collection of information about these

matters. Their goal may be to convey such information

to the public, and thereby contribute to the public debate, which in the Democratic

the rule of law not only legitimate but also necessary. The monopoly on information,

that the Court shall enjoy, as a form of censorship, sui generis. In

due to the censorship of the information monopoly may result in interference with the exercise

control functions, as well as civil society, since it may have

a similar function to print. The barriers set up to prevent

access to information of public interest can deter even those who work in

media and similar areas from their search. As a result,

not be able to continue to fulfil its role of public control and their

the ability to provide accurate and reliable information would be adversely

affected. Put more specifically, for example, in relation to the criminal

proceedings, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted recommendation Rec (2003) 13,

provision of information relating to criminal proceedings

through the media, in which correctly points out that with regard to the

right of the public to receive information they have a right to the public media

inform, and underlines the importance of reporting on criminal proceedings, which

preparing media for the purpose of informing the public, and to allow

public to realize its right to oversee the operation of the criminal

the judiciary. Indeed, in the annex to the recommendation is noted. the right to

the public to receive information about the activities of law enforcement

control through the media, which includes the right of journalists to

free report on the functioning of the criminal justice system (cf. above

cited the judgment of the European Court of human rights in case Campos

Daâmaso against Portugal). There is no reason to nedomnívat that can be

the arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, not only on the print, but also on the ability to

access of civil society to information of public interest.



40. the Constitutional Court emphasises that it will be necessary to examine in each

of the individual case (depending on the circumstances of a particular case) the fulfillment of conditions

the necessity of the restrictions on the fundamental right of the individual to information here

and limitations of the right to the granting of the judgment in nepravomocného.



Vi. (d))



41. On an existing view that a ban on the provision of judgments is

justified the constitutional value of the independence and impartiality of judicial protection

power is no longer responded to the arguments above (cf. paragraph 33 et seq..

This finding). It cannot be



a priori

ruled out that in the particular case will be the protection of the fundamental rights of

such information prevail over another constitutional value, i.e. protected.

that will be determined by the existence of a "pressing social need" for the restriction

the basic law. Here you cannot see that the constitutional values (including

constitutional rights) are



prima facie

equivalent (cf. section 38 of this finding). It is necessary to reflect

case-law of the European Court of human rights, according to which it cannot be and

priori that matters present courts cannot be the subject of

earlier or at the same time ongoing debates elsewhere, whether in professional

magazines, the national press or in public as such (cf. section

36 this finding).



42. While the public discussion on the matter addressed by the Court without further (t. j.

automatically) may not interfere with the independence and impartiality of the judicial

power. Presumption of the judge (e.g., critical in the appellate instance of

about the nepravomocně yet finished things) abounds with sufficient personality

the modes (otherwise it would not be a judge appointed), garantujícími its

the ability to decide the matter independently and impartially, even independently of the

event. opinion, in the public area [e.g. judges, moreover,.

the oath, m. j., will be in accordance with your faith and

conscience to decide independently and impartially-cf. § 62 para. 1 of the law on

courts and judges and, indeed, whether or not § 79 paragraph 2. 1 of Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on

the courts, judges, lay judges and the State administration of courts and amending

some other laws (law on courts and judges)]. Of the like

the opinion is also the case law of the European Court of human rights (cf..

for example. top cited the judgment in case Campos Daâmaso against Portugal:

"Besides, in case no judge could not decide who would not

a career judge, which reduced the risk that the articles, such as article

at issue in the main proceedings, have affected the outcome of the proceedings. The Court in the

Esposende acknowledged that the publication of the contested article in no way derail the progress of the

the investigation ... In addition, the Government did not specify how the publication of the contested article

could interfere with the investigation in question... ").



43. Apart from this, a public debate on the matter solved non-definitive

the judgment, it may contribute to an independent and impartial decision making,

because sometimes it can reveal the existence of undue influences on the judicial

decision making. This is just one of the senses of the basic right to information

as a derivative of freedom of expression. Legitimate objective of public discussion is

public accountability of the venue justice, judging in broad daylight,

not in the dark chambers of the court proceedings. On the contrary, judging the under

the public is eligible to reduce the authority of the judiciary, as it may generate

the suspicion to the public that "there is nothing to hide" (in the sense of the venue

the injustice). Without trust is not a proper exercise of the official authority in the

democratic state possible. The element of trust is so functional condition

the performance of the democratic public authorities and, therefore, it is necessary to trust in the acts

the public can protect; trust in judicial decision-making is an essential

mimoprávní attributes of the rule of law [cf. find SP. zn. IV. TC 525/02


dated News (N 131/31 SbNU 173)]. The authority of the judiciary, moreover,

referred to as public interest-eligible limit a fundamental right or freedom

-even the Convention on protection of human rights and freedoms in article. 10, paragraph 1. 2.

Public authorities must take into account what your expectations

the procedure and activities. As a result of the censorship of the information

monopoly (in the form of a flat prohibition to provide nepravomocné judgments)

Therefore, you may experience interference with the exercise of public functions, that

It is for not only the press, but also of civil society, and in its consequences

and the authority of the judiciary. A priori (unlimited) exclusion

public control of the failure and the judgments would therefore be

expression of an inadequate understanding of the meaning of the basic right to information and

freedom of expression in relation to a public authority, and the lack of reflection

the meaning of public control of public power. Even the Court's power authority, which

It exercises the power in the State, so it is subject to public control.



44. Indeed, and therefore constitutional command article. paragraph 96. 2 in fine of the Constitution,

According to which "the judgment shall be delivered always publicly.". The judgment of the

It is basically a written copy of what is already publicly declared was

(see also the text below); If he had would be rationally defensible

a flat ban on the provision of judgments in order to protect

independence and impartiality of the judiciary, he would have to pay from-logically-

for the same reason also ban public judgment (at first instance)

at all.



45. even so, can be considered that any public debate (especially professional),

not unreasonably criticize nepravomocné judgments, can surely its

argumentative fundovaností contribute to a fair outcome in the

the ongoing court proceedings. In that can hardly be reasonably see intervention in

independence and impartiality of the judiciary; After all, according to § 82 para. 2

Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on courts and judges as amended laws,

the judge must consider the continuous education about deepening their

legal and other professional knowledge required for the proper performance of

function.



46. The hypothetical opinion advocating-in order to protect the independence and

impartiality of the judiciary-general prohibition provision nepravomocných

at the same time admitting at a flat rate of judgments and final provision

judgments, whether or not on a logical account of final judgments that can

realistically be changed; It is also relatively often happens, by the extraordinary

appeals or constitutional complaint or a complaint to the European

Court of human rights.



Vi. e)



47. There is also the view that the State should in private law relations at all

not be the person liable to provide the information, and that res judicata

the judgment resolves the private relationship between the State (so that in

court proceedings equal status as any other party to the proceedings), and

natural or legal person, the State should not have even never-

the obligation to provide nepravomocné judgments; If by virtue of the participation

in proceedings required by the State granting the nepravomocného judgment, then it would

State-in this case-he had to bear greater responsibility than the other

party to the proceedings. Extent of obligations are dictated by the civil procedure rules

and they are pursued by a dispute for both parties the same.



48. Such a conclusion, however, misses the above-mentioned constitutional law

argument, which is that in the case of collision of constitutional values

they need to be addressed with regard to the particular circumstances of each case).



49. that view is based on a far-fetched premise further, that the provision of

nepravomocného judgment is required from the State in the position of the participant

the proceedings before the General Court in private litigation arising from such

participation in court proceedings. Fundamental rights (i.e. the right to

However, public information) are subjective rights, i.e. the addressee

obligations (i.e. observe these rights and protect them, i.e. positively something

do) is a public power. The provision of nepravomocného judgment is required

from the State as from the bearer of public authority, because the required information

(res judicata) is the result of decision-making powers, thus

the result of the realization of the public authority (not private acts). Therefore,

in the case of the obligation to comply with the requirement for the provision of such information

the State did not carry a greater degree of responsibility than the other party to the proceedings; such

the obligation of the State-as the nobility-is founded in a completely different

the legal title that does not affect the legal status of the participant

control in your own private dispute.



50. The conclusion that the addressee of the basic right to information under article. 17

The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms is not state as a participant

private legal proceedings, but the State as a bearer of public authority,

they aren't even the view that not only the Court, but also other State authority.

acting as a party before the Court-will be required to

give judgment res judicata, if the applicant so requests, and he

the requested information will be available. The addressee of the basic law

the information referred to in article 14(2). 17 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms is the State

(as a recipient of State power) rather than the Court or other State authority. If

There is a law on the provision of information and

the obligation of the State to provide information, in terms of meaning and purpose

This right is irrelevant, that the State authority the required information

provide. Such a different Government Department (in the case of the claimant Ministry

Finance) will act as a body of State power, as well as the Court, in

both cases will be the same authority (the State). This is also defined by the difference

between the hypothetical situations in which the Court was not acting in civil proceedings

as a participant State, but up to the present. two natural persons; in this case,

then it could not be allowed to require information (res judicata) from

party to the proceedings, i.e., from private persons.



51. After all, the obligation to provide judgment res judicata can hardly

be (from the nature of things) breach of the principle of equality of arms, equality

procedural status under the code of civil procedure. It is the Act of excluding

framework of civil procedure unrelated to him. As to the

implementation of the public service obligations based on other legislation

than a standard, private (this obligation is based on the law of the administrative

and the constitutional law). After all, even if not listed above, it would not be

This in no way interfered with the procedural rights of a party to proceedings pursuant to

Code of civil procedure. Sense and the purpose of the principle of equality of arms,

equal rights and obligations in civil (and other) proceedings before a

the authority is to guarantee the conditions for a fair outcome of the proceedings; because you would

have absentovat, if one of the parties was in the process of

Typically, one (inability to translate their own claim and evidence

etc.). The case, however, clearly not in on.



52. it is also noted that as to the meaning and purpose of the fundamental right to

information is not (in principle) the essential, whether the judgment is res judicata concerns

private dispute (e.g. between the State as the owner and the third

person, etc.) or things public. Sense and purpose of the right to

information is the public exercise of State control (judicial) authority;

This is the logic of things implemented-and thus eligible to be subject to legitimate

control-not only in decision-making on public matters, but also in

decisions on disputes under private law (and in the latter

When it comes to authoritative decision-making on the rights, responsibilities of the persons

that may be on the rise. abused, etc.). From the perspective of teleology article. 17

Of the Charter and article. 10 of the Convention may be the difference between deciding private law

disputes and public affairs consist merely in degree (not in principle)

the interest of the public, as it can often be higher in the case of the examination

matter of public interest; the public will then be checked not only the actual

actions of the Court, but will be interested to know. evaluate the factual

information about what happened before the start of court proceedings, up to the present. about

the management of the State. The public interest it is possible to find-as

for example, the Constitutional Court said. in finding SP. zn. I. ÚS 260/06 dated

24.1.2007 (N 10/44 SbNU 129)-and in the activities of the State in the form of management

with the property of the State; the management of the property of the State, m. j. going on the conclusion

private-law contracts, which in the future may also generate

private law disputes. In that finding, the Constitutional Court. aproboval

the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court in the former proceedings, according to which

the conduct of the State enterprise can be regarded as an act in the public

interest due to business with the use of State of the entrusted property. The constitutional

the Court in the abovementioned findings also pointed out the views of the part of the professional

literature, according to which it is possible under the term "public institution managing

with public funds "within the meaning of the law on free access to

information (and therefore under the body obliged to provide information) to include

even a company to be formed by the State.



53. the Opinion that the State should in private law relations should not be

the person liable to provide information, it is therefore contrary to the thesis that, even

the management of the property of the State (that is, inter alia, private relations, on


with one hand he performs State) is undoubtedly in the public interest (and

It already because it's about money management selected m. j. from the tax

taxpayers, therefore they have a legitimate claim to control it; to do this,

CF.. also high priority individuals against the State as part of the

the rule of law), so it makes sense and purpose of the article. and article 17 of the Charter. 10

Convention turns out. Indeed, reasoning that the State should in private law relations

should not be the person liable to provide information, does not reflect

consistently meaning and purpose and podústavní editing. Entry into force of the amendment to the

the law on free access to information made by law No. 61/2006

SB. namely, a compulsory subject under the Act on free

access to information is also a "public institution



managing public funds

“. In this way the legislature explicitly pointed out that the question of the management of

public funds is in the public interest, that it has to be subject to public

inspection. The legal definition of "public money" is contained in section 2 of the

(a). g) Act No. 320/2001 Coll., on financial control, as amended by

amended: "public finances, belongings, property rights and other

assets belonging to the State or to another legal person referred to in

(a)) ". Even though it was cited by an amendment to the information act the phrase

"managing public funds" released (section 2 (1)), then

for example, in finding SP. zn. I. ÚS 260/06 (see above), it was explained that the

purpose was to guarantee the right to information relating to the scope of the

public institutions, regardless of whether it is running a public

resources or not. You must also realize that the idea that the State should in

private law relations should not be the person liable to provide the

the information opens up a potential space for corruption and other similar

negative phenomena.



54. It remains to add that sense provide judgments can

tkvět in the predictability of judicial decisions and can go to source

interpretation of the law, that is, about the source of the legal arguments. On the logic of

the case does not alter the fact that these judgments may be later

modified. After all, even a final judgment may be dropped, and published

are also different opinions of the judges considered the majority.



Vi. f)



55. the Constitutional Court, however, found another reason to support the finding of a

unconstitutionality of the challenged law.



56. the said law does not meet the condition of necessity limit

the basic rights and freedoms of individuals in a democratic society and

Therefore, it will be possible to achieve often pursued a legitimate aim

(protection of the cited values) using a different resource, neomezujícího

the basic right to an extent (or the denial of the fundamental right to freedom of

the speech will not be necessary). The standard therefore does not meet the (challenged under

measurement of the standing constitutional values colliding) condition

the need, IE. the condition, which consists in the comparison of the legislative

resource, the official constitutional values, with other measures,

that allow you to achieve the same goal, but constitutional values

nedotýkajícími.



57. Expressed somewhat differently, the impugned law in this sense

stand up already with regard to her conflict with the article. 4 (4). 4 of the Charter, which

forces the use of provisions on limits of fundamental rights and freedoms

to save their essence and meaning. Therefore, if everyone has the right to information,

then the law that the right to seek and disseminate information limits (section 17(2).

4 of the Charter), you cannot cancel this right basically (negate), and thus is

Thus, excluded. Therefore does not respect the principle of affected standard minimization

interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms in the form of their possible limitations, and

maximizing the retention of the basic content of law.



58. In this context, it can be pointed out in particular to the provisions of section 7 of the Act

about free access to information, according to which if the requested

information in accordance with the law (Law No. 412/2005 Coll. on

the protection of classified information and security)

for classified information to which the applicant has authorized access, required

the body does not provide it. Pursuant to section 8a of the Act on free access to

information information about personality, expressions of personal nature,

the individual's privacy and personal data will provide the statutory body only

accordance with the legislation governing their protection (for example, section

11 through 16 of the civil code, section 5 and 10 of the law No. 101/2000 Coll., on the

protection of personal data and on amendments to certain laws). Under section 9 of the Act on

free access to information, if the required information is

trade secret (section 17 of Act No. 513/1991 Coll., the commercial code),

It does not provide a statutory body. Pursuant to section 10 of the Act on free access to

information information about the financial circumstances of the person who is not a mandatory

the body, obtained on the basis of the laws on taxes, fees, pension

or health insurance or social security, statutory body

under this Act does not provide. The provisions of § 11 of the law on free

access to information then establishes additional restrictions on the right to information;

for example, in the paragraph. 2 (a). (c)) prohibits the provision of information, if the

This was broken by the protection of the rights of third persons to the subject of rights

of the copyright. The provisions of § 12 of the Act on free access to information

then States that any restrictions on the right to information, performs the required

body by providing the required information, including accompanying

information after the exclusion of the information on which it lays down the law (the law of the

deny information lasts only as long as it takes to the reason for the denial; in

justified cases, statutory body shall check whether the reason for the denial takes).

The content of section 12 of the Act on free access to information is so rule

selection; This corresponds to the requirement that justified limiting access to

the information has always been applied only to the least extent necessary. Only

This provision thus infuse and guarantees the minimisation of the intervention request

the fundamental right or freedom rather than challenged standard, which basically

denies the basic right to information-in her case, at all.



59. There may be invoked and the explanatory memorandum to the following provisions of the Act on

free access to information. There it says: "an exception to this

the rules will be information whose provision of the draft law expressly

excludes or limits to the extent necessary. In particular, the information that is

on the basis of the act declared classified, or information that would

breach of privacy protection and the privacy of the people ... The provisions governing the

exceptions to the right of access to information that is expressed in the

the previous provisions. Restrictions on the right of access to information is

based constitutionally. The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms permits protect

information prior to the provision "If the measure of a democratic society

necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, security of the State and the public

safety "(article 17, paragraph 4, of the Charter). pronounced positive law

Each personality and protection to prevent unauthorised

by publishing information about yourself (article 10 of the Charter). The exceptions

(the limit) guarantees the law so that defines the criteria to determine the information

that the statutory body may not. may not provide. " (cf.

www.psp.cz)



Vi. g)



60. the applicant argues, even pointing to the article. paragraph 96. 2 in fine

Of the Constitution, according to which "the judgment shall be delivered always publicly." In this

the context of logically argues that the judgment is only the written

the drawing-up of what was already publicly published.



61. The Supreme Administrative Court's reasoning in this regard is greatly

unconvincing. Limits are basically just on the Declaration of the granting of

information about the judgment and its conditions of promulgation are two completely

different legal institutions.



62. The Supreme Administrative Court, however, leaves out the maximum internal

control and consistency of the rule of law. The rule of law, based on the

the principles of unity of rationality and internal content control, with

inevitably the same imperative on a comparable legal preview

institutes, although modified in different laws or even

sectors [cf. e.g. Constitutional Court, SP. zn. PL. ÚS 73/06 of

June 29 (N 23/48 SbNu 263; 291/2008 Coll.), paragraph 50]. For similar

He principles in its case law the Supreme Administrative

the Court. For instance, in its judgment in SP. zn. 2 Afs 81/2004 (available on

www.nssoud.cz) stated identically, that "the rule of law, based on the principles of

unity of rationality and internal content control, necessarily

brings the same imperative Preview on comparable legal institutions, albeit

modified in different laws or even sectors. " In

judgment SP. zn. 5 Afs 138/2004 (available at www.nssoud.cz)

The Supreme Administrative Court held that interpretation cannot be accepted, "according to the

between public and private that liability there is a substantial

the difference; Moreover, it follows from the decision of the enlarged Board

The Supreme Administrative Court (1 Afs 86/2004, InStr. URwww.nssoud.cz). "



63. While there is no doubt that the meaning of the constitutional terms of public

the judgment, without exception, and the meaning of the provision and the nepravomocného


the judgment is similar; t. j. to allow the participation of the public as a guarantee of public

control of the judiciary. This Constitutional soda dealt with in the previous text

This finding (paragraph 44).



64. As noted already, the Constitutional Court in its finding SP. zn. Pl. ÚS

28/04 of 8.11.2005 (N 205/39 SbNU 171; 20/2006 Coll.), "General legal

Note traditionally sees the right to a public hearing of the case as a tool

public control of the judiciary. The purpose of the public hearing "is to make each

He could assure himself of how the State held the justice,

an audience becomes impossible to control all the strannost

the judges "(cf. the password" public ", in: Encyclopaedia Rieger, IX, Prague

1872, p. 997). The purpose of the public hearing of the case has been for a long

time in the Czech lands considered to be the only one. From the case law

the Czechoslovak first Republic the Supreme Court has repeatedly

given that "the purpose of that law to the provisions of the neveřejnosti the main

version only tracks, proceedings was held without a permit

public control. " In this one the purpose of public capital

the trial is not according to the law the distinction between proceedings before the jury and before

the Senate and does not monitor the law's intent, even when the jury in particular, would be a powerful

the impression of the mood of his audience in the jury courtroom of radiations at the jury "[cf.

decision No. 4336/1932 in: f. Serious, Supreme Court decisions

Czechoslovak Republic in criminal matters (hereinafter referred to as "serious"), XIII,

1932, p. 567]. Likewise, the former Supreme Court came to the

the conclusion that "the purpose of the Act is the public accountability of the venue

Justice, judging on the white day, not in the dark secret of the

control. Therefore, the concept of the public served as opposed to secret and is

just a matter of praktikability the extent to which it can be restored to the audience

access to the version for the investigation of unbreakable postulátu of inadmissibility

impacts adversely on the legal procedure and the factors to

It súčasněné "(cf. decision No 1729/1925, in: Serious, VI, 1925

page 549). "



65. The applicant must therefore be put in this direction for the truth that even from the

the perspective of the article. paragraph 96. 2 in fine of the Constitution cannot be accepted a priori exclusion

provide nepravomocné the judgments of those who provide them.



VII.



66. For all these reasons, the Constitutional Court upheld the design and the word

"final" in section 11 (1) 4 (b). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on the

free access to information, as amended, on the date of

the publication of this finding in the statute book, set aside, and that conflict with the

articles 17, paragraph 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 4, paragraph 2. 4 of the Charter of fundamental rights and

liberties and with article 10, paragraph 1. 1 and 2 of the Convention for the protection of human rights and

fundamental freedoms.



67. The Constitutional Court just to make sure it adds that the arguments and conclusions in the

This finding does not apply to judgments of the cancelled or changed (Note:

this case, moreover, cannot be a "judgment" within the meaning of § 11 (1) 4

(a). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free access to information, in

as amended, cancelled or changed since the judgment already



de jure

It is not in the range in which it has been canceled or changed-exist).



The President of the Constitutional Court:



JUDr. Rychetský in r.



Different opinions under section 14 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court,

as amended, a decision of the plenary, the judges adopted a Vlasta

Formankova, Pavel Holländer, Jiří Mucha, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský

and Michaela, and his justification of the April judge Dagmar Lastovecká.