123/2010 Sb.
FIND
The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic of
The Constitutional Court ruled on 30 November. March 2010 in plenary in the composition of Stanislav
Package, Francis Skinner, Vlasta Formankova, Turgut Güttler, Pavel
Holländer, Ivana Janů, Vladimir Crust, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jiří Mucha,
Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Výborný, Eliška
April Wagner and Michael about the design of Mgr. f. k. Ph.d., cancellation
the word "final" in section 11 (1) 4 (b). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on the
free access to information, as amended,
United with constitutional complaints against the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court
of 29 April 2004. 4.2009 No. 8/2008 As 50-75,
as follows:
The provisions in section 11 (1) 4 (b). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free
access to Information Act, as amended, is deleted in
the word "final" on the date of publication of this finding in the statute book.
Justification:
(I).
The progress of the proceedings and a recap of the proposal
1. On 17. 7.2009 received the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court of the petitioner,
the annulment of the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 June.
4.2009 No. 8/2008 As 50-75, for violation of their fundamental right to
information according to art. 17 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms (hereinafter referred to as
"The Charter").
In the former case municipal court in Prague, by judgment of 18 March 2004. 6.2008, no.
j. 9 Ca 4/2007, 43, dismissed the complainant against the decision of the Minister
Finance of the day 30. 10.2006, no. 10/99 897/2006-RK, which was
rejected the complainant's breakdown against a decision of the Treasury Department
29 April 2004. 9.2006, no. 22/92219/2006/3341IK-255, and at the same time confirmed
This decision on the partial refusal of information or failure to provide
the judgments of the courts in legal actions against the purchasers of the property for valuable consideration
converted by the Fund of children and youth in the "disposal" pursuant to Act No. 367/2000
Coll. repealing Fund children and youth and on changes of some acts, in
as amended, which did not enter into legal force. Against this
the judgment of the municipal court, the complainant filed an appeal in cassation, which, however,
was the judgment under appeal rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court. The highest
Administrative Court ruled, with regard to the judgments of the nepravomocné, to the
decision-making activity of courts is necessary to accommodate even these judgments (if they are
the final judgments of the decision-making activities of the courts, there is no reason to
This activity also judgments have not been nepravomocné, and vice versa). The provisions of the
§ 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Information Act therefore clearly prevents
the compulsory subjects in the provision of any information about the decision-making
judicial activities (with the exception of the provision of information in the form of final
judgments). This rather then the provisions of this Act prevents the provision of
information about the decision-making activity of courts in the form of judgments which have not yet
did not enter into legal force. The Supreme Administrative Court further stated that he
It is not for the courts to carry crucial to whether adjustment of the provisions of § 11
paragraph. 4 (b). (b)), in the version information Act effective from 23. 3.2006,
He is happy or not, the Court held, however, that is not in conflict with the law on
information, guaranteed the constitutional order, and in particular article. Article 17(1). 5
The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms. Restrictions on the right to information about
decision-making activity of courts is in principle based on the denial of
public access to any information on the decision-making activity
the courts (cf. the provision of information in the form of final judgments). This
the restriction is limited by the requirement not to intervene in the process-in the
the interest of objectivity and impartiality of the assessment of each case-to own
the decision-making activities of the Court (including the decision-making activities in the form of
judgments), and further is limited and necessary measures
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morality, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, prevent the disclosure of confidential
information or maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary [article 10
paragraph. 2 Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (also
"the Convention")]. The exercise of freedom of expression and the right to information can be
therefore limited by law. in the interest of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
of the judiciary.
2. The core of the constitutional complaint is a matter of interpretation of the provisions of § 11 (1) 4
(a). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free access to information, in
as amended, (hereinafter referred to as "the law on free access to
the information "or" information ") for the use of the law of constitutional principles and
the limits referred to in article 14(2). 17 and article. 4 (4). 4 of the Charter of fundamental rights and
freedoms, in particular the case of the request the complainant to provide
judgments of the courts. The Ministry of finance denied to provide
the complainant copies of judgments in matters concerned with the position of the participant
took part in the proceedings, by pointing to their nature of res judicata.
The complainant considers that the judgments as the results of activities
the courts are the exceptions laid down by law closely-public. Referred to
applies all the more if the information required about them from the authority of
public authority which acted in the proceedings preceding them in the dispute about the
the property of the State. The question of the judgment itself is not, in the opinion
the complainant, a criterion that would be able to fill material
the conditions of the restrictions on the right to information referred to in article 25(2). Article 17(1). 4 of the Charter of
fundamental rights and freedoms. Such a restriction is not only he could be unfaithful
a basic political right of the complainant, but also historical sense, and
the purpose of the public adjudication, which is to contribute to the long term
confidence in the predictability, transparency and justice itself
the system of justice.
3. together with the constitutional complaint, the complainant submitted the proposal to repeal section
the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to
information, and specifically the word "final".
4. the first Chamber of the Constitutional Court did not find the reason for the rejection of the constitutional
the appellants ' complaints pursuant to section 43 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the constitutional
the Court, in the wording of later regulations (hereinafter referred to as the "law on the constitutional
the Court "), since the application of the contested provisions of the occurrence of the event
that is the subject of a constitutional complaint. The formal prerequisites of its
hearing pursuant to § 43 para. 1 are fulfilled and the constitutional complaint was not
found to be manifestly unfounded pursuant to § 43 para. 2 (a). and) cited
the law. Therefore, the first Chamber within the meaning of § 78 para. 1 of this Act, the procedure for
a constitutional complaint (interrupted by order of the busiest SP. zn. I. ÚS
1885/09, available on http://nalus.usoud.cz/Search/Search.aspx) and the draft
on cancellation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Act, forward the full Court
The decision of the Constitutional Court according to article. 87 para. 1 of the Constitution of the United
Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution").
II.
Recap of the observations of the parties
5. The Constitutional Court has requested, in accordance with the provisions. section 69 of the Act on the Constitutional Court
representation of the parties-both houses of Parliament.
6. The Chamber of deputies in its observations on the draft just zrekapitulovala
the course of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the law zakotvujícího
the contested provisions and indicated that the legislature acted in
the belief that the law is adopted in accordance with the Constitution and with our legal
of procedure. In conclusion, it expressed agreement with the abandonment of the oral proceedings.
7. The Senate in its observations on the draft legislative progress recounted
the process leading to the adoption of the law zakotvujícího the contested provisions.
Among other things, stated that the objective of section 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the
free access to information was approved by the Senate amendment,
that the present legal template expanded so that, in substance,
applicants for information could be instead of the proposed final
the judgments provided by all final decisions of the courts. In any of the
newsgroup messages, which were in the course of the hearing of the Senate to the content
the draft law, challenging the constitutionality of the papers presented in the classroom procedure
restrict the provision of judicial decision only, which has acquired a legal
power. The Senate discussed the Bill containing the appellant contested
the part of the designated section 11 para. 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to
information within the limits of the Constitution laid down the competence and constitutionally established by the
way. The contradiction of the legal provisions of the Namítaný with the article. 17
paragraph. 4 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms of the Senate when acting on it
did not find. The Senate agreed with the abandonment of the oral proceedings.
8. The Constitutional Court has requested (according to the provisions of section 48 (2) and § 49 paragraph 1.
1 of the law on the Constitutional Court) and the representation of the Ministry of Justice,
that, however, did not respond within the specified period.
III.
The diction of the contested provisions of the Act
9. The provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to
information added: incumbents do not provide further information about the
decision-making activity of courts, with the exception of final judgments. "
IV.
The appellants ' locus standi
10. Standing of the applicant to submit a proposal is under consideration
dovoditelná to the provisions of section 74 of the Act on the Constitutional Court. The petitioner thus
meets the defined terms of locus standi for Administration of the
proposal to the Constitutional Court.
In the.
The constitutional conformity of the legislative process
11. Pursuant to § 68 para. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court-in addition to
assessment of compliance of the contested law with constitutional law – checks whether the
the law was adopted and issued within the limits of the Constitution laid down the competence and
constitutionally prescribed way.
12. given that the applicant did not defect to the legislative
process, or exceeding the Constitution laid down the competence of the legislature, is not
having regard to the principles of procedural economy to examine this question more closely
and it is sufficient, in addition to taking into account the observations submitted by the
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, formal verification during the legislative process of the
publicly available information sources on http://www.psp.cz.
13. the contested the wording of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) was inserted into the law on
free access to information by the amendment made by Act No 61/2006
Coll., amending Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free access to
information, as amended, law No. 121/2000 Coll., on the
Copyright, rights related to copyright and on the amendment
certain laws (Copyright Act), as amended by Act No. 81/2005 Coll., and
Act No. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities (municipal establishment), as amended
rules (print no. 991). This law was adopted by the
House of the day 14.10.2005. The Chamber of Deputies, the Senate returned the law with
amendments (resolution No. 250), but the Chamber of Deputies
She remained on the original draft law (resolution No. 2153). The law has been
declared in the collection of the Act in the amount of 26 under the number 61/2006 Coll., Constitutional
the Court therefore finds that the law was enacted and issued within the limits of the Constitution
set out competences and constitutionally prescribed way.
Vi.
Reviews of the Constitutional Court
Vi. a)
14. the appellant first submits an alternative to the Constitutional Court, that section 11
paragraph. 4 (b). (b)) of the law on free access to information could be
regarded as vyložitelné in the sense that it does not prohibit the provide
nepravomocné judgments of the courts. The opposite interpretation (espoused by mj. The highest
the Administrative Court in a judgment dated dated 29.4.2009 No. 8/2008 As 50-75)
your rapporteur considers it "too restrictive".
15. the applicant has submitted the first control, so the question of the interpretation of the
the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to
the information in the sense that it prohibits or does not prohibit
nepravomocné judgments of courts provide.
16. The Constitutional Court has come to the conclusion that the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))
the law on free access to information is not ústavněkonformně
vyložitelné when it comes to the ability to provide information to nepravomocné
judgments of courts. The legislator in section 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the
free access to information used to enumerate exhaustively. Therefore,
provide information about the decision-making activity of courts can be only in the form of
final judgments. Of arg.
converse
(indirectly) implies a prohibition to provide information about other activities,
i.e.. including judgments. Otherwise, textuálně
enshrined permission to provide information about the decision-making activity of courts
only in the form of final judgments to lose any reasonable sense.
The opposite interpretation would could not be accepted or application of constitutional rules
to interpret national law, for as it follows from the case law of the constitutional
[cf. e.g. find SP. zn. PL. ÚS 73/06 dated 29/1 (N 23/48
SbNU 263; 297/2008 Coll.) *, point 31]-this rule is applicable to the
the situation of double (or vícerého) possible interpretation of legislation; otherwise,
should no longer logically there was no interpretation of the law, but about the creation of the law. For
the completeness of the Constitutional Court States that this (the only possible) interpretation cannot be
interpretation of the restrictive (as the appellant wrongly), as
on the contrary, based on the literal (and exhaustively formulated) the wording of § 11 (1) 4
(a). (b)) of the law on free access to information. The restrictive interpretation
means that speaking is refraining from the legislature with a narrower range than
corresponds to the text of the literal, expression used to indicate more than
the legislature actually intended.
17. in this context, refers to the relevant part of the Constitutional Court
the preamble above cited judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court: "on
23.3. 2006 came into effect the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))
Information Act, in the version in force at the material time, according to which
incumbents do not provide information about the decision-making activity of courts, with the
the exception of the final judgments. The amendment of the Information Act (Law No.
61/2006 Coll.) join the original text, the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b).
(b) of the Act (information) "compulsory bodies do not provide further information about the
decision-making activity of courts ") compulsory subjects with effect from 23. 3.
2006 a unique obligation to, make a final judgment.
But this is not a trivial clarification of the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))
Information Act only in that direction, that incumbents must
make final judgments of courts. This amendment has serious implications
for a definition of "the decision-making activity of courts" in relation to the scope of
information obligations of the competent bodies. Written copies of the judgments
are always outputs the decision-making activity of courts, bearing the necessarily information
about this their activity in a specific case (operative part and grounds of the judgment).
For the decision-making activity within the meaning of the provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b))
information law is therefore to be considered not only the procedure of the courts in
proceedings and their acts to establish the facts of the case and to
its law, but also its own adjudication, respectively.
decision on the merits. From the diction "mandatory entities do not provide further
information about the decision-making activity of courts, with the exception of final
judgments "then it follows that the final judgments, or the results of the
decision-making activity of courts in the form of final judgments, they are as
exceptions to this activity directly from the law a necessary part of the decision-making
the activities of the courts (in the decision-making activity of courts, therefore, by definition, include the
final judgments). If then for judgments nepravomocné, be (i)
here to conclude that in the decision-making activity of courts is necessary to accommodate and
these judgments are the final judgments (the decision-making activity of courts,
There is no reason that this activity was not also the judgments in nepravomocné,
on the contrary). The provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the information act
clearly prevents the compulsory subjects in the provision of any
information about the decision-making activity of courts (with the exception of the provision of information
in the form of final judgments). This rather then the provisions of this Act
prevents the provision of information about the decision-making activity of courts in the form of
the judgments that have not yet have legal power. This is because, if
are subject to statutory exclusions for information about the decision-making activity of courts
as such (with the exception of final judgments) cannot be provided, or
information about this activity, as enshrined in judgments nepravomocných
(argumentum converse, which reveals the meaning of legal norms by
the rules of formal logic) ... "
Vi. (b))
18. In terms of the content of the proposal the applicant so the question arose of the constitutional
conformance to the standards, which prohibits the granting of nepravomocných
judgments, but permits the granting of final judgments
(hereinafter referred to as "the contested norm").
19. The Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment that deduced the constitutional
souladnost contested the legal standards.
20. on the contrary, the appellant in support of his conclusion on the unconstitutionality
the contested States essentially the following standards. The requirement to provide
judgments that the claimant planned to use as a source
interpretation of the law, and the source of the legal arguments, it could not in any way
cause interference with the course of the judicial process or to its own decision-making
the activities of the Court. If disclosure of the nepravomocných decision should
compromise the decision-making activities of the Court, it did not and could not be such
the decision for the same reason, or publicly announced. If you could
actually lead to conflict with the right to protection of personality, with the right to
protection of personal data and privacy, it is necessary to find solutions to the first
using other less restrictive legal institutions, legal standards, and
only after this failed to apply the provisions of restrictive
the right to information. In the case of eg. the right to protection of personal data or
privacy includes a provision providing sufficient protection for these
the rights of the law on free access to information in section 8a, which
refers to the legal provisions governing their protection. For more
adequate protection or "insurance policy" includes the provisions of § 12 of the Act on
free access to information. The argument of the Supreme Administrative Court,
that this decision can be varied nepravomocná as a result of their review of the
major changes, it's relevant, but it is a fact that the applicant must
count and with information. The applicant must in this
the case to know that nepravomocné is not immutable and the decision is not
the final, but it can't be a reason for refusing to grant this
decision as information. As a source of interpretation of law
published not only the final decisions, but for example. even different views whether
I headed to the Court. The European Court of human rights.
In addition, a final judgment may not be the final decision on the matter,
Since it can be canceled for example. by the decision of the Supreme Court or Constitutional
the Court. If it is ruled by the principle of public court proceedings and the judgment shall
without exception, announces the public, data concerning the RES
neskončeného of the control of the de facto published are (whether during the
control itself, or the announcement of the judgment), and the judgment is no longer
only a written copy of what has already been published.
Vi. (c))
21. The Constitutional Court-the justification for the proposal nevázaje, but merely his
Petite-the examination of the constitutionality of the contested stepped up to the standards.
22. According to the article. Article 17(1). 1 of the Charter, that "freedom of expression and the right to
information are guaranteed. " According to the article. Article 17(1). 2 of the Charter, "Each
has the right to express their opinions by Word, print, printing, image or
in another way, as well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart
ideas and information regardless of frontiers. " According to the article. Article 17(1). 5
Of the Charter, "State bodies and territorial self-government bodies are
required to adequately provide information about their activities.
Conditions and the implementation of the law. "
23. According to the article. 10, paragraph 1. 1 of the Convention, that "everyone has the right to freedom of
speech. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and without
regardless of frontiers. "
24. The provisions of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free access to
the information does not allow to provide the information about the decision-making activity of courts
in the form of judgments. This interferes with the fundamental right of
of the individual to information (under article 17 of the Charter) and the fundamental freedoms
individuals receive information (under article 10 of the Convention) and limits.
25. In this context, it is appropriate to point out, even on the more general case law of the
The European Court of human rights regarding the right to information.
To refer to the decision on admissibility of the complaint, the Association of the South Bohemia
Mothers in the United States. of 10.7.2006 no. 19101/03,
the explicit recognition of applicability lies in article 10 of the European Convention
in cases of refusal of a request for access to public or administrative
documents (cf.. Parliamentary Institute: the Access of non-governmental non-profit
the Organization of the courts in selected EU Member States in cases where the
It is a larger number of people vulnerable to discrimination, available at
http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/kps/pi/prace/pi-5-269.pdf). You can also
quote for example. judgment in case Campos of Daâmaso against Portugal
4, no complaints 16115/05, in which the reproduction of the indictment
journalist granted protection having regard to (among other things) the right
(the public) receive the information according to art. 10 of the Convention.
26. After all, or the Supreme Administrative Court in that judgment
does not deny that the contested norm is the intervention into the article. and article 17 of the Charter. 10
Of the Convention.
27. But not every restriction on a fundamental right of the individual is
unconstitutional. Specifically it predicts article. Article 17(1). 4 of the Charter: "the freedom to
of expression and the right to seek and disseminate information may be limited by law if it is
about the measure in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others, national security, public safety, the protection of
public health and morals. " Similarly, the talk article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention:
"The exercise of these freedoms, since it includes the duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties, which
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety,
protection order and prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals,
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, to prevent leakage of confidential information
or maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. "
28. Thus, the intervention of the rights arising from article. 17 of the Charter and of the article. 10, paragraph 1. 1
The Convention violates the Charter and the Convention if it does not comply with the requirements
laid down in article 4(1). Article 17(1). and in article 4 of the Charter. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention. Must be
therefore found that the intervention was "provided for by law", whether watching a
or more of the legitimate aims set out in these provisions and whether the
"necessary in a democratic society" to reaching these goals.
29. with regard to the existence of § 11 (1) 4 (b). (b)) of the Act on free
access to information is not in dispute that the intervention is "determined by law" in the
meaning of article 87(1). Article 17(1). 4 of the Charter and article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention.
30. Also condition the Constitutional Court considers that the legitimate objective for
filled with. The intervention may be seen as serving to protect the
the values quoted in the article. Article 17(1). and in article 4 of the Charter. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention.
In so far as the Constitutional Court agrees with the reasoning of the cited judgment
The Supreme Administrative Court.
31. However, the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the challenged standard does not meet the
the condition of the necessity of the restriction on the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in
of a democratic society.
32. the European Court of human rights considers that permanently in article 10
paragraph. 2 the Convention contained the adjective ' necessary ' incorporates the
the existence of a "pressing social need" [see Lingens judgment,
1986, cited. in the resolution of the Constitutional Court, SP. zn. IV. ÚS 606/03
of 19 December 2003. 4.2004 (23/33 SbNU 453)].
33. The key is the proposition that (naturally) cannot be a priori excluded that
the specific case will prevail over the protection of the fundamental rights of the
the cited values. that will be determined by the existence of "urgent
societal needs "to limit the basic rights (hereinafter referred to as" this
the proposition "). This is why it is necessary to examine in each case (according to the
the circumstances of the particular case) condition of the necessity of the restrictions
the basic rights and freedoms of individuals in a democratic society.
34. Indeed, this proposition follows from the case-law of the Constitutional Court. For example, the
in finding SP. zn. IV. TC 154/97 of 9 December 1996 on 2. the 1998 (N 17/10 SbNU 113)
The Constitutional Court stated that "in the face of basic political rights
the information and its dissemination to the law on the protection of the personality and the private
life, therefore, of fundamental rights, which stands at the same level, it will always
Affairs of independent courts, that taking into account the circumstances of each
individual case carefully consider whether one law was not
no reason given priority over other law. ".
35. After all, this thesis also spoke to the issue of the Administrative Court,
specifically, the municipal court in Prague, in the judgment of 23 March. 2.2007, SP. zn.
10 Ca 144/2005 (available in the system ASPI), while the Supreme Administrative
the Court in the judgment quoted. Municipal Court in this context
has stated that "Any conflict of the right to information with another
a fundamental human right ... must be due to a specific case
to assess which of these rights in the specific case is to be given
prefer ... Request to provide anonymised final
the judgments in the cases of some kind therefore cannot be rejected in General with
the fact that information about "the decision-making activity of courts" ... but it is necessary to
the need for and the specific reason leading to the restriction of the right to such
information to uniquely identify and assess whether in the present case is
restriction of this right is necessary. "
36. this proposition follows from case-law European Court of human rights.
For example, in the judgment in case Campos of Daâmaso against Portugal
4, no complaints 16115/05 (available in the system ASPI) [řešícím
the case of the publication of the text of the indictment a journalist before her official
the ordinary balance sheet within a specific management] it was noted: "32. Court
so it must now determine whether the disputed action corresponds to the ' urgent social
the need for "whether it was proportionate to the pursued legitimate objectives and whether the reasons
which is invoked by the national authorities for the purpose of its rationale,
seems like a "relevant and sufficient". 33. with regard to the circumstances of the
in the present case, the court first observes that article
the basis of the complainant was convicted, apparently dealt with the question of General
interest. ... 35. it is necessary to determine whether in the particular circumstances
the particular case of interest prevailed over the public information
"duties and responsibilities" ... " In this judgment, the European Court of
human rights at the outset of its review sets out that "31. In particular, you cannot
consider that the courts cannot be the subject of the present
earlier or at the same time ongoing debates elsewhere, whether in professional
magazines, the national press or in public as such. The Mission of the
media to disseminate such information and ideas corresponding to the right of the public
It is to receive. " This view can be applied to this case, since souzenou
This is merely about the assignment of judgment of the applicant for a simple nepravomocného
information (
converse
its publication in the newspaper and the subsequent debate, which concerned the
cited the judgment in case Campos Daâmaso against Portugal). Can be
to quote the famous judgment of the European Court of human rights in the case
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (cf. e.g. 26.4.1979.
Berger, m.: jurisprudence of the European Court of human rights, 1.
Edition, IFEC, Prague, 2003, pp. 477-482), which concerned the prohibition
post information about ongoing civil proceedings,
saved the periodical. The European Court of human rights in this
the judgment of the deduced that an interference with the freedom of expression did not match the urgent
social need, which would have exceeded the public interest which are
associated with the freedom of expression; basing itself, in terms of article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention
on reasonable grounds and was not proportionate to the objective of, or
necessary in a democratic society to preserve the authority of the judiciary.
The last cited case designed by the European Court of human rights
turns out this rather well on souzenou thing now, when it is-as already mentioned
-only about the assignment of nepravomocného judgment the applicant for information
(as opposed to its publication in a newspaper, and possibly there the assessment judgment).
37. this argument has also been made, for example, in the recommendations of the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe Rec (2003) 13 on the provision of information related
prosecution through the media (see for example: "... After
consideration of possible conflicting interests protected by articles 6, 8 and 10
The Convention and the need to ensure a balance between those rights with regard to the
the circumstances of each particular case, without being neglected inspection
the function of the European Court of human rights in ensuring commitments
arising out of the Convention ... "-retrieved from the above judgment in
things Campos Daâmaso against Portugal).
38. With this thesis, however, challenged the standard manifestly incompatible. Does not allow
namely to examine in each case (look the
things) the existence of a "pressing social need" to restrict the basic rights
(hence the necessity for the restriction of the Basic Law). Challenged the standard indicates that
always (automatically)-in the case of the existence of the law and the legitimate objective
the restriction of the fundamental right of the individual to information (to provide
nepravomocného of the judgment), that is, the values quoted in the article. Article 17(1). 4
Of the Charter and article. 10, paragraph 1. 2 of the Convention-will be given preference these values
compared to the fundamental right of the individual to freedom of expression in the form of rights
on the information; Therefore, in any contested case (
a priori
the fundamental right of the individual is articulated). This also (strictly speaking) denies
notorietu [mj. resulting from the case-law of the Constitutional Court, cf. for example.
find in case SP. zn. PL. ÚS 15/96 dated 9.10.1996 (N 99/6 SbNU
213; 280/1996)], that the constitutional values (including constitutional rights) are
prima facie
equivalent. Standard conditions of challenged the necessity of the restrictions
the basic rights and freedoms of the individual in a democratic society in
essence is the postulate, for its assessment of the nepřezkoumatelný-
taking into account the circumstances of a particular case-has consistently taken.
39. In this context, it should be recalled that freedom of expression-
including in it according to the article. 10, paragraph 1. 1 of the Convention included freedom to receive
information-is one of the most important foundations of democratic
of the company; they are therefore particularly important warranty. You cannot see that
the right to information as a collection of information is an essential preparatory step
(among others.) first of all, in journalistic activity and is inherent in the protected
part of the freedom of the press. The functioning of the press involves the creation of a forum for the
public discussion. The implementation of this function, however, is not limited to media
and on the professional journalists. In which case it creates a space for
public discussion. in relation to non-governmental organisations, but also to
individuals. The purpose of the activity, i.e.. collect the information, you can therefore
regarded as one of the essential elements of an informed society.
The important role played by civil society in the discussion of public
issues. There is no doubt that judgment res judicata may address
matters of public interest; applicants for information are, or at least
may be involved in the legitimate collection of information about these
matters. Their goal may be to convey such information
to the public, and thereby contribute to the public debate, which in the Democratic
the rule of law not only legitimate but also necessary. The monopoly on information,
that the Court shall enjoy, as a form of censorship, sui generis. In
due to the censorship of the information monopoly may result in interference with the exercise
control functions, as well as civil society, since it may have
a similar function to print. The barriers set up to prevent
access to information of public interest can deter even those who work in
media and similar areas from their search. As a result,
not be able to continue to fulfil its role of public control and their
the ability to provide accurate and reliable information would be adversely
affected. Put more specifically, for example, in relation to the criminal
proceedings, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted recommendation Rec (2003) 13,
provision of information relating to criminal proceedings
through the media, in which correctly points out that with regard to the
right of the public to receive information they have a right to the public media
inform, and underlines the importance of reporting on criminal proceedings, which
preparing media for the purpose of informing the public, and to allow
public to realize its right to oversee the operation of the criminal
the judiciary. Indeed, in the annex to the recommendation is noted. the right to
the public to receive information about the activities of law enforcement
control through the media, which includes the right of journalists to
free report on the functioning of the criminal justice system (cf. above
cited the judgment of the European Court of human rights in case Campos
Daâmaso against Portugal). There is no reason to nedomnívat that can be
the arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, not only on the print, but also on the ability to
access of civil society to information of public interest.
40. the Constitutional Court emphasises that it will be necessary to examine in each
of the individual case (depending on the circumstances of a particular case) the fulfillment of conditions
the necessity of the restrictions on the fundamental right of the individual to information here
and limitations of the right to the granting of the judgment in nepravomocného.
Vi. (d))
41. On an existing view that a ban on the provision of judgments is
justified the constitutional value of the independence and impartiality of judicial protection
power is no longer responded to the arguments above (cf. paragraph 33 et seq..
This finding). It cannot be
a priori
ruled out that in the particular case will be the protection of the fundamental rights of
such information prevail over another constitutional value, i.e. protected.
that will be determined by the existence of a "pressing social need" for the restriction
the basic law. Here you cannot see that the constitutional values (including
constitutional rights) are
prima facie
equivalent (cf. section 38 of this finding). It is necessary to reflect
case-law of the European Court of human rights, according to which it cannot be and
priori that matters present courts cannot be the subject of
earlier or at the same time ongoing debates elsewhere, whether in professional
magazines, the national press or in public as such (cf. section
36 this finding).
42. While the public discussion on the matter addressed by the Court without further (t. j.
automatically) may not interfere with the independence and impartiality of the judicial
power. Presumption of the judge (e.g., critical in the appellate instance of
about the nepravomocně yet finished things) abounds with sufficient personality
the modes (otherwise it would not be a judge appointed), garantujícími its
the ability to decide the matter independently and impartially, even independently of the
event. opinion, in the public area [e.g. judges, moreover,.
the oath, m. j., will be in accordance with your faith and
conscience to decide independently and impartially-cf. § 62 para. 1 of the law on
courts and judges and, indeed, whether or not § 79 paragraph 2. 1 of Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on
the courts, judges, lay judges and the State administration of courts and amending
some other laws (law on courts and judges)]. Of the like
the opinion is also the case law of the European Court of human rights (cf..
for example. top cited the judgment in case Campos Daâmaso against Portugal:
"Besides, in case no judge could not decide who would not
a career judge, which reduced the risk that the articles, such as article
at issue in the main proceedings, have affected the outcome of the proceedings. The Court in the
Esposende acknowledged that the publication of the contested article in no way derail the progress of the
the investigation ... In addition, the Government did not specify how the publication of the contested article
could interfere with the investigation in question... ").
43. Apart from this, a public debate on the matter solved non-definitive
the judgment, it may contribute to an independent and impartial decision making,
because sometimes it can reveal the existence of undue influences on the judicial
decision making. This is just one of the senses of the basic right to information
as a derivative of freedom of expression. Legitimate objective of public discussion is
public accountability of the venue justice, judging in broad daylight,
not in the dark chambers of the court proceedings. On the contrary, judging the under
the public is eligible to reduce the authority of the judiciary, as it may generate
the suspicion to the public that "there is nothing to hide" (in the sense of the venue
the injustice). Without trust is not a proper exercise of the official authority in the
democratic state possible. The element of trust is so functional condition
the performance of the democratic public authorities and, therefore, it is necessary to trust in the acts
the public can protect; trust in judicial decision-making is an essential
mimoprávní attributes of the rule of law [cf. find SP. zn. IV. TC 525/02
dated News (N 131/31 SbNU 173)]. The authority of the judiciary, moreover,
referred to as public interest-eligible limit a fundamental right or freedom
-even the Convention on protection of human rights and freedoms in article. 10, paragraph 1. 2.
Public authorities must take into account what your expectations
the procedure and activities. As a result of the censorship of the information
monopoly (in the form of a flat prohibition to provide nepravomocné judgments)
Therefore, you may experience interference with the exercise of public functions, that
It is for not only the press, but also of civil society, and in its consequences
and the authority of the judiciary. A priori (unlimited) exclusion
public control of the failure and the judgments would therefore be
expression of an inadequate understanding of the meaning of the basic right to information and
freedom of expression in relation to a public authority, and the lack of reflection
the meaning of public control of public power. Even the Court's power authority, which
It exercises the power in the State, so it is subject to public control.
44. Indeed, and therefore constitutional command article. paragraph 96. 2 in fine of the Constitution,
According to which "the judgment shall be delivered always publicly.". The judgment of the
It is basically a written copy of what is already publicly declared was
(see also the text below); If he had would be rationally defensible
a flat ban on the provision of judgments in order to protect
independence and impartiality of the judiciary, he would have to pay from-logically-
for the same reason also ban public judgment (at first instance)
at all.
45. even so, can be considered that any public debate (especially professional),
not unreasonably criticize nepravomocné judgments, can surely its
argumentative fundovaností contribute to a fair outcome in the
the ongoing court proceedings. In that can hardly be reasonably see intervention in
independence and impartiality of the judiciary; After all, according to § 82 para. 2
Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on courts and judges as amended laws,
the judge must consider the continuous education about deepening their
legal and other professional knowledge required for the proper performance of
function.
46. The hypothetical opinion advocating-in order to protect the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary-general prohibition provision nepravomocných
at the same time admitting at a flat rate of judgments and final provision
judgments, whether or not on a logical account of final judgments that can
realistically be changed; It is also relatively often happens, by the extraordinary
appeals or constitutional complaint or a complaint to the European
Court of human rights.
Vi. e)
47. There is also the view that the State should in private law relations at all
not be the person liable to provide the information, and that res judicata
the judgment resolves the private relationship between the State (so that in
court proceedings equal status as any other party to the proceedings), and
natural or legal person, the State should not have even never-
the obligation to provide nepravomocné judgments; If by virtue of the participation
in proceedings required by the State granting the nepravomocného judgment, then it would
State-in this case-he had to bear greater responsibility than the other
party to the proceedings. Extent of obligations are dictated by the civil procedure rules
and they are pursued by a dispute for both parties the same.
48. Such a conclusion, however, misses the above-mentioned constitutional law
argument, which is that in the case of collision of constitutional values
they need to be addressed with regard to the particular circumstances of each case).
49. that view is based on a far-fetched premise further, that the provision of
nepravomocného judgment is required from the State in the position of the participant
the proceedings before the General Court in private litigation arising from such
participation in court proceedings. Fundamental rights (i.e. the right to
However, public information) are subjective rights, i.e. the addressee
obligations (i.e. observe these rights and protect them, i.e. positively something
do) is a public power. The provision of nepravomocného judgment is required
from the State as from the bearer of public authority, because the required information
(res judicata) is the result of decision-making powers, thus
the result of the realization of the public authority (not private acts). Therefore,
in the case of the obligation to comply with the requirement for the provision of such information
the State did not carry a greater degree of responsibility than the other party to the proceedings; such
the obligation of the State-as the nobility-is founded in a completely different
the legal title that does not affect the legal status of the participant
control in your own private dispute.
50. The conclusion that the addressee of the basic right to information under article. 17
The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms is not state as a participant
private legal proceedings, but the State as a bearer of public authority,
they aren't even the view that not only the Court, but also other State authority.
acting as a party before the Court-will be required to
give judgment res judicata, if the applicant so requests, and he
the requested information will be available. The addressee of the basic law
the information referred to in article 14(2). 17 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms is the State
(as a recipient of State power) rather than the Court or other State authority. If
There is a law on the provision of information and
the obligation of the State to provide information, in terms of meaning and purpose
This right is irrelevant, that the State authority the required information
provide. Such a different Government Department (in the case of the claimant Ministry
Finance) will act as a body of State power, as well as the Court, in
both cases will be the same authority (the State). This is also defined by the difference
between the hypothetical situations in which the Court was not acting in civil proceedings
as a participant State, but up to the present. two natural persons; in this case,
then it could not be allowed to require information (res judicata) from
party to the proceedings, i.e., from private persons.
51. After all, the obligation to provide judgment res judicata can hardly
be (from the nature of things) breach of the principle of equality of arms, equality
procedural status under the code of civil procedure. It is the Act of excluding
framework of civil procedure unrelated to him. As to the
implementation of the public service obligations based on other legislation
than a standard, private (this obligation is based on the law of the administrative
and the constitutional law). After all, even if not listed above, it would not be
This in no way interfered with the procedural rights of a party to proceedings pursuant to
Code of civil procedure. Sense and the purpose of the principle of equality of arms,
equal rights and obligations in civil (and other) proceedings before a
the authority is to guarantee the conditions for a fair outcome of the proceedings; because you would
have absentovat, if one of the parties was in the process of
Typically, one (inability to translate their own claim and evidence
etc.). The case, however, clearly not in on.
52. it is also noted that as to the meaning and purpose of the fundamental right to
information is not (in principle) the essential, whether the judgment is res judicata concerns
private dispute (e.g. between the State as the owner and the third
person, etc.) or things public. Sense and purpose of the right to
information is the public exercise of State control (judicial) authority;
This is the logic of things implemented-and thus eligible to be subject to legitimate
control-not only in decision-making on public matters, but also in
decisions on disputes under private law (and in the latter
When it comes to authoritative decision-making on the rights, responsibilities of the persons
that may be on the rise. abused, etc.). From the perspective of teleology article. 17
Of the Charter and article. 10 of the Convention may be the difference between deciding private law
disputes and public affairs consist merely in degree (not in principle)
the interest of the public, as it can often be higher in the case of the examination
matter of public interest; the public will then be checked not only the actual
actions of the Court, but will be interested to know. evaluate the factual
information about what happened before the start of court proceedings, up to the present. about
the management of the State. The public interest it is possible to find-as
for example, the Constitutional Court said. in finding SP. zn. I. ÚS 260/06 dated
24.1.2007 (N 10/44 SbNU 129)-and in the activities of the State in the form of management
with the property of the State; the management of the property of the State, m. j. going on the conclusion
private-law contracts, which in the future may also generate
private law disputes. In that finding, the Constitutional Court. aproboval
the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court in the former proceedings, according to which
the conduct of the State enterprise can be regarded as an act in the public
interest due to business with the use of State of the entrusted property. The constitutional
the Court in the abovementioned findings also pointed out the views of the part of the professional
literature, according to which it is possible under the term "public institution managing
with public funds "within the meaning of the law on free access to
information (and therefore under the body obliged to provide information) to include
even a company to be formed by the State.
53. the Opinion that the State should in private law relations should not be
the person liable to provide information, it is therefore contrary to the thesis that, even
the management of the property of the State (that is, inter alia, private relations, on
with one hand he performs State) is undoubtedly in the public interest (and
It already because it's about money management selected m. j. from the tax
taxpayers, therefore they have a legitimate claim to control it; to do this,
CF.. also high priority individuals against the State as part of the
the rule of law), so it makes sense and purpose of the article. and article 17 of the Charter. 10
Convention turns out. Indeed, reasoning that the State should in private law relations
should not be the person liable to provide information, does not reflect
consistently meaning and purpose and podústavní editing. Entry into force of the amendment to the
the law on free access to information made by law No. 61/2006
SB. namely, a compulsory subject under the Act on free
access to information is also a "public institution
managing public funds
“. In this way the legislature explicitly pointed out that the question of the management of
public funds is in the public interest, that it has to be subject to public
inspection. The legal definition of "public money" is contained in section 2 of the
(a). g) Act No. 320/2001 Coll., on financial control, as amended by
amended: "public finances, belongings, property rights and other
assets belonging to the State or to another legal person referred to in
(a)) ". Even though it was cited by an amendment to the information act the phrase
"managing public funds" released (section 2 (1)), then
for example, in finding SP. zn. I. ÚS 260/06 (see above), it was explained that the
purpose was to guarantee the right to information relating to the scope of the
public institutions, regardless of whether it is running a public
resources or not. You must also realize that the idea that the State should in
private law relations should not be the person liable to provide the
the information opens up a potential space for corruption and other similar
negative phenomena.
54. It remains to add that sense provide judgments can
tkvět in the predictability of judicial decisions and can go to source
interpretation of the law, that is, about the source of the legal arguments. On the logic of
the case does not alter the fact that these judgments may be later
modified. After all, even a final judgment may be dropped, and published
are also different opinions of the judges considered the majority.
Vi. f)
55. the Constitutional Court, however, found another reason to support the finding of a
unconstitutionality of the challenged law.
56. the said law does not meet the condition of necessity limit
the basic rights and freedoms of individuals in a democratic society and
Therefore, it will be possible to achieve often pursued a legitimate aim
(protection of the cited values) using a different resource, neomezujícího
the basic right to an extent (or the denial of the fundamental right to freedom of
the speech will not be necessary). The standard therefore does not meet the (challenged under
measurement of the standing constitutional values colliding) condition
the need, IE. the condition, which consists in the comparison of the legislative
resource, the official constitutional values, with other measures,
that allow you to achieve the same goal, but constitutional values
nedotýkajícími.
57. Expressed somewhat differently, the impugned law in this sense
stand up already with regard to her conflict with the article. 4 (4). 4 of the Charter, which
forces the use of provisions on limits of fundamental rights and freedoms
to save their essence and meaning. Therefore, if everyone has the right to information,
then the law that the right to seek and disseminate information limits (section 17(2).
4 of the Charter), you cannot cancel this right basically (negate), and thus is
Thus, excluded. Therefore does not respect the principle of affected standard minimization
interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms in the form of their possible limitations, and
maximizing the retention of the basic content of law.
58. In this context, it can be pointed out in particular to the provisions of section 7 of the Act
about free access to information, according to which if the requested
information in accordance with the law (Law No. 412/2005 Coll. on
the protection of classified information and security)
for classified information to which the applicant has authorized access, required
the body does not provide it. Pursuant to section 8a of the Act on free access to
information information about personality, expressions of personal nature,
the individual's privacy and personal data will provide the statutory body only
accordance with the legislation governing their protection (for example, section
11 through 16 of the civil code, section 5 and 10 of the law No. 101/2000 Coll., on the
protection of personal data and on amendments to certain laws). Under section 9 of the Act on
free access to information, if the required information is
trade secret (section 17 of Act No. 513/1991 Coll., the commercial code),
It does not provide a statutory body. Pursuant to section 10 of the Act on free access to
information information about the financial circumstances of the person who is not a mandatory
the body, obtained on the basis of the laws on taxes, fees, pension
or health insurance or social security, statutory body
under this Act does not provide. The provisions of § 11 of the law on free
access to information then establishes additional restrictions on the right to information;
for example, in the paragraph. 2 (a). (c)) prohibits the provision of information, if the
This was broken by the protection of the rights of third persons to the subject of rights
of the copyright. The provisions of § 12 of the Act on free access to information
then States that any restrictions on the right to information, performs the required
body by providing the required information, including accompanying
information after the exclusion of the information on which it lays down the law (the law of the
deny information lasts only as long as it takes to the reason for the denial; in
justified cases, statutory body shall check whether the reason for the denial takes).
The content of section 12 of the Act on free access to information is so rule
selection; This corresponds to the requirement that justified limiting access to
the information has always been applied only to the least extent necessary. Only
This provision thus infuse and guarantees the minimisation of the intervention request
the fundamental right or freedom rather than challenged standard, which basically
denies the basic right to information-in her case, at all.
59. There may be invoked and the explanatory memorandum to the following provisions of the Act on
free access to information. There it says: "an exception to this
the rules will be information whose provision of the draft law expressly
excludes or limits to the extent necessary. In particular, the information that is
on the basis of the act declared classified, or information that would
breach of privacy protection and the privacy of the people ... The provisions governing the
exceptions to the right of access to information that is expressed in the
the previous provisions. Restrictions on the right of access to information is
based constitutionally. The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms permits protect
information prior to the provision "If the measure of a democratic society
necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, security of the State and the public
safety "(article 17, paragraph 4, of the Charter). pronounced positive law
Each personality and protection to prevent unauthorised
by publishing information about yourself (article 10 of the Charter). The exceptions
(the limit) guarantees the law so that defines the criteria to determine the information
that the statutory body may not. may not provide. " (cf.
www.psp.cz)
Vi. g)
60. the applicant argues, even pointing to the article. paragraph 96. 2 in fine
Of the Constitution, according to which "the judgment shall be delivered always publicly." In this
the context of logically argues that the judgment is only the written
the drawing-up of what was already publicly published.
61. The Supreme Administrative Court's reasoning in this regard is greatly
unconvincing. Limits are basically just on the Declaration of the granting of
information about the judgment and its conditions of promulgation are two completely
different legal institutions.
62. The Supreme Administrative Court, however, leaves out the maximum internal
control and consistency of the rule of law. The rule of law, based on the
the principles of unity of rationality and internal content control, with
inevitably the same imperative on a comparable legal preview
institutes, although modified in different laws or even
sectors [cf. e.g. Constitutional Court, SP. zn. PL. ÚS 73/06 of
June 29 (N 23/48 SbNu 263; 291/2008 Coll.), paragraph 50]. For similar
He principles in its case law the Supreme Administrative
the Court. For instance, in its judgment in SP. zn. 2 Afs 81/2004 (available on
www.nssoud.cz) stated identically, that "the rule of law, based on the principles of
unity of rationality and internal content control, necessarily
brings the same imperative Preview on comparable legal institutions, albeit
modified in different laws or even sectors. " In
judgment SP. zn. 5 Afs 138/2004 (available at www.nssoud.cz)
The Supreme Administrative Court held that interpretation cannot be accepted, "according to the
between public and private that liability there is a substantial
the difference; Moreover, it follows from the decision of the enlarged Board
The Supreme Administrative Court (1 Afs 86/2004, InStr. URwww.nssoud.cz). "
63. While there is no doubt that the meaning of the constitutional terms of public
the judgment, without exception, and the meaning of the provision and the nepravomocného
the judgment is similar; t. j. to allow the participation of the public as a guarantee of public
control of the judiciary. This Constitutional soda dealt with in the previous text
This finding (paragraph 44).
64. As noted already, the Constitutional Court in its finding SP. zn. Pl. ÚS
28/04 of 8.11.2005 (N 205/39 SbNU 171; 20/2006 Coll.), "General legal
Note traditionally sees the right to a public hearing of the case as a tool
public control of the judiciary. The purpose of the public hearing "is to make each
He could assure himself of how the State held the justice,
an audience becomes impossible to control all the strannost
the judges "(cf. the password" public ", in: Encyclopaedia Rieger, IX, Prague
1872, p. 997). The purpose of the public hearing of the case has been for a long
time in the Czech lands considered to be the only one. From the case law
the Czechoslovak first Republic the Supreme Court has repeatedly
given that "the purpose of that law to the provisions of the neveřejnosti the main
version only tracks, proceedings was held without a permit
public control. " In this one the purpose of public capital
the trial is not according to the law the distinction between proceedings before the jury and before
the Senate and does not monitor the law's intent, even when the jury in particular, would be a powerful
the impression of the mood of his audience in the jury courtroom of radiations at the jury "[cf.
decision No. 4336/1932 in: f. Serious, Supreme Court decisions
Czechoslovak Republic in criminal matters (hereinafter referred to as "serious"), XIII,
1932, p. 567]. Likewise, the former Supreme Court came to the
the conclusion that "the purpose of the Act is the public accountability of the venue
Justice, judging on the white day, not in the dark secret of the
control. Therefore, the concept of the public served as opposed to secret and is
just a matter of praktikability the extent to which it can be restored to the audience
access to the version for the investigation of unbreakable postulátu of inadmissibility
impacts adversely on the legal procedure and the factors to
It súčasněné "(cf. decision No 1729/1925, in: Serious, VI, 1925
page 549). "
65. The applicant must therefore be put in this direction for the truth that even from the
the perspective of the article. paragraph 96. 2 in fine of the Constitution cannot be accepted a priori exclusion
provide nepravomocné the judgments of those who provide them.
VII.
66. For all these reasons, the Constitutional Court upheld the design and the word
"final" in section 11 (1) 4 (b). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on the
free access to information, as amended, on the date of
the publication of this finding in the statute book, set aside, and that conflict with the
articles 17, paragraph 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 4, paragraph 2. 4 of the Charter of fundamental rights and
liberties and with article 10, paragraph 1. 1 and 2 of the Convention for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
67. The Constitutional Court just to make sure it adds that the arguments and conclusions in the
This finding does not apply to judgments of the cancelled or changed (Note:
this case, moreover, cannot be a "judgment" within the meaning of § 11 (1) 4
(a). b) of Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on free access to information, in
as amended, cancelled or changed since the judgment already
de jure
It is not in the range in which it has been canceled or changed-exist).
The President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Rychetský in r.
Different opinions under section 14 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court,
as amended, a decision of the plenary, the judges adopted a Vlasta
Formankova, Pavel Holländer, Jiří Mucha, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský
and Michaela, and his justification of the April judge Dagmar Lastovecká.
