Posted the: 2013-05-06 Numac: 2008015115 SERVICE PUBLIC FEDERAL Foreign Affairs, external trade and development COOPERATION 15 July 2008. -Act for consent to the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, adopted at Vienna on 8 July 2005 by the Conference of the States parties to the Convention (1) ALBERT II, King of the Belgians, to all present and future salvation.
The Chambers have adopted and we endorse the following: Article 1. This Act regulates a matter referred to in article 77 of the Constitution.
S. 2. the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, adopted at Vienna on 8 July 2005 by the conference of the States parties to the Convention, will release its full and complete effect.
Promulgate this Act, order that it be under the seal of the State and published by le Moniteur.
Given in Brussels on July 15, 2008.
ALBERT by the King: Foreign Minister K. DE GUCHT the Minister of the Interior, P. DEWAEL the Minister of Justice, J. VANDEURZEN. the Minister of defence, P. DE CREM seen and sealed with the seal of the State: the Minister of Justice, J. VANDEURZEN _ Notes (1) Session 2007-2008.
Documents. -Bill filed February 20, 2008, no. 4 - 570/1. -Report, n ° 4-570/2.
Parliamentary Annals - Discussion, meeting of April 10, 2008, meeting of April 10, 2008.
House of representatives: Documents. -Draft transmitted by the Senate, no. 52-1062/1. -Report, no. 52-1062/2. -Text adopted in plenary meeting and submitted to the Royal assent, no 52-1062/3.
Parliamentary Annals. -Discussion, meeting of May 15, 2008, Vote, meeting of May 15, 2008.
Amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material 1. The title of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, adopted on 26 October 1979 (hereinafter 'the Convention') is replaced by the following title: Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities 2. The preamble of the Convention is replaced by the following text: the States party to this convention, recognizing the right of all States to develop and use the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interest for the benefits that can arise from, convinced of the need to facilitate international cooperation and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful nuclear energy applications Bearing in mind that the physical protection is of vital importance for the protection of the public's health, safety, the environment and national and international security, bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of peace and security international and the promotion of relations of good-neighbourliness and friendship , and cooperation between States, whereas the terms of paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, "members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations, to resort to the threat or use of force, either against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations" , Recalling the Declaration on measures to eliminate international terrorism annexed to resolution 49/60, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1994, eager to dismiss the risks that could arise from illicit traffic, obtain and use illicit nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material and facilities, and noting that the physical protection of such materials and facilities against such acts became a cause for concern increased levels national and international, deeply concerned by the multiplication in the world of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and by the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime, believing that the physical protection plays an important role of support to the objectives of non-proliferation nuclear and counter-terrorism, eager to contribute through this Convention to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear material in the world and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, convinced that offences relating to nuclear material and nuclear facilities are a cause for serious concern and that it is urgent to take appropriate and effective measures, to strengthen the existing measures to ensure the prevention, discovery and punishment of such offences, willing to further strengthen cooperation with a view to , in accordance with the national legislation of each State party and the Convention, effective measures to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, nuclear, convinced that this Convention should complement the use, storage and safe nuclear materials transport and the safe operation of nuclear facilities, recognizing that there are international physical protection recommendations , which are periodically updates and can provide at any time of the guidance on the current to achieve effective physical protection levels, means recognising also that the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for military purposes, under the responsibility of the State possessing such nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and on the understanding that such materials and facilities are and will continue to be the subject of protection rigorous physics ((, Have agreed the following: 3. in article 1 of the Convention, after paragraph c) are added two new paragraphs as follows: d) 'nuclear installation' means an installation (including buildings and related equipment) in which nuclear materials are produced, processed, used, handled, stored or stored permanently, if injury to such a facility or an act that disturbs its operation may result in the release of significant amounts of radiation or of radioactive materials;
(e) "sabotage" means any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, in storage or in transit, which is capable, directly or indirectly, affect the health and safety of staff or of the public or the environment by causing exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances;
4. after the first Article of the Convention is added a new Article 1 read as follows: Article 1 the objectives of this Convention are to establish and maintain worldwide physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, to prevent and combat offences of such materials and facilities around the world , and facilitate cooperation among States parties for this purpose. 5. Article 2 of the Convention is replaced by the following: 1. this Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in use, in storage and during transport and at the nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, provided, however, that the provisions of articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 4 of article 5 of this Convention apply to such nuclear only during international nuclear transport.
2. the development, implementation and maintenance of a system of physical protection in the territory of a State party responsibility entirely to that State.
3. in addition the commitments expressly contracted by States parties under this Convention, nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting the sovereign rights of a State.
4. has) Nothing in this Convention affects the other rights, obligations and responsibilities arising for States parties to international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of Nations United and international humanitarian law.
(b) the activities of armed forces in armed conflict, within the meaning given to those terms by international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law are not governed by this Convention, and the activities carried out by the armed forces of a State in the exercise of their official functions, as they are governed by other rules of international law are not governed by this Convention.
(c) Nothing in this agreement is considered as an authorization lawful use or threaten to use force against material or nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.
(d) Nothing in this Convention does not excuse or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other laws.
5. this Convention does not apply to nuclear material used or preserved for military purposes or in a nuclear facility containing such substances.
6. after the Article 2 of the Convention is added a new Article 2A as follows: Article 2A 1. Each State party develops, implements and maintains an appropriate system for physical protection of materials and nuclear facilities under its
jurisdiction with the objectives: has) to protect nuclear material in use, in storage and during transport against theft and unlawful obtaining by other means;
(b) to ensure the application of rapid and comprehensive action to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing nuclear material or stolen; When materials are situated outside its territory, the State party is in accordance with the provisions of article 5;
(c) to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities against sabotage;
(d) to mitigate or reduce the possible radiological consequences of sabotage.
2. for the implementation of paragraph 1, each State party: a) establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection;
(b) create or designate one or more competent authorities responsible for implementing the framework legislative and regulatory;
(c) take any other appropriate measures necessary to ensure the physical protection of materials and nuclear facilities.
3. for the implementation of the obligations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, each State party, without prejudice to the other provisions of this Convention, applicable insofar as it is reasonable and feasible the fundamental principles of physical protection of materials and nuclear facilities following.
A fundamental principle: Responsibility of the State the responsibility for developing, implementing and maintaining a "system of physical protection in the territory of a State is entirely in that State.
PRINCIPLE fundamental B: Responsibilities during international transport the responsibility of a State to ensure adequate protection of nuclear material extends to the international carriage of latter until she was transferred to another State, as appropriate.
PRINCIPLE fundamental C: Legislative and regulatory framework the State is responsible to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework for physical protection.
This framework should include the relevant physical protection requirements development and setting up a system of evaluation and accreditation or provide for other procedures for the issuance of authorizations. It should also include a system of inspection of nuclear facilities and the transport of nuclear materials, intended to ensure that the relevant requirements and the conditions for approval or other authorization documents are complied with and implement the means to enforce them, including effective sanctions.
PRINCIPLE fundamental: Competent authority the State should establish or designate a competent authority to implement the legislative and regulatory framework and powers, competence and financial and human resources needed to assume the responsibilities that have been entrusted. The State should take measures to ensure there is a real independence between the functions of the national authority competent and those of any other body of the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.
PRINCIPLE fundamental E: Responsibility of holders of amenities the responsibilities of implementation of different components of the system of physical protection in the territory of a State should be clearly defined. The State should ensure that responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of materials or nuclear facilities to holders of relevant approvals or other documents of authorization (e.g. operators or shippers).
PRINCIPLE F: Safety Culture all entities involved in the implementation of physical protection should give priority required the culture of security, its development and its maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation at all levels of each of these entities.
PRINCIPLE fundamental G: Threat physical protection in a State should be based on the current assessment of the threat made by the State.
PRINCIPLE fundamental H: Graded approach physical protection requirements should be established according to a graduated approach that takes account of the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness of the nature of the materials and the consequences that could result from the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and of an act of sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities.
CORE principle I: Defense in depth national requirements for physical protection should be the expression of a concept based on several levels and methods of protection (whether structural or technical personnel or organizational) that must be overcome or circumvented by an attacker to achieve its objectives.
PRINCIPLE fundamental J: A Quality Assurance policy and quality assurance programmes should be established and implemented to ensure compliance with the requirements defined for all important physical protection activities.
PRINCIPLE fundamental K: Contingency Plans contingency plans designed to meet an unauthorized removal of nuclear material or an act of sabotage facilities or nuclear materials or attempted in this sense should be prepared and tested appropriately by all holders of authorisation and the relevant authorities.
PRINCIPLE fundamental L: Confidentiality the State should establish the requirements for confidentiality of information, the unauthorized disclosure could compromise the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials.
4. a) the provisions of this section do not apply to any nuclear material which the State party reasonably decides that she does not have to be subject to the system of physical protection established in accordance with paragraph 1, taking into account its nature, its quantity and its potential and other radiological consequences of attractiveness consequences of any unauthorized act directed against it and the current evaluation of the threat on it.
(b)) a nuclear substance that is not subject to the provisions of this section pursuant to paragraph a) should be protected in accordance with prudent management practices.
7. Article 5 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. States parties shall designate and indicate each other, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency, their correspondents for matters covered by this Convention.
2. in the event of theft, robbery or any other unlawful obtaining nuclear materials, or likely threat of such an Act, States parties provide their cooperation and their help as far as possible, in accordance with their national legislation, for the protection of the said materials recuperationet, state that so requests. Particular: has) a State party shall take the necessary steps to inform as soon as possible other States who seem to be concerned by theft, robbery or other illicit obtaining nuclear materials, or likely threat of such Act, and to inform, as appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations;
(b) in so doing, and as appropriate, the States parties concerned shall exchange information among themselves or with the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations in order to protect nuclear materials threatened to check the integrity of the transport container or recover illicitly removed nuclear materials, and: i) coordinate their efforts through diplomatic channels and by other means provided by mutual agreement;
(ii) shall assist, if the application is made;
(iii) ensure the return of stolen or missing nuclear materials that have been recovered as a result of the aforementioned events.
The modalities of implementation of this cooperation shall be adopted by the States parties concerned.
3. in the case of acts of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility, or likelihood of such an act threat, States parties shall cooperate as far as possible, in accordance with their national legislation as well as the relevant obligations which their obligations under international law, in the following manner: has) If a State party has knowledge of a threat likely to sabotage of materials or nuclear in another State facility , he decided the arrangements to inform as soon as possible the latter and, as appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, to prevent sabotage.
(b) in the case of sabotage of materials or nuclear in a State facility part and if it considers that other States are likely to be affected by an event of radiological nature, without prejudice to the other obligations which its obligations under international law, it takes the necessary steps to inform as soon as possible one or the other States likely to be affected by an event of radiological nature and as appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations relevant to reduce or mitigate the radiological consequences of this Act of sabotage;
If, taking into account paragraphs a) and b), a State party requests assistance, each State party to which a request is addressed shall promptly determine and informed person who requires assistance, directly or through the international agency of atomic energy, if it is able to provide the required assistance, as well as the scope and the conditions of support that may be granted;
(d) the coordination of cooperation activities referred to in subparagraphs (a), b)) and c) is provided through diplomatic channels and by other means provided by mutual agreement. The modalities of implementation of this cooperation are defined by the States parties concerned of bilaterally or multilaterally.
4. States parties shall cooperate and consult, as appropriate, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to obtaining advice on the design, maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material during international transport.
5. a State party may consult with other States parties and cooperate with them, as appropriate, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, to seek their opinion on the design, maintenance and improvement of its national system of physical protection of nuclear material in use, in storage and during transport within the national territory and nuclear facilities.
8. the Article 6 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. States parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information they receive in confidence under the provisions of this Convention from another State party or on the occasion of their participation in an activity carried out in application of this Convention. When States parties communicate confidential information to international organizations or to States that are not parties to this Convention, measures are taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. A State party which has received information in confidence from a another State party disclose this information to third parties only with the consent of that other State party.
2. States parties are not bound by this Convention to provide information that their national legislation does not communicate or that would compromise their national security or the physical protection of materials or nuclear facilities.
9. paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. intentionally committing any of the following acts: a) concealment, detention, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material without the permission required, and resulting or which may result in death or serious injury to others or damage to property or the environment;
(b) the theft or robbery of nuclear material;
(c) the hijacking or any other misappropriation of nuclear material;
(d) an act of transport, send, or move nuclear materials to or from a State without the required permission;
(e) an act directed against a nuclear facility, or an act disrupting the operation of a nuclear facility, through which the author intentionally causes or knows that it can cause the death or serious bodily injury to another person or substantial damage to property or the environment as a result of exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances, unless this Act is undertaken in accordance with the national law of the State party on whose territory the nuclear installation is located;
(f) the fact to require nuclear material by threat, the use of force or any other form of intimidation;
((g) threat: i) to use nuclear material for the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury to another person or substantial damage to property or the environment or the offence described in subparagraph (e)); or ii) to commit an offence described in paragraphs b) and e) order to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or abstain from doing an act.
(h) attempt to commit an offence described in paragraphs a) to (e));
(i) participate in any of the offences described in paragraphs has) to h);
(j) the fact for a person to organize the commission of an offence referred to in paragraph a) to h) or to order others to commit;
(k) an act which contributes to the commission of an offence described in paragraphs a) to h) by a group of persons acting in concert. Such an act is intentional and: i) is intended to facilitate criminal activity or to serve the criminal group purpose, when this activity or purpose involve the commission of an offence referred to in paragraphs) to g);
((ii) either is done knowing that the Group intends to commit an offence referred to in paragraph a)-g);
is considered by each State party as a punishable offence under its national law.
10. after article 11 of the Convention are added two new articles, article 11 and article 11 B read: Article 11 for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance between States parties, none of the offences referred to in article 7 is considered as a political or related to a political offence, offence or inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may be refused for the sole reason that it concerns a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.
Article 11 (b) no provision of this Convention shall be construed as implying an obligation of extradition or mutual legal assistance if the requested State party has reasonable grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 7 or the request for mutual assistance concerning such offences was presented for the purpose of continuing or punishing a person for reasons of race religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions, or that this request would be detrimental to the situation of that person for any of these considerations.
11 after the Article 13 of the Convention is added a new article 13 read as follows: Article 13 nothing in this Convention affects the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is undertaken to strengthen the physical protection of materials and nuclear facilities.
12. paragraph 3 of article 14 of the Convention is replaced by the following: 3. when an offence concerning materials nuclear in use, in storage or during transport within the national territory and that both the alleged perpetrator of the offence involved nuclear materials remain in the territory of the State party where the offence , or where an offence involves a nuclear facility and the alleged perpetrator of the offence remains on the territory of the State party where the offence, nothing in this agreement is interpreted as implying for that State party to provide information on criminal proceedings relating to the offence.
13. article 16 of the Convention is replaced by the following: 1. the depositary shall convene a conference of States parties five years after the entry into force of the amendment adopted on 8 July 2005 to review the implementation of this Convention and its assessment with respect to the preamble, the whole of the device and annexes taking into account the situation existing at this time there.
2. Subsequently, at intervals of at least five years, the majority of States parties can obtain the convening of further conferences with the same objective, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary.
((14 note b) of annex II of the Convention is replaced by the following text: b) material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor giving a level of radiation equal or less to 1 gray/hour (100 rads/hour) at 1 meter distance without a screen.
((15. footnote e) of the annex II of the Convention is replaced by the following: e) other fuels that under their original fissile content are classified in category I or category II before irradiation may be categorized as directly below if the level of radiation from the fuel exceeds 1 gray/hour (100 rads/hour) at 1 meter distance without a screen.
Declaration referring to article 2A of the Protocol of amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of nuclear material, the Kingdom of Belgium declares that it interprets the fundamental principles of physical protection of materials and nuclear facilities covered by article 2A § 3 as guidelines that the State party should apply when it performs the obligations of §§ 1 and 2 of article 2 (A).
As a result, the Kingdom of Belgium considers that the fundamental principles of physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials is not, in itself, legal obligations.
Amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, adopted at Vienna on 8 July 2005 by the Conference of the States parties to the Convention.
States/OrganisationsDate authentificationType of consentementDate Consentemententree local force Algeria 2007-04-Ratification25 Germany Ratification21/10/2010 ANTIGUA 2009-12-Ratification17 Saudi Arabia Acceptation21/01/2011 Argentina 11-Ratification15-2011 Australia 2008-07-Ratification17 Austria Ratification18/09/2006 Bahrain Acceptation09/06/2010 Belgium Ratification22/01/2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina Ratification21/06/2010 Bulgaria Ratification17/03/2006 Chile 2009-03-Acceptation12 China (REP. 2009-09-Ratification14 popular), Croatia Approbation11/09/2006 Denmark Approbation19/05/2010 UAE 2009-07-Acceptation31 Spain Acceptation09/11/2007 Estonia 2009-02-Ratification24 Fiji 2008-06-Approbation22 Finland Acceptation17/06/2011 FRANCE Approbation01/02/2013 GABON 2008-03-Acceptation20 GHANA Ratification12/12/2012 Greece Ratification13/12/2011 Georgia Acceptation05/04/2012 Hungary 2008-12-Ratification04 India 2007-09-Ratification19 Indonesia Ratification27/05/2010 ISRA "L Ratification16/03/2012 Jordan 2009-10-Acceptation07 KAZAKHSTAN 2011-04-Ratification26 KENYA
Acceptation01/08/2007 LESOTHO acceptance18/09/2012 Latvia Acceptation23/11/2010 Libya Ratification19/07/2006 LIECHTENSTEIN Ratification19/10/2009 Lithuania 2009-05-Ratification19 LUXEMBOURG Ratification24/02/2012 Macedonia (EX - REP. Yugoslav's) 2011-11-Ratification25 MALI Acceptation27/01/2010 Mauritania 2008-02-Ratification28 Mexico Ratification01/08/2012 Moldova 2008-12-Ratification22 NAURU Approbation14/06/2010 NIGER 2009-05-Ratification28 NIGERIA Ratification04/05/2007 Norway 2009-08-Approbation20 Netherlands Acceptation17/04/2011 Poland 2007-06-Ratification01 PORTUGAL Ratification26/11/2010 Romania 2007-02-Ratification06 UK Ratification08/04/2010 Russia 2008-09-Acceptation19 Saint Lucia Acceptation08/11/2012 SEYCHELLES Acceptation09/01/2006 Slovenia 2009-09-Acceptation01 Sweden Ratification23/03/2012 Switzerland Ratification15. 10/2008 CZECH REP.
2010-12-Acceptation30 Tunisia Acceptation07/06/2010 TURKMENISTAN Acceptation22/09/2005 UKRAINE 2008-12-Ratification24 VIETNAM Ratification3/11/2012