Article 2 applies to the transfer of safe management activities within the territorial administration.

Article 3. This approach refers to the transmission of items such as letters, photographs, prints, etc. to the activities of a particular individual or unit, in accordance with the envelopes, including receipts, subscription, transport, transfer, etc.

This approach refers to units of all or part of the activities carried out in letters, boxes, print materials, etc., including postal enterprises, fast-moving enterprises and other relevant enterprises.

Article IV. Defer security management is governed by the principle of a combination of geospatial management and sub-sector management, adheres to the first, prevention of ownership, integrated governance approaches and mechanisms for corporate responsibility, government regulation, industrial self-regulation and social oversight.

Article 5 Governments of more people at the district level should establish a mechanism for the sound management of deportees within the current administration to study key issues in the management of the management of the transferee and identify the relevant sectors to cooperate with the management of the postal administration.

Article 6 Departments such as public security, national security, customs, transport, safe production supervision, business administration, testing and quarantine are in accordance with their responsibilities and are in accordance with the law to be transferred to security.

Article 7.

Article 8. Devolutions are the subject of a security responsibilities and assume responsibility for the security of the units.

The transferee is a legal representative or the principal holder of the first responsibility for the security of the transferee and has the following duties for the transfer of the unit's security work:

(i) Establish, maintain a system of responsibility for the safe transfer;

(ii) Organizing the development and implementation of the regulations and operational modalities for the distribution of security regulations and the development of a safe and standardized approach to the development of the security of the transport;

(iii) Organizing and implementing a security education and training plan for this unit;

(iv) To ensure the input and effective use of deported security funds;

(v) Accreditation, inspection of the security of a deportation and prompt elimination of the accident;

(vi) Organization of the development and implementation of a pre-emption case for a security accident;

(vii) Defer security accidents in a timely and factual manner.

Article 9. Devolutions should establish a security management body or be assigned to a security manager, as required, and report on the following postal management cases at the provincial level. Deferred enterprise legal representative or key holder, a security manager should have the corresponding security knowledge and management capacity.

Article 10 is a company that engages in a deportation activity by allies and is vested with the security management responsibility of the GNU.

The Allieds involved in the transferee (in the self-governance area, in the immediate municipalities) should establish provincial network security management structures in this province, harmonize management, coordinate the relevant work of the network's devolution security and file with the provincial postal administration.

Article 11. Devolutions shall disclose, in a clear manner, the prohibition of the placement or limitation of the name of the transferee, the collection system, the safe operation schedule, the emergency response requirement and the safety mark.

Article 12 Devolutions should implement a system of inspection, develop a process for receiving inspection and report on the following postal management cases in the local governorate.

In the case of a transferee, it should be noted that the users should, if they complete the transfer details, including the sender, the addressee's location and contact, and the name, type, quantity, weight, etc. of the goods other than letters, be subject to the examination of the matter; that the safe residual items should not be identified, and that the user should be required to provide security certificates in the relevant sectors.

The user refused to complete the transfer details, reject the test or refuse to provide security certificates, and the communes were not sent.

Article 13. Deporting enterprises have found that the user's sending State provides for the prohibition of the transmission of the goods and should be denied.

Deferents should immediately report to the relevant sector and cooperate with the authorities concerned; and, if not forfeiture, destruction, a transferee should be contacted with the user and properly processed.

In the context of the identification of significant hazardous items such as weapons, ammunition, drugs and hazardous chemicals in the context of the transfer, the warder shall report to the following postal management bodies at the provincial level within twenty-four hours.

Article 14. Devolutions should implement the security education training system, organize at least once a year for security training and establish training files.

Sectors such as postal management, public security, national security, safe production monitoring, testing and quarantine should strengthen operational guidance for the training in the safe education of deported enterprises in accordance with their responsibilities.

Article 15. Deporting enterprises shall use technical means to exercise safety control over the receipt, subscription, transport, surrender etc. and to prevent the short, loss, destruction and destruction of the assigned goods during the distribution process.

Monitoring equipment should be operational 24 hours, and control of information is not less than thirty days.

Article 16 deals with the processing centre of the communes and the sub-centres should be equipped with security inspection equipment that meets national standards and possesses a safety inspection facility for the detection function.

Article 17 is sent to the new construction, alteration and expansion of the processing centre and the distribution centre, and its security facilities should be designed in conjunction with the main works, along with construction, parallel production and use. Devolutions should be made available to the following postal management bodies at the provincial level within thirty days of the completion of the inspection.

Article 18 Devolutions should be regulated by the distribution, distribution, transport, surrender, etc., and should result in the destruction of the goods being sent in other dangerous ways.

Article 19 vehicles for transporting a transferee shall be in accordance with the norms and requirements of road transport technologies in both the State and the province, as well as with a single marking of transport. The public security sector and transport management should facilitate access to transport vehicles according to urban traffic conditions.

The vehicle for receipt and surrendering of a transferee shall be closed, indicating the mark of a given enterprise.

Article 20 should take the necessary measures to ensure that the transfer of the goods is safe.

High-level institutions, centralized office spaces, and property management in the residential small area should provide facilities for the receipt of a transferable enterprise, the provision of transportation and the temporary suspension of vehicles.

Article 21 Devolutions should establish emergency response mechanisms, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State, to establish emergency prestige cases, which are revised in due course, in accordance with the changing circumstances.

Devolutions should establish mechanisms for responding to emergencies, organize at least once a year of emergency response and document cases.

Article 2, which causes or may result in a sudden incident or may result in loss of human life, major property, should be reported to the postal administration and the relevant security production supervision, public safety, national security, in accordance with the relevant national, provincial regulations.

Article 23, which causes disruption of services or suspension of business activities for reasons such as sudden emergencies, should be triggered in a timely manner by a pre-emptive business. Devolutions should record and preserve information on the events listed in the previous paragraph. Information and written records are kept for at least one year.

Article 24 engages in devolutions by allies, resulting in a residual, backlog of communication items due to the dispute, and is to be dealt with in a timely consultation process to avoid delays, loss, destruction.

Article 25 Devolutions should establish a list of further details as well as the electronic information archives management system, and take the necessary measures to ensure information security and prevent user information disclosure, damage and loss. Remedies should be taken immediately when or when user information is disclosed, destroyed and lost.

The physical preservation of the mail should meet the period of custody of the archives provided for in the relevant standards. After the expiry of the custody period, the destruction is in accordance with the provisions.

Article 26

(i) To guide and monitor the implementation of safety responsibilities by a transferee enterprise, and to promote business security management within the enterprise;

(ii) Organizing or co-locating security emergencies in other sectors;

(iii) To receive timely complaints, reports of users;

(iv) Technical secrets and operational secrets of the licensed enterprise known in the course of monitoring inspections should be confidential;

(v) Other functions to be performed by law.

Article 27 should strengthen industrial self-regulation, develop industrial safety norms, lead member businesses to increase the level of security management of communes and promote the health development of the communes.

No unit or individual shall be entitled to:

(i) Distinction, concealment, destruction or unlawful seizure, seizure and seizure of other items;

(ii) Disturbate the normal order of the place of production of the devolved enterprises in such a way as perseverances and gressions;

(iii) Illegal interception, strong denunciation and the use of transport vehicles for the shipment of shipment items;

(iv) Theft, instigation and sale of a transferee;

(v) Removal of user information;

(vi) Other effects of a security offence.

Article 29 violates this approach by providing for legal responsibility and applying its provisions; laws, regulations do not provide for the implementation of this approach.

Article 31 of the Postal Administration and its staff are in violation of article 26 in the context of the transfer of security management activities, which is punishable by law by the competent and other direct responsible persons directly responsible; constitutes an offence punishable by law.

Other relevant departments and their staff abuse their functions in the context of a security management exercise, play negligence, favouring private fraud, and are lawfully disposed of; constitute a crime and hold criminal responsibility under the law.

Article 31, in violation of this approach, has been vested in the Trans-Autonomous Region (Autonomous Regions, LL) in the communes who have been dispatched to the provincial network security management in the province, or have not been required, with the provincial postal administration responsible for the period of time being converted; the uncorrected fine of up to three0,000 dollars.

In violation of this approach, a transferee enterprise has one of the following cases, which is being converted by the postal administration to the time limit; the uncorrected period of time, with a fine of more than one million dollars:

(i) The non-existence of entry points, processing centres, distributing centres and sub-centres in a clear manner of prohibiting the placement or limitation of the directory of the assigned goods, the receipt inspection system, the safe operation schedule, emergency response provisions and safety marks;

(ii) Monitoring equipment does not operate 24 hours, or monitoring information is less than thirty days;

(iii) No further details or the corresponding electronic information archives management system was established.

Article 33, in violation of this approach, found a significant hazard prohibition of the transferee in the course of the transfer, where the commune was not reported by the following Postal Administration in the province within twenty-four hours, with a fine of up to 2,000 yen of the Postal Administration.

In violation of this approach, a transferee enterprise has one of the following cases, with a fine of more than three million dollars in the Postal Administration:

(i) Deforestation, sparkation, head pressure or other dangerous ways;

(ii) Resistance of services or suspension of business activities due to, inter alia, sudden-onset emergencies, and the pre-emptive disposal of a deferred enterprise;

(iii) Delays, losses and damage caused by the dispute, the backlog, the failure of allies, the Allieds and the Allieds to consult in a timely manner.

In violation of this approach, no more than one million yen was fined by the Postal Administration for more than one million yen, without the provision for custody or destruction of the assigned details.

In violation of this approach, one of the following acts does not constitute a crime, and the public security authorities are punished by law:

(i) Distinction, concealment, destruction or unlawful seizure, seizure and seizure of other items;

(ii) Disturbate the normal order of the place of production of the devolved enterprises in such a way as perseverances and gressions;

(iii) Illegal interception, strong denunciation and the use of transport vehicles for the shipment of shipment items;

(iv) Theft, instigation and sale of a transferee;

(v) Removal of user information.

Article 37 of this approach is implemented effective 1 May 2015.