162/2017 Sb.
DECREE
of 25 June 2002. may 2017
about the requirements for a safety assessment by the Atomic Act
State Office for nuclear safety, establishes, pursuant to section 236 of the Act No.
263/2016 Coll., the Atomic Act, to implement section 48 para. 6:
§ 1
The subject of the edit
This Decree incorporates the relevant provisions of Euratom ^ 1) and establishes
and implementation of the evaluation of the safety rules), and each type of
reviews and time periods in which they are carried out,
(b)) the way of documenting safety evaluation and individual types
reviews and ratings for safety and documentation contents of each type of
reviews and
(c)) use the safety assessment.
§ 2
The concepts of
For the purposes of this Ordinance, means the
and the analysis of uncertainty impact assessment) uncertainties associated with each
the elements of the logical model of the current state of nuclear devices created
in the framework of probabilistic safety assessment (hereinafter referred to as the "model
probabilistic safety assessment ") on the overall results of the
probabilistic safety assessment,
(b) analysis of the degree of sensitivity analysis) the impact of the assumptions used and
the specified input data, reviews the results of certain facts
This evaluation,
(c)) generic production figure on the reliability of information systems,
construction and components of non-information about past conditions
the evaluated nuclear devices, and applicable to determine the reliability of the
systems, structures and components of a nuclear device,
d) initiating event requiring response of a nuclear installation or
its operator to convert a nuclear device to a safe condition,
that would be in the case of a failure response could result in damage to the nuclear
fuel or a radioactive substance leaks from a nuclear installation,
e) scenario a sequence of events involving, in particular, random
the initiation of the event, the response of the individual systems, structures and components
ensuring a safety function and convert nuclear devices to
safe or other status,
(f) specific operational information) numeric indication of the reliability of the systems,
structures and components based on information about past conditions
the evaluated nuclear devices and
g) large early leakage leakage of more than 1% of the initial amount of 137Cs in
a nuclear device within 10 hours of the announcement of the accident.
§ 3
General requirements for safety assessment
(1) the safety assessment must be carried out according to the current and
practical applications of proven methodologies in accordance with the existing levels of
Science and technology and good practice.
(2) a safety assessment must take account of the changes affect the eligible
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and
security that occur over the life-cycle of a nuclear
device.
(3) the safety assessment must take into account new knowledge from operating
experience and information on the risks and consequences of the use of nuclear
energy relevant in terms of nuclear safety, which could
significantly affect the safety evaluation.
(4) the procedure referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be applied graduated
access by the influence of the relevant facts on nuclear safety,
radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of radiological situation
management of radiation incidents, and security.
§ 4
Deterministic safety assessment
(1) a deterministic safety assessment must be given to the
the acceptability of the consequences of the nuclear facility and its response systems
construction and components, and workers at the initiation of the event in terms of
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety and management
radiation emergencies.
(2) Deterministic safety assessment must be assessed
and the nuclear device) the ability to ensure compliance with the principles of the safe
the use of nuclear energy,
b) durability, reliability and effectiveness of the security systems and other
systems, structures and components with an impact on nuclear safety in the
conditions for which they are intended, and
(c) the worker's ability to ensure compliance with) the basic safety
features of the nuclear device.
(3) Deterministic safety assessment shall evaluate the implementation of
the requirements of the Ordinance on the requirements for the project of a nuclear device.
(4) the results of deterministic safety assessment must be listed in the
input the safety report, preliminary safety report, operating
the safety report for the first startup of the nuclear device physics
nuclear reactor operational safety report and safety message
the decommissioning of a nuclear installation.
Probabilistic safety assessment
§ 5
(1) a probabilistic safety assessment must include
a) 1. probabilistic safety assessment level, in which the
must be implemented by the project analysis of the nuclear facility and its operation,
including the preceding phases of the life cycle, so that the sequence has been identified
events that can lead to damage to the nuclear fuel or the system,
construction or components containing radioactive substances
occurring on this device and fixed frequency per year, with
where such damage may occur as a result of the sequence of these events, and
(b)) 2. probabilistic safety assessment level, in which the
the analysis shall be carried out of the chronological development of the consequences of corruption
nuclear fuel and other systems, structures or components containing
radioactive substances occurring in a nuclear installation, detected in
under 1. level probabilistic safety assessment, including
quantitative evaluation of the resulting phenomena; in the framework of the 2.
probabilistic safety assessment level must be identified
ways in which a leaked radioactive substances can spread into the
environment.
(2) Probabilistic safety assessment must take into account
and) radioactive substances occurring in nuclear facilities,
(b)) modes of operation of nuclear facilities, including stoppages, and
c) internal and external initiation events, including acting across the Board
internal and external initiation event.
(3) in the framework of probabilistic safety assessment must be created
model of probabilistic safety assessment, which must be based
on a realistic modeling during the development of the internal and external
initiation event.
§ 6
(1) when creating a model of probabilistic safety assessment must
be
used by the data of the project) of the nuclear facilities of the facts having
impact on nuclear safety, radiation protection and radiation management
Special events,
(b) justified by determining the period) for which models the response of the nuclear
the device on the inner and outer initiation events,
(c)) modes of operation of the nuclear facility divided into partial operation
States according to the facts related with the status of the nuclear facilities,
that can lead to the same response to the initiation of a nuclear installation
events,
(d)) for a subset of conditions determined initiation events that are not
virtually eliminated,
e) created the Group initiation event referred to in subparagraph (d)) and established
the frequency of their occurrence per year
(f)) established the criteria for admissibility to prevent melting of nuclear
fuel or leak of radioactive substances,
g) used causal analysis method for the evaluation of the process, and
the events leading to possible radiological emergencies using
the criteria for admissibility referred to in subparagraph (f)),
h) constructed trees event for each group initiation
events in the form of a graphical logical model based on the results of the use of
causal analytical methods
I) detected and removed the loop in the model the probability
evaluation of the safety,
j) used deductive reasoning method based on probabilistic approach
which analyzes the development of adverse events or system failure,
to find all of the strings causes that can lead to this event,
using the criteria for admissibility referred to in subparagraph (f)),
k) constructed trees for each device to be used in response to
the initiation event in the form of a graphical logical model based on
the results of applying the deductive method,
l) carried out a comprehensive analysis of the human factor so that they are included
possible errors of workers carrying out activities related to the use of
nuclear energy activities within the exposure situations and activities of the
coping with radiation emergencies; in this analysis must be
taken into account the factors affect the activity of the eligible workers in all
intermediate States of operation of nuclear installations, including dependencies
between human errors,
m) carried out a comprehensive analysis of the failures of the common causes of and
n) analysis of radiological incidents leading to the leakage of
radioactive material from a nuclear installation.
(2) in the model of probabilistic safety assessment must be further
taken into account
and all the functional dependencies) systems, structures or
components and dependencies arising from their location,
b) interdependence of fact affecting nuclear safety,
that may occur as a result of the failure of the nuclear device, and
c) interdependence among the various nuclear installations located in the
the same territory, the location of a nuclear device.
§ 7
Based on the model of probabilistic safety assessment must be
and calculation of the frequency of damage) of nuclear fuel in an active zone
nuclear reactor (hereinafter referred to as "active zone") for the year that includes the
1. the overall frequency of occurrence,
2. the frequency for each partial operating States and
3. frequency of occurrence for each group initiation events
(b)) calculation of the frequency of occurrence of damage to the nuclear fuel in the
the active zone and outside of the active zone per year including
1. the overall frequency of occurrence,
2. the frequency for each partial operating States and
3. frequency of occurrence for each group initiation events
c) calculation of the frequency of occurrence of the great early leak
radioactive substances for the year including
1. the overall frequency of occurrence,
2. the frequency for each partial operating States and
3. frequency of occurrence for each group initiation events
(d) the accuracy of the calculation model) probabilistic reviews
safety, in order to achieve realistic results
e) identified the main scenarios leading to damage to the nuclear fuel
or leakage of radioactive material from a nuclear installation for 1. and 2. the level of
probabilistic safety assessment,
(f)) for the 1. and 2. probabilistic safety assessment level
identified by the smallest of a set of events
1. the common occurrence of the scenario leads to damage to the nuclear fuel
or leakage of radioactive material from a nuclear installation and
2. that most significantly contribute to the overall risk posed by
nuclear facilities,
g) carried out reviews of importance for overall results
probabilistic safety assessment, for each
1. the systems, structures and components,
2. errors caused by the human factor, and
3. the failure of the common causes of and
h) during the operation of a nuclear installation conducted monitoring of the level of risk
represented by nuclear facilities.
§ 8
(1) in the model of probabilistic safety assessment must be
performed
and statistical) analysis of the uncertainties with the data used in the
model of probabilistic safety assessment and required to
determination of the reliability of the systems, structures and components and
likely or annual frequency errors of workers and
b) sensitivity analysis of variables that exhibit a high degree of uncertainty,
may have a significant effect on the results of probabilistic evaluation
safety and are associated with the
1. the default assumptions used when creating the model
probabilistic safety assessment,
2. data used in the model of probabilistic safety assessment
necessary to establish the reliability of the systems, structures and components
for the performance of their prescribed functions and
3. data used in the model of probabilistic safety assessment
necessary to determine the likelihood or frequency
workers ' errors.
(2) the results of the probabilistic safety assessment must be
compared to probabilistic the acceptability criteria to verify whether the
with them is nuclear safety. When comparing results
probabilistic safety assessment with probabilistic
the acceptability criteria must be taken into account the results of the analyses carried out
sensitivity and uncertainty analyses.
(3) the Probabilistic safety assessment must be subsequent to its
design subject to an independent expert evaluation to
revealed its shortcomings.
(4) all the elements that have an effect on the probability
evaluation of the safety, must be taken into account in the framework of this
probabilistic safety assessment, if it is used for the assessment of
a) frequency of testing of systems, structures and components,
(b) the allowable time disposal of systems), structures and components of the operation,
or
c) changes of variables under (a)), or (b)).
§ 9
Implementation of probabilistic safety assessment period
(1) a probabilistic safety assessment must be carried out within 12
months after you make a change in the use of nuclear energy, in the
parts, which could be affected by this change, if the change with the
the influence on
and the location of the property) of a nuclear device,
(b)) the real state and the operation of a nuclear installation when you change
the project of a nuclear installation or changing the method of testing and maintenance
nuclear installation,
(c)) the current status of the internal rules,
(d)) the data needed to establish the reliability of the systems, structures and
components and the probability of success of individual human errors,
based in particular on the acquisition of specific traffic data from nuclear
device or nuclear facility of a similar type,
(e)) the current technical information about the status of a nuclear device, or
(f)) of the current information on the properties and behavior of the nuclear device while
operational events, including radiological emergency.
(2) Probabilistic safety assessment must be done collectively,
at least once every 5 years of operation of a nuclear installation.
(3) when the probabilistic safety assessment referred to in paragraph 2 shall
be
and taken into account updated data) needed to establish the reliability of the
systems, structures and components and the probability of success of individual
errors of workers based on the
1. specific traffic data from nuclear facilities or nuclear
the device of a similar type, if available, or
2. Generic traffic data from nuclear facilities or nuclear
the device of a similar type and
(b)) used currently available analytical methods and tools
good practice.
The use of probabilistic safety assessment
§ 10
(1) a probabilistic safety assessment must be used during the
the life-cycle of a nuclear installation in the evaluation of relevant information on the
the risk and the consequences of the use of nuclear energy, while reviewing
the present level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and management
radiation emergencies and in taking measures to prevent
a decrease in their levels and their improvement.
(2) Probabilistic safety assessment must be continuously used
to reduce the risk posed by a nuclear device for the detection of
necessary changes to project nuclear facility resulting from the deficiencies
and the project of nuclear equipment) or
(b)) the internal rules.
(3) the Probabilistic safety assessment must be used to
determining priorities for the planning of measures to increase the level of nuclear
safety, radiation protection and management of radiation incidents.
This planning must be put on measures with a significant
impact on nuclear safety, radiation protection, radiation management
emergency and security.
(4) the Probabilistic safety assessment must be used to
assessment of the overall risk posed by nuclear facilities.
(5) the Probabilistic safety assessment must be used to
verification of the
and the balance of the project of a nuclear installation),
(b) the) absence of minor deviations from their nuclear device properties
normal values provided for by the legislation which are eligible
cause significant reduction in the level of nuclear safety of nuclear installations,
(c) the absence of the elements of the project of nuclear) device or group initiation
events that represent a disproportionately large contribution to the overall risk
posed by nuclear facilities and
(d)) share agents which are fixed with significant uncertainty, the
achieving an overall low level of risk posed by nuclear
device.
(6) the Probabilistic safety assessment must be used to
reviews
and changes in needs and acceptability) of nuclear installations,
(b)) needs and acceptability of changes within the limits and conditions,
(c) the needs and acceptability of amendments) the internal rules and
(d) the seriousness of the events in the nuclear) device.
(7) the use of probabilistic safety assessment pursuant to
paragraph 1, in the conditions of the authorisation holder shall be determined by the internal
Regulation of the authorisation holder.
§ 11
(1) a probabilistic safety assessment must be used in the
processing of emergency legislation and the verification of their accuracy.
(2) the results of the probabilistic safety assessment must be
used to check whether the program includes operational controls
all of the systems, structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety.
(3) the results of the probabilistic safety assessment must be
used to check whether the process of controlled ageing are subject to
all of the systems, structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety.
(4) the Probabilistic safety assessment must be used to
identify the systems, structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety, whose operability must always be ensured. The results of the
probabilistic safety assessment that identifies such
systems, structures and components must be listed in the preliminary
the safety report, in operating the safety report for first physical
launching a nuclear installation with a nuclear reactor, in the operations
the safety report and in the safety report to the decommissioning
the nuclear device.
(5) the results of the probabilistic safety assessment must be
used as an input in the preparation and verification of information security
major training programs for workers, including training of operators
block supervisory room Simulator.
(6) every time the use of probabilistic safety assessment must
be identified and taken into account the restrictions for use of this method.
The appropriateness of the use of probabilistic safety assessment must be
examined in the light of these limitations.
§ 12
Documentation of probabilistic safety assessment
Probabilistic safety assessment documentation must include
and a description of the range of probability) the safety assessment,
(b) a description of the methodology used, and) the documentation of quality assurance
probabilistic safety assessment,
(c) information on the investigational) nuclear facilities needed to implement the
probabilistic safety assessment,
(d)) list of operating conditions of a nuclear device, in which the
for the purposes of probabilistic safety assessment divided all
modes of operation of nuclear facilities, and a description of the process of their establishment,
(e) a description of the selection process) and group initiation events, their
list and description of each group initiation events with annual
frequencies of their creation, including the analysis of these frequencies, and
assign each group initiation events each subarea
the operating conditions of a nuclear device, which was for the purpose of implementing
probabilistic safety assessment of distributed operation
the device,
(f) a description of the sestrojených trees) events, including the assumptions and
criteria under section 6 (1). 1 (b). (h)),
(g)) the list of errors caused by the human factor included in the
probabilistic safety assessment and a description of their analysis,
(h) a list of the data needed to) the determination of the reliability of the systems,
structures and components that have been used for modeling failure
the equipment and its repairs, maintenance and testing, and a description of their analysis,
(I) a list of the common disorders) causes and a description of their analysis,
j) description of circular loop in the model of probabilistic solution reviews
safety,
for a list of major assumptions used) in the implementation of
probabilistic safety assessment and limit model
probabilistic safety assessment,
l) description of systems analysis and sestrojených disorders, including trees used
assumptions,
m) description of relations between 1. and 2. a probabilistic level reviews
safety,
n) a description of the analysis of radiation emergencies, leading to leakage
radioactive materials from the nuclear device that brings the most important
contribution to the risk posed by nuclear facilities,
o) defining the categories of releases of radioactive material released into the
around nuclear facilities according to the size and time levels,
p) description and characterization of the amount of radioactive material released by the
in the vicinity of the nuclear installation, depending on the category of the leak by
the letter o),
q) description of the main results 1. and 2. a probabilistic level reviews
Security under section 7,
r) the results of sensitivity analyses,
with the results of the analysis of uncertainties)
t) conclusions and recommendations for the possible increase in the level of nuclear safety,
including the assessment of the effectiveness of the strategy management of severe accidents, and
u) Description 1. and 2. probabilistic safety assessment level
that includes for each level
1. the probabilistic safety assessment for power States
2. the probabilistic safety assessment for nízkovýkonové and parking
the States and the
3. the probabilistic safety assessment for individual internal and
external initiation event.
General requirements for the implementation of the periodic evaluation of the safety
section 13 of the
(1) Periodic reviews of safety must compare the status of nuclear
safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring
the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and security
achieved on nuclear equipment with the requirements of the legislation and with the
the requirements resulting from the present level of science and technology and the correct
practice (hereinafter referred to as "safety requirements") in force at the time of his
implementation.
(2) Periodic safety evaluation must be at predetermined
systematically and comprehensively screened intervals, the following areas:
and the nuclear devices) project
(b)) the actual condition of systems, structures and components,
(c)) the capacity of the systems, structures and components to perform functions
the project required a nuclear device (hereinafter referred to as "qualification
device "),
d) aging systems, structures and components,
e deterministic safety analysis),
(f) assessment of safety, probability)
g) risk analysis,
h) operational safety,
I) use operating experience from other nuclear facilities and knowledge
Science and research,
j) Organization and management,
k) procedures and regulations,
l) the human factor,
m) management of radiation incidents and
n) affect operation of a nuclear device on its surroundings in terms of radiation
the protection.
(3) Periodic evaluation of the security must be in the research of nuclear
device at predetermined intervals to systematically and comprehensively further
checked the area of the special nature of the use of a nuclear reactor to
research, training, production of radionuclides, neutron radiography,
testing of materials or the provision of health services (hereinafter referred to as
"the use of nuclear reactor").
(4) Periodic safety evaluation shall be provided for storage
radioactive waste at predetermined intervals in a systematic and
further explored the region holistically the special nature of the use of storage
of radioactive waste.
(5) Periodic reviews of safety must examine the situation by
paragraph 1 during operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation and after
period of validity of the authorisation for the conclusion of storage of radioactive waste.
(6) for each region in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 4 shall be set
requirements and criteria, in the filling can be safety requirements
be regarded as having been complied with.
(7) for each region in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 4 shall be carried out minor
evaluation of all safety requirements for the appropriate area.
The results of the intermediate evaluation of the areas referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4 shall be
used for the implementation of the General evaluation of all areas.
§ 14
(1) in the context of periodic reviews of safety must be evaluated
the safety significance of all deviations from the security
requirements.
(2) based on the evaluation of the safety significance of all identified
deviations from the safety requirements must be created the design file
measures for achieving and ensuring the level of nuclear safety,
radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of radiological situation
management of radiation incidents and security of nuclear installations
the required safety requirements until the next periodic
safety evaluation (hereinafter referred to as "the set of measures") and a timetable for their
implementation.
(3) Periodic reviews of safety must continue to evaluate whether they have been
solved all the deviations from the security requirements identified in the
during operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation or
exposed the previous periodic safety evaluation.
(4) Periodic safety assessments must be carried out according to the strategy
access to periodically reviews security (hereinafter referred to as "strategy").
The strategy must be processed before you perform periodic reviews
safety.
§ 15
Periodic security assessment deadlines
(1) the first periodic safety assessments shall be made within 6 years
from the start of the operation of a nuclear installation.
(2) the periodic evaluation of the safety, with the exception of the first periodic
evaluation of the safety, must be made within 10 years of the implementation
the previous periodic safety assessments.
(3) Periodic reviews of safety during decommissioning of nuclear
the device must be carried out at the end of each stage of decommissioning
nuclear installation and later in the case of changes to the originally planned the way
the decommissioning of a nuclear installation.
section 16 of the
The scope of periodic safety reviews
(1) The periodic safety assessment must be included in
Depending on the type of nuclear device all areas affecting the
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and
security in the various operational units of the nuclear device and on
a nuclear device as a whole according to § 13 para. 2 to 4.
(2) For nuclear installations without a nuclear reactor or nuclear
reactor of less than 50 MW range must be periodic
adapted to the characteristics of the project safety assessment of nuclear
device and method of operation of a nuclear installation.
The subject of periodic safety reviews
§ 17
Periodic safety assessments must be assessed
and in the area) is a project of the nuclear device, the actual project
solutions of systems, structures and components and their operation by comparing it with
applicable safety requirements, including the method of documenting changes
carried out at the nuclear facility and the ability of a nuclear device
to fulfill the principles of the safe use of nuclear energy,
(b)) in the field, which is the actual status of the systems, structures and components,
whether the systems, structures and components with an impact on nuclear safety
comply with the technical requirements specified in the technical specifications,
meet project requirements, are no longer able to carry out the functions
the anticipated project of nuclear devices and that their status is properly
documented,
(c)) in the region, that is, the status of the equipment qualification and ability range
systems, structures and components to meet project requirements in the
conditions to which they are exposed throughout their life with
taking into account the impact of the working environment, including the emergency conditions;
equipment qualification must be assessed in terms of whether
1. is properly performed and documented and
2. is regularly checked and evaluated in the process of the planned
maintenance, inspection and testing of the functionality of the systems, structures and components,
(d)) in the field which is the ageing of the systems, structures and components,
1. implementation of systematic monitoring and effective control of the process
aging systems, structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety in a way that allows you to keep safety function after
the entire life cycle of a nuclear device,
2. the extent of wear and degradation of the materials, including the impact of wear and
degradation of the ability of systems, structures and components to meet your
the function and the prediction of future developments, and
3. process documentation of controlled aging
(e)) in the field which are deterministic safety analysis, range,
the completeness, validity and timeliness of the deterministic safety analysis,
including the harmony used deterministic methods reviews, computing
codes used safety criteria and standards to the current level
Science and technology and good practice, and at the discretion of the
1. all changes to the project of nuclear devices that were on the nuclear
the device carried out,
2. the actual state of the systems, structures and components and
3. the expected state of the systems, structures and components at the end of the period
before the next recurring safety evaluation, and
(f)) in the field, which is a probabilistic safety assessment,
1. management of accidents and its compliance with the results of a probabilistic
evaluation of the safety, so that the suitability of this system was intended for
the prevention of serious damage to the active zone or mitigate its consequences,
2. scope and completeness, probabilistic safety assessment of
as to whether is taken into account the effect of radioactive substances occurring
in a nuclear installation, nuclear devices and the operating conditions envisaged
initiation of events for a nuclear device,
3. perform regular updates of probabilistic evaluation
safety so that rated the current state of nuclear devices, including
the current state of the internal rules,
4. compliance of the used methodologies of computational codes and criteria for success is
the existing levels of science and technology and good practice,
5. the use of probabilistic safety assessment of compliance with
the requirements resulting from the present level of science and technology and the correct
practice and
6. the legality of a probabilistic safety assessment with the requirements of this
decrees on the probabilistic safety assessment.
section 18
Periodic safety assessments must also evaluate the
and in the area) is the analysis of risks,
1. the adequacy of the protection of nuclear facilities against internal and external
events relative to the actual state of all the systems, structures and
components with an impact on nuclear safety and the current values of the
the probability of occurrence of risks arising from the current reviews of the territory to
the location of the nuclear facility, in which the nuclear device is placed, with the
regard to the possible presence of climate change and transport and other
industrial activities, and
2. the measures for the prevention of emergency conditions and mitigate
their consequences by applying defense-in-depth,
(b)) in the field, which is the operating safety,
1. the long-term level of nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical
safety, monitoring radiation situation, the management of radiological emergency
events and security when operating nuclear facilities and its trends
development based on the analysis of the ongoing evaluation of nuclear safety,
radiation protection and technical safety and operational experience
2. the system of detection, classification, recording and reporting
operational events
3. the method of processing and management feedback and system documentation
4. the effectiveness of the system of feedback,
(c)) in the field, which is the use of operational experience from other
nuclear facilities and knowledge, science and research,
1. the existence and use of the system for the collection, classification, evaluation
and record information from the operation of other nuclear devices like
the type and
2. the extent to which new knowledge and research and development reflected in the measures
for the enhancement of nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical
safety, monitoring radiation situation and management of radiation
incidents of nuclear installations,
(d)) in the field, which is the Organization and management,
1. the way of the introduction of a management system and the overall level of culture
safety,
2. the adequacy of the amount of workers with the required qualifications for the
the implementation of mission-critical activities in terms of nuclear safety and
radiation protection and activities important in terms of nuclear safety,
3. the system of training of workers,
4. the requirements on the qualifications of the staff and
5. the suitability of qualification of personnel for the performance of specified activities and
(e)) in the field which are the procedures and regulations, procedures, and internal
provisions for the operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation from
point of view
1. conformity with the current status of the nuclear facilities and its operation
or decommissioning,
2. their complexity, validation, approval,
3. establishment of a system for the management of change and
4. the extent of their compliance.
§ 19
Periodic safety assessments must also evaluate the
and in the area) is the human factor, that the human factor does not increase the
the risk of initiation events, including an assessment of whether the
1. the prescribed activities and intervention workers are referred to as
actions in support of nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical
safety, monitoring radiation situation, the management of radiological emergency
events and security, are feasible and that they have the necessary
technical and organisational support
2. the number of workers engaged in activities relevant to the
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and
sufficient security,
3. the process of selecting and training workers having a bearing on nuclear
safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring
the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and security
to be effective,
4. the overall personnel policy and its management are leading
workers in accordance with the requirements of the safety culture,
5. working environment has a suitable arrangement and technical equipment in the
According to ergonomic requirements based on the current state of science and
techniques and good practice and to
6. programmes operating experience feedback for activities
the failure of humans that have contributed or could contribute to production
events are eligible to determine the causes of such failures and their
corrective measures and
(b)) in the area, which is coping with radiation emergencies,
1. the requirement of the project of a nuclear installation in equipment shelters and their
the ability to perform his duties with regard to the wear and tear of equipment,
2. the requirement of the project of a nuclear installation for continuous uptime and
habitability shelters intended as emergency control centre and
the technical support service,
3. whether it is regularly examined and evaluated the process of planned maintenance
shelters,
4. whether there is and is used by the system for gathering, sorting,
analyzing, evaluating, and recording information about the emergence of
radiological emergencies and during the response to the other
nuclear facilities of a similar type,
5. the adequacy of the amount of workers with the required qualifications for the
the implementation of the management of and response to a radiological incident, according to
individual intervention to instructions,
6. that the system of education of individuals designated to carry out activities
According to the emergency instructions, internal emergency plan or emergency
regulations in the field of radiation emergencies, in accordance with the
the current status of science and technology and good practice,
7. whether the work environment in the shelter areas designated as emergency management
the Centre and the technical support service has the arrangement and technical
equipment in accordance with ergonomic requirements, under the existing State of the
Science and technology and good practice,
8. remedies the deficiencies found during the authentication functionality
the technical means in accordance with the internal emergency plan, carried out by
the previous periodic safety assessment,
9. remedies the deficiencies found during emergency exercises are
by including the internal emergency plan and emergency instructions, which
He was a procvičován scenario involving a radiation accident, carried out during the period
Since the previous periodic safety assessment,
10. the provision of basic information in case of accident
the population in the emergency planning zone,
11. the system of informing the general public in the emergency planning zone in
the event of a radiological accident and
12. significant changes in the area of nuclear facilities in the zone, emergency
planning that may have an impact on ensuring the management of radiation
Special events for the period since the previous periodic reviews
safety.
section 20
Periodic safety assessments must also evaluate the
and in the area) is the influence of the operation of a nuclear device on its surroundings from
radiation protection,
1. timeliness and comprehensiveness of program monitoring of releases and program
monitoring the surrounding area having regard to the changes made to the nuclear device and
infrastructure changes in the vicinity of the nuclear installation,
2. the timeliness of the methods and technical means used to monitor
discharges and surroundings and to the assessment of the doses for representative person of the
the perspective of the current state of science and technology and good practice,
3. development of long-term trends in values of monitored according
program monitoring program monitoring of discharges and the surrounding area in comparison
with the results of the monitoring of radiological situation before placing the nuclear
the device into operation and
4. development of long-term trends — effective dose values for
the representative person in comparisons with authorized limits
By the Office,
(b)) in the area of the special nature of the use of nuclear research facilities
1. the current use of the nuclear reactor and the expected changes in his
use of,
2. the suitability of the existing internal regulations for the use of nuclear
the reactor,
3. the effectiveness of the management system for processes and activities related to the use
nuclear reactor,
4. changes in the documentation relating to the research of nuclear devices with
regard to the use of nuclear reactor
5. the effect of the way the use of a nuclear reactor at the nuclear safety,
radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of radiological situation
management of radiation incidents and security,
6. the appropriateness of the limits and conditions laid down specifically for the use of
nuclear reactor,
7. the process of controlled aging device used for the use of nuclear
the reactor and
8. the qualifications of the personnel performing the processes and activities in the use of
a nuclear reactor and
(c)) in the area of the special nature of the use of the storage of radioactive waste
1. the procedures for verifying that the properties of the radioactive waste shall correspond
the conditions of acceptability to store in the repository of radioactive waste, and
2. items affecting nuclear safety, radiation protection,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and
Security storage of radioactive waste after its conclusion, including the
analysis of its operation and the potential barriers to the development of the territory, the location of the
This store and the biosphere.
section 21
The periodic evaluation of the safety documentation
(1) the strategy shall contain
description of the scope recurring) safety assessment,
(b) a description of the implementation of the periodic reviews), including the
the stages and schedule requirements
1. the outputs of the periodic evaluation of the safety and
2. validation of the periodic evaluation of the safety outputs according to the Decree on the
requirements for a management system
(c)) the procedures for detecting and resolving differences between the existing and
the required functional and performance characteristics of nuclear
the device,
(d) implementation evaluation) how the significance of deviations from the
security requirements
(e) a list of the recurring documentation) assessment of the safety and
(f) a description of the recurring management system) safety assessment, including
method of communication when carrying out periodic reviews of safety.
(2) the methodology according to § 3 (2). 1 for the periodic evaluation of the safety
must be processed separately for each area to be evaluated pursuant to section 13
paragraph. 2 to 4 and must contain
and a description of the requirements of the legislation) and technical standards or requirements
technical regulations, which will be used in the evaluation,
(b) a description of evaluation and methods)
(c) a description of the criteria used for) the evaluation of the fulfillment of safety
requirements.
(3) the results of the evaluation of individual security requirements must be
captured records of reviews. A record of the completion of the reviews
must contain the
and of the supporting documents used for the description), reviews,
(b) a description of how the performance criteria) according to § 13 para. 6 and 7,
(c)) the derogation from the implementation of the criteria under section 13(2). 6 and 7,
(d) the importance of evaluation) deviations from safety
the requirements and
e) recommendation corrective action to address variances from safety
requirements.
(4) the results of the evaluation of individual areas of the periodic reviews
security must be captured by the partial reports of the reviews area
periodic reviews of safety. These reports must contain the
and objectives of the evaluation, description)
(b)) list of security requirements
(c) the rating of each result) security requirements with an indication of
1. security requirements
2. the criteria used for the evaluation of the fulfillment of safety requirements and
methodologies in accordance with § 3 (1). 1,
3. a description of the evaluation process and
4. design of deviations from safety requirements and
(d) in the case of a minor) reports from the evaluation of the actual state of the systems,
construction and components on
1. enumeration of the systems, structures and components, for which it is not possible to examine the
the actual condition of the technical methods,
2. Description of the indirect methods of assessing the State of the systems, structures and
the component referred to in point 1 and
3. the assessment of the inability to verify the actual status of the technical methods of
importance for nuclear safety, radiation protection,
technical safety, monitoring of radiological situation and management
radiation emergencies.
(5) the results of periodic reviews of safety with the design file
the measures must be processed in the final summary report on the recurring
the safety assessment (hereinafter ' the summary report '). The synthesis report
must be submitted to the Office within 3 months from the expiry of the period for the implementation of
recurring security assessments pursuant to section 15.
(6) the summary report must contain
and a brief description of the executed periodic) safety evaluation with
an indication of its objectives, the scope, procedure, of the sources and references to
the most important used and prepared documentation
(b)) for other than the first periodic reviews of safety comparison
investigational areas with a status of in the previous periodic reviews
safety,
(c) a summary of the results and findings) that allow the assessment of the achieved level
nuclear safety indicating deviations from safety
requirements and measures to resolve them,
(d)) the conclusion of the overall level of nuclear safety, radiation protection,
technical security, monitoring of radiological situation and management
radiation emergencies achieved in the period,
(e)) a finite set of measures and
(f) the plan for the execution of the file summary) measures, including a timetable for their
implementation.
section 22
Continuous evaluation of the safety
(1) for the entire life cycle of a nuclear device the holder must
permit to carry out a continuous evaluation of the safety evaluation of the current
State to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical
safety, monitoring radiation situation, the management of radiological emergency
events and security and how the fulfilment of the principles of peaceful use of
of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation.
(2) the interim safety assessment must include
and) monitoring, evaluation and recording of
1. quantities and important in terms of nuclear safety,
2. the results of monitoring the radiation situation monitoring and programme
3. data on the reliability and operability of the systems, structures and
components with an impact on nuclear safety,
(b)) ratings system planning and implementation of changes in the use of nuclear
energy,
(c) evaluation of the effectiveness of the management system),
d) monitoring compliance with the conditions laid down in the authorisation issued by the authority,
(e) evaluation of the results of the periodic verification) conformity of the operated
Select equipment with the technical requirements, including the evaluation of the results
the supervision carried out by the holder of the authorization of its suppliers, and
f) reviews of processes and activities to prevent the development of emergency response
conditions at the nuclear facilities and to alleviate their consequences according to § 49
paragraph. 1 (b). the Atomic Act).
(3) the assessment of the facts and important in terms of nuclear
safety and radiation protection must be carried out by comparing their
the present condition with the values set and of the nuclear facility project
the internal rules.
(4) for the evaluation referred to in paragraph 3 shall be determined and used file
safety and reliability indicators for these physical quantities and the fact
that will allow the monitoring of the development level of nuclear safety, radiation
protection, technical safety, monitoring the radiation situation, the management of
radiation emergencies and security by examining the same data for the
previous years.
(5) the interim safety assessment must assess the effectiveness of the internal
regulations.
(6) records of the outputs of ongoing evaluation of security must describe
the implementation of a continuous evaluation of the safety and the results.
(7) the result of the ongoing assessment of the security must be taken into account in the
the internal regulations, operational safety report, in the safety
report for the decommissioning of nuclear installations and in probability
the safety evaluation.
Special safety assessment
Article 23 of the
(1) special safety evaluation before making any change in the use of
nuclear energy, that applies to the selected device, it must assess
and the impact of the change on the) ability to carry out the principles of nuclear installation
the safe use of nuclear energy,
(b)) completeness and accuracy of the draft amendment in terms of concurrent requests to
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and
Security and
(c) compliance with the requirements of change) documentation for povolovanou activities and
the internal rules.
(2) special safety evaluation before making any change in the use of
nuclear energy, which concerns the organisation and management, must assess
and compliance) management system after the change,
(b) the effect of changes in activities) particularly important from the perspective of nuclear
the safety and activity of importance for nuclear safety and
(c) compliance status) after you change the provisioning request and
maintaining the human resources necessary to discharge the responsibilities associated
with nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring the radiation situation, be radiation emergency and
Security.
(3) special safety evaluation before making any other changes when
the use of nuclear energy, which is the operation of a nuclear installation over the
beyond its service life estimated his project when you first
the physical execution of the nuclear device, all the time his
the next operation to assess the
and peace-ageing systems), structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety, which may restrict the scope of damage safety
function,
(b)) the reliability of systems, structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
security that is recorded in the framework of the continuous evaluation of the safety,
(c) acceptance criteria and implementation) maintaining the security provisions for
systems, structures and components with an impact on nuclear safety
due to the effects of aging,
(d) the ability of the systems, structures) and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety to perform the functions assigned to the nuclear security project
the device,
(e)) the validity of the analyses of the ageing containing a limited-time assumptions and
(f)) the effectiveness of retention of knowledge and experience of workers of nuclear
equipment from all the previous stages of its life cycle.
(4) special safety assessment referred to in paragraph 3 shall be carried out
no later than 24 months before the lifetime of a nuclear installation
the project envisaged a nuclear device the first time that the physical
launching a nuclear device.
(5) in the event that the term special reviews referred to in paragraph
3 is the same as the planned date of the implementation of the periodic reviews
Security under section 15 must be this special reviews conducted in
the corresponding ranges in accordance with § 13 para. 2 to 4.
section 24
(1) the special evaluation of the safety in the event of a radiological emergency
events at nuclear facilities, or nuclear device on another similar
type must assess
and radiation emergency) the importance of the nuclear facility or on
another nuclear device of a similar type in terms of nuclear safety,
radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of radiological situation
management of radiation incidents and using security procedures
System feedback according to the Decree on the provision of nuclear safety
nuclear installation,
(b) the appropriateness of the measures) are designed to avoid or reduce the
the possibility of recurrence of arising radiation emergencies, and
c) in the case of a radiological emergency events occurring on another nuclear
a similar type of device the appropriateness of the use of remedial measures proposed
the operator of this equipment for their own nuclear devices.
(2) special safety ratings when you suspect a demotion
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents and
security must assess
and the ability to carry out the nuclear installation) the principles of the safe use of
nuclear energy,
(b) the validity of the deterministic safety analyses),
(c) the operation of a nuclear installation) compliance with the requirements of the documentation for the
povolovanou activity and internal regulations,
(d) increasing the frequency of occurrence of) the possibility of initiating events or development
emergency conditions,
e) influence of the human factor,
(f)) status, physical security barriers against radioactive leakage
substances or ionising radiation,
(g) monitoring the radiation situation) outputs by comparing with authorized
the limits laid down by the authority,
(h) a representative person, irradiation) if there is a leak of the radionuclide in the
of the environment,
(I) the accuracy of the determination of the causes of reduction) level of nuclear safety,
radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring of radiological situation
management of radiation incidents or security,
j) the actual condition of systems, structures and components with the influence of the nuclear
security, the failure of which led to a suspicion of a reduction level of nuclear
safety, radiation protection, technical safety, monitoring
the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents or
security,
to the adequacy of the measures for the recovery of) achieve the required level
nuclear safety, radiation protection, technical safety,
monitoring of the radiation situation, the management of radiation incidents
or security, if it was designed, and
l) effectiveness of the measures referred to in subparagraph k), if it was adopted.
§ 25
Documentation of the special safety assessment
(1) the results of the special safety assessment before making the change in the
the use of nuclear energy must be summarised in a report, which must
contain
the changes)
(b) the expected date of the change),
(c) a description of the reasons for the implementation) changes,
(d) a description of the difference between the current) and the proposed status,
(e) a description of the impact of the changes on)
1. management system documentation,
2. the documentation for the povolovanou activities and
3. the ability of the nuclear device to meet the principles of the safe use of
nuclear energy,
(f) the type of change)
g) evaluation of the impact of change on the human factor and
(h) the results of the evaluation of safety.)
(2) in the case of reviews pursuant to § 23 para. 3 the message must also include the
and a list of systems, structures) and components with the influence of the nuclear
safety,
(b) the results of the aging-driven process),
(c) the results of the evaluation of the reliability of the systems), structures and components with the
impact on nuclear safety,
(d) the results of the evaluation of the validity of the analyses) aging tagged time
limited assumptions
(e)) the list of changes made since the commissioning of a nuclear installation and
(f) the continued operation of the nuclear program) of the device.
(3) documentation special safety assessment pursuant to § 24 para. 1
must contain the
and the results of the assessment of the significance of radiation) incident to nuclear
the device,
(b)) the results of the conclusions of the report of the occurrence and course of radiation
the emergency and
c) enumeration of remedial measures to prevent the occurrence of a radiological emergency
events of the same category and the expected date of their implementation.
(4) documentation of the special safety assessment pursuant to § 24 para. 2
must contain the
and report on the results of the special) reviews security
the results of the assessment referred to in § 24 para. 2,
(b) a description of the enumeration and measures) according to § 24 para. 2 (a). k) and
(c) the results of the probabilistic safety assessment) in the event that
the measures referred to in section 24 para. 2 (a). to change the way) the use of
nuclear energy.
section 26
Transitional provision
Periodic evaluation of the safety of nuclear installations operated prior to the
the effective date of this Ordinance shall be made within 10 years after the
entry into force of this Decree.
section 27 of the
The effectiveness of the
This Decree shall take effect on the date of 15. June 2017.
Chair:
Ing. Drábová, Ph.d., v. r.
1) Council directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2002. June 2009, which
establishes a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.
Council directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 December. July 2011, which is
establishes a Community framework for responsible and safe handling
spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Council directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 June. July 2014, amending
Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for
nuclear safety of nuclear installations.
