294/2010 Coll.
FINDINGS


Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic


Constitutional Court decided on 6 October 2010 Plenary composed
Stanislav Balik, Frantisek Duchon, Vlasta Formánková, Vojen Güttler, Pavel Holländer
, Ivana Janu, Vladimir Kurka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jiri Mucha, || | Jan Musil, Jiri Nykodým, Pavel Rychetsky, Miloslav Vyborny and Eliska
Wagner on the proposal of senators Senate of the Czech Republic
for which it is Senator Mgr. Sonia Paukrtová to cancel
points 1, 2, 3, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42 and 49 Art. I,
points 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, Art. II, Sections 2 and 3 of Art. III, as well as Art.
IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll., amending Act no. 6/2002 Coll . on
courts, judges, lay judges and state administration of courts and changing
some other laws (Act on courts and judges), as amended
amended, Act no. 150/2002 Coll., court order administrative, in
amended, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., on proceedings relating
judges and prosecutors, as amended, Act no.
349/1999 Coll., on the Public Ombudsman, as amended,
Act no. 283/1993 Coll., on the Public Prosecutor, as amended
regulations, the Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanors, as amended
and Act no. 85/1996 Coll., on advocacy, as amended
regulations, and to remove the words "the Ministry or" in § 68 par. 1 and
§ 68 par. 2 point. b) and the annulment of § 100a of Act no. 6/2002 Coll., on
courts and judges, as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll.


In eventum to repeal: the Law no. 6/2002 Coll., On Courts, Judges, Lay and
state administration of courts and amending certain other laws (Act on Courts and Judges
) as amended by Act no. 151/2002 Coll., Act no. 228/2002 Coll.
Constitutional court ruling promulgated under no. 349/2002 Coll., Act no. 192/2003 Coll
., Act No. . 441/2003 Coll., Act no. 626/2004 Coll., Act no. 349/2005 Coll
., Act no. 413/2005 Coll., Act no. 79/2006 Coll., Act no. | || 221/2006 Coll., Act no. 233/2006 Coll., Act no. 264/2006 Coll., Act no. 267/2006 Coll
., Act no. 342/2006 Coll., the Constitutional court ruling
promulgated under no. 397/2006 Coll., Act no. 184/2008 Coll. and Act no. 314/2008
Coll., § 15 para. 1 of the word "vice-chairmen" in § 15 para. 2
words "vice-chairmen" in § 23 para. 1 of the word "vice-presidents" § 102, § 103
. 1 and 2, § 104. 1 and 2, § 105 para. 1 and 2, § 105a, § 108, paragraph
. 2, § 119 para. 2 of the words "vice-presidents of the Supreme Court," in § 121, paragraph
. 2, the words "vice-chairmen" in § 168, the words "vice"
forth in Act no. 314/2008 Coll. Article. II, points 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, further
§ 13 par. 3 and § 13a of the Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the Administrative Procedure Code
as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll., and in connection with this Article. IV Act No.
. 314/2008 Coll., And the words "the Ministry or" in § 68 para. 1 and §
68 par. 2 point. b) Law no. 6/2002 Coll., as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll
., and the annulment of § 100a of the same Act,


In eventum to cancel the word "vice-chairmen" in § 15 para. 1, § 23 para. 1 and § 102
paragraph. 2, the words "vice-chairmen" in § 15 para. 2 and § 121 par. 2
word "vice" in § 102 para. 1 and § 168
and the words "vice-presidents of the Supreme Court" in § 119 Sec. 2, further
words "Ministry or" in § 68 para. 1 and § 68 para. 2 point. b) further §
100a, § 102 para. 2, § 103. 2, § 104. 2, § 105 para. 2, §
105a, § 108 par. 2 Act no. 6 / 2002 Coll., as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll .;
further § 13 par. 3 and § 13a of Act no. 150/2002 Coll.
Administrative Procedure Code, as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll., and
provisions of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9, 10 and 11, Art. II of part One of Act no. 314/2008 Coll., as
participation of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic
as parties

Follows:

I. The provisions of § 68 para. 1 the words "to the Ministry or" provisions of §
68 par. 2 point. b) the words "or ministry" and § 100a paragraph
. 1 point. b) Law no. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts, Judges, Lay
and the State Administration of Courts and amending certain other Acts (
Courts and Judges), as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll. amending
Act no. 6/2002 Coll., on courts, judges, Lay judges and the State administration
courts and amending certain other acts (Act on courts and judges)

Amended, Act no. 150/2002 Coll., Administrative Procedure Code
, as amended, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., On proceedings
matters of judges and prosecutors, as amended, Act No.
. 349/1999 Coll., On the Public Defender of Rights, as amended
regulations, the Act no. 283/1993 Coll., On the Public Prosecutor, as
amended, Act no. 200/1990 Coll. misdemeanors, as
amended, and Act no. 85/1996 Coll., on advocacy, as
amended, abolishing the date of publication of this judgment in the Collection of laws
.

II. The provisions of § 102 para. 1 the words "and Vice" Law no.
6/2002 Coll., On Courts, Judges, Lay Judges and the State Administration of Courts and
amending certain other laws (Act on Courts and Judges)
amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll., amending Act no. 6/2002 Coll., on courts,
judges, lay judges and state administration of courts and amending certain other
laws (the courts and judges), as amended,
Act no. 150/2002 Coll., administrative procedure Code, as amended
, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., on proceedings relating to judges and state
representatives, as amended, Act no. 349/1999 Coll., on
Public Defender of rights, as amended, Act no. 283/1993
Coll., on the Public Prosecutor, as amended, Act no.
200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanors, as amended, and Act no.
85/1996 Coll., on advocacy, as amended, was abolished on 1 | || October 2011.

III. The provisions of paragraph 11 of Art. II of Act no. 314/2008 Coll., Amending
Act no. 6/2002 Coll., On Courts, Judges, Lay Judges and the State Administration
courts and amending certain laws (Act on courts and judges)
amended, Act no. 150/2002 Coll., administrative procedure Code
, as amended, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., on proceedings
cases of judges and prosecutors, as amended, Act No.
. 349/1999 Coll., On the Public Defender of Rights, as amended
regulations, the Act no. 283/1993 Coll., On the Public Prosecutor, as
amended, Act no. 200/1990 Coll. misdemeanors, as
amended, and Act no. 85/1996 Coll., on advocacy, as amended
is abolished on 1 October 2011.

IV. The provisions of § 105a of Act no. 6/2002 Coll., On Courts, Judges,
lay judges and state administration of courts and amending certain other laws
(Act on Courts and Judges), as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll ., which
amends Act no. 6/2002 Coll., on courts, judges, assessors and state
administration of courts and amending certain other laws (Act on courts and judges
), as amended Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the
administrative procedure Code, as amended, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., on
proceedings relating to judges and prosecutors, as amended
regulations Act no. 349/1999 Coll., on the Public Defender of rights, as
amended, Act no. 283/1993 Coll., on the Public Prosecutor
amended, Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanors,
amended, and Act no. 85/1996 Coll., on advocacy,
amended, and the provisions of § 13a of Act no. 150/2002 Coll., || | administrative procedure Code, as amended, shall be eliminated on
this judgment in the Official Gazette.

V. The remainder of the proposal is rejected.
Reason


I.
Recap draft


First Group of Senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (hereinafter
"petitioner") filed a petition to initiate proceedings pursuant to § 64 para. 1 point.
B) of the Act no. 182/1993 Coll., On the Constitutional Court, as amended
amended (hereinafter "the Constitutional Court Act"), in which section requires
"repeal parts of Act no. 314/2008 Coll., amending Act no. 6/2002
Coll., on courts, judges, Lay judges and the State administration of courts and change
some other laws (Act on courts and judges), as amended | || amended, Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the administrative procedure Code,
amended, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., on proceedings relating
judges and prosecutors, as amended regulations, the Act no.
349/1999 Coll., on the Public Defender of rights, as amended,

Act no. 283/1993 Coll., On the Public Prosecutor, as amended
regulations, the Act no. 200/1990 Coll., On misdemeanors, as amended
and Act no. 85 / 1996 Coll., on advocacy, as amended
regulations


In eventum annulment of certain provisions of Law no. 6/2002 Coll., On Courts, Judges,
lay judges and state administration of courts and amending certain other laws
(Act on Courts and Judges) as amended by Act no. 151/2002 Coll., Act No.
. 228/2002 Coll., The Constitutional Court ruling promulgated under no. 349/2002
Coll., Act no. 192/2003 Coll., Act no. 441/2003 Coll., Act no. 626/2004 Coll
., Act no. 349/2005 Coll., Act no. 413/2005 Coll., Act no. 79/2006
Coll., Act no. 221/2006 Coll., Act no. 233/2006 Coll. Law no. 264/2006
Coll., Act no. 267/2006 Coll., Act no. 342/2006 Coll., the Constitutional court announced
under no. 397/2006 Coll., Act no. 184 / 2008 Sb. and Act No.
. 314/2008 Coll., As well as certain provisions of the Act no. 150/2002 Coll.
Administrative Procedure Code, as amended by Act no. 192/2003 Coll., Act no. 22/2004
Coll., Act no. 237/2004 Coll., Act no. 436/2004 Coll., Act no. 555/2004
Coll., Act no. 127/2005 Coll., Act no. 350/2005 Coll., Act.
357/2005 Coll., Act no. 413/2005 Coll., Act no. 79/2006 Coll., Act no. 112/2006
Coll., Act no. 159/2006 Coll., Act No. . 165/2006 Coll., Act no. 189/2006
Coll., Act no. 267/2006 Coll. and Act no. 314/2008 Coll., and some
provisions of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll. ".

Second With regard to the method of formulating the design section, the structure of its
reasoning and petit final (coincides with the heading), it should be noted that
proposal is actually composed of several variously combined and variously
justified proposals, which always petitioner requests the annulment
certain provisions of the aforementioned legislation, and if
that the Constitutional court in this part of the proposal accepted such a
raised the argument and thus reasoned proposal failed, suggests further
wording of the statement of claim


In eventum. It was therefore necessary, in the interest of clarity, the proposal by the statement of claim
variants spread on individual objections of unconstitutionality and gradually
them to deliver an opinion. As decisive in terms of its case [already
finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 16/93 of 24. 5. 1994 (N 25/1 SbNU 189;
131/1994 Coll.) ^ *] Constitutional Court took variants judgment in the petition because
section and reasoning with him always do not correspond. Collectively and generally be
stated that the petitioner:

A) preferred annulling those parts of Act no. 314/2008 Coll., Whose
acceptance in his opinion, constitutes a violation of procedural rules
legislative process through a comprehensive amendment.
This proposal is linked with the proposal for abolition of selected parts of § 68 para. 1, § 68 paragraph
. 2 point. b) and § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges
with different arguments, because these provisions are not affected
discussing government proposals in a comprehensive amendment.

B) In the event that his arguments, the Constitutional Court does not agree, the petitioner suggested
cancellation of equal parts of Act no. 314/2008 Coll., But the
because of their substantive non-compliance with constitutional requirements. In this case
would be abolished following the relevant provisions
laws that Act no. 314/2008 Coll. amends. Also this variant is associated
statement of claim for annulment of selected parts of § 68 para. 1, §
68 par. 2 point. b) and § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges.

C) Finally, in the event that neither this proposal, the Constitutional Court did not,
petitioner submits to repeal certain provisions of the Law on Courts and Judges
and the Administrative Procedure Code, amended by Law no. 314/2008
Coll., respectively. Some individual provisions of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
with justification, that is no longer based on the alleged unconstitutionality use
comprehensive amendment. Even in this case, it is proposed to repeal
selected parts of § 68 para. 1, § 68 par. 2 point. b) and § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges
.

With regard to the wording of the preamble to the proposal and its distribution in three variants
statement of claim, the Constitutional Court ruled for the procedure, which will soon
examined the question of the constitutionality of a law no. 314/2008 Coll.
and subsequently the petitioner's objections based on the alleged inconsistency
individual amended provisions of the Act on Courts and Judges Act, the Administrative Procedure
detached and provisions of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll
. with the constitutional order.


II.

Text of the contested provision, and the petitioner's arguments

Third The petitioner challenges the individual parts of Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
procedural reasons, in which case a proposal is directed against itself
novelizujícímu Act no. 314/2008 Coll., as it corresponds
settled case law of the Constitutional Court. The variants of possible attacks already made contents
amendment and its application is directed against the amended laws on
courts and judges and judicial administrative order [see variants proposed judgment sub
2b) and 2c)], respectively. against Art. II and Art. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll., which
have an independent meaning and not the amending provisions.
II.a


Unconstitutionality institute a comprehensive amendment

Fourth The petitioner first asks the Constitutional Court to annul points 1, 2, 3,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42 and 49 of Art. I, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10 and 11, Art. II (transitional provisions to implement the tenure
in the law on courts and judges), paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article. III (establishing a functional office of the President
and Deputy Supreme administrative court and the possibility
reappointed), as well as Art. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
(Transitional provisions for the introduction of the term of office in the court order
administrative). The contested provisions in this case is not applicable.
As a whole they are part of the so-called. O- změňovacího comprehensive proposal which
use (no matter what its content)
petitioner considers unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional according to the petitioner himself has
procedure for the adoption of this Act no. 314/2008 Coll., Which falls on the points above its
Art. I, Art. II, Art. III and Article. IV. In this case, this part of the proposal
settled by the Constitutional Court concluded that those
parts of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. not accepted
constitutionally prescribed manner. Although the petitioner proposes to repeal the law because
non-compliance procedures, however, proposes to abolish a certain procedure adopted by
provision (sub 12 and 13).

Fifth In the event that the Constitutional Court the basic design [sub 2a)]
assess differently and concludes that the arguments for it are The approach - as the petitioner
- more substantive nature, is


In eventum proposed repeal of all provisions of Law no. 6/2002 Coll. and no. 150/2002 Coll
., which are in them changed those provisions of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll
., which exceeded the original scope of the legislative initiative of the government.
The law on courts and judges is therefore proposed to abolish

- In § 15 para. 1 of the word "vice-presidents"

- In § 15 para. 2 of the word "vice-presidents"

- In § 23 para. 1 of the word "vice-presidents"

- As a whole, § 102, § 103 paragraph. 1 and 2, § 104. 1 and 2, § 105 para. 1 and 2
, § 105a, § 108, paragraph. 2

- In § 119 para. 2 of the word "Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court,"

- In § 121 par. 2 of the word "vice-presidents"

- In § 168, the words "vice".
Furthermore, in this context, it proposes to abolish the Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
in Art. II, sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, and in Act no. 150/2002 Coll.
Administrative Procedure Code, § 13 par. 3 and § 13a, and in connection with this Article .
IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll.

6th This second variant petit proposal [sub 2b)] is, as already mentioned
, in terms of extent identical variant sub 2a) differ only
starting point for reasoning. While in the first case, it is proposed to repeal
selected points of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll., Ie. The amendment of the above-mentioned laws
going beyond the original legislative initiative
government, the second option judgment in the petition proposes to abolish individual || | provisions of these amended laws to the extent that they were
amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll. In this case the petitioner their arguments
closer divorced, merely stated that exceeded the scope of the original
legislative initiatives governments could be considered (though not procedurally)
violation of the constitutional order of the substantive point of view. This variant
Petit and arguments identical to the previous option
objections brought against constitutionality. Complex amendments.
In this case, as is the constitutionality of the above provisions of the Act
on Courts and Judges, points 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, Art. II and Art. IV of the Act
no. 314/2008 Coll., § 13 and § 13a of the Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the administrative procedure
.

7th Constitutionally defective procedural error when dealing with the press
Chamber of Deputies no. 425, which the Constitutional Court by the petitioner,

Lie in the way of adoption of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. Buffet called.
comprehensive amendment. The petitioner stated that the Constitution
Czech Republic (hereinafter "Constitution") in its Art. 41 lists the entities
legislative initiatives and other provisions of constructing the foundations
legislative process, which are subject to other layers so .
reglementového rights in the form of statutory regulation or autonomous resolution
parliamentary chambers, parliamentary practices and a consistent practice.
Stressed that the Constitutional Court provides protection primarily express editing
constitutional [see Judgment no. 331/2005 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 23/04 of
14th 7. 2005 (N 137/38 SbNU 9)], but not limited to it [see. eg.
findings no. 476/2002 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 5/02 of 2
10. 2002 (N 117/28 SbNU 25) and no. 37/2007 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 77/06 of
15th 2. 2007 (N 30/44 SbNU 349]. The importance of the individual layers of rules
legislative process is not only due to a possible degree of legal
forces, but also to the level of detail modifications: the concise adjustment to a higher degree of legal
force, the major modification lower level.

eighth petitioner also stated that the right of legislative initiative follows
right not only to bring the bill, but also the right to be consulted.
it is essential that the right of legislative initiative is accessorial right
submit proposed amendments. they must not, in his opinion
take the form of "disguised legislative initiative." Here pointed out that the Constitutional court
already been identified and banned so. limpet (finding no.
37/2007 Coll.), the so-called. comprehensive amendments are marked by
Institute relatives because their essence is to replace the entire text
submitted bill completely new text, usually prepared materially
the relevant parliamentary committee, although that under the Constitution
legislative initiative does not. Chamber de facto cease
be a properly filed the bill without it approved or rejected
. Amendments while deputies from that moment
to be formulated in relation to this new "bill", although they could
them in good faith, after consultation with outside bodies to prepare
original bill. Like so. Hemocyanin lack of comprehensive amendments
proper preparation, justification, the government has a chance to comment on them
, as discussed different (original) bill, may be shortened
parliamentary minority rights, increased law
risk of standing conflict with the requirements comprehensible, understandable and predictable
law, because it is prepared in a specific time
conditions inside the Parliament. The procedure for adoption of major laws through
complex amendments that are inconsistent with the "right to good legislation
" principle and hear all parties, which were expressed in
Constitutional Court judgment no. 37/2007 Coll.

9th Another challenge in this regard is that comprehensive amendments
which "pass" with the first reading by the House and deform the second reading,
also reach the deeper layers of parliamentary procedures that are neutral
only in the sense of impartiality, but not nehodnotovosti;
contrary, they allow informing the public about the decision-making process, hearings
interests involved, considering the various implications, including constitutional,
to monitor the value of transparent, prudent, and the informed
inclusive governance.

10th Form a comprehensive amendment by the petitioner also
against the law on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies because
track to launch, expand or change some parts of the original proposal
[see. his § 63 para. 1 point 5 point. a)], but its complete
replacement, but without eg. equipped with an explanatory memorandum (
written justification), without which (only) senators difficult seznávají
intention of the legislature. At the same time we do not consider so.
Close relationship of the individual amendments to the draft altered. Only individual amendments
designs can properly adjust the legislative sub-projects petitioner
Act in relation to the subject.

11th Of all the reasons given petitioner considers
institute a comprehensive amendment at least contradictory to Art. 1, paragraph. 1, Art. 41 and Article
. 44 of the Constitution.

12th However, the petitioner does not seek annulment of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. as

Whole, because on the one hand it considers advisable to minimize the derogatory
intervention of the Constitutional Court, on the one hand recognizes a different method of preparation and discussion
original and newly supplemented parts of the Act relating to a single
comprehensive amendment. Therefore takes into account not only the shape but also
its content, an approach quite different from so-called. Limpet, which can
from the rest of the Act technically separated relatively easily. In this respect, it is possible to distinguish
provisions which were duly filed by the government as part
government proposal, the provisions in the bill brought
constitutional committee of Deputies. The first
are handled in a proper manner and equipped with an explanatory memorandum to the others is the only justification
několikavěté presented at meetings of the two chambers, from which
derive what treatment options were considered. The petitioner while
not consider it essential that the text is also accompanied by the constitutional committee
probably originated at the Ministry of Justice and the Minister of Justice
J. Pospisil comprehensive amendment supported. This is according to the petitioner
maybe even worse, because knowingly breach
established procedures. Legislative initiatives has the government, and not
ministry. As a general rule applies that, just as they can circumvent
officials and cabinet ministers to pursue their own ideas about the form of laws
direct negotiations with deputies, the Minister circumvent
(coalition) government, in which his idea failed or it might not succeed
. Either way conflicts with the position of the government as a collegiate
supreme executive body which your program a significant part
implemented through legislative initiatives. "Siphoned off" bill
can therefore be considered as interference in the separation of powers. He also pointed to
professional superiority, which allows the government to prepare laws
taking into account various aspects of quality of law-making, ie. Physical, procedural and organizational
(Legislative Rules of the Government, the Legislative Council
government amendment procedure) .
Ignored, reducing the chance of formally perfect law, which is enhanced
comprehensive amendments, by their nature further and wider discussion
considering depressants.

13th In this regard, the petitioner pointed out that the proposal is in addition
touching one of the three fundamental branches of state power, in matters
extremely sensitive and complex (appointment and removal of judicial officers,
introduction of office, changing relationships Supreme court etc.). Therefore
is an unacceptable lack of reasoning as in the explanatory memorandum, and all readings
parliamentary debate, which becomes all the more obvious need
indicate the procedure for adopting amendments to the Act on Courts and Judges way
comprehensive amendment for contradictory to the principle of the rule of law and democratic
legislative process (Art. 1. 1 and Art. 2 paragraph.
3 of the Constitution) is the "right to good laws" and the principle
hear all sides. According to the petitioner, in this case directly injects doubt
whether a particular course of the legislative process was not elected because of
an effort to omit an uncomfortable discussion with judicial public, which is even
inconsistent with the definition of democracy as the government debates, and
policy not only between each other, but mostly between the rulers and the ruled.
Petitioner therefore proposed to annul those parts of the constitutionally unacceptable forms
comprehensive amendment (see print no. 425/1.
Chamber of Deputies. V. vol. Period. 2008), which were not properly filed and Government || | Deputies discussed transparently, and not of those parts
Act no. 314/2008 Coll., which were part of the original government proposal
(print no. 425/0. Deputies. V. vol. period. 2008) .

14th According to the petitioner, it is possible that the Constitutional Court will aforementioned
arguments considered only substantive. In this case, submitted a statement of claim
another variant (see above sub 5) formulated so that they can be lifted
implications of the amendment to Act no. 314/2008 Coll., As reflected in
law on courts and judges and in the administrative Procedure Act as amended
regulations or. Article. II and Art. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
(Transitional provisions for the amendments of the said laws). This proposal
petitioner has further substantiate. His reasoning can only conclude that
compared to the procedural nature of the opposition first variant of the judgment in the petition suggests

Second variant eliminate the consequences of the amendment from a material standpoint.
In other words, in this case, after the Constitutional Court requires
infringement procedures deemed a breach of the actual content of the constitutional order
.

15th It is so comprehensively stated that the first two variants of judgment in the petition
thus considered to be the basic problem of unconstitutionality use complex
amendment. The first one is directed against selected parts of the Act
no. 314/2008 Coll., Amending Act no. 6/2002 Coll., On Courts,
judges, lay judges and state administration of courts and amending certain other
Acts (Courts and Judges), as amended regulations
Act no. 150/2002 Coll., administrative procedure Code, as amended
, Act no. 7/2002 Coll., on proceedings relating to judges and state representatives
, as amended regulations, the Act no. 349/1999 Coll., on
Public Defender of rights, as amended, Act no. 283/1993
Coll., on the Public Prosecutor, as amended, Act no. || | 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanors, as amended, and Act no.
85/1996 Coll., on advocacy, as amended. The second variant
draft statement of claim has been directed not against the amendment, ie. Act. No. 314/2008 Coll
., But in the same range to accurately labeled
provisions of the law on courts and judges, the Administrative Procedure Code and Art. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll
., but only with a note that this happens in the event that
Constitutional court concluded that the arguments presented in the first version of the statement of claim
proposal are more substantive character, ie. the content
contradiction is established and the faulty procedure in the form of a comprehensive amendment.
II.b


Unconstitutionality of § 68 para. 1, § 68 par. 2 point. b) and § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges


16th Both variant described above judgment in the petition the petitioner merged with another
proposal, and for annulment of selected parts of § 68 para. 1, § 68 paragraph
. 2 point. b) and § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges. Regardless
impact assessment adoption of the law in the form of a comprehensive amendment
terms of procedural or substantive law, the appellant seeks annulment
assignment of judges to the Ministry of Justice and abolishing
petition to initiate disciplinary proceedings as a reason for the temporary | || waived the office of President or Vice-court. These provisions
was indeed also part of the amending Act no. 314/2008 Coll. (See
his points 4, 5 and 28), but it was already contained in the original text of the government's draft
(print no. 425/0), so they are not vitiated by the petitioner
links using comprehensive amendment proposal (
print no. 425/1). The petitioner is also ranked the third variant of judgment in the petition, which has already
not based on arguments of unconstitutionality use complex
amendment, but the argument of unconstitutionality of the individual
selected solutions. Therefore, it will address the Constitutional Court within
special part of the decision. The contested provisions of the Law on Courts and Judges including
contested parts (bolded text) added:

"§ 68

(1) The judge assigned to perform the functions of a particular court under § 67 or
translated to another court pursuant to § 71 and 72 can be with his consent for a
more than three years in the interest of the proper administration of justice to assign temporarily
another court, or in order to use his experience to


Ministry or the Judicial Academy.

(2) The secondment will decide

B) the Minister of Justice, after consultation with the chairman of the court to which the judge assigned
according to § 67 or transferred pursuant to § 71 and 72 to perform
function, if it is a temporary assignment of a judge to


Ministry or the Judicial Academy ".

"§ 100a

(1) The Minister of Justice may temporarily relieve the duties of the President or Vice-court


A) as provided in § 100 paragraph. 1 point. a) and c)

B) if disciplinary prosecuted for a disciplinary violation for which the disciplinary action
suggested imposing disciplinary removal from office of a judge or
removal from office of President or Vice-President of the court, a period in | || final completion of disciplinary proceedings.

(2) During the temporary waiver of office under paragraph 1
chairman or deputy court does not belong to an increase in salary
coefficient associated with its functions under separate legal

Legislations6). Unless the termination of the office of president or vice
court, suffer the chairman or deputy court remainder of
salary if he would it otherwise be entitled; This does not apply if it was
judge convicted of a criminal offense.

(3) The provisions of § 99 para. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis. ".

17th The appellant's argument is based on the fact that the allocation of judges
to the Ministry of Justice is constitutionally questionable, as the judges have primarily
judge. Likewise, the level of the judicial salary represents a material
component of judicial independence, which, however, should be taken when deciding on disputes
right, but not the exercise of policy activities at the ministry, which in addition
unreasonably burdens the state budget and the disparity in remuneration
between ministry officials. It is enhanced by extending the length
allocation of up to three years. The contested provisions are in conflict with
principle of separation of powers and the independence of courts and judges and can lead to questioning the impartiality
thus allocated to judges who
ministry build personal relationships or identify with the implementation
departmental policies, with which then in its judicial activities can
clash. His argument here petitioner added that, given the
nomination forms and authorized the Minister of Justice will
judges trainees well known and generally conform with it, so choose
offers presiding judges right from their ranks. Since
chairmen propose his Deputy could Department using "discreet"
personnel policy to control the entire judiciary.

18th In the petition to annul § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges for
petitioner considers the most controversial authorization of the Minister of Justice
temporarily relieve a judge of office of the Chairman and Vice-court
if it was a disciplinary proposal against proposed removal from office of judicial
officials. It is an instrument to abuse particularly when the minister
acts as a disciplinary petitioner, who himself suggested an appropriate sanction. There's a little limited
rather vague formulations merits.
Minister as disciplinary petitioner creates the conditions for it to minister as a representative
central authority of courts to temporarily exempted the judicial officers
its functions. The same minister will also have to ensure
makeshift court proceedings, so that by the time any zprošťujícího
verdict of the disciplinary court can significantly transform. This interferes
independence of judges and courts, separation of powers and opens the possibility of arbitrariness and
arbitrariness in the exercise of state administration of justice.

19th According to the petitioner, however, a serious institutional deficit § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges
not in the individual reasons for a temporary exemption
, but the inadequacy of legal protection compared with
temporary waiver of a judge when it is possible to bring the disciplinary court
objections (cf. § 100 paragraph. 4 of the same Act). In all the cases covered by §
100a so during a temporary exemption function may occur
irreversible facts, and that intervention by the executive.
While restrictions on the temporary exemption only on the function of the judicial officers indicates that it does not go on
offenses fatal importance, so the risk of improper performance of his duties
person becomes compared with a threat to independence less distinct.
The petitioner therefore finds sufficient possibility of a temporary waiver
position of Chairman and Vice-court due to redevelopment on the office of judge, and thus
judicial officers (akcesorium judicial function) and therefore
annulment of the entire § 100a. If the legislature is not the same
opinion, should modify the temporary exemption exclusively to the Chairman or Vice-court
way in terms of legal protection comparable to
redevelopment on the office of judge. However, since the Constitutional Court is not a new provision
supplement, it is necessary to cancel the entire § 100a.


II.c
Unconstitutionality indefinite number of vice-presidents of the Supreme Court

20th Moreover, in the third variant of the judgment in the petition submitted by the petitioner
closely reasoned proposals to repeal individual provisions of the above-mentioned
laws that already do not associate with the problems of application
so. a comprehensive amendment. This variant is a substantial
part coincides with the second option. Specifically, in this case the petitioner
challenging these provisions and their designated part. Regarding
law on courts and judges, challenges as unconstitutional the provisions of that amendment

Law on Courts and Judges has established an indefinite number of vice-presidents
Supreme Court expressed in the words "vice-chairmen" in § 15 para. 1, § 23 paragraph
. 1 and § 102 para. 2, the word "vice-presidents" in § 15 para. 2 and
in § 121 par. 2, the word "vice" in § 102 para. 1 and § 168 and
words "vice-presidents of the Supreme court" in § 119 para. 2 of the Act
courts and judges. These provisions read:

"§ 15

(1) The Supreme Court shall consist of the President of the Court,


Court vice-presidents, Presidents of colleges, presiding judges and other judges.

(2) The decision-making activities of the Supreme Court, judges. Chairman and


Vice-presidents of the Supreme Court decision in addition to performing operations also
state administration of the Supreme Court of the extent provided by law.
The Presidents of colleges in addition to decision-making also organize and manage the activities
colleges. The chairmen of Senate except for decision-making
also organize and manage the activities of the Chambers.

§ 23 paragraph. 1

(1) The Plenum of the Supreme Court consists of the Chairman,


Vice-Presidents, the Presidents of colleges, presiding judges and other judges of the Supreme Court
.

§ 102 para. 1 and 2

(1) The chairman and


Vice-President of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from among judges of the President.

(2) The President and


Vice-presidents of the Supreme Court is 10 years.

§ 119 para. 2

The state court administration

(

2) The state administration of courts, the President and


Vice-presidents of the Supreme Court, chairman and deputy chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the chairmen and vice-chairmen
high, regional and district courts.

§ 121 paragraph. 2

(2)


Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Vice-Presidents of the high courts exercise state administration of the courts
to the extent determined by their chairmen.

§ 168

President of the Supreme Court deals with complaints whose content is
complaint about delays in proceedings, improper conduct or disturbing the dignity of the proceedings



Vice President, presiding judge, judges, assistants and other employees
serving at the Supreme Court, or the President of the Supreme Court. ".

21st The petitioner argues that this change is linked to the alleged contradiction between the law
(Singular "Vice") and Art. 62 point. f) of the Constitution
(plural "Vice-Presidents"). According to the petitioner's opinion, there is a discrepancy
existed since the law on courts and judges
adjusted based on the mandate in Article. 91 para. 2 of the Constitution of the organizational structure of the Supreme Court
so that it was factually substantiated only one location Vice which is our
indeed traditional. For the period 1918-1952 he was at the top
courts typically chairman with one representative. Followed by a period
chairman and deputy chairmen of the capacity of the colleges ( "professional
Vice-Presidents"), which lasted essentially until 1988. The disruption was
at the Federal Supreme Court by re-establishing (adding) || | Deputy Chairman in response to the federalization of Czechoslovakia on January 1
1970's. After 1988 resumed ratios similar to the first stage, ie. function
chairman and vice chairman. Combination of several Vice- Chairman
colleges thus departs from tradition and would be thoroughly justified:
is not justified at all. Additionally, this change led to the halt proceedings
on the proposal of the President sp. Nos. Pl. US 17/07 (
unpublished resolution in SbNU, available at http://nalus.usoud.cz), directed
precisely this contradiction.

22nd According to the petitioner legislature certainly can organizational structure
Supreme Court to modify otherwise, it has not done in a constitutionally correct
. However, there is lack of explaining the need for additional
vice-presidents of the Supreme Court, but mostly ignores the fact that the relationship
laws and the Constitution is based on the specification of the general rules, not on their
mechanical picking, which also has a significant in this case
constitutional consequences. The legislature is elected indefinite diction, because - unlike
to the Constitutional Court Act - did not exactly
number of vice-presidents. While other ordinary courts limits its proposal
number of vice-presidents presiding judge, here it is left to the discretion
appointing authority, ie the president. This opened space
executive power personified just the president, for a brand

Inadequate and arbitrary interference with the situation at the Supreme Court.
President of the Republic is not for the actions of the Supreme Court responsibility
while he now admits permission to appoint an indefinite number
Presidents, which may change the position of President of the Supreme Court
management model court, the court encumber budget for financial and other
material demands of the new vice-presidents etc. at the Supreme court judges
might raise career expectations, which may not be without impact on their
decisions.

23rd Therefore, according to the petitioner, such legislation inconsistent with
principles of the democratic rule of law demands certainty laws and
clear legal determination of the powers of state authority as contained in Article
. 1. 1 and Art. 2, paragraph. 3 of the Constitution and Art. 2. 2
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter"). He also pointed to the Constitutional Court
eg. No. 88/2008 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 24/07 of 31 first
2008 (N 26/48 SbNU 303), no. 198/2003 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 11/02
of 11. 6. 2003 (N 87/30 SbNU 309).
Determining an indefinite number of vice-presidents of the Supreme Court is also inconsistent with the constitutionally enshrined
prohibition of arbitrariness and contingency (Art. 1, Art. 2. 3 of the Constitution and Art. 2
paragraph. 2 of the Charter) and ultimately it can also weaken the division
power.


II.d
Unconstitutionality introduction of the office of the Chairman and Vice courts

24th The petitioner described as unconstitutional introduction of tenures
chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts in § 102 para. 2, § 103, paragraph
. 2, § 104. 2, § 105 para. 2, § 108 par. 2 Act on Courts and Judges
. These provisions read:

"§ 102 para. 2

(2) The President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court is 10 years.

§ 103. 2

(2) The President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court is 7 years.

§ 104 paragraph. 2

(2) The President and Vice-President of the Regional Court is 7 years.

§ 105 paragraph. 2

(2) The President and Vice-President of the district court is 7 years.

§ 108 paragraph. 2

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman court under § 102-105 also expires
expiration of the term. "
.

25th Regarding the introduction of the office of the Chairman and Vice
courts as stated literally the petitioner has a "feeling" that important objective and purpose
under the law to circumvent the existing case law of the Constitutional Court in the case
independence of the judiciary [in particular Judgment sp. Nos. Pl. US 7/02 from
on 18. 6. 2002 (N 78/26 SbNU 273; 349/2002 Coll.), And finding sp. Nos. Pl. US
18/06 of 11. 7. 2006 (N 130/42 SbNU 13; 397/2006 Coll.)] And limit
principle of independence of the judiciary explicitly expressed in Article. 81 and 82 of the Constitution and
Art. 36 of the Charter. There recalled the conclusions from judgment. Nos. Pl. US 7/02 (no.
349/2002 Coll.), Justifying the revocation of the former § 106 para. 1 of the
courts and judges, among others referring to the promotion of judges and
possibility of dismissal only the law that reason and the procedure
disciplinary proceedings which respects the independence of the judiciary, the principle
uninterrupted performance of the personal mandate of an independent judiciary and the separation of powers
, though otherwise the legislature, the way should be addressed || | question the performance of court administration. The petitioner summarized the conclusions of the Constitutional
Court in its judgment. Nos. Pl. US 18/06 to the possibility of appeal
Chairman of the Supreme Court, which declared that the office of President and Chairman of the Supreme Court
is inseparable from the office of judge, because you can not construct
ambiguity of the legal position as chairman of the court | || civil servants on the one hand and the judge on the other hand,
while the law may provide exceptions to the finality of the office of judge,
mainly due to disciplinary responsibility. As well as legislation
dismissal of chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts must respect the constitutional principles of separation
powers, independence of the judiciary and the like. You can not do so without reflection
constitutional values ​​determine any model appeals court functionaries.

26th On that basis, the petitioner concludes that the contested legal
scheme essentially circumvents this binding legal opinion of the Constitutional Court, because instead of model
dismissal of judicial officers is introducing a new model
appointment of judicial officers for a fixed period with unlimited discretions | || executive power to re-appoint the same person to the same function. closer yet

Argues with the fear of "managerial wear" RESOLVED
officials in function must be twenty years or more. In this context it refers to a statistical overview
processed documentation department and analysts
Supreme Administrative Court, from which it follows that such functionaries to
30th April 2008 was 12 out of a total of 271. The statistics showed
that more than 68% of all judicial officials, more than two-thirds
not hold office for more than a decade, a third of them were
appointed in the last five years.
Largest number of judicial functionaries (nearly two thirds) in the age group around or just below
50 years. It is therefore questionable whether such a marginal share
longer serving judicial officers could be reason enough for so serious
legislative intervention. We must be alert to the fact that these
officials were dismissed by previous ministers even at a time when it was possible
(due to the absence of relevant case then
Constitutional Court) very easily. The petitioner also stated that what would
could be tolerated by the decisions of a collegial body with a share
judicial representation should not be tolerated in deciding
political bodies executive.

27th The petitioner argues specific agendas, which have
judicial officials in charge. The legislature does not proceed so that the needs
Administration adjusts to demands for judicial officers, but it has the necessary independence to soudců-
judicial officials
derive the volume and nature of the tasks that can fulfill. Court official is a judge, only
personality, whose consciousness is, under normal circumstances, rozdvojovat.
It is therefore necessary in the interests of judicial independence
certain attributes of independence and judicial officials admit, therefore, to be possibly
removed from office only by an independent and impartial body. Law
disciplinary proceedings as a way to appeal judicial officials accept that
it immediately devalued by setting another reason, when the extinction function
there, and it's expiration of the term, which can be considered by the petitioner and
for violation of Article. 89 para. 2 of the Constitution. Therefore, the petitioner
stressed that if the currently accepted re-appointment to almost
empty set of criteria, creating the risk of influencing the behavior
judges who wish to continue in office and is approaching the end of their term of office
. The petitioner is aware that the Constitutional Court can not
urging lawmakers to set up a body of judicial representation.
Can not clearly define what restrictions the absence of such a body in the creation of judicial power
carries. These conclusions petitioner added solutions examples from other states
with a model of judicial self-administration or the executive model as
Czech Republic (Austria, Germany), where, however, regarding the appointment of an indefinite period
. He recalled also that in the Anglo-American countries, then executive
appointment of judicial officers for indefinite rule, moreover
Anglo-American theory between a judge and a court official position
not distinguish at all.


II.e
Unconstitutionality reappointed judicial officials

28th Another objection of unconstitutionality applied petitioner in the case
introduction of the possibility of re-appointment of chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts.
This provision reads:

"§ 105a

Chairman and Vice-court under § 102 to 105 may be in his
function reappointment if

(A) during the term of office of President or Vice
court was not held liable for disciplinary offenses committed by them in the performance of this function
or

(B) their tenure has not been convicted of an offense. ".

29th Proposal by stating that, in his opinion, is the possibility of re-appointment of Chairman and Vice
court contrary to the independence of courts and judges.
This is particularly true with regard to how they are, respectively.
not formulated criteria for reappointment from which it is apparent that
will necessarily dominate in terms of the Act an unexpressed. Since
that the role of those who appoint judicial officials, acting (political)
executive bodies, and not, for instance.
Body also including judicial representation, creating a space uncertainty about how | || be a judicial official, who is also a judge, act in an effort to achieve
reappointment. Such uncertainty can certainly be seen as

Conflicting with the requirements of the European Court of Human Rights to judge
not be independent and impartial, but so also appeared.
Sensitivity of the issue is further enhanced by keeping internships judges
at the Ministry of Justice, which was recently extended for up to three years (see
arguments sub IIb). The Minister of Justice could appoint or to propose
appointment of judges was a long-acting outside courts
identifying with the ministry or even individual minister
who served as officers. Certain statements the Minister of Justice
about internships as a criterion for "functionaries career" these concerns
updated. Like in Constitutional Court to electoral reform
So here goes - among other things - about the negative cumulative effect of individual
provisions of the Act.

30th Another problem reappointment sees petitioner transfer
appointment of authorization from the Minister of Justice to the President of the Republic
which is in no way equipped to monitor the activities
judicial officials, so either limited to the approval of the minister
proposal, or at its discretion, apply more political considerations.
In European comparison, there is no doubt that the possibility of re-appointment of judicial officers
applies only where it has jurisdiction decisní
body of judicial representation, not by the executive authority; moreover
with this institute we will meet only in the former postcommunist space
ie not in Western Europe.


II.f
Unconstitutionality of transitional provisions to implement the mandate as President and Vice
high, regional and district courts

31st In this part of the petition, the petitioner contests detached
transitional provisions to implement the mandate of the President and Vice
high, regional and district courts in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and Article 11
. II, part One, Act no. 314/2008 Coll. The contested provisions Art. II
points 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll. added:

"Art. II
Transitional provisions


Fourth Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his position in 1989 before ending the function
period of 1 year from the effective date of this Act.

Fifth Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his post in 1990, the term of office for
two years from the effective date of this Act.

6th Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his post in 1991 to 1994, ending functional
period of 3 years from the effective date of this Act.

7th Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his post in 1995 to 1998, ending functional
period of 4 years from the effective date of this Act.

8th Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his post in 1999 and 2000, ending functional
period of 5 years from the effective date of this Act.

9th Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his post in 2001 and 2002, ending functional
period of 6 years from the effective date of this Act.

10th Chairmen and vice-chairmen high, regional and district courts,
appointed to his post in 2003 to 2007 and in 2008
before the effective date of this Act, the term of office for seven years from the effective date of this
Act.

11th Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Supreme Court's term ends
5 years from the effective date of this Act. ".

32nd Unconstitutional establishment of transitional arrangements for the introduction of functional
period Chairmen and Vice high, regional and district courts
petitioner sees in that there determined the end of the term of office
individual currently involved judicial officials, at the time || | shorter than the new statutory full term
relevant officials. Such treatment is an infringement on judicial independence and simultaneously
clear case of false retroactivity, which is undesirable because
tramples legitimate expectations of the officials. For
case the Constitutional Court did not grant the application for revocation term
period, the petitioner stated that perhaps ústavněkonformní options were exhausted
entire term of office established by law and calculated from

Force of the Act, without arbitrarily shorten this term in
transitional provisions of the Act. It pointed to the example of President
Supreme Court, whose function is to disappear in five years, while
President of the Supreme Administrative Court, appointed less than a year later
for ten years. It considers it an example of arbitrariness in the legislative
as a breach of the principle of formal justice (legal equality)
decision legislators in individual cases of violations of
equal access to public office under Art. 21 par. 4.


II.G
Unconstitutionality of transitional provisions to implement the mandate as President and Vice
Supreme Administrative Court

33rd For similar reasons as II.D II.e the petitioner seeks repeal
amended § 13 par. 3 and § 13a of Act no. 150/2002 Coll.
Administrative Procedure Code, as amended by Law no. 314 / 2008 Sb. (There Art. III
point 2 and 3), which introduces also the Chair and Vice
Supreme Administrative Court and the possibility of repeated nomination.
In this case it is not contested by the transitional provisions of Article. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll
., Which provides that the President and Vice
Supreme Administrative Court ends term of 10 years from the effective date of this | || law. The contested provisions added:

§ 13 paragraph. 3

"(3) The term of office of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court
10 years.".

"§ 13a

Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court may be in its
function reappointment if

A) during the term of office of President or Vice
court was not held liable for disciplinary offenses committed by them in the performance of this function
or

B) their tenure has not been convicted of an offense. ".

III.
Observations of the parties


34th The proposal to the Constitutional Court expressed by both parties.
The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic commented on 12 July 2007
its Chairman. Miloslav Vlcek, who
regardless of the fact that the petitioner challenges one of the basic procedural practices
in the legislative process, in fact, an opinion on the proposal has not delivered.
It simply stated that the proposal was approved by the constitutionally prescribed manner
meeting on 23 June 2008, in vote no. 242; from the present 155 deputies were
proposal for 109 against 8. After the Senate vote, the proposal was
signed by the President and duly promulgated.

35th The Senate is extensively expressed its chairman, MD. Premysl Sobotka, who
mainly recapitulated the contents of the proposal. He said the specific circumstances
discussing the proposal in the Senate, where the Minister of Justice J. Pospíšil
volunteered as the original government proposal, as well as the text that came out
modified form of Deputies. Intelligence report
Senator J. Rippelová contained a fundamental objection to the draft
hearing in the Chamber of Deputies in the form of a comprehensive
amendment. The draft lively discussion took place in the constitutional
Senate committee for the presence of many guests (eg. JUDr. Josef Baxa, Chairman
Supreme Administrative Court, Mgr. Iva Brozova, chairwoman of the Supreme Court
, representatives of the Union of Judges and the Czech Republic other).
Proposal was also discussed Standing Senate Commission on the Constitution of the Czech Republic and
parliamentary procedure, the conclusions of which according to the chairman of the Senate
petitioner is partly based. On July 16, 2008 discussed the draft Law
Senate. Of the 54 senators present for the proposal expressed
35 senators, 12 were against. Furthermore, the chairman of the Senate informed about the content
closer consideration of the bill and pointed to the problem of intricately conceived
proposal for its abolition, where there is a mixing aspects
procedural and substantive unconstitutionality (see point II.A sub IIb) .
Also pointed out that the procedural concept unconstitutionality transformed in
middle variant (referred to herein as II.b) petit to "substantive
expression" in the case derogation lead to undesirable, hence the sense || | nedávajícím gaps in the statutory text, as well as the removal of the Article. IV
Act no. 314/2008 Coll. the last alternative proposal.
Own decision left the Senate President to the Constitutional Court.

IV.

Formal prerequisites for consideration of the constitutionality of a legislative procedure



36th The Constitutional Court concluded that the petition was filed pursuant to § 64 para. 1
point. b) of the Act on the Constitutional Court, a group of 21 senators and formal
site is in compliance with the requirements of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The proceedings
repeal the legislation is the responsibility of the Constitutional Court, first
examine whether the legislation, which was concerned, was approved
bounds of constitutionally provided jurisdiction and in a constitutionally prescribed manner (§
68 para. 2 of the Law on the Constitutional court).

37th First, it was necessary to assess the conditions of management in accordance with § 66 and 67
Law on the Constitutional Court. The Law on Courts and Judges, meanwhile, was changed
Act no. 7/2009 Coll., Amending Act no. 99/1963 Coll., Civil
Procedure Code, as amended, and other related laws, and
Act no. 41/2009 Coll., amending certain acts in connection with
adoption of the criminal Code, those laws are not touched provisions
whose constitutionality is the subject of this proceeding. Also, they affect
draft amendment to the law on courts and judges made by Act no. 217/2009 Coll
. (Prejudice § 42) and no. 227/2009 Coll. (§ 175a).
The same applies to the amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act no. 7/2009 Coll. (§ 41, 45, 49 and 55
) and no. 320/2009 Coll. (§ 89 para. 5) and constitutional law no. 195/2009 Coll
. (Repealed).

38th The fundamental question in terms of meeting the requirements
legislative procedure, was itself a variant of the above-mentioned judgment in the petition sub II.a.
In the event that the Constitutional Court reached the same conclusion as the petitioner
it would not be further in the procedure and the proposal would have been settled already at this point
repeal of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. The same would be true for the statement of claim
second variant (also sub II.a) in the event that such a method
change was considered not as a violation of the constitutionally prescribed manner
acceptance, but as a content conflict with the constitutional order. The above
arguments of the petitioner, the Constitutional Court notes that this section
both proposals as the first and second lines of the statement of claim unfounded.

39th The extensive arguments předestřeným petitioner sub II.a (
points 4 to 14), the Constitutional Court states that it has on several occasions discussed the draft on
repeal the law, which was based on a comprehensive amendment or amendments
proposal [especially finding no. 88/2008 Coll. (See above). Further, judgment no.
257/2008 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 56/05 of 27. 3. 2008 (N 60/48
SbNU 873), no. 163/2009 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 42/08 of 21 fourth
2009, and most recently, no. 9/2010 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 17/09 of 1
12th 2009]. He never reaches the conclusion that this practice was contrary to the constitutional rules
parliamentary law [specifically eg. In judgment no. 160/2008 Coll
. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. WS 25/07 of 13. 3. 2008 (N 56/48
SbNU 791) stated that the adoption and publication of the contested Act no.
181/2007 Coll., On the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and the Archive
security forces and amending some laws, there
prescribed manner (similarly, judgment no. 163/2009)]. Conversely, in the judgment III.
US 455/08 of 10 March 2009 the Constitutional Court took as determinative in interpreting
legislation was the part that was inserted into it only in the so-called
. A comprehensive amendment. Likewise, in the case
judgment no. 37/2007 Coll. (See above), in this context, the Constitutional Court only
referring to the opinion expressed in the literature (Kysela, J .: Formation
rights in the Czech Republic: Tragedy with a Happy Ending ?, Legal newsletter no. 7/2006) | || recalled that the government had called for.
comprehensive amendments to insist on their right to comment on the bill under Art. 44 of the Constitution, because
in fact a disguised new legislative initiative.
In this case, it is evident that this proposal was initiated just
government that its representation in the discussion of the draft amendment to the law on courts and judges
instructed the Minister of Justice.
Not the task and competence of the Constitutional Court to examine all the details and procedures
adopt laws, if not constitutional rules
legislative process (see judgment no. 331/2005 Coll. - See above). It found that even in the case of a complex
amendment, which, when used
Senate hearing [judgment no. 207/2003 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 14/02 dated
4. 6. 2003 (N 82/30 SbNU 263 Sb.)]. Objection use the comprehensive amendment
proposal in judgment no. 88/2008 Coll. (See above) has been applied only as a

Dissenting opinion. Likewise, the fact that the proposal in this part
lacks justification fulfilling the requirements of § 86 par. 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies
itself does not lead to the unconstitutionality thus
negotiated with and approved by law. While the petitioners in this part
to actual problems of the practice of the legislative process, but they do not reach
unconstitutionality.

40th Called. comprehensive amendments are part of a longer time
reglementového rights in the Czech Republic. Based on these
approved laws and constitutional. The Constitutional Court has not yet had reason to question the
this procedure even if it came as a particular initiative
Committee of Deputies in discussing government proposals
laws (the usual case), even in the event that this initiative came in
facts from the government, which sought to eliminate the adverse impacts
parliamentary proposals [see judgment no. 257/2008 Coll. (See above)
in connection with an amendment to the Commercial Code made by Act no. 216/2005 Coll. and
Syllová, J. et al .: Czech Parliament. 2nd ed. Prague 2008, p. 237
]. Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies concept of a comprehensive draft amendment
know. It is one of the institutes of parliamentary practice that
However, within the bounds of constitutional order when the bill
treated on the basis of legislative initiatives
authorized petitioner under Art. 41 paragraph. 2 of the Constitution (here Document No. . 425/0), but the basis for negotiations
is just a comprehensive amendment (here print no. 425/1)
relevant parliamentary committee (here it was the constitutional committee).
This does not mean that the subject of legislative initiative
ceases to be a "master design" because it is still on its legislative initiative.
Therefore only one with this proposal (albeit in the form of a comprehensive amendment
proposal) has and may be withdrawn without further debate
until the end of the second reading, which is based on a comprehensive proposal for amendment
his legislative initiative act (§ 64 in connection with § 86 paragraph
. 6 of Act no. 90/1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies), with the consent of the Chamber of Deputies
still in the third reading.

41st A comprehensive amendment in the form of print no. 425/1 was therefore still only
amendment within the meaning of § 63 para. 1 point 5 point. a)
Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The government as a petitioner therefore
also be able to proceed under § 63 para. 2 of the Rules of Procedure and propose
interrupt the present case, in the event of non-compliance withdraw it
according to § 64 of the Rules of Procedure. In this case, the government did not proceed, while her
representative supported the proposal at the meeting in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate advocated in
. That the minister representing the government at the second reading of the proposal
18th June 2008 in the Chamber of Deputies said that the "
state for the Ministry of Justice that these supplements agree"
does not change the fact that the it was the government's proposal and the opinion of representative government.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court considers that this approach not only to undermine the general rules
constitutionally prescribed process of passing laws, but not for
substantively inconsistent with the constitutional order in a particular case approval
print no. 425/0 in the Chamber of Deputies . Any other procedure would finally mean that
Constitutional Court, as in the case of so-called. Hemocyanin (judgment no. 37/2007 Coll
. - See above), establishes


Obligation for futuro


Ex officio examine every proposal under Art. 87 paragraph. 1 point. a) of the Constitution also from
terms of whether the law under review was adopted on the basis of a comprehensive
amendment (the first option proposed judgment - sub 4) and whether
in this case was investigated reglementová initiator of the draft law,
possibly


Ad hoc (second option proposed judgment - sub 5) that contains a long enough
justification. Such an unconstitutional interference, this procedure does not. Here
Constitutional Court recalls that a comprehensive amendment
were approved two key components of the constitutional order - in 1991
Charter and the 1992 Constitution.

42nd Therefore, in these parts dismissed as unfounded.
In addition, it must be for the sake of completeness, the Constitutional Court noted that, in the event of objections
unconstitutional procedure for the approval of laws applies petitioner said
principle of minimizing interference so that in that case, the content of the law does not decide
[cf. . finds no. 30/1998 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US

33/97 dated 17. 12. 1997 (N 163/9 SbNU 399), no. 476/2002 Coll. - Finding
sp. Nos. Pl. US 5/02 of 2. 10. 2002 (N 117/28 SbNU 25) and no. 283/2005 Coll
. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 13/05 of 22 6. 2005 (N 127/37 SbNU 593)
a resolution file. Nos. Pl. US 5/98 of 22. 4. 1999 (U 32/14 SbNU 309)].
Not so no longer possible combinations Petit listed in the sub II.a
form that the proposal was partly constitutional and partly not constitutional.
The Constitutional Court can not therefore in this case, choose what
will be reviewed and what is not, because it is a matter of deciding
inside the chambers of Parliament. The Constitutional Court (see judgment no. 331/2005 Coll. - See above)
There must confine itself to respecting the constitutional rules of the legislative process
and the evaluation result of the decision of Parliament in compliance with them.
Preserves in the Rules of Procedure Act chamber position of the appellant as a master
proposal, there is generally room for intervention by the Constitutional Court.
The task of the Constitutional Court can not therefore, pursuant to § 68 para. 2 of the Constitutional Court
compulsorily submitted any proposal
foregoing review that went beyond procedures and evaluation meant
content. Again, the government in implementing its policies must ensure
rights. There is therefore not correct that, eg. For another term
such a procedure the previous government subsequently questioned.

43rd The proposal was therefore in this section in terms of both argumentation planes
how they were raised the petitioner (sub II.a), ie. Both procedural and substantive
rejected as unfounded.

V.

The constitutionality of the proposal concerned individual provisions

44th On this basis, the Constitutional Court review the remainder of the proposal in
points marked as II.b to II.G, both in terms of actual
contested provision, and in terms of argument associated with it.
Basis for why the third took the petition that is not in this case
essential that the petitioner complicated variants suggested
repeal and transitional provisions Art. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll., As in
if compliance with this draft (introduction of a mandate as President of the Supreme administrative court
) would both have lost a sense of itself, secondly, do not suffer
alleged defects other contested provision, while Article problem.
IV of Law no. 314 / 2008 Sb. He consisted only in the procedure of its adoption (
comprehensive amendment).

45th Generally, the Constitutional Court points out that, in their capacity
could only deal with the contested provisions of the Law on Courts and Judges and
Act no. 314/2008 Coll., Rather than a set of legal solutions
status of judges and judicial officials on the one hand and the bodies of legislative
or particularly powerful (President of the Republic, Government, Ministry
justice, Ministry of Finance) on the other.
Role of the Constitutional Court is to assess the contested provisions, rather than in developing reasoning



De lege ferenda and finding appropriate legislative solutions where to lawmakers
gives constitutional order space. If there are, therefore, possible other solutions based
judicial self-administration, but the Constitution does not require such solutions, not
possible from this perspective to evaluate the challenged statutory provisions nor her because
challenge. Likewise, it was not possible to go back to the historical context
judicial administration in connection with a federal structure (lack
Federal Ministry of Justice in the Czechoslovak Federation on
Unlike most federations, and therefore another position outside the Supreme Court
republican outreach ministries of justice). Finally, it should
emphasized that the petitioner basing its arguments on the action
"negative cumulative effect" (sub 29)
individual provisions of the amendment to the law on courts and judges. Interference in the independence of courts
sees coherence of action of the individual amended solutions.
Constitutional Court must in this context to recall that such a doctrine
[particular judgments no. 64/2001 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US
42/2000 dated 24th 1, 2001 (N 16/21 SbNU 113), no. 349/2002 Coll. (See above) and no.
318/2009 Coll. - Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 27/09 dated 10. 9. 2009]
may lead to the strengthening of the position of the petitioner's arguments where the same applies
him all the alleged constitutional defects in the legislation. In the event that the weight of the individual
claimed defects on the part of the contested provisions challenged by
decreases as their impact on other provisions that can then test

Constitutionality upheld. Finally, the Constitutional Court must emphasize that he
restricted to complaints directed against a particular provision of the
courts and judges, without being able to relate their findings to other solutions
introduced into this law after the pronouncement of judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 7/02 (no.
349/2002 Coll.) - See above.
Va


Constitutionality assignment of a judge to the Ministry of Justice pursuant to § 68 paragraph
. 1, § 68 par. 2 point. b) of the Act on Courts and Judges

46th As the first two questions, the Constitutional Court to assess the reasonableness of the proposal to repeal
words "Ministry or" in § 68 para. 1 and § 68 para. 2 point.
B) of the Act on Courts and Judges and § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges
(sub IIb). These provisions are part of Act no. 314/2008 Coll
. (See his points 4, 5 and 28), but it was already contained in the original text
government proposal, rather than a comprehensive amendment, so they are not subject
complaints listed in versions judgment in the petition sub II.a. At this point
Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that the proposal is justified only in part.
While he was guided by the following considerations.

47th Proposal designated as IIb represents two separate parts.
In the first part of the proposed removal of the option to assign a judge to take advantage of his experience
to the Ministry of Justice, and its allocation
Minister of Justice decides with the consent of the judge and after consultation with the Chairman
Court which is judge assigned pursuant to § 67 or translated
according to § 71 and 72 of the law on courts and judges for appointment.
For evaluating the constitutional aspect of the matter here is crucial that
finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 7/02 (no. 349/2002 Coll.) Was
§ 68 paragraph. 1 of the Act on Courts and Judges, as amended, in the words
"the Ministry or" unconstitutional cleared to conflict with Art. 82 par. 3
Constitution. Act no. 192/2003 Coll. in paragraph 11 to § 68 para. 1
repealed provisions in the words "the Ministry or" returned, as
(point 20) in § 99 para. 1 point. c) where this provision has been cited
findings also canceled. The Constitutional Court notes that just as with
assigning judges to the Ministry of Justice counts § 68 para. 4
law on courts and judges. This provision, however, was not challenged nor
proceedings in the case file. Nos. Pl. US 7/02, nor in the present case. In
cited judgment (no. 349/2002 Coll.), The Constitutional Court concluded that
immanent feature of the judicial function is the continuity of its performance.
Therefore, membership in advisory bodies of ministries, government and both chambers of Parliament
, as well as the fulfillment of the tasks of the different components of state power
is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers, notwithstanding the fact that personal and
Detention without trial that occurred while such activity occurs
inevitably increase the likelihood of potential conflicts of interest, and does so in fairness
form impartiality of judges to doubt. The amended law on courts and judges
this unconstitutional state of affairs even further underlined by the fact that
assignment period is now extended to three years to option
allocation for one year in the annulled § 68 para. 1
law on courts and judges, as in force until 1 July 2003, when this provision was repealed
judgment no. 349/2002 Coll. This requirement
continuous exercise of the judicial function even more challenged and vice versa
objection liaison with the executive becomes even more serious.
It is also to be seen in this context that the process of selection and assignment of judges
in the Czech Republic, in comparison with countries with a developed judicial
government, in the hands of the executive power, especially || | Ministry of justice. The Constitutional Court is aware that this practice is
maybe in other countries (France, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia
, Austria), but answering this question it is necessary
take into account specific circumstances in the Czech Republic and the Ministry of justice
role in preparing for the judicial function and when
career advancement of judges, as well as the length and content transfer
activity translated judges in other state bodies in other states.
Why the Constitutional Court insisted on its legal opinion in judgment Pl. US 7/02
(no. 349/2002 Coll.) And still considers the assignment of judges to perform tasks in
within other branches of state power as an activity inconsistent with Art. 82 par. 3
Constitution, and due to that the legal opinion of the Constitutional court has already spoken once
(judgment Pl. US 7/02) and Art. 89 para. 2 of the Constitution; in

This respect also agrees with the petitioner regarding recalling
requirement to preserve the so-called. External or objective independence of judges
which would be a way to parties, but also the public
appear.

48th One also can not fail to see that in this context, § 99 par. 3 of the Act on Courts and Judges
provides that, for a temporary exemption from the performance
functions for the purpose of allocation to the Ministry of Justice entitled judges
salary and other matters related to the duties
judge under special legislation, which, however, is the Act no. 236/1995 Coll., on
salary and other indemnities associated with the duties
representatives of state power and some state bodies and judges and members of the European
Parliament, as amended, not by the Labour Code.
In its case law, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized the reasons for which judges
need to provide protection against deprivation of salaries or other
formalities associated with the exercise of the judicial function [
recently in proceedings conducted under file no. Nos. Pl. US 24/07 - Judgment dated 31. 1. 2008 (N 26/48
SbNU 303; 88/2008 Coll.), Sp. Nos. Pl. US 1/08 - Judgment dated 20. 5. 2008
(N 91/49 SbNU 273; 251/2008 Coll.), Sp. Nos. Pl. US 2/08 - Judgment dated
23rd 4. 2008 (N 73/49 SbNU 85; 166/2008 Coll.) And sp. Nos. Pl. US 13/08 -
finding of 2. 3. 2010 (104/2010 Coll.)]. In this case, however, those
reasons can not pay, because the central government authority to exercise judicial power
occur not so necessarily there is inequality in salary
ranking employee of such an authority pursuant to § 110 of the Labour Code
and assigned to judges on the basis of Act no. 236/1995 Coll., although in this case
judiciary and do not exercise are also temporarily according to § 99 para. 1
point. c) of the Act on Courts and Judges exercise the judicial function
relieved.

49th Deleting the words "to the Ministry or" in § 68 par. 2 point. b)
law on courts and judges is only a consequence of the repeal of the provisions in §
68 para. 1. As already stated, the assignment judge to the Ministry of Justice is regulated
also in § 68 para. 4 and § 99 para. 1 point.
C) of the Act on Courts and Judges. These provisions have been
contested by the petitioner, after the abolition of the above provisions, however
become redundant, as they mentioned hypothesis "has been temporarily assigned to the Ministry
" can no longer fulfill due to the cancellation words | || 'Ministry or "in § 68 para. 1 of the Act on courts and judges.


Vb
Constitutionality possibility of a temporary waiver of office (§ 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges
)

50th The second part of the proposal is IIb attack permission of the Minister of Justice
temporarily relieve a judge of office the President or the Vice
court to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him in accordance with §
100a of the Law on Courts and Judges (see the arguments of the petitioner sub 18
and 19). The Constitutional Court observes that under § 8 par. 3 point. b) Law no.
7/2002 Coll., on proceedings relating to judges, prosecutors and judicial
executors, as amended, the proposal for commencement of disciplinary proceedings
disciplinary responsibility of chairman or vice-court
entitled to bring justice minister against any President or Vice
court. In connection with this provision put Act no. 314/2008 Coll
. the Act on Courts and Judges of § 100a, which extends
discretion of the Minister of Justice to decide on the temporary exemption
serve as a judge is also a possibility of a temporary waiver
performance of the chairman or deputy presiding judge.
The petitioner requests that this provision was annulled in its entirety, although his argument
directed by its content only because of possible (not obligatory
) exemption from the office of President or Vice-court under
§ 100a paragraph. 1 point. b) of the Act on Courts and Judges.

51st Under this provision, the Minister of Justice may temporarily relieve
performance of the Chairman or Vice-court je- If disciplinary
prosecuted for a disciplinary violation for which the disciplinary action proposed
imposing disciplinary removal from office of a judge or appeal
from the office of President or Vice-President of the court, and the period until a final
completion of disciplinary proceedings. It is this reason the petitioner expressly
attacks and focusing on it exclusively their arguments without the draft mentions another

Possible reason under § 100a paragraph. 1 point. a) of the Act on Courts and Judges.
In this case, another possible reason is a situation with which
also counts cited law, ie. Status under § 100 paragraph. 1 point. a)
when the chairman or deputy court or prosecuted by state
§ 100 paragraph. 1 point. c) So if it was the reason stated in § 91 of the Act on Courts and Judges
instituted against him control of his incapacity
perform the judicial function, and the period until final completion
this procedure. The reasons for which should be abolished and that part
contested § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges, however
Claimant never does.

52nd Since it is proposed to repeal § 100a of the Act on Courts and Judges
as a whole, however, finds this part of the contested provisions of the Constitutional Court
it necessary to note that in these cases it is the states that its procedure can cause
or induce the Minister of justice himself.
In the case of the prosecution regards the decision of the body acting in criminal proceedings
together with the preliminary consent of the President of the Republic (§ 76 par. 1
Law on Courts and Judges). In the case of § 91 of the Act on Courts and Judges
it is about situations that are also given on grounds other than possibly imaginable
arbitrary procedure justice minister
and their use is associated with protection from the issue | || judge. Pursuant to § 91 of the Act on Courts and Judges are mainly
case, where a judge is unfit to perform the judicial function,
if he does not allow long-term health condition. Furthermore, it
there are situations where the judge was convicted of a crime and
such conviction was not grounds for termination of judge in accordance with § 94 point.
C) if the offense for which the judge was sentenced, by their nature
undermine the credibility of his stay further in the judicial function
or was in the last 5 years before the application to open proceedings on the competence of judges
perform its function at least three
finally convicted disciplinary offense when this fact calls into question the credibility
its further continuance of the judicial function (ie. the principle
three strikes). Therefore, the Constitutional Court in this part of the proposal as unfounded
dismissed when the legislation itself a breach of the constitutional order
not found, but that does not mean that it may take its arbitrary
applications or her abuse in a particular proceeding.

53rd His proposal in this section and directed the petitioner in fact only
against § 100a paragraph. 1 point. b) the amended Law on Courts and Judges
. With this in mind, the Constitutional Court focused on assessing whether
aforementioned authorization of the Minister of Justice can be considered
exploitable instrument performance against the independence of the judiciary especially when
if it affects minister as disciplinary petitioner, who himself relevant
proposed sanction pursuant to § 8. 3 point. b) Law no. 7/2002 Coll., on management
relating to judges, prosecutors and court executors, as amended
. It was therefore necessary to assess whether the structure itself is
unconstitutional or whether there is still unconstitutional, but may in a particular case
lead to unconstitutional interference in the independence of the judiciary, or whether it already
in the abstract does not allow to constitutional interpretation.

54th The petitioner here in the first place objects rather vague formulation
merits a disciplinary offense. It is however necessary in this context
emphasize, however, suggested that the repeal of the relevant provisions of § 87 para.
2 and § 88 para. 2 of the Law on Courts and Judges, but at least this
provisions mentioned. Therefore their own objections also closer namely clothing.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to state that the merits
funkcionářského disciplinary offense according to § 87 para. 2 of the Law on Courts and Judges
ie. "Culpable violation of obligations associated with" is
must be interpreted in the context of defining the judicial
officials, as required by Art. 91 para. 2 of the Constitution, and it is possible to evaluate
especially in the context of a specific case.

55th Furthermore, to support its claim the petitioner stated that as Minister
disciplinary petitioner creates the conditions for that as a representative of the central government authority
court temporarily exempted the judicial officers of his
function. The same minister will also have to provide temporary management
court, which so until any disciplinary verdict zprošťujícího

Court can significantly transform. This interferes with the independence of judges and courts
, separation of powers and opens the possibility of randomness and arbitrariness in the exercise
state administration of justice. Fundamental constitutional defect under § 100a
Law on Courts and Judges petitioner sees not individual
reasons for temporary exemption (to sub 56), but the inadequacy
legal protection compared with a temporary waiver of a judge when
it is possible to file objections to the disciplinary court (cf. § 100 paragraph.
4 of the Act). In all the cases covered by § 100a so during a temporary exemption
function may occur irreversible facts, and that intervention by
executive. While restrictions on the temporary exemption only function
judicial officials indicates that it does not go on offenses fatal
importance, so the risk of improper performance of the person becomes
compared with less distinct threat to independence. Therefore, the petitioner
finds sufficient possibility of a temporary exemption from the position of Chairman and Vice
court as a result of redevelopment on the office of judge, and thus the court officials
(akcesorium judicial function), and therefore proposes to abolish the entire
§ 100a of the Act on courts and judges. If the legislature did not
same opinion, it should modify the temporary exemption exclusively
office of President or Vice-court manner in terms of legal protection comparable to the protection
judge before a temporary waiver of duties.

56th In this regard, the Constitutional Court upheld the petitioner's objections
in that part, which is directed against the lack of a remedy against
temporary exemption from the office of President or Vice-court.
Constitutional Court are of the opinion that he was justified in detail in its judgment. Ref.
Pl. 18/06 (no. 397/2006 Coll. - See above), according to which it is not possible to construct
ambiguity of the legal position of chairman of the court as an official
government on the one hand and the judge on the other side.
It is still the same person and personality, which combines events in both functions.
It must involve not only the method of removal of officers of the courts, but also to their temporary waiver
function. Even such modification must respect
constitutional principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, ie. that in this case
must have a chairman or deputy court the possibility of relying on
protection against interference in his public
constitutionally guaranteed subjective right, but I just protection from interference by the executive in
judicial power in a manner that enables § 100a paragraph. 1 point. b)
law on courts and judges, and all the more so that the application of such intervention is available
Minister of Justice, both in terms of the request for the disciplinary
proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, and in terms of temporary || | waiver of duties. Means of protection of judicial officials
therefore be comparable with the means of protecting judges. Until
so happens, § 100a paragraph. 1 point. b) of the Act on Courts and Judges, seen in the context of
other provisions in conflict with the constitutional principle of separation
power and independence of the judiciary from interference by the executive.
Vc


Constitutionality of an indefinite number of vice-presidents of the Supreme Court

57th The petitioner also challenges (sub II.c) an indefinite number of vice-presidents
Supreme Court expressed in the words "vice-chairmen" in § 15 para. 1, § 23 paragraph
. 1 and § 102 para. 2, the word "vice-presidents" in § 15 para. 2 and
in § 121 par. 2, the word "vice" in § 102 para. 1 and § 168 and
words "vice-presidents of the Supreme court" in § 119 para. 2 of the Act
courts and judges. The amended version of the Act on Courts and Judges
is thus essentially a confused singular word "Vice"
word "vice-presidents" in various falls. The petitioner points out that
(detailed sub 22n.), That this change is not justified except
alleged contradiction between Article. 62 letters. f) of the Constitution, which is used in the plural, while
law on courts and judges used the singular. According to the petitioner
there arises an unconstitutional condition on the grounds that, among other general courts
limiting its proposal, the number of Vice-Presidents of the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
however, it is left to the discretion of the appointing authority, namely the President of the Republic
. This opened space for the executive totally inadequate and
arbitrary interference with his situation at the Supreme Court. This is underlined
fact that the president is not for the actions of the Supreme Court

Responsibility, yet he now admits permission to appoint
indefinite number of vice-presidents, which can change the position of President of the Supreme Court
model proceedings to the court, the court encumber budget for financial and other material demands
new vice-presidents, in addition
ordinary judges of the Supreme court such a situation may raise career expectations, which may not be
no impact on their decision.

'58. In the Constitutional Court itself using single or plural
in the legislation still does not definitively how many
people can touch, it does if the nature of the case itself (cf.
Well to Art. 40, paragraph . 4 Legislative rules of the Government). Therefore, neither explicit
use the plural in the Constitution would automatically not exclude the existence of only one Vice
, respectively. imposed appointing more
Chairmen. The same applies to the use of the plural in the ordinary
law. In this case, it must be seen in the plural
paste numbers into the provisions of the Act on Courts and Judges
intention of the legislature, which is to enable the President of the Republic nomination
larger number of vice-presidents of the Supreme Court. This legislature has made
mandate, which gives it the Art. 91 para. 2 of the Constitution, according to which the scope
ordinary legislator to establish the organization of courts, while
removed by external differences in the text of Art. 62 point. f) of the Constitution and
text of the law on courts and judges to the adoption of Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
In this regard, therefore, the petitioner's objections about the conflict
law on courts and judges and the Constitution of the Constitutional Court could not identify. True, however, that
far as the appointment of only one Vice
not in conflict with the Constitution, so it will not be such a state even after the amendment of the Act
on Courts and Judges.

59th However this does not mean that the legislature has, as
appointing authority, ie. The president, discretionary option.
Constitutional Court in deciding the status and role of the judiciary has repeatedly
stressed that it is not possible to put emphasis only on linguistic interpretation.
The position of the president in relation to the judiciary (including
appointment responsibilities) must be interpreted in light of the rules
division of power and the need to ensure the independence of the judiciary.
President of the Republic must respect the basic constitutional arrangements
starting position, organization and functioning of the judicial system as a whole, not just
terms of Art. 62 point. f) and Art. 91 para. 2 of the Constitution. Therefore, in this context
it is questionable whether it was constitutional obligations
legislator to stipulate a certain number of Vice-Presidents (eg. In § 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court
). This would mean that the president has already
can not stay with the appointment of only one vice, even though the law allows
appointing more. The actual number of factual
vice-presidents of the Supreme Court on the Independence of exercise of judicial power can not decide.
It may, however, for him to have an impact with respect to the factual circumstances in which the appointment occurs
. But especially in terms of whether, as in the case
permission Presidents of other courts was not necessary to bind the appointment
Vice-Presidents on a proposal from the Chairman of the Supreme Court.
Threat to the principle of judicial independence would be reduced in a situation where it would be possible to understand
§ 70 of the Act on Courts and Judges as an agreement not only with the allocation
to serve as a judge, but also to his appointment (here | || Vice-President) of the Supreme court. That is not so in this direction
gets the Chairman of the Supreme Court in a different position than what
occupy in controlling the operation of their courts chairmen top,
regional and district courts under § 103 to 105 of the Courts Act
and judges.

60th The contested provision is not in conflict with the constitutional order because
it would not be in terms of the Constitution, the Supreme Court increased the number of vice-presidents
than one, but because in this way creates
space for intervention in the functioning of this court as the highest judicial instance
from the executive, without there being any balance
as in the case of § 70 of the Act on courts and judges. In this case, it is the task of the Constitutional Court
advance the very possibility of such problems
remove, although it is possible that, in practice, on the basis of existing
Constitutional Court jurisprudence [see. Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 17/06 dated 12th

12th 2006 (N 222/43 SbNU 457) sp. Nos. Pl. US 18/06 (see above), and in particular
finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 87/06 of 12. 9. 2007 (N 139/46 SbNU 313)] in this direction
problem arises. This is even more so in comparison with other courts
chairman's position of Chairman of the Supreme Court
special in the sense that the management of the Ministry of Justice of the Supreme Court
carries through (§ 120 para. 2 of the Law on Courts and
judges), not directly, and the Vice-Presidents of the Supreme court
perform state administration of the Supreme court within the scope specified
chairman (§ 121 par. 2 of the Act). It is also necessary, in view of possible
number of vice-presidents of the Supreme Court, highlighting the fact that there
operates the chairpersons of the Supreme Court appointed its chairman
(§ 18 and § 102 para. 3 of the Law on Courts and judges).
Indefinite number of vice-presidents because in the future may create a situation where
could be based on this provision in the administration of justice by the Supreme Court
affected. It's even more important that the Czech Republic
there is no body of judicial autonomy comparable with foreign
patterns applied when deciding on personnel issues judiciary, and
that the President of the Supreme Court is not in the same position as in the case | || assignment of judges to the Supreme court. The Constitutional Court, however, in terms of minimizing interference maxima
concluded that there is no need to cancel all
proposal containing the contested provisions of the plural word "
Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court," but it is possible to reduce the blow to the citation
appointment contained in § 102 para. 1 of the Act on courts and judges.
Led him to these reasons.

61st The Constitutional Court is in this context, aware that his past
case law [in particular Judgment. Nos. Pl. US 87/06 of 12. 9. 2007 (N 139/46
SbNU 313)] addresses the requirement of maintaining the guarantees of the independence of the judiciary
only partially, when determining the constitutional limits to determine a judge, who may be
Vice appointed. According to the court of
position of Vice-President of the Supreme Court, as well as the content
its functions, it follows that first you must become a judge of the court to have his
government exercise. Therefore, the Constitutional Court ruled that it
power to appoint a Vice-President of the Supreme Court in
himself included, and that as a result of replacing,
any stage of the process of appointment of judges, including the phase of allocating judges to the Supreme Court
Minister of justice, after prior approval of the Chairman
Supreme court, since it is the jurisdiction with respect to officials
Supreme court. The Constitutional Court therefore legal opinion, according to which
power to appoint a vice-president of the Supreme Court
does not, and hence does not replace any stage of the process
appointment of judges of this court, as that could lead to circumvention competencies
other state agencies (the Ministry of justice, Supreme court Chairman
). Because, unlike the appointment procedure in the case
vice-presidents of other courts (§ 103 paragraph. 1, § 104. 1, § 105
par. 1) in the case of the Supreme Court of § 102 para. 1 of the | || courts and judges do not contain sufficient guarantees to preserve the independence of the judiciary
terms of participation of the judicial Council of the Supreme court, as well as
especially in terms of the President of that court was shown
provisions should be repealed in the part that for such
possible interference in the independence of the judiciary creates preconditions. The task of the Constitutional Court
eliminate such a possibility. Because of the threats lie not in itself
number of Vice-Presidents (the specification nor the Constitutional Court is not entitled
), but in the disclosed defects in the procedure of appointment of Vice-Presidents
Supreme Court, as embodied in § 102 para. 1 of the Act on Courts and
judges, restricted to the Constitutional court to annul the part of that
provision. While the petitioners demanded only cancel
word "vice". However, as in this way would create a confusing appearance
§ 102 para. 1 of the Act on Courts and Judges
was decided to remove the words "and vice." The task of the legislature will
to adjust (until the possible establishment of bodies of judicial self
not only advisory in nature) the procedure for appointing vice-presidents of the Supreme Court
such a way that it can not be independence of the judiciary and the

This area challenged or even hit. This took
Constitutional Court to postpone the enforceability of the judgment and according to § 58 par. 1
Law on the Constitutional Court did so with delayed approximately one year
judgment is promulgated in the Official Gazette. It should also be respected
nekontrasignovanou appointing authority of the president, which in turn means
that bind appointment to the agreement would only be possible in
if the constitutional provision to some authority such competence
confided. Zstavní principle of independence of the judiciary and does not restrict
ordinary law, the constitutional prerogatives of the president
consent of other state authority. It must be taken into account here
fact that the inclusion of appointment competences between the President
nekontrasignované not an attempt to strengthen the role of the Constituent Assembly
president, but to strengthen the independence of the judiciary that the appointment
(and a fortiori odvolávacího) process - see judgment. Nos. Pl. US 18/06 and
government involvement to appeal President of the Supreme Court - will be eliminated
political influence in deciding the form of government that for such a decision
extra responsibility before the Chamber of Deputies under Article. 63 paragraph. 4 || | and Art. 68 para. 1 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court emphasizes that he does not
verbatim quotes provisions of the Constitution in Art. 62 point. f) -
plural number at the vice-presidents of the Supreme Court - to the common law for
sufficiently specific. Without being challenged nekontrasignovaná
appointing authority of the President in relation to the Vice-
Supreme Court, does not mean that should the president the power to determine their
number. This deficit is yet possible to remove such.
Legal determination of the number of vice-presidents of the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article.
91 para. 2 of the Constitution or modifying an analogous appointment of the Vice-Presidents in the case
courts of district, regional and high.
Vd


Constitutionality of introducing term of chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts

62nd The petitioner challenged the establishment of the Chair and Vice-Chairs
district, regional and high courts and the Supreme Court
in § 102 para. 2, § 103. 2, § 104. 2, § 105 para. || | 2, § 108 par. 2 Act on courts and judges.
Petitioner's arguments (for details see sub 25 to 27) is based on the fact that "feels" it is
attempt to circumvent the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (in particular, judgments file. Nos. Pl. US
7 / 02 sp. Nos. Pl. US 18/06 - both see above) and reduce the principle of judicial independence
explicitly expressed in Art. 81 and 82 of the Constitution and Art.
36 of the Charter. The petitioner stated inter alia, that what might be
tolerated by the decisions of a collegial body with a share
judicial representation should not be tolerated in political decision-making bodies of the executive
. Therefore, in the interest of judicial independence
certain attributes of independence and judicial officials admit to be
eventually removed from office only by an independent and unbiased
authority. Law Disciplinary proceedings as a way to appeal judicial officials
accepts that it immediately devalued by setting another reason for the demise
function occurs, which may be considered by the petitioner as well as
violation of Article. 89 para. 2 of the Constitution. He stressed that if the currently accepted
re-appointment to almost empty set of criteria, thus creating
risk of influencing the conduct of judges who wish to continue in office and
approaching the end of their term.

63rd The Constitutional Court did not agree with this argumentation and proposal in this part
dismissed as unfounded. The appellant's argument is based on a different legal situation
and consistently distinguish between custodial functions due
disciplinary offense (sanctions) and the disappearance of function due to the expiration time.
Unlike indefinite appointment as a judge in Art. 93
paragraph. 1 Constitution such a condition for the exercise of office of President or Vice
court does not, with the exception of the Supreme Court nor such
function explicitly mentioned. If elected because the legislature for the introduction
tenure, it may become subject to review by the Constitutional Court
only in terms of potential interference to other constitutionally enshrined principles
organization and activity of the courts, as the very principle of time exercising || | restriction of certain functions is not in itself contrary to the principle of separation of power
(rather its instantiations), especially where not directly own

Administration of justice. Time limit performance of the state administration of courts
(you be the judge) may not be unconstitutional. However it must be stressed that
appointment for a limited period of time must be (as in other cases) is inversely proportional
aggravated demands for early withdrawal from a temporary office.
The shorter the term, the greater the demands to be placed on the possibility
premature removal from office. This aspect is however in this case the Constitutional Court
dealt with in a different context (sub 53 to 56).
Adequacy determining the length of the term of office of Constitutional Court's opinion reflects the fact that
to function as judicial officers appointed in the case of chairmen and vice-chairmen
executive, not the choice of judicial administration (in such a case
abroad shorter term).

64th Another constitutional safeguards is the time at which the appointment is made.
In this respect, the set term of 10 years for the President and the Vice
supreme courts and 7 years for President and Vice President
other courts comparable to that of officials or other authorities
institutions (the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank 6 years
president and vice-president of the Supreme Audit Office 9 years) receiving
Constitution guarantees the independence of the position. Length of tenure also
beyond the term of the appointing authority, so this way
executive power does not "their" functionaries assembly.
Petitioner's argument thus seeks to appeal a court ruling opportunities
officials [in particular Judgment. Nos. Pl. US 18/06 (no. 397/2006 Coll.) -
See above], not the issue of the constitutionality of setting a fixed term
period. Likewise, in this case, unlike the assignment of a judge to
Ministry of Justice pursuant to § 68 para. 1, § 68 par. 2 point. b)
Law on Courts and Judges (sub Va), there is no violation of Article. 89 para. 2
Constitution, since the introduction of tenure of judicial officials still
Constitutional Court did not address the merits. Arguments other states, especially from the area
Anglo-Saxon law in this respect can not be relevant
already with regard to what are the conditions for the appointment and what is generally
age in the case of appointment of judges and court officials.
Task of the Constitutional Court is also considering whether there is a problem "managing
wear" or not, respectively. How many officials and how long or
is currently in his post.
In


Constitutionality of the possibility of re-appointment of chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts

65th At this point the Constitutional Court agreed with the proposal of sub II.e, ie. With
attacks possibility of re-appointment of chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts
in § 105a of the Act on Courts and Judges, which the petitioner considers interference in the independence
judges and courts with regard to the formulation of criteria
reappointment (detailed sub 29 and 30). Arguments that there
petitioner states lie in the inadequacy adjustments
criteria for reappointment. The criteria set out in the contested provisions of § 105a
law on courts and judges, ie. The performance of the Chairman or Vice
without a disciplinary offense and without a final conviction for a criminal offense
, but not yet in itself constitute a threat
independence of the exercise of judicial power. Unable to them in this direction in terms of protection of constitutionality
reproach, because in this direction
decision is not the result of discretionary authority of the executive power, which can serve as a means
possible intervention. The problem, in the view of the Constitutional Court
lies in the very possibility of reappointment, which can lead
judicial officials to proceed accordingly
creating preconditions for their reappointment., Respectively. their individual steps, including the way
decision (court officials are mainly judges)
outside world were thus viewed and judged. In terms
absence of a system of checks and balance to the executive branch with its exclusive
decision-making powers in personnel this possibility can not be ruled out
. Therefore her in the proceedings on abstract review of contested norms
Constitutional Court must take into account, since legal rights should not create
conditions for the emergence of the personal corruption that would threaten the constitutionally
commanded the independence and impartiality of judges.
Possible unconstitutional conditions need to be in such a serious area in advance to eliminate. Consultative role
it attaches to the Law on Courts and Judges judge's counsel in § 51

Paragraph. 1 point. a) § 52 paragraph. 1 point. a) and § 53 par. 1 point. a), in this direction
insufficient guarantees. In the case of chairmen and deputy chairmen of the supreme courts
however, it is not regulated or that option.
The Constitutional Court notes that the proceedings in the abstract review of the constitutionality of the norms
assesses the contested rules in terms of its potential to undermine the constitutional order
preserving the independence and impartiality of the judge, ie.
Does not examine the specific behaviors of several hundred judges, who will be
time involved in the administration of justice. From the perspective outlined is derogated
regulation also likely to cause the outer doubts about the court proceedings.

66th The petitioner also challenges the part of the move appointment
authorization from the Minister of Justice to the President, who is in no way
equipped to monitor the activities of judicial officials. However, it can hardly
serve as a reason for the Constitutional Court to such a move
pronounced in the case of finishing and regional courts as unconstitutional with respect to the constitution
these privileges directly in the Constitution. In addition, there
should be noted that the appointment of such officials outside the scope
nekontrasignovaných competence of the President pursuant to Article. 62
Constitution, but under Art. 63 Sec. 3 of the Constitution in conjunction with Art. 91 para. 2
Constitution. Finally, in other contexts noted that
appointing authority of the President to be seen in the context of
principles of the organization and functioning of the judiciary enshrined in the Constitution.
The petitioner's objection that the sensitivity of this subject is further enhanced by keeping
internships of judges at the Ministry of Justice, however
should be noted that this objection becomes enforceability of the award
pointless.
Vf


Constitutionality of the transitional provisions for the establishment of office of the Chairman and Vice courts


67th The petitioner also challenges the transitional provisions in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10 and 11, Art. II of Part One of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. the introduction
tenures of Presidents of courts that are shorter than the newly set
term of the relevant officials. Here no choice but
Constitutional Court stated that the transitional period itself can not be unconstitutional,
if not out of proportion to the actual term of office. Such a disparity is not
detected with regard to the proportion 19 years of office and one year transition period for
functionaries appointed in 1989, 18 years to the performance and
2 years transitional period for officials appointed in 1990, 14
to 17 years of office and three years transitional period for officials appointed
between 1991 and 1994 from 10 to 13 years, the performance and four years
transitional period for officials appointed from 1995 to 1998 to 8 9 years
the performance and 5-year transitional period for officials appointed
in the years 1999-2000, 6-7 years of office and 6 years
transitional period for officials appointed from 2001 to 2002, and transitional || | period of tenure for officials appointed since 2003
into force of Law no. 314/2008 Coll. Therefore the Constitutional Court for the annulment
transitional provisions to implement the mandate of the President in the courts
points 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Art. II of the First Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
Dismissed as unfounded.

68th Regarding the transitional provisions to implement the tenure
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of Art. II, Part One
Act no. 314/2008 Coll., The Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that if the Prime
Supreme court this disparity appears to be significant, both in terms of time
ie. the ratio transitional period, the length
tenure, as well as by the Vice-President of the Supreme court and
President of the Supreme administrative court. Here, the Constitutional Court agrees with
arguments (under 32), who refers to the circumstances of the case
forms of abuse and the law in a particular case. Therefore, this provision
repealed as unconstitutional because the legislature as a manifestation of arbitrariness
constitutes interference in the rule of law pursuant to Art. 1 paragraph. 1
Constitution. At the same time, given the circumstances of the case
violation of the right to access to public office under equal conditions under Art. 21 par. 4
Charter. Given the circumstances of the case, while it is illegal
hidden form of an individual legislative act directed against a specific person
, and therefore an attempt at interference in the independence of the exercise of judicial power.


69th Because derogation of transitional provisions in paragraph 11, Art. II
first part of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. there would be the establishment of inequality, as
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court would be the only pair
officials throughout the judicial system, whose term would remain
unlimited, ie. the inequality, which is unlikely to be constitutionally
acceptable, the Constitutional court used the possibility of postponing the enforceability
this verdict of the judgment and according to § 58 par. 1 of the Constitutional court and
done with delayed approximately one year of publication in the Collection of laws
. The task of the legislator is to lay down the transitional provisions
term of office of the existing officers of the Supreme Court as well as
in the case of officials of the Supreme Administrative Court.
Vg


Constitutionality of the President's and Vice
Supreme Administrative Court and the possibility of re-appointment

70th The petitioner further similar reasons as in the case of chairmen and vice-chairmen
district, regional and high courts and the Supreme Court seeks
(sub 33) abolition of the amended § 13 par. 3 and § 13a
Law no. 150 / 2002 Coll., the administrative procedure Code, as amended by Act no. 314/2008 Coll
. ie. introduction term of 10 years for
Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court and the possibility of re-appointment to this
function. In this case, however, challenged the transitional provisions of Article. IV
Act no. 314/2008 Coll.

71st In the case of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court
Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that the application should share the fate of similar proposals in case
II.D II.e. The proposal was therefore for the same reasons (see sub
62N.) Dismissed as unfounded as regards the introduction of tenure
officials of the Supreme Administrative Court. For the same reasons as sub 65
other hand, was granted the petition to annul § 13a of the Administrative Procedure Code.
Not considering Art. IV of the Act no. 314/2008 Coll., Which is a transitional provision
to § 13 par. 3 and § 13a of the Administrative Procedure Code, in this case
insignificant, since even if that happened, it would not be possible here, with
regard to what was said under 68, decide otherwise, when both the length
tenure, so the length of the transitional period of 10 years are in mutual
ratio. Finally, the transitional period in this case, neither the appellant
not think as he himself says that perhaps constitutionally consistent options were exhausted
entire term of office established by law and calculated from
Energy Act. This requirement is satisfied in this case.

VI.
Conclusion


72nd In conclusion, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proposal found partially well-founded.
Therefore came under § 70 para. 1 of the Constitutional Court to derogate

) Of § 68 para. 1 the words "to the Ministry or"
and the provisions of § 68 para. 2 point. b) the words "the Ministry or" Law no. 6/2002 Coll
. conflict with the constitutional principle of separation of powers under Art. 2 paragraph. 1
Constitution and independence of the judiciary and the impartiality of judges under Article. 81 and
Art. 82 para. 1 and 3 of the Constitution and to conflict with Art. 89 para. 2 of the Constitution, according to which
enforceable decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all authorities and persons
,

B) of § 100a paragraph. 1 point. b) Law no. 6/2002 Coll.
to conflict with the constitutional principle of separation of powers under Art. 2 paragraph. 1 of the Constitution and the independence of the judiciary
under Article. 81 and Art. 82 para. 1 of the Constitution and inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed right to
equal access to public office in accordance with Article. 21
paragraph. 4 of the Charter in conjunction with the constitutionally guaranteed right to review
legality of administrative decisions by the court under Art. 36 para. 2
Charter

C) of § 102 para. 1 the words "and Vice" Law no. 6/2002 Coll
. to conflict with the constitutional principles of certainty in the law and the prohibition
arbitrariness in the exercise of state power that spring from the notion of a democratic
law under Article. 1. 1 of the Constitution, conflict with the constitutional principle of separation of powers
under Article. 2 paragraph. 1 of the Constitution and the independence of the judiciary under Article
. 81 and Art. 82 para. 1 of the Constitution and contrary to the provisions of Article
. 91 para. 2 of the Constitution, according to which the determination of the organization of courts in
scope of the legislator, who must do so in the form of a law,

D) the provisions of paragraph 11 of Art. II of Act no. 314/2008 Coll.
a conflict with the principles of democratic rule of law pursuant to Art. 1 paragraph. 1 of the Constitution, prohibiting
arbitrary exercise of state power and the abuse of a law to

Adoption of an individual act against a specific person, for
conflict with the constitutionally guaranteed right to equal access to public office in accordance with Article
. 21 par. 4 and conflict with the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary
under Article. 81 and Art. 82 para. 1 of the Constitution, and finally

E) of § 105a of Act no. 6/2002 Coll. and § 13a of Act no. 150/2002 Coll
. conflict with the constitutional principle of separation of powers under Art. 2 paragraph. 1
Constitution and independence of the judiciary and the impartiality of judges under Article. 81 and
Art. 82 para. 1 and 3 of the Constitution, while
enforceability of the judgment in the case of derogation of the provisions of § 102 para. 1
the words "and Vice" Law no. 6/2002 Coll. and the provisions of section 11
Art. II of Act no. 314/2008 Coll. according to § 58 par. 1 of the Constitutional Court postponed
about one year to give lawmakers
sufficient time for the adoption conform to the Constitution and legislation in order to prevent
serious consequences that would be associated with any immediate
derogation of these provisions. The remainder of the proposal found no reason to
, so it pursuant to § 70 para. 2 of the Constitutional Court
dismissed.

Chairman of the Constitutional Court:

JUDr. Own hand

Dissenting opinions according to § 14 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., On the Constitutional Court,
amended, took the decision Plenum judge Jan Musil
part of the statement I derogative words "Ministry or" in
§ 68 paragraph. 1 and § 68 para. 2 point. b) Law no. 6/2002 Coll. and a statement IV
Judge Ivana Janu, Vladimir Kurka and Pavel Rychetský IV to the verdict, Judge Elizabeth Wagner
a statement in Judge Pavel Holländer and the
justification statement IV.

* Note. ed .: Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court, Volume 1, No.
finding. 25, pp. 189, promulgated under no. 131/1994 Coll.