The Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Czech Republic
The Constitutional Court ruled June 13. October 1999 in the plenary on the draft political
Parties Democratic Union filed complaints with the constitutional abolition of the
part of the third sentence of section 85 of the Act No. 247/1995 Coll., on elections to Parliament
The Czech Republic and amending and supplementing certain other acts, which
sounds ", which won at least three percent of the total number of
valid votes, "
Part of the third sentence of section 85 of the Act No. 247/1995 Coll., on elections to Parliament
The Czech Republic and amending and supplementing certain other acts, which
sounds ", which won at least three percent of the total number of
valid votes, "shall be deleted.
Day 16. October 1998, the complainant filed, i.e.. political party Democratic
the Union, the constitutional complaint pursuant to section 72, paragraph. 1 (a). and Act No 182)/1993
Coll., on the Constitutional Court. The reason the constitutional complaint was the decision
The Ministry of finance for the non-payment of the contribution margin of the election
the cost of the Democratic Union in the amount of CZK 7 778 790. The Ministry of finance
notified by letter from the 19. in August 1998, the Democratic Union of its decision with the
referring to the part of the provisions of § 85 of Act No. 247/1995 Coll., on elections to the
The Parliament of the Czech Republic and amending and supplementing certain other
laws (hereinafter referred to as "electoral law") was misleading for the payment of the allowance
the border gained votes at the rate of three per cent of the total number of valid
the votes cast in the election. The Ministry of finance is under section 85
the electoral law of the authority authorized to be paid to political parties
contribution to the reimbursement of election expenses after a $ 90 for each valid
resigned voice. With regard to this, that the payment of the contribution to the electoral
reimbursement of election expenses was refused with reference to the provisions of the
the law, submitted a democratic Union, together with a proposal on constitutional complaints
the repeal of section 85 election law whose application occurred
the fact that it is the subject of a constitutional complaint.
Democratic Union of the decision of the Finance Ministry sees the violation of
article. 22 of the Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms (the "Charter"), specifically
public authority intervention in the free competition of political forces in the
of a democratic society. According to the constitutional complaint, if any
the voice of the individual in the elections, provisioned amount $ 90 for the
a political party, then any of the other conditions for the payment of this
the amounts indicate the intervention into the free competition of political forces, since the
so create unequal conditions for the functioning of political parties. This
inequality conditions is exacerbated by the duties of the candidate
political parties consist of the bail in the amount of Eur 1 600 0000. If, then
Some Parties will not return this deposit or do not get a post on the
the election expenses for each individual voice, it's about economic discrimination
of the State against the emerging political parties, which are at a disadvantage against
Parties as demonstrating an appreciation, which is in direct conflict with the article. 5 of the Constitution of the Czech
Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), which is a political system based
on the free competition of political parties. According to the Democratic Union State this
the procedure requires that the newly-established political party without any
State funding exceeded already in the first election after its
the formation of the 3% threshold, in competition with the parties State
richly financed. In addition, the constitutional complaint finds and
the clear discrimination from the perspective of the citizen, because the State has decided that
a voice will have a value of $ 90 and another not. Finally, the
constitutional complaint points out that not only the protection of the political
the rights declared and then then the economic instruments do just the opposite.
Has to be maintained really free competition of political forces, then it must
This amount is also paid for each individual voice, without further
In the Chamber of deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as
the party mainly argues that according to the article. paragraph 87. 1 (a). (j))
Of the Constitution and article 73, paragraph. 1 of law No. 182/1993 Coll., a political party
submit a proposal to the Constitutional Court only in the event of its dissolution or
another decision of the public authority, which is affecting its business.
The current legislation, other legal reason for the active card
political parties in proceedings under section 72 et seq.. Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the
as amended, does not allow. The Democratic Union is not, therefore, to
the submission of the proposal. The Chamber of Deputies is considered, therefore,
a pointless to comment on the proposal to repeal section § 85 of the electoral
the law and is limited only to the statement that the election law was
approved by the necessary majority of MPs, signed by the competent constitutional
agents and properly declared. The legislature acted in the belief that
the Act is adopted in accordance with the Constitution, the constitutional order and our
the rule of law, and is on the Constitutional Court to assess the proposal and brought
issued the relevant decision.
Due to the opposition of the lack of evidence of the active political parties in the
proceedings under section 72 of the Act No. 182/1993 Coll., as amended,
the Constitutional Court was forced to first deal with this subject. He came to the
the conclusion that the arguments of the Chamber of Deputies is based on erroneous interpretation of the
the law, and is therefore not justified. Pursuant to section 72, paragraph. 1 (a). and the law)
No. 182/1993 Coll. of the constitutional complaint may submit an individual or
the legal person referred to in article. paragraph 87. 1 (a). (d)) of the Constitution against the final
the decision, measure or other intervention by the public authority in breach of
constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. A legal person is undoubtedly
a political party that is the subject of rights and obligations.
The provisions on the circuit of authorised persons for submission to the constitutional complaint is not
prejudice, but only supplemented by section 73 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., which regulates
a special case of the dissolution of a political party or other decision
State power, which concerns the activities of political parties, etc. the decision on the
refusal of registration of a political party or for a suspension of its activities
According to section 14 of Act No. 424/1991 Coll. on Association in political parties and
in political movements, as amended, that is, things which
as a rule, on the proposal of the Government is decided by the Supreme Court. In the case of section 73 of the Act
No. 182/1993 Coll., a political party may submit a proposal in accordance with article. paragraph 87. 1
(a). (j)) of the Constitution, if it is considered that the decision concerning its
activities not in conformity with the constitutional or other laws. This is not limited to the
the law of political parties, in addition to the proposals under section 73 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll.
given the constitutional complaint under the terms of section 72 of the Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the
If the section 72 of the Act No. 182/1993 Coll., as amended
regulations, the political party as a legal person shall be entitled to submit
the constitutional complaint, if he considers that the final decision in the proceedings,
which was a participant in, or other measures by the intervention of a public authority
It was a person's fundamental right or freedom guaranteed by the constitutional
by law or international treaty in accordance with article 10 of the Constitution. Because in the
the case of the constitutional complaint challenged the fact occurred
the immediate effects of the provisions of section 85 election law, it is for the
The Democratic Union, the right to file complaints with the constitutional draft on
the abolition of this law, the application of the consequences that occurred
are the subject of the constitutional complaint (section 74 of law No. 182/1993 Coll.).
The Constitutional Court also considered the question of whether the constitutional complaint has not been submitted
someone obviously unlawful under section 43, paragraph. 1 (a). (c)) Law No.
182/1993 Coll., as amended. The Ministry of finance in the
communication of 19. August 1998 No. 143/61 733/1998 States that it is not entitled to
contribution to the reimbursement of election expenses of the Democratic Union pay,
because this party has not fulfilled the legal condition for the payment of the electoral
contribution according to section 85 election law.
The Ministry of finance probably does not consider its communication for the decision of the authority
State administration and refers expressly to the "usual way" against the restrictions,
that democratic Union considered unconstitutional. The "usual way"
may be two. The first is the submission of a proposal to repeal Regulation
the electoral law by a group of MPs or Senators of those
political parties, which are already represented in the Parliament. Such
the (imaginary) feat big parties in favor of the small parties that are
their potential competitors, however, you can hardly assume.
The other way it could be legal action against the Czech Republic
represented by the Ministry of finance for payment of the relevant parliamentary
contribution. But even this path has its pitfalls. Even if a plaintiff in this
the case was designed by the General Court, to ask for the annulment of the contested
the provisions of the electoral law, the Court might not have control
interrupt and not according to the article. paragraph 95. 2 of the Constitution refer to the constitutional
of the Court. The plaintiff in this case fully depends on the opinion of the General
the Court, which has the obligation to refer to the Constitutional Court only if
If alone, it concludes that the law, which has to be in the solution of the matter
used, is inconsistent with the constitutional law.
It is obvious that such a procedure would be the complainant, i.e.. The Democratic
the Union, could give rise to serious and the inevitable injury under section 75, paragraph. 2
(a). (b)) of the Act No. 182/1993 Coll., but the reference to the "usual way"
General courts in this case does not hold water either in terms of section 75, paragraph. 2
(a). and Act No 182)/1993 Coll., for any claim that the
the complainant has not exhausted all the procedural means which the Act to
the protection of his rights, provides the Constitutional Court cannot accept, if the
the complaint that its significance substantially exceeds their own interests
the complainant in the present case-the question of general importance which closely
is related to the principle of equality of political parties in the electoral contest.
Notwithstanding this serious circumstance both paths marked for "normal"
reported deficiencies, which would in effect impose restrictive
interventions in the conceptual content of the material rule of law and to the rights of
Sue in a Court of the application of the principle of equality guaranteed
The Constitution, the Charter, as well as the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms (article 36 of the Charter and article 6 of the Convention). Before this fact
the argument does not hold water, the communication from the Ministry of finance is not a formal
by decision of the administrative authority. Pursuant to section 20a of Act No. 424/1991 Coll., on the
as amended, the contribution shall be paid to the Ministry of Finance on the
the request of a political party or movement. In the present case, in reality it is
of refusal put forward by the requirement, therefore, to give an opinion, which is in the
communication of 19. August 1998 under no. 143/61 733/1998 expressed. According to the
the opinion of the Constitutional Court in this case is not so much whether it was
formal factual refusal or simply just about the "measures" or
"other action" of the public authority.
The fact remains that the negative reaction of the public authority to the
raised by the claim, albeit with a link, that the provisions of the Electoral Act, the payment of
the contribution does not. Also given is spot on the constitutionality of § 85
the electoral law review, since the plaintiff derives the refusal
their claims from the protiústavního nature of this provision.
The Senate's Constitutional Court has, indeed, according to § 64 paragraph. 1 (a). (c)) Law No.
182/1993 Coll. law "in connection with the decisions on the constitutional complaint"
also, where appropriate, to submit himself to a proposal to repeal the law, if in
the review concluded that, contrary to the constitutional law.
For all these reasons, the Constitutional Court proceeded to discuss the draft on the
the cancellation of the second sentence of section 85 election law, which is "that in the
the election has received at least three percent of the total number of valid
the votes ".
The Constitutional Court, after considering all the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that the
the proposal to repeal section section 85 election law, which makes the State
contribution to electoral costs the parties getting at least three percent of the
the total number of valid votes cast, is well founded.
The opinion of the Constitutional Court based on the consideration of fundamental questions, namely the
the relationship between the two conflicting aspects of electoral competition of political parties.
The first is the requirement of free electoral competition policy
parties under equal conditions, providing political parties equal chance
in the electoral competition and leading to such composition, which elected Ward
corresponds to the best real differentiation of the political will of the voters. The second
the requirement is the ability of the legislature to take a decision on the
the basis of the formation of a political majority, IE. be a legislative body not only
nominal, but also functional. In countries with a relatively fragmented spectrum
political parties are so interferes with the principle of effective integration
natural differentiation, since the inception of the majority must also be political
How to create a capable Government, so exercise the legislative activity is in
the nature of the constitutional State.
Both of these requirements is the need to sensitively and in a balanced manner to respect in total
the legal adjustment of all elements of the electoral process and when adjusting the position of the
political parties. It is therefore in terms of representative democracy
permissible to incorporate into the regulation of integration incentives there-and only
there-where there are serious reasons, in particular, provided that the
the fragmentation of votes among a large number of political parties has occurred
bezbřehému "overgrowth" of political parties, and thereby to compromise the functionality of the
and capacity, as well as the continuity of the parliamentary system. After bad
the experience from the excessive fragmentation of the parliamentary spectrum
joined European States applying the system of proportional representation in the
the election also largely to the introduction of integration incentives, especially
restriction clause, mostly 5. Such integrative interventions
Lawmakers are generally considered constitutionally legitimate, if
be made to the extent strictly necessary for the formation of the political will of the people
required for the adoption of a decision in a random, and if these adjustments
on the whole, do not distort the real picture too much political will of voters
expressed their vote, as in the confrontation of both of these requirements
enjoys higher constitutional protection of the principle of free competition of political right
the parties (article 5 of the Constitution, article 22 of the Charter).
The Constitutional Court has already dealt with the integration of incentives, especially in two
cases. The first (PL. ÚS 24/96-No. 88/1997 Coll.) concerned the 5%
the restriction clause. The Constitutional Court then said this clause for
constitutionally Conformal and found that certain restrictions when differentiation
the distribution of mandates, it is permissible, in the case of minimum intervention that allows
the formation of the Chamber of Deputies, capable to perform their constitutional functions.
The second case was a proposal to repeal the electoral deposits (PL. ÚS 3/96-No.
161/1996 Coll.), which received the support of most of the judges, although the constitutional
However, the majority of the Court, not qualified, so was rejected. In this
the case was in the Chamber of Deputies about the cancellation of the obligations of each of the parties
or coalition of deposit 200 000 Czk in each constituency, in which
participating in the elections, while the repayment of this amount is bound to get at least
five percent of the votes in the elections. As a result, remained in force and
This integration of stimulus that puts small parties from the obligation to
fold 1 600 0000 $ as a deposit for their turnout in all constituencies
with the risk that the amount lost, not gained if at least five percent of the
votes in the election (section 35 (4) of the Electoral Act).
How the 5% restriction clause, and these measures are
explained by the need to face the excessive differentiation of the political spectrum and
the existence of numerous small political parties. In essence, the same
the reasons are based and section 85 election law, which binds the payment of election
contribution in the amount of $ 90 for each individual voice for the party or the Coalition
on the condition get at least three percent of the total number of valid
As another reason for these restrictions stated fear of repeating
aimless activity parties pointing primarily to obtain State
resources, as well as the visibility of its candidates from other than
electoral reasons (e.g. in order to obtain the personal popularity of the reasons
corporate, or commercial activities, of a recession, etc.).
Contribution to the reimbursement of election expenses, as defined in section 85
the electoral law is not itself in the countries of the European Union, nothing quite
exceptional. Less stringent conditions for the payment of the allowance applies in the electoral
Germany, France, Italy and Denmark. Belgium and Spain weighed on
obtaining the parliamentary mandate, Greece on the electoral gain of three percent of the votes
and on the candidacy of the party in at least two thirds of the circuits, Luxembourg
to obtain at least five percent in the relevant circuit, United Kingdom,
Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal don't know the direct funding of political
the parties to the State at all. From this perspective, the solution of the Czech election law
it to the European average.
However, the Constitutional Court considers that the objective assessment of the design of the Democratic
the Union requires not only an isolated consideration of the actual contribution to the
reimbursement of election expenses, but its guest in a summary of the resulting
the effect of all these factors in our electoral system.
There is a need to distinguish particular effects 5 depth definition
the clause from the election deposits and gross margin of electoral costs.
The 5% restriction clause acts directly and primarily to the system
the distribution of seats among the various political parties, i.e., only after
their vote, voters, and its effect on the admission of political parties to the
electoral competition and on their participation in the elections is only indirect,
mediated by a consideration of whether the chance to gain parliamentary representation for the
the party is, or is not real. This consideration may discourage some parties
from participation in the elections, their freedom to participate in elections and to compete with the
others in the electoral contest, however, is not directly limited.
By contrast, the electoral deposit represent intervention primarily not to the
the distribution of mandates, but the right kind of "advance" to the freedom of entry to the
electoral competition and participation in elections and clearly operates a priori to
equality of electoral chances that weighs 1 600 0000 CZK, payment which the parties
in advance for their full participation in the elections, gaining at least composed
five percent of the vote on a national scale.
This "apriornímu tool integration" directly in the Czech Republic
one limitation of the contribution to the reimbursement of election expenses, which your
the nature of the limits of a small political party, and other additional
the financial advantage, in comparison with the parties parlamentně
represented. In the Czech Republic is experiencing such cumulation
economic barriers for the participation of small parties in the election
the competition, which is unprecedented in any of the States of the European Union, with the election
the system of proportional representation. In the absence of or in
the electoral deposit. Although there are no electoral deposit, is itself the boundaries for
a contribution to cover the cost of the election assessed critically.
So for example. in Germany the level was 2.5% of the obtained votes found by the Federal
the Constitutional Court was unconstitutional, and the new edit section 18 of the law on political
sides was reduced to 0.5% for federal and 1% of the votes for the provincial
options. The Federal Constitutional Court in its decision (Entscheidungen St. 24,
with. 300, 339 n.) He said that although the legislature may payment of electoral
contribution to make odvislou from getting a minimum number of votes, the
but the border of 2.5% declared unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the
the principle of equal electoral chances of political parties. Democracy is in the
essentially directed against the Charter, therefore, in 1975, in other
the context of the same constitutional court found that "everyone has to exercise their
státoobčanská the rights to form and method with a maximum degree of equality "and
that "everyone must have, regardless of the social differences, especially on your
origin, nationality, education, or assets, the same chance to become a member of the
the Parliament "(ibid., vol. 40, pp. 317-318).
The principle of free competition of political parties includes the obligation of the conception
the State must respect the equality of chances these parties from the point of view of legislation
the terms of this competition and the adjustment of claims for its participants, since it is in the
the essence of the application of the general principle of equality guaranteed as constitutional,
and international instruments. Any action of the legislature in the following conditions
is the intervention of the State and should be guided by the general interest. The percentage limitation
for the payment of the allowance to cover the election expenses of political parties
must not be the product of arbitrariness or fitness to be assessed only from
the interests of established parties.
And for the Czech Republic, therefore, that the legislator must while editing in
creating the political will to respect, that he is on the field
set out a particularly narrow limits and that he denied any differentiated
treatment of parties whose base is not a reason for the extraordinary severity.
In this context, it can be pointed out at the conclusion of the Federal Constitutional Court
GERMANY, that "when the payment of the cost of the election battle, which must be taken into account
in principle, all the parties that participated in the electoral struggle, cannot be
determination of the minimum percentage of votes entitled by pointing out that the election
have a parliaments "to create funkceschopné (Entscheidungen, vol. 24, p.
341.) Also in the Czech Republic, this criterion must be different.
It is not a tool for more integration, but simply about determining whether the suggestions and
programs submitted for the election are really meant that the focus
exclusively on electoral success and not on other targets. The purpose of the electoral
the contribution must not be restrictions of freedom of election competition, but to ensure the
its seriousness. The Federal Constitutional Court of GERMANY for example. expressly stated that the
the share of 0.5% of the vote as proof of the seriousness of the efforts in the electoral battle and it is sufficient
makes unnecessary validation according to the other criteria. The lower the threshold
the electoral success, the more likely it is that the electoral success with covers
with the political importance of the parties.
If modern representative democracy takes into account functionality
the parliamentary system and receives limited stimulus to integration
the system of allocation of mandates, it does not mean that the terms of integration may
take precedence over the principle of free and unrestricted competition in principle
electoral parties. Their competition is the direct expression of pluralistic
the nature of democratic society and the protection of pluralism in the political
life has a primary importance for the existence of a democratic society.
It is therefore significantly protected the article. 5 of the Constitution and article. 22 of the Charter. Any direct
or indirect restriction on the equality of parties in the electoral contest may not
individually or in the accumulation of measures that affect or differentiated
favour certain parties, suppress the priori itself already participate
political parties in the electoral contest. The accumulation of financial support only
for some of the party is, in effect, at the same time the accumulation of factual
financial penalties for parties to the other. Therefore, you must carefully consider whether
the purpose of such measures is not exceeded. This purpose must only be
the seriousness of the efforts of rival parties that is not focused on other objectives than to
participation on political representation and enforcement of the program itself.
Integration of incentives are in a representative democracy to a limited extent
permitted up to the end of the process of free competition legally equal
political parties, after counting votes for the party, and it's a
differentiation in the distribution of seats, but not a priori financial
by stimulating certain handicaps and other parties, as this would
to modification and drafting in the number of votes for the political
the parties of the cast.
Also, the French Conseil Constitutionnel in 1990 (decision No 89
DC-271) binding the electoral contribution to obtain more than five percent
votes in individual districts unconstitutional and contrary to the
the principle of equality, so that at the present time, while half of the total sum
electoral contributions divided proportionally among the parties according to the number of
members of Parliament, but the other half is to be distributed to all parties, which
to participate in the elections, according to the number of votes proportionally, without
the percentage limit has been set. In Denmark just to get
the contribution of 1 thousand votes cast during the last parliamentary
The Constitutional Court has already, in its finding on the financing of political parties (PL. ÚS
26/94-no 296/1995 Sb.) He acknowledged the admissibility of State financial
contribution to political parties, due to their fair
features of the constitutional Government in the form of representative democracy. The Constitution in article.
5 is based on the fact that the formation of the political will and the formation of State authority is
the result of the free competition of political parties in the framework of democratic
the rule of law. The result of this contest is a specific political profile
the elected organs of State power. Therefore, interventions of State authorities back to the
the life of political parties are unwanted there, where they could be free and
free the parties to restrict competition. Also the article. 22 of the Charter provides that the
the legal adjustment of all political rights and freedoms and its interpretation and
the application must allow and protect free competition of political
Parties in a democratic society.
At the present time there are elections to the Chamber of Deputies for the material
incentives to encourage the electoral abstenci of small parties, which must on the way
non-refundable bond election State "pay" for it, that did not reach the boundaries of the
set on five percent of the valid votes, and thus pay a
"fine" in the amount of 1 600 0000 CZK for simple participation in the electoral contest.
In addition, however, there are also a number of limitations which financial claims in the opposite
direction, namely the rights of political parties to the State, in the case of small
the parties completely eliminated, and despite the fact that these Parties apply its role
in the electoral contest in the general interest as well as the parties to the parlamentně
entrenched incumbent. These, in addition to the contribution to cover the cost of the election
enjoy a variety of other material benefits; are entitled to a permanent post
a political party or movement, at least in the amount of Czk 3 0000 0000 each
a year ago, if received at least three percent of the votes cast (article 20, paragraph 4, and
paragraph. 6 of Act No. 424/1991 Coll.). This amount is increased for each additional
I started about tenth of a percent of the votes each year 100 000 Czk. Then have the
entitled to the each individual mandate according to § 20 paragraph. 7 of the law
No. 424/1991 Coll. in the amount of 500 000 CZK for the mandate and then finally receive
the financial remuneration from the State in connection with the exercise of parliamentary functions and
the activities of the parliamentary Club. In Germany for example. by contrast, there are only
election contribution paid to all parties that have won at least 0.5% of the
Accumulation of a series of financial penalties for small parties (and thus financial advantages
for larger parties) is in the current edit so extensive that occurs
in fact the "choking" those small parties, which do not have enough financial
resources for the conduct of the election campaign and the payment of the bonds. In recognition of this
the potential of such parties when voters vote the way their
the votes elsewhere, if "their party does not have enough resources to
visibility in competition with each other ". The higher the limit for small
the parties, the less will be the number of votes cast for them to express their
the true meaning and the weaker will also be the credibility of the election results.
The vote of the electorate, however, has to be an expression of the free in free
Contest Parties and the integrating factor is causing to their free
Excessive accumulation of material sanctions is in its consequences
counterproductive, as it affects only those democratic political
Parties that do not have plenty of hearty donations and to whom
the accumulation of financial sanctions makes it impossible to conduct a fair election
campaign, or even enter the election contest. On the other hand, then
can other, also small, political parties have plenty of
funds from influential sponsors who associate with them
the political pursuit of our own interests.
Considering all these circumstances, the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that
binding post to cover electoral costs to obtain at least three
percent of the total number of valid votes cast in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies
the Chamber of Deputies, in particular, its scope, and also taking into account the additional restrictions,
which are subject to sanction political parties that received less than five,
or three percent of the votes, the minimum needed to
determine the seriousness of the electoral intentions of the parties and to the equality of chances
political parties in the electoral contest. In this summary of financial
penalties for some of them to participate in elections is becoming financially unbearable
The Constitutional Court therefore, the relevant provisions of the electoral law with effect from the
the announcement of the award in the collection of laws set aside for its conflict with article. 5 of the Constitution
and the article. 22 of the Charter. It is for consideration by the Parliament of the Czech Republic, whether
for elections to the Chamber of Deputies during the existence of the bond election
left also a certain boundaries-say around 1%-gained votes
as proof of the seriousness of the intentions of the parties to the election, and thus the condition for
payment of the allowance to cover the costs of the election.
On the constitutional complaint of a request of the Democratic Union for the
payment of the allowance to cover electoral costs in the amount of Czk 7 778 790
requested in connection with past elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which
were held in 1998, and the Senate shall decide the Constitutional Court as soon as this
find plenum of the Constitutional Court shall be enforceable.
The President of the Constitutional Court:
JUDr. Kessler v. r.