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RS 732.11 Nuclear Energy (OENu) Order of 10 December 2004

Original Language Title: RS 732.11 Ordonnance du 10 décembre 2004 sur l’énergie nucléaire (OENu)

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732.11

Nuclear Energy Ordinance

(OENu)

10 December 2004 (State 1 Er May 2012)

The Swiss Federal Council,

See art. 101, para. 1, of the Act of 21 March 2003 on nuclear energy (LENu) 1 ,

Stops:

Chapter 1 General provisions

Art. 1 1 Nuclear Material

1 The following are considered nuclear materials:

A.
The following raw materials:
1.
Natural uranium, that is, uranium containing the mixture of isotopes in nature,
2.
Depleted uranium, which is uranium with a uranium content of 235 less than that of natural uranium,
3.
Thorium,
4.
The materials referred to in c. 1 to 3, in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compounds or concentrates; any other material containing one or more of the above substances at concentrations defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency;
B.
The following special fissile materials:
1.
Plutonium 239,
2.
Uranium 233,
3.
Uranium 235,
4.
Enriched uranium, that is, the proportion of uranium 235 or uranium 233 or these two isotopes is higher than in natural uranium,
5.
The materials referred to in c. 1 to 4, in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compounds or concentrates; any other material containing one or more of the above substances at concentrations defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2 Not considered nuclear material:

A.
Uranium and thorium ores;
B.
Raw materials and products derived from raw materials that are not used for nuclear fission energy production, in particular armour, sensors in measuring instruments, ceramic alloys and other alloys;
C.
Special fissile materials up to a weight of 15 g and products derived from special fissile materials that are not used for nuclear fission energy production, in particular sensors in measuring instruments and other products That only an excessive technical and economic effort would be able to extract special fissile materials.

1 New content according to the c. II 2 of Annex 6 to the O of 21 March 2012 on the application of guarantees, in force since 1 Er May 2012 ( RO 2012 1703 ).

Art. 2 Nuclear Facilities

1 The facilities in which the following nuclear material is extracted, produced, processed or stored are not deemed to be nuclear facilities:

A.
Substances for which the content of natural uranium, depleted uranium or thorium does not exceed 1000 kg;
B.
Raw materials for which it is proved that due to their physico-chemical state and the operating conditions to which they are subjected, the establishment of a self-sustaining chain reaction is not possible;
C.
Special fissile materials for which the plutonium 239, uranium 233 or uranium 235 content does not exceed 150 g.

2 The Federal Office of Energy (Office) determines the raw materials that meet the conditions set out in para. 1, let. B.

Art. 3 Brokerage

The activities defined in art are not considered to be brokering. 3, let. K, LENu when the nuclear items concerned serve the specific needs of Switzerland.

Art. 4 Definitions

Definitions of the other terms used in this order are found in Appendix 1.

Art. 5 Sector Plan for Deep Geologic Layers

The Confederation fixed, in a binding sectoral plan for the authorities, the objectives and conditions for the storage of radioactive waste in deep geological deposits.

Art. 6 1 Monitoring Authorities

The supervisory authorities are:

A.
The Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (IFSN) for nuclear safety and security,
B.
The Office for other areas relevant to the implementation of the LEnu.

1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Chapter 2 Principles of Nuclear Safety and Security

Art. 7 Nuclear safety requirements

The following steps must be taken to ensure nuclear safety:

A.
For the design, construction, commissioning and operation of a nuclear facility, processes, materials, techniques and types of organization that have been satisfied or demonstrated to be of high quality; and Applies in particular to the development of the project, manufacture, verification, operation, monitoring, maintenance, quality assurance, feedback, ergonomics, training and development;
B.
If the operation deviates from the norm, the installation must react with behaviour as much as possible self-regulating, not sensitive to the error; to this effect, one will have to choose as much as possible a behaviour characterised by safety Inherently means a state in which a technical system functions safely on its own, that is, without the need for ancillary systems;
C.
In order to be able to control malfunctions, the installation should be designed to ensure that no release of radioactive substances occurs in the vicinity; passive and active safety systems will have to be provided for this purpose;
D.
In preparation for malfunctions that may release radioactive substances in hazardous quantities, preventive measures and measures to mitigate them should also be taken at the technical, organisational and administrative levels. Adverse effects.
Art. 8 Requirements for failure protection

1 In nuclear installations, measures should be taken to protect against failures originating both inside and outside the nuclear facility.

2 Deficiation failure, loss of coolant, loss of heat sink, fire, flooding, mechanical effects of the system shall be deemed to have originated within the facility. Failure of a component, deterioration of a sheath during the handling of a fuel element, failure of an operating system, improper reaction of a safety system or incorrect operation and errors Committed by staff.

3 Deficiation caused by an earthquake caused by an earthquake, by a flood, by the accidental fall of a civilian or military aircraft on the installation, by an accident shall be deemed to have originated outside the facility. Wind gusting, lightning, shock wave, fire, loss of external power supply and obstruction or interruption of external cooling water supply.

4 In designing a nuclear facility in accordance with s. 7, let. C, the deficiencies referred to in paras. 2 and 3 depending on the frequency specified in s. 94 of the Radiation Protection Order of 22 June 1994 (ORaP) 1 Assumptions should include an isolated error that will be added to the triggering event. The limits of the doses referred to in s. 94, para. 2 to 5, ORaP can be met.

5 A probabilistic analysis will have to show that the criterion set out in s. 24, para. 1, let. B, may be respected. Preventive measures or measures to mitigate the adverse effects referred to in s. 7, let. D, may then be taken into account.

6 The Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication sets out in an order specific risk assumptions and evaluation criteria.


Art. Safety Requirements

1 The protection of nuclear installations and materials against acts of sabotage, acts of violence or theft must be based on a deep-scale defence system consisting of measures of an architectural and technical nature, Organizational, personal and administrative.

2 The principles applying to safety zones and barriers and the protection of nuclear power stations, nuclear materials and radioactive waste are set out in Annex 2.

3 The department shall lay down in an order the principles applying to risk assumptions and security measures of an architectural, technical, organisational and administrative nature.

Art. 10 Principles governing the design of a nuclear power plant

1 The following principles, in particular, apply to nuclear power plants:

A.
The security functions must react even if an isolated error occurs regardless of the triggering event, and even if a component is not available for maintenance purposes; is deemed to be an isolated error Inadvertent component that prevents it from exercising its security function; errors resulting from this inadvertent failure are considered to be part of the isolated error;
B.
Security functions must as far as possible meet the principles of redundancy and diversity; redundancy is the presence of more functional equipment than is required to perform the intended security function; Diversity is the use of different physical or technical principles;
C.
Redundant circuits intended to fulfil a safety function must as far as possible operate independently of each other, and this both in the mechanical systems and in support systems such as control-control or Energy supply, cooling and ventilation;
D.
Redundant circuits intended to perform a safety function shall as far as possible be separated from each other in space;
E.
Redundant circuits intended to perform a safety function shall as far as possible be able to be verified in full or in default, by segments as large as possible, both by manual triggering and by means of incitement Simulated automatic transmission, including under emergency power supply;
F.
The security functions must be automated so that in the event of a failure within the meaning of s. 8, personnel are not required to intervene to ensure security within 30 minutes of the triggering event;
G.
By dimensioning systems and components, adequate safety margins must be provided;
H.
To ensure that the system's behaviour is focused on safety in the event of equipment malfunctions;
I.
Between passive and active security functions, the former should be preferred;
J.
Human capabilities and limitations must be taken into account when designing and developing the work places and the conduct of the operation and maintenance of the facility;
K.
For equal gain in terms of security, the measures referred to in s. 7, let. D, which are specific to prevent malfunctions from those that would mitigate their consequences.

2 The IFSN is responsible for regulating the design principles in guidelines that are specific to light-water reactors. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 11 Principles governing the design of a deep geologic repository

1 The site of a deep geologic deposition must have the following characteristics to ensure long-term security:

A.
A sufficient extent of suitable host rock;
B.
Favourable hydrogeological conditions;
C.
Long-term geological stability.

2 A deep geologic deposition must be designed to:

A.
The principles set out in s. 10, para. 1, be respected by analogy;
B.
Long-term safety is ensured by means of successive passive barriers;
C.
That the arrangements made to facilitate the monitoring and repair of the deposit or to recover the waste do not affect the passive safety barriers after the closure of the deposit;
D.
That the deposit can be closed within a few years.

3 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in guidelines the principles of design design that are specific to deep geological deposits. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 12 Principles governing the design of other nuclear facilities

1 Art. 10, para. 1, is applicable by analogy to the dimensioning of nuclear installations other than nuclear power plants and deep geological deposits.

2 In addition, a radioactive waste warehouse must be designed to:

A.
Not to impair the final storage capacity of waste packages;
B.
To provide sufficient capacity to cover foreseeable needs.

3 The IFSN is responsible for addressing the principles of design and design that are specific to certain types of nuclear facilities, as required. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Chapter 3 Nuclear Articles

Art. 13 Jurisdiction

The Office is competent to grant:

A.
Authorizations to handle nuclear material;
B.
The approval of the Convention for the resumption of radioactive waste or used fuel elements, as referred to in Art. 9, let. D, LENu.
Art. 14 Authorization to Export and Brokerage Technologies

1 An authorization is required for the export and brokering of nuclear material technologies.

2 The Office grants these authorizations.

Art. 15 Application for Authorization; Attachments

1 The request for authorization to transport, import, export or transit nuclear material must be made jointly by the consignor, consignee, carrier and organizer of the transport.

2 The documents to be attached must provide all the information necessary for the assessment of the application, in particular:

A.
The composition and properties of nuclear materials;
B.
Technical details of equipment;
C.
The place of production;
D.
The place of destination and the name of the recipient;
E.
Intended use;
F.
Terms of purchase or sale;
G.
Transport, including proof of compliance with the requirements for the transport of dangerous goods.

3 The request for authorization to commission nuclear materials to export or obtain technology related to nuclear materials must provide:

A.
For nuclear material, including indications on:
1.
The composition of materials,
2.
Their quantity,
3.
The place of departure and the place of destination or, if the applicant does not know them at the time of application, the place of execution;
B.
For technology: the indications mentioned in para. 2 let. C to f, by analogy, as well as the form and content of the technology concerned.

4 At the request of the Office, the holder of a nuclear brokering authorization shall submit a periodic report to the Office on:

A.
The composition of materials;
B.
Their quantity;
C.
The place of departure and the place of destination or, if the applicant does not know them at the time of application, the place of execution;
D.
The mode of execution of the initial transaction and its date;
E.
The parties to the contract.

5 The Office may require additional parts as required.

Art. 16 Pre-Survey

1 At the request of the applicant, the Office shall first examine whether it may grant an authorization under this Chapter and, if so, under what conditions.

2 The prior investigation is not eligible for authorization.

3 If an authorization is sought, the Office will not review the conditions set out by it and referred to in para. 1 only if the actual or legal conditions have changed since the previous investigation or if new facts have arisen.

Art. 17 1 Diplomatic or consular representations, international organizations, customs warehouses, customs depots and customs enclaves

Shipments from or to destination shall be assimilated to imports or exports:

A.
Diplomatic or consular representations;
B.
International organizations;
C.
Open customs warehouses, warehouses of consumer goods, customs free deposits or customs enclaves.

1 New content according to the c. 31 of Schedule 4 to the O of 1 Er Nov. 2006 on customs, in force since 1 Er May 2007 ( RO 2007 1469 ).

Art. 18 Duration of validity of authorization

The authorisation shall be valid for no more than twelve months and may be extended for a further period of six months.

Art. 19 Request to export with a fundamental scope

1 If a request for export is of a fundamental nature, in particular political, the Office shall decide, after obtaining the agreement of the relevant departments of the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, of the Federal Department of Economics, of the Department Federal defence, protection of the population and sports, and after consultation with the Federal Intelligence Service. 1

2 In the absence of unanimity, the Federal Council decides on a proposal from the Department.


1 New content according to the c. II 21 of Annex 4 to the O of 4 Dec. 2009 on the Federal Intelligence Service, in force since 1 Er Jan 2010 ( RO 2009 6937 ).

Art. Retention of Parts

All documents which have issued the authorisation must be kept for five years from the date of issue of the authorisation and must be submitted to the competent authorities upon request.

Art. Notify Notification

1 The holder of an authorisation shall announce to the IFSN, in particular, the following events and findings relating to the safety of the transport of nuclear materials: 1

A.
Exceeding limit values for doses, radioactivity or contamination;
B.
Technical defects in transport containers subject to approval;
C.
Other events and findings that adversely affect or affect security.

2 It shall immediately announce the following events and findings in respect of security: 2

A.
Acts of sabotage and sabotage attempts;
B.
Threats of bombing;
C.
Threats of blackmail and hostage taking (s);
D.
Malfunctions, damage and failures of facilities and security systems that extend beyond 24 hours;
E.
Other events and findings that affect or may affect the security of the security.

3 It must provide a report to the IFSN on each event or observation. The reports to the NSN must meet the requirements of Annex 6. Safety reports must be submitted within 30 days and classified. 3


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
3 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Chapter 4 Nuclear installations

Section 1 General authorization

Art. Low-risk nuclear facilities

1 A blanket authorization is not required for a nuclear facility if the frequency of failures referred to in s. 8, para. 2 and 3, which results in a dose of more than 1 mSv for persons not exposed to radiation in the course of their profession, does not exceed 10 -6 In addition, in a warehouse or in a deep geological deposit, the sum of the activities of the nuclides to be stored shall not exceed 10 13 LE within the meaning of Annex 3, column 9, ORaP 1 .

2 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in guidelines the method and standards of failure analysis required by para. 1. 2


1 RS 814.501
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. General Authorization Request

A person who requires a blanket authorization must provide the following:

A.
Safety and security reports, which include:
1.
Site characteristics,
2.
The purpose of the project and its broad lines,
3.
Exposure to predictable radiation around the facility,
4.
Important personal and organizational data,
5.
In addition, for deep geological deposition, long-term security;
B.
The environmental impact report;
C.
The report on concordance with land use planning;
D.
The concept of decommissioning or closing observation phase;
E.
Proof of disposal of radioactive waste generated by the facility.

Section 2 Authorisation to build and carry out the project

Art. 24 Building Authorization Request

1 Anyone requiring a building authorization must demonstrate:

A.
The principles set out in s. 7 to 12 can be respected;
B.
In addition, for the construction of a new nuclear power plant, the average frequency of damage to the heart in the event of failure within the meaning of s. 8 does not exceed 10 -5 Per year;
C.
And for low-risk nuclear facilities, that the requirements referred to in s. 22 are completed.

2 To this end, it must provide the following parts:

A.
Documents to obtain the authority to construct referred to in Schedule 4;
B.
The environmental impact report;
C.
The report on concordance with land use planning;
D.
The quality management program for the project development and implementation phases;
E.
The concept of emergency protection;
F.
The decommissioning plan or the proposed observation phase and closure plan;
G.
The project's compliance report with the general authorization.

3 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in directives the type, content, presentation and number of parts to be provided. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 25 Quality Management Program

1 In the quality management program referred to in s. 24, para. 2, let. D, the applicant must describe the organization and the diversion of the project, including the mechanisms of its collaboration with the agent companies and with the authorities granting the authorization and supervision.

2 The quality management programme must correspond to the state of the nuclear safety and security technology.

3 The applicant must periodically review by external services that the quality management program complies with the industry standards of the moment and adapt it if necessary.

4 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in detail the details of the requirements to be met by the quality management program. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 26 Enforcement Permits

1 With respect to the structures and components of the facility that the authority to construct declares to be subject to the granting of a performance permit, the IFSN grants licences to: 1

A.
The construction of the construction elements, including fasteners embedded in the concrete, the reinforcement or mounting of elements of the metal frame and the method of intervention in the large work and subsequent fixation;
B.
Manufacturing of major mechanical components;
C.
The assembly of mechanical and electrical systems, including their control-control, and the safety equipment.

2 To obtain the enforcement permit, the applicant must provide the documents necessary for the assessment of the application in accordance with Annex 4.

3 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in directives the type, content, presentation and number of parts to be provided. 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 27 Construction Folder

1 The holder of the authorisation shall record all acts relating to the construction of the buildings, as well as the manufacture and assembly of the technical equipment, as well as the checks and examinations carried out, in order to Ensure traceability.

2 It must keep the file in a safe place until the end of the decommissioning, until the closure or until the end of the monitoring period.

3 Changes to the facility, including decommissioning and closure, must be recorded in the file.

4 The holder of the authorisation must submit the dossier to the IFSN, after the decommissioning and to the department after the closure or after the period of supervision. 1

5 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in directives the requirements to be met by the construction file and its conservation. 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Section 3 Authority to operate

Art. 28 Application for Authorization to Operate

1 A person who requires an authorization to operate must provide the following:

A.
The corresponding technical and organisational documents, in accordance with Annex 3;
B.
The documents required for the authorization to operate in accordance with Schedule 4;
C.
Proof of insurance coverage;
D.
The report establishing the compliance of the facility with the general authorization and with the authority to construct.

2 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in directives the type, content, presentation and number of parts to be provided. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Enforcement Permits

1 The authority to operate must apply for a specific enforcement permit for the following stages of commissioning:

A.
The first nuclear fuel storage;
B.
The first loading of fuel into the reactor;
C.
The first criticality;
D.
Other stages of the commissioning program;
E.
Continuous operation in the first operating cycle;
F.
The first storage of waste packages of a given type;
G.
Storage of containers of spent fuel elements or of highly radioactive waste.

2 In order to obtain the enforcement permit, the applicant must provide the necessary parts for the assessment of the application in accordance with Annex 4.

3 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in directives the type, content, presentation and number of parts to be provided. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Organization Requirements

1 The organisation of the operation of the nuclear facility must be designed to assume at least responsibility for the following activities and sectors:

A.
The operation of the facility in all operational states;
B.
Maintenance, materials technology and verification, technical support;
C.
The design and monitoring of the reactor core;
D.
Radiation protection and radioactive waste;
E.
The chemistry of water and the use of chemical additives;
F.
Preparation of and implementation of contingency plans;
G.
Nuclear safety monitoring and evaluation;
H.
Security;
I.
Assurance of the quality of benefits provided by agents;
J.
Staff training and development;
K.
Strengthening a security-friendly attitude.

2 The authorisation holder must apportion the staff between a number of organisational units which will not be too high, each headed by a leader. Any framework must have a designated replacement.

3 It must set up a body that will analyse the events and findings of the human factors, propose measures and monitor its implementation.

4 It shall designate, in order to ensure the technical operation of the nuclear facility, a position that it will have the necessary skills and resources and that it will assume responsibility for the decisions taken to ensure safety and security.

5 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in detail the details of the requirements to be met by the organization. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Operational Quality Management System

In particular, the operating quality management system must meet the following requirements:

A.
Responsibilities and competencies related to the organization's processes must be clearly and concisely defined;
B.
The security and safety tasks require a management cycle; they must be systematically planned, accomplished, monitored, documented, and periodically checked by internal services and External and adapted;
C.
The system must correspond to the state of the nuclear safety and security technology.

Section 4 Operations

Art. 32 Maintenance

1 The holder of the authorization shall develop systematic maintenance programmes for safety and security equipment and carry out the planned measures, in particular:

A.
Maintenance;
B.
Recurring non-destructive reviews;
C.
Recurring operating tests.

2 In the event of a deviation from the intended state, it shall perform the restoration work.

3 Maintenance must be carried out by qualified personnel who will use the appropriate processes and equipment.

4 The authorization holder must record the maintenance results and evaluate them on a regular basis. If necessary, it must complement the programs.

Art. 33 Systematic assessment of safety and security

1 The holder of the authorisation shall establish systematic assessments:

A.
The safety consequences of the installation and, in particular, the risk involved, any modification of the installation, any events that have occurred or any findings made; the assessment of the risk will, in particular, support an analysis The probabilistic security (APS) that will be recent and specific to the plant;
B.
Feedback on electrical and mechanical equipment, fuel elements, safety building, and water chemistry;
C.
Radiation protection and radioactive waste;
D.
Organization and staff;
E.
Emergency planning;
F.
The criteria set out in s. 44, para. 1.

2 It must establish systematic assessments:

A.
The concept of security;
B.
Security measures.

3 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in directives the requirements to be met by systematic assessments of safety and security. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 34 Comprehensive review of the safety of nuclear power plants

1 The holder of an authorization to operate a nuclear power plant must conduct a comprehensive security review (Periodic Security Review, RPS) every ten years.

2 To this end, it must set out and evaluate:

A.
The safety plan;
B.
The operation and behaviour of the facility;
C.
Deterministic security analysis;
D.
Probabilistic security analysis;
E.
The overall assessment of the security level;
F.
Organization and staff.

3 The NSTP is responsible for regulating in detail the requirements to be met by the SDN. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 35 Monitoring of Aging

1 The holder of the authorisation shall ensure, by means of the appropriate programme, the systematic monitoring of the ageing of all equipment and constructions whose function and integrity rely on safety and security.

2 It must analyse the results obtained, deduce the measures to be taken and take them.

3 It must, always with the appropriate program, record the results of the monitoring of the aging of the facility and periodically update this program, depending on the status of the facility.

4 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in guidelines the methods of monitoring aging and how far this surveillance should go. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 36 State of science and technology and return of experience of comparable installations

1 The holder of the authorisation shall monitor the development of science in his field, in particular the results of the research, and examine the extent to which it can draw lessons for the safety of the facility.

2 It must follow the development of the technique, including the organization and personnel, and seek lessons learned for the safety and security of the facility. In particular, they will:

A.
Recognized technical standards in Switzerland and abroad;
B.
The normative systems of nuclear energy adopted by the supplier country of the nuclear facility and by other countries;
C.
Recommendations from international organizations;
D.
The state of the art in comparable nuclear installations and in other significant technical installations.

3 It must follow the experience of comparable installations and evaluate the consequences for the installation.

Art. Periodic reports

1 The holder of the authorization shall submit to the NSN reports evaluating the condition and operation of the facility in accordance with Annex 5. 1

2 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in directives the type, content, presentation and number of reports to be submitted. 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 38 1 Duty to notify in the security domain

1 The holder of an authorisation to operate must notify the IFSN, before carrying out them, in particular the following activities:

A.
Programmed shutdown of the reactor;
B.
Restarting the reactor after a failure due to failure;
C.
Work involving a probable collective dose greater than 50 mSv;
D.
Radioactive releases to the programmed but unusual environment;
E.
The renewal of activated carbon in aeration emergency filters;
F.
Planning and carrying out emergency drills;
G.
Tests performed on systems or components that rely on safety.

2 It is expected to announce the following activities to IFSN:

A.
Any modification of the facility that does not require authorization or licence to execute;
B.
Any change in the content of the files referred to in s. 27 and 41.

3 It is expected to announce the following events and findings to the NSN:

A.
Events that compromise or may compromise safety;
B.
Other public interest events;
C.
Findings that could compromise security but did not provoke an event.

4 Reports required by Schedule 6 on any events or findings must be reported to the IFSN.

5 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in directives the procedure to be followed by the holder in order to carry out the notifications referred to in paras. 1 and 2, and to classify the events and findings referred to in para. 3.


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 39 1 Duty to notify in the field of security

1 The holder of an authorisation to operate must notify the IFSN before carrying out in particular the following activities:

A.
Any modification of the buildings or the facility or any new construction for which an enforcement permit is being requested from the IFSN;
B.
Any exercise involving military, cantonal or communal bodies;
C.
Any extraordinary security activities.

2 It shall immediately announce the following events and findings to the IFSN:

A.
Acts of violence against staff;
B.
Acts of sabotage and sabotage attempts;
C.
Threats of bombing;
D.
Threats of blackmail and takeovers;
E.
Malfunctions, damage and failures of equipment and security systems that extend beyond 24 hours;
F.
Other events in or around the nuclear facility that are attributable to or indicative of unlawful acts;
G.
Other events and findings that affect or may affect the security of the security.

3 It must provide a report to the IFSN within 30 days of any events or findings. This report must be classified.


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 40 Amendments Requiring a Enforcement Permit

1 Generally considered as amendments are not significantly different from an authorization but require a performance permit within the meaning of s. 65, para. 3, LENu, in particular:

A.
Modifications to buildings that are classified as important to the safety or security, to the components of the nuclear facility, to the systems and equipment that are classified as such, as well as the modifications to the facilities that Rely on safety or security, if the project maintains or improves their current security or safety functions;
B.
The following modifications to the reactor core:
1.
The modification of the loading of the heart with combustible elements in the context of the renewal of these elements,
2.
Modification and repair work of the fuel elements and control rods,
3.
An increase in the allowable burn rate,
4.
Modification of the justification methods,
5.
Modification of certain safety criteria,
6.
The increase in the proportion of combustible elements to mixed uranium-plutonium in the reactor core up to a maximum of 50 %;
C.
Modification of the content of the following documents:
1.
The regulation of the plant resp. Operating regulations,
2.
The regulation for emergencies,
3.
The Radiation Protection Regulations,
4
The tech spec
5.
Requirements and directives in the field of security.

2 To obtain a licence to carry out the amendments referred to in s. 1, let. A and b, the applicant shall submit the documents necessary for the assessment of the request in accordance with Annex 4.

3 To obtain a licence to carry out the amendments referred to in s. 1, let. C, the applicant must present the documents necessary for the assessment of the application and justify the requested amendment.

4 If the applicant requests an amendment to the technical specifications, the applicant must also set out the method and technical criteria to which he has referred in order to assess the effect that this amendment will have on the safety of the installation.

5 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in directives the type, content, presentation and number of parts to be provided. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Documents

1 The holder of the authorisation shall maintain, for the duration of the operation of the nuclear facility and up to the end of the decommissioning or closure, the relevant technical and organisational documents, In accordance with Annex 3, and shall continuously adapt them to the state of the installation.

2 It shall ensure the traceability of the operation by means of the operating surveys referred to in Annex 3 and the proof of the operating tests and maintenance work.

3 It must keep the records in a safe place until the end of the decommissioning, until the closure or until the end of the monitoring period.

4 Once the decommissioning is complete, the documentation must be returned to IFSN; after the closure or after the monitoring period has been completed, it must be returned to the department. 1

5 The IFSN is responsible for setting out in directives the details of the requirements for documents and their preservation. 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Update the decommissioning plan or closure project

1 The holder of an authorisation to operate shall verify and update every ten years the decommissioning plan for the nuclear facility or, for a deposit in deep geological layers, the project of the observation phase and the plan of Closing.

2 An update is also required:

A.
Significant changes have been made to the facility;
B.
If significant changes have been made to the decommissioning or observation phase and closure requirements;
C.
If a significant evolution of the technique requires it.
Art. 43 Stopping a Nuclear Power Plant

1 The holder of an authorisation to operate a nuclear power plant shall stop the installation when one of the stopping criteria laid down in the technical specification or in the regulation of the plant is fulfilled.

2 It is only permitted to refit it at a reactor power of more than 5 % after taking the necessary measures.

Art. 44 Criteria for the temporary decommissioning and reequipment of a nuclear reactor

1 The holder of an authorization to operate shall stop the nuclear reactor and reequipment when one or more of the following technical criteria are met:

A.
Events or findings indicate that the cooling of the reactor core after a failure under s. 8 is no longer insured;
B.
Events or findings indicate that the integrity of the primary circuit is no longer assured;
C.
Events or findings indicate that the integrity of containment is no longer assured.

2 The department sets in an ordinance the method and standards for verification of these criteria.

Section 5 Decommissionation

Art. 45 Project Folder

Any person who is responsible for the decommissioning of a nuclear facility shall provide the following documents concerning the decommissioning project:

A.
The comparative presentation of possible variants, with the phases and timing of the decommissioning work and the foreseeable end state, indicating the reasons for the chosen solution;
B.
The presentation of the successive stages of the work and the means necessary for this purpose, in particular the seizure of the radiological state of the installation, dismantling, cutting and decontamination of equipment, decontamination and demolition Buildings;
C.
The process to separate radioactive waste from those that are not and the evacuation of the former;
D.
Measures to ensure radiation protection for staff and to prevent the release of radioactive substances into the environment;
E.
Security measures;
F.
Failure considerations, including identification of possible malfunctions during decommissioning, assessment of the frequency and radiological consequences of such failures, and countermeasures and Potential emergency protection measures to be taken;
G.
The proof of staff commitment in sufficient numbers and with the professional qualifications required to carry out and supervise the decommissioning work, as well as the proof of the appropriate organisation, with a clear Assignment of skills;
H.
The quality management program;
I.
The environmental impact report;
J.
A complete list of costs attributable to decommissioning, including those for the disposal of radioactive and non-radioactive waste, as well as proof of the existence of the financial means.
Art. Decision

The fixed decision in particular:

A.
The extent of the decommissioning work;
B.
Each phase of the operation, including the duration of a possible safety containment of the nuclear facility;
C.
The limits of the release of radioactive substances into the environment;
D.
Monitoring of the immissions of radioactive substances and direct radiation;
E.
The organization of the decommissioning.
Art. Enforcement Permits

The decision referred to in s. 46 rules the requirement to obtain a performance permit for each of the following activities:

A.
The process used for the measurement of material release;
B.
Packaging of radioactive waste;
C.
Demolition of recognized non-active buildings after decontamination;
D.
Non-nuclear reuse of parts of the facility prior to decommissioning;
E.
The lifting of security measures;
F.
In addition, during the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant, the disassembly of the reactor pressure vessel and the parts of the reactor surrounding it.
Art. 48 1 Decommissionation Reports

Anyone who is responsible for decommissioning a nuclear facility shall submit an annual progress report and a final report to the IFSN.


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Notify Notification

Art. 38 and 39 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the notification in the case of decommissioning.

Chapter 5 Radioactive waste

Section 1 General

Art. 50 Minimization of quantities of radioactive waste

A nuclear facility must be designed, constructed and operated in such a way that its operation and decommissioning produce as little radioactive waste as possible, in terms of volume and radioactivity. To this end, in particular:

A.
Select for the construction of materials for which activation product formation is low;
B.
Limit the assets used in the controlled area as far as possible during the operation of the facility;
C.
Decontaminate to the extent possible, where appropriate, materials and assets contaminated with radioactive substances.
Art. Classes of radioactive waste

For the purpose of disposal, radioactive waste must be classified in the following categories:

A.
High-activity waste:
1.
Used fuel elements that are not reused,
2.
Vitrified fission product solutions from the reprocessing of spent fuel elements;
B.
Alphatoxic waste: waste with a content of alpha emitters exceeding the value of 20 000 becquerel/g of conditioned waste;
C.
Low or medium-sized waste: all other radioactive waste.
Art. Waste Management Program

1 Waste disposal authorities should provide guidance in their management program on:

A.
The source, type and quantity of radioactive waste;
B.
Necessary deep geological deposits and how they are designed;
C.
The allocation of waste to these deposits;
D.
The plan for making these deposits;
E.
The duration of centralized or decentralized warehouse storage and the capacity that these warehouses must have;
F.
The financial plan for the disposal of waste until the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, specifying:
1.
The work to be done,
2.
The amount of costs;
3.
The method of funding;
G.
The concept of information.

2 Waste disposal officials must adapt their waste management programs every five years.

3 The IFSN and the Office are competent to verify the waste management programme and monitor its application. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Section 2 Release and packaging

Art. Release of Materials

1 Any person who intends to remove material considered to be inactive in the controlled area of a nuclear facility shall perform a measurement of their release by means of a certified quality method and shall record the operation.

2 If the release relates to materials of a weight greater than 1000 kg or greater than 1 m 3 , the IFSN must be informed at least ten days before the transport of these materials outside the nuclear facility; the relevant documents must be submitted to it at the same time. 1

3 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in directives the detailed requirements to be met by the measurement of material release and the manner in which it is to be informed. 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. Packaging

1 Radioactive waste must be packed as quickly as possible. The collection of unpackaged waste in preparation for periodic packaging campaigns is permitted.

2 Packages of packaged waste must be suitable for transport, storage and final storage.

3 Each package of waste must be marked and accompanied by documentation that describes its manufacture, composition and properties. The documentation must be kept and forwarded to the company that will complete the subsequent phases of the evacuation.

4 A request for approval of a package or type of package must be submitted to the IFSN prior to the manufacture of a package of packaged waste. 1

5 Upon request, all the documents required for the assessment shall be attached and, in particular, shall provide guidance on:

A.
The packaging process;
B.
The waste package and its components;
C.
Quality assurance;
D.
The established record.

6 The IFSN is responsible for regulating in detail the requirements for packaging and application files. 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Section 3 Handling of radioactive waste

Art. Jurisdiction

The Office is competent to grant:

A.
Authorisations for the handling of radioactive waste;
B.
The approval of the Convention for the resumption of radioactive waste referred to in Art. 34, para. 3, let. D et al. 4, LENu.
Art. 56 Application for Authorization; Attachments

1 The request for authorization to transport, import, export or transport radioactive waste must be made jointly by the consignor, the consignee, the carrier and the organiser of the transport.

2 The documents to be attached must provide all the information necessary for the assessment of the application, in particular:

A.
The composition and properties of radioactive waste;
B.
The names of the evacuation officer, the sender and the consignee;
C.
The source and destination of the waste;
D.
Transport, including proof of compliance with the requirements for the transport of dangerous goods.
Art. 57 Prior investigation, duration of validity of authorisation, retention of parts and compulsory notification

Art. 16, 18, 20 and 21 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the handling of radioactive waste.

Section 4 Geological studies

Art. Request

A person who requires authorization to conduct geological investigations must provide the following documents:

A.
The investigation programme;
B.
A geological report;
C.
A report on the possible consequences of investigations on geology and the environment;
D.
Maps and set plans;
E.
Indication of the desired duration of the authorisation.
Art. Programme of investigations

The investigation programme shall provide guidance on:

A.
The objectives of the investigations;
B.
The anticipated scope of the investigations;
C.
The date of commencement of the investigation and its probable duration.
Art. 60 Geological Report

The geological report shall provide in particular the following particulars:

A.
A geological description of the area concerned;
B.
An overview of the geological surveys already undertaken in the region to which the applicant has access and a summary of the results obtained;
C.
A description of the geological and hydrogeological factors determining the choice of the region concerned.
Art. 61 Exceptions

1 An authorization is not required for the following geological investigations:

A.
Seismic and other geophysical surveys such as gravimetric, geoelectrical and electromagnetic measurements;
B.
Surface geological surveys and existing underground structures, including rock sampling;
C.
The collection of groundwater and source water samples, source measurements, shallow piezometric surveys, and marking tests;
D.
Measuring natural gas.

2 The authorisations required by the cantonal law or the federal law to carry out these activities are reserved.

Section 5 Special provisions for deep geological storage

S. 62 General Authorization Request

A person who requires blanket authorization for a deep geological deposit must present, in addition to the documents referred to in s. 23, a report containing the following indications:

A.
A comparison of possible solutions in terms of security of deposit;
B.
An assessment of the defining characteristics of the site selection;
C.
The amount of costs.
S. 63 Aptitude Criteria

The criteria under s. 14, para. 1, paragraph f, c. 1, LENu and which shall be included in the general authorisation shall relate to:

A.
The extent of suitable host rock areas;
B.
The hydrogeological conditions of the site;
C.
The duration of stagnation of groundwater.
Art. 64 Elements of a deep geologic deposition

A deep geological layer deposit consists of the main deposit where the radioactive waste, a pilot deposit and experimental areas will be stored.

Art. Experimental Fields

1 The characteristics of the host rock that matter for safety need to be investigated further, at the site, in the experimental areas, to confirm the security credential.

2 Techniques that rely on safety and reliability must be tested prior to the introduction of deep geological deposition. This concerns in particular:

A.
The introduction of the duplicating material;
B.
The extraction of this material for the eventual recovery of waste packages;
C.
The waste package recovery technique.

3 The sealing of the caves and galleries must be tested and its reliability demonstrated during the period of operation of the deposit into deep geological layers.

Art. 66 Pilot Depot

1 The pilot deposition is used to monitor the behaviour of waste, material and host rock until the end of the observation phase. The monitoring carried out there shall provide data of such a nature as to confirm the security rationale for the closure.

2 The results of the monitoring must be applicable to what is happening in the main repository. They are used to make the decision to close the deposit.

3 During the design phase of the pilot deposit, the following principles must be respected:

A.
The geological and hydrogeological conditions must be comparable with those prevailing in the main deposit;
B.
The pilot deposition must be separated from the main deposit in the space and the hydraulic plan;
C.
The method of construction of the pilot deposit, the storage of the waste and the duplicating must be the same as those of the main deposit;
D.
The pilot deposit must contain a small but representative amount of waste.
Art. 67 Complications

1 The owner of a deep geological deposit must fill the caves and galleries of the deposit after storing the waste packages.

2 They must be bridged to ensure long-term safety and to allow for the recovery of waste without major efforts.

Art. 68 Observation phase

1 The owner of a deep geological deposit must describe, in the project updated for the observation phase, the measures planned to monitor the deposit after the end of the storage of waste. In so doing, it must propose the duration of the observation phase.

2 The department orders the monitoring and sets the duration. It may extend it if necessary.

Art. 69 Closure

1 At the time of closure, the owner of a deep geological deposit must fill all remaining open parts of the deposit and seal the elements that matter for long-term safety and security.

2 In the closing project, it should describe in particular:

A.
The sealing and sealing of access to storage facilities;
B.
The work to be done to bring the pilot depot to a secure, long-term condition;
C.
The sealing and sealing of access to the deposit in depth;
D.
Ensuring long-term security.

3 In closing the deposit, it must ensure in particular:

A.
There will be no unacceptable leakage of radionuclides through access to the depot;
B.
The separation of the aquifers will, in the long term, return to its configuration prior to the construction of the deposit;
C.
The deposit in deep geological layers is marked by a durable marking.
Art. Protection Area

1 The area of protection for deep geological deposition shall be established on the basis of the long-term safety report and submitted with the request for the general authorization of the project. It should include:

A.
All elements of the deposit in depth, including access;
B.
Rock masses ensuring the hydraulic containment of the deposit;
C.
Rock masses that contribute significantly to the retention of radionuclides that may be released through deposition over time;

2 Following the granting of the general authorisation by the Federal Council, the Office shall invite the Office of the Land Registry to affix to the parcels concerned the reference "Area of provisional protection, deposited in deep geological layers". Once the authorization to operate is issued, it will place the words "Area of Final Protection, Deeper Geological Layers" on the parcels concerned.

3 The department decides on the lifting, of the provisional or permanent protection zone. The Office then invites the Office of the Land Registry to delete the statement.

4 The department grants authority to carry out projects in the area of protection. The prerequisite is that the long-term safety of the deposit is not compromised.

Art. Folder

1 The owner of a deep geological deposit must establish a file where the deposit information will be recorded in a sustainable manner.

2 The file must show:

A.
The situation and extent of underground construction;
B.
Inventory of stored radioactive waste, broken down by type and quantity in each storage room;
C.
The design of technical safety barriers, including the sealing of access;
D.
The key elements of the final analysis of long-term security and its results.

3 After the deposit is closed or at the end of the monitoring period, the deposit owner must submit the file to the department.

Art. 72 Use of Geological Data

1 Geological data collected during investigations or during the construction of a deep geological deposit must be transmitted to the Geological Information Service of Confederation.

2 The Geological Information Service of Confederation and the one that is held under para. 1, to provide the geological data by contract on access to and use of the data.

Chapter 6 Procedure, information and encouragement

Art. 1 IFSN opinion

The IFSN adjudicates applications for authorization and approval of a project that is subject to ss. 49 to 63 LENu.


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

S. 74 Processing times

Generally applicable to the processing of applications for approval or approval of a project under s. 49 to 63, LENu the following time limits:

A.
One month, from the receipt of the complete application to its transmission to the relevant cantons and services or to the publication and public inquiry;
B.
Six months from the end of the inquiry procedure to the date of the decision.
Art. 75 Procedure for the granting of enforcement permits and type or individual approvals

1 Not published or publicly investigated:

A.
Applications for an enforcement permit under s. 26, 29, 40 and 47 of this order and s. 36, para. 1, let. B, LENu;
B.
The application for type or individual approval within the meaning of s. 54, para. 4.

2 If necessary, the IFSN will be required to submit the application for prior notice to the specialized services of the Confederation. It will set an appropriate deadline for them to respond. 1

3 An enforcement permit is issued when the conditions that have been met in order to obtain the prior official authorization or decision continue to be fulfilled and the obligations related to the authorization or official decision are fulfilled.

4 ... 2


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).
2 Repealed by c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, with effect from 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 76 1 Information on specific events and findings related to nuclear safety

1 The IFSN shall inform the public without delay of the events and the specific findings of the nuclear installations if they:

A.
Represent a hazard to the facility or staff, or if they have radiological consequences of some significance in the vicinity of the facility (level 3 events and observations of the INES scale as defined in Annex 6);
B.
Count for safety but have little or no radiological consequences in the vicinity (INES events and findings 2 of the INES scale as defined in Annex 6);

2 In the event of a particular event or finding of public interest but not falling within the scope of para. 1, the IFSN ensures that the public is informed.


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Art. 77 Encouragement of research, education and training

1 The supervisory authorities shall support, within the limits of the appropriations granted, applied research, education and training projects in the fields of safety and security of nuclear installations and Disposal of radioactive waste.

2 They shall support them by means of financial aid or by assisting the staff of the Office or the IFSN. 1


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).

Chapter 7 Criminal provisions and final provisions

S. 78 Criminal provision

Under s. 93 LENu will be punished by the person who, intentionally or negligently, is in breach of the obligation to keep records within the meaning of s. 20, 27, para. 2, and 41, para. 3.

Art. Amendment of Annexes 2 and 6

The Department may amend Annexes 2 and 6 to take account of the decisions of the export control regimes to which Switzerland participates and the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Art. 80 Repeal of the law in force

Are repealed:

1.
The order of 11 July 1979 regulating the procedure for the general authorisation of atomic installations for the benefit of a site authorisation 1 ;
2.
The order of 27 November 1989 on preparatory measures 2 ;
3.
The Atomic Order of January 18, 1984 3 ;
4.
The order of 14 March 1983 on the supervision of nuclear installations 4 .

1 [RO 1979 972]
2 [RO 1989 2476]
3 [RO 1984 209, 1987 546 1484, 1991 1450, 1993 901 Annex c. 10, 1994 140, 1995 4959, 1996 2243 ch. I 65, 1997 2128, 2002 349 art. 29]
4 [RO 1983 283]

Art. Amendment of the law in force

The amendment to the existing law is set out in Schedule 7.

Art. Transitional Provision

In determining the extent of the reequipment of a nuclear power station put into service before the entry into force of the LENu, the requirements and principles formulated in art will be respected. 7 to 12 based on s. 22, para. 2, let. G LENu.

Art. 83 Entry into force

This order shall enter into force on 1 Er February 2005.

Annex 1

(art. 4)

Definitions

In this order, the following means:

A.
Finding: The identification of a condition, in the components of the facility, that may compromise security but did not result in an event;
B.
Event: Improper conduct, in the operation of a facility or during transportation, that may compromise security;
C.
Release measurement: Evidence that the radioactivity of the material has been measured, these materials no longer fall within the scope of the ORaP 1 ;
D.
Maintenance: All measures taken to maintain or restore the desired state, as well as measures to capture and assess the current state of equipment and systems;
E.
Heart Cooling: Evacuation of heat energy from the reactor core by cooling systems, so that for all components of the core, the design temperature is not exceeded;
F.
Frequency of heart damage: Annual number of heart damage due to a failure, as determined by a probabilistic security analysis (APS);
G.
Normal operation: Condition of the facility that meets specified operating limits and complies with current requirements;
H.
Security Classification: The allocation of nuclear installations, systems and equipment to categories of structures, security or seismic categories, depending on their importance to nuclear safety;
I.
Failure: Any condition of the facility that deviating from normal operation and calling for the operation of a safety system;
J.
System: Combination of mechanical or electrical equipment required to operate a certain function;
K.
Technology: Specific information, not available to the public or not used for basic scientific research, in the form of technical documentation or technical assistance, which are necessary for development, production or Use.


State 1 Er May 2012

Annex 2 1

(art. 9, para. 2)

Principles Governing the Safety of Nuclear Installation, Nuclear Material and Radioactive Waste

1. Nuclear installation security

Areas and areas of safety, as well as security barriers, should be developed according to the following diagram:

Image

The various security barriers have the following functions:

-
Vehicle protection protects against attacks that would be carried out by means of vehicles and prevents the means of attack from crossing the vehicle protection area and reaching the perimeter fence;
-
The perimeter fence surrounds the security area. It is used to detect aggressors, to situate the place of aggression and to trigger the alarm.
-
Safety barriers D, C, and B are a growing resistance going from the outside to the inside. They surround and protect each area with specific safety systems and equipment.

In the case of a warehouse or deep geological deposition, the IFSN decides whether certain security barriers can be waived.

Any security system (security system, door box, etc.) controlling access to a security zone shall be protected by a barrier with the same resistance as the protection of the area in question.

The resistance of a safety barrier must be maintained systematically. The passages must therefore be equipped with an airlock. In exceptional situations where it is necessary to abandon this principle and remove the function of airlock, guards will have to secure the passage.

2. Safety of nuclear material and radioactive waste

Categories of nuclear material and radioactive waste

Material

Shape

Category

I

II

III

1. Plutonium 1

Not irradiated 2

2 kg or more

Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g

500 g or less, but more than 15 g

2.
Uranium-235

Not irradiated 2

-
Uranium enriched at 20 % U 235 Or more

5 kg or more

Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg

1 kg or less, but more than 15 g

-
Uranium enriched at 10 % U 235 And more, but less than 20 % U 235

-

10 kg or more

Less than 10 kg but more than 1 kg

-
Enriched uranium beyond natural content, but less than 10 % U 235

-

-

10 kg or more

3. Uranium-233

Not irradiated 2

2 kg or more

Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g

500 g or less, but more than 15 g

4.
Irradiated fuel

Depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low-enriched fuel (less than 10 % fissile)

5.
Radioactive waste

Vitrified

Highly radioactive

1

Plutonium, with the exception of plutonium of more than 80 % Pu238.

2

Material which has not been irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor and whose dose-free dose rate does not exceed 1 Gy per hour at a distance of one metre.

Category I

Materials in this category should be protected as follows from any illicit use by extremely safe systems:

Their use and storage will be carried out in an extremely well-protected area, that is, protected according to the definitions of category II, whose access is moreover restricted to people of trust, whose credibility has been verified, Which is monitored by guards who will be in close contact with the intervention forces, which they will be able to alert immediately in the event of an emergency. Isolated measures taken in this context will be designed to detect and prevent attacks, to prevent access to unauthorized persons or to unauthorized removal of materials.

Their transport will be operated according to specific prudential rules of the type of rules laid down for the transport of Category II and III substances, in addition under permanent observation by the accompanying staff and under conditions Ensuring close contact with the corresponding intervention forces.

Category II

Their Using and Their storage will be operated in a well-protected area, whose access is monitored, that is, an area under the permanent observation of guards or equipped with electronic surveillance devices, surrounded by a physical enclosure having a Limited number of entries sufficiently controlled, or with physical protection of the same level.

Their Transport Be operated by taking special precautions including prior arrangements between the consignor, the consignee and the carrier, and a prior agreement between the bodies subject to the jurisdiction and the regulation of the States Supplier and consignee, in the case of international transport, which will specify the time, place and rules for the transfer of liability.

Category III

Their Using and Their storage will be carried out in a sector whose access is monitored.

Their Transport Be operated by taking special precautions including prior arrangements between the consignor, the consignee and the carrier, and a prior agreement between the bodies subject to the jurisdiction and the regulation of the States Supplier and consignee in the case of international transport, which will specify the time, place and rules for the transfer of liability.


1 Update as per c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).


State 1 Er May 2012

Annex 3 1

(art. 28 and 41)

Operating Folder

The operating record of a nuclear facility includes organizational and technical records and operating records.

1. Organizational Documents

Central Regulations, Operating Regulations

These regulations define the conditions (organization, personnel) of a safe operation, including the organizational criteria for stopping the facility.

Emergency Regulations

This regulation sets the organization and responsibilities in an emergency situation. The instructions for the tasks of the emergency staff (emergency instructions) are an integral part of this regulation.

Radiation Protection Regulations

This Regulation defines the radiation protection tasks of the holder of the authorisation to operate, in particular the measurement of radioactive discharges in the vicinity and the radiation protection of the persons employed in the controlled area.

Quality Management Manual

This manual describes a comprehensive and consistent quality management system for the operation of the nuclear facility.

Requirements and guidelines in the field of security

These requirements and guidelines shall include the general instructions for the safety of the nuclear installation and the instructions for the service of the custody of the undertaking.

Concept of safety culture

This document sets out the way in which the management of the nuclear facility designs and promotes the safety culture as well as the indices and criteria used to measure its effectiveness.

2. Technical documents

Security Report

This report describes the technical and organisational aspects of the nuclear facility. It serves as a basis for the ongoing assessment of security. For a deep geological deposit, it must provide in particular the proof of long-term safety after the deposit has been closed.

Security Report

The security report sets out the current state of security measures according to the instructions of the IFSN. It must be classified.

Technical Specification

The technical specification contains requirements for the operation of the nuclear facility and its security systems, including the technical criteria for stopping the installation.

Inspection Program in Service

This program describes the recurring inspections of components and pressure systems assigned to safety classes 1 to 4.

The Aging Monitoring Program

This program describes the state and monitoring of the mechanical and electrical components and buildings of the facility.

Operating requirements and failure requirements

These requirements shall govern the safe operation of the installation in a normal situation and in the case of failures referred to in Art. 8.

Decision instruments for accident management

These instruments contribute to the fight against failures in which radioactive substances are likely to be released in unacceptable quantities.

Day-to-day APS specific

For a nuclear power plant, the current facility-specific PSA includes, in particular, for all critical operating states:

A.
A probabilistic analysis of the deficiencies referred to in s. 8 due to an internal or external event and during which radioactive substances may be released;
B.
A quantitative assessment of measures to prevent such failures;
C.
A quantitative assessment of the risk of release of radioactive substances in hazardous quantities (risk of release).

Technical descriptions

These descriptions include, in particular, schemas, sketches, a folder of the installation with the sizing base, building plans, maintenance programs, component lists, zone plans, and other Technical descriptions of the current state of the installation.

3. Operational Statements

Operating Entries

These entries provide information on the operation of the operation. These include, in particular, operating data, results of measures in operation and operating characteristics, control of dose rate and contamination, and monitoring of the surroundings and analyses of the Operating materials and solid, liquid and gaseous wastes.

Book of watchkeeping

The quarter book shall include the names of the members of the watch team and the tasks assigned to them, as well as the important events and control operations carried out; but also the discrepancies found by Report to operating data and values of important safety measures.

Custody Log

The newspaper describes the names of the members of the guard group and their responsibilities, as well as routine checks, patrols and observations, as well as extraordinary events and contacts established with services External.


1 Update as per c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).


State 1 Er May 2012

Annex 4

(art. 24, 26, 28, 29, 40)

Records for authorizations and enforcement permits, security classification

A person who requires an authorization or a performance permit for a nuclear facility must provide the documents (c. 1 and 2) necessary for the assessment of the application.

The ch. 2 indicates the main documents.

Legend of the table to c. 1

G

Full Installation

R

Reactor technique

B

Building Technique

S

Systems Technique

M

Machine Technique

E

Electrotechnical and command-control

U

Radiation protection, waste and emergency protection

D

Security

P

Organization of operations, staff

HIS

Security class systems 1, 2, 3, and 1E

SB

Safety class 4 and system 0E systems related to security

MY

Critical mechanical equipment for the first building permit, e.g. Reactor pressure vessel, steel safety cabinet, primary circuit conductors, steam generators, pressurizer, main circulation pumps

MB

Other mechanical equipment for safety classes 1 to 4

1. Documents to be provided by type of application and domain

Domains

Request

G

R

B

S

M

E

U

D

P

Authorization to Build resp. Concept permit (if modified)

G1

R1/R2

B1

S1

M1

E1

U1

D1

P1

First building permit resp. Allowed for sizing specifications

G2

B2 and B3 for 1 Er Building element

S2 for SA

M2 for MA

E2

U2

P2

Other building permits (building or building elements)

B2/B3

S2 for SB so significant to constr. Building elements.

D2

Manufacturing Permit

M2 for MB M3

D3

Mounting permits

S2 for SB S3 for SA

E3

U3

Permission to Operate

G3

A3

P3

Power-of-service and walking permits or continuous operation

G4

R4

B4

S4

M4

E4

U4

D4

P4

2. Documents to be submitted, by domain

G Complete Installation

G1

G2

G3

G4

Install Concepts/Design Bases

General design and implementation

Folder required for authority to operate

Service and continuous operation files

Security report for building authorization

APS for building authorization

Installation concept

Risk Specifications

Full installation implementation plans

Applicable Regulatory Sets

Maintenance concept and ageing monitoring

Construction and installation plans for buildings and main equipment

Specifying surrounding conditions

Key Supplier Quality Management Programs

Service Programs

Report on Quality Assurance in Construction and Evaluation of Results

Results of the acceptance testing and commissioning nuclear tests

R Reactor engineering

R1

R2

A3

R4

Design Basics

Temporary Security Analysis

Final Safety Analysis

Evaluation of the nuclear service

Dimensioning of combustible elements

Interim Heart Dimensioning

Definition of safety deficiencies and limit values

Definition of important terms and conditions,

Analysis of operating states and failures determining the design and their effects on and around the facility

Hypotheses, calculation models for the behaviour of radioactive substances

Analysis of failures and their consequences

Failure Analysis; Technical Specifications

Service Programs

Definitive Core Dimensioning

Evaluation of the implementation tests and the results

B Building Technical

B1

B2

B3

B4

Design Basics

Dimensioning Buildings

Dimensioning and Running Building Elements

Construction Folder

Classification of structures

Convert Risk Specification to Calculation Parameters

Field Properties,

Groundwater protection concept

Sizing Basics

Requirements for shielding screens

Specifications/Dimensioning Criteria

Solicitation Assumptions

General Static/Static Model

Primary Dimensions

Behavioural events by floor

Requirements: impermeability, groundwater protection, drainage, protection/lightning, protection/fire

Fastener Concept

Static Detailed Static and Supporting Voltage or Supporting Strength and Practical Utility

Construction Detail

Safety and formwork plans

Review of the method

Special manufacturing requirements

Quality audit plans.

Execution Folder

Quality Assurance Report

Site Reports/Monitoring

Maintenance Programs

S Systems Technical

S1

S2

S3

S4

Systems Concepts

Design

Executing

Getting into service

System classification and concepts

System Provisional Specifications

Systems Login Plans

Operating Schemes

Mechanical and electrical components list

Security assessment if modification of the installation

Final System Specifications y c. Technical data

Development Plans

Systems Connection Plans

Operating Schemas

Mechanical components list

System Descriptions y c. Analysis Interactions

Logical Schemas

Electrical components list

Receipt test requirements

System Test Results

Periodic performance requirements/examinations of systems and components

Final System Connection Plans and Operating Schemes

M Mechanical

M1

MM2

M3

M4

Sizing Basics

Dimensioning

Executing

Commissionout and established records

Applicable regulatory systems and construction requirements

Construction Detail

Materials selected for major components

Sizing Specifications

Overview of important components for security

Programs for evidence or special qualifications

Construction and production: documents/self-examination by the manufacturer of the important components/safety

Initial Review Program

Special test results of type and qualification,

Final documents/component production,

Initial review,

Final editing control and quality assurance

Voltage analysis

Recurring controls

Construction Monitoring Report

Maintenance Programs

E Electrotechnical and Control-Command

E1

E2

E3

E4

Electrical equipment bases

Design

Executable Justifications

Service and documentation

Applicable technique for main components and control-control

Allocation to a circuit

Component Design Basics 1E

Applicable regulatory systems,

Procedure for qualification of isolated and serial parts

Specifications and Data Sheets

Requirements/qualifications

Results of qualifications

Programs-testing for special component commissioning

Test Results,

Technical folder,

Quality Assurance Report

Maintenance Programs

U Radiation protection, waste and emergency protection

U1

U2

U3

U4

Design Criteria and Concepts

Dimensioning of radiological equipment

Proof of performance

Service and documentation

Concepts for: radiological zones, protection screen, monitoring area,

Monitoring of space, system and emissions, emergency protection, wastewater,

Waste packaging process

Waste Storage

Sizing Specifications

Collective dose operating, periodic testing, revisions

Review and Receipt PV

Special Test Results

Training and development of supervisory staff

Operational, Control and Maintenance Programs

D Safety

D1

D2

D3

D4

Design Basis (Security Concept)

Sizing specifications (for constructs, systems, components)

Execution Documents (for security equipment)

Operating Folder (for commissioning)

Threat Analysis

Project file (situation plan, construction plans, construction program, etc.)

Bases for safety zones, location of security barriers, access and leakage routes, security measures during construction and for the period of operation, security organisation (driving and communication, equipment and armaments)

Training and development concept.

Specifications (plans constr. And layout buildings, penetrations location of pipes and cables, aeration, means of communication, operating schemes and diversions, power supply, control certificates)

Security Regulations

Security Personnel Specifications

Execution Plans

Requirements for commissioning

Verifying and then receiving the security equipment

Control and Receiving PV

Corporate Guard Training

Security Report Integration

P Operational Organization (Personnel)

P1

P2

P3

P4

Concept of staff organization and interventions

Organization

Certificate of qualification

Rules for continuous operation

Roadmap

Staff staffing

Training and implementation of staff during construction

Training and Professional Development Plan

Rules for organization

Terms of reference

Training Program for Implementation

Operating documents, regulations and provisional diversions

Qualifications of on-duty radiation protection and other personnel

Staff staffing

Training and development programs for ongoing operations

3. Security Classification

Security Classes (SK)

The Mechanical equipment Are divided into four safety classes according to their importance to nuclear safety and radiation protection:

A.
Safety class 1: equipment under pressure from the reactor cooling system up to and including the second closing valve, the failure of which may result in an irrepressible leak of primary coolant;
B.
Safety class 2: equipment for systems with a security function or which are important for safety, but not assigned to safety class 1;
C.
Safety class 3: equipment in support systems (auxiliary systems) for security functions or that are important to safety;
D.
Safety class 4: equipment containing or capable of containing radioactivity and which is used to hold, process or store liquid or solid radioactive substances, but which is not assigned to any of the safety classes 1 to 3;
E.
Unclassified equipment: equipment which is not assigned to any of the classes 1 to 4.

The Electrical equipment Are divided into two safety classes according to their importance to nuclear safety:

A.
Equipment classified 1E: electrical equipment of mechanical systems and components assigned to safety classes 1 to 3, and electrical safety and control systems;
B.
Equipment classified 0E: other electrical equipment and systems which can also perform functions of importance to safety.

Seismic classes (EK)

Mechanical and electrical equipment is divided into 2 seismic classes according to their function in terms of safety.

A.
Seismic Class I: mechanical equipment of safety classes 1 to 3 and electrical equipment classified as 1E. Their safety functions and therefore the integrity of the systems must remain during and after an earthquake of safety (ESS);
B.
Seismic Class II: mechanical equipment of safety class 4. Their integrity must remain during an operating earthquake (OBE);
C.
Equipment and constructions not assigned to one of these two seismic classes are considered unclassified in relation to the earthquake.

Classes of nuclear structures (BK)

The structures are divided into two classes of nuclear structures according to their importance to nuclear safety and radiation protection:

A.
Class I: structures with mechanical or electrical equipment of seismic class I.
B.
Class II: structures with mechanical equipment of the seismic class II or unclassified in relation to the earthquake.

State 1 Er May 2012

Annex 5 1

(art. 37)

Periodic reports

Report

Discount Content/Time

Periodicity

Annual Security Report

Report on nuclear facilities with a summary and assessment in particular of the operation and safety, the state of the facility, changes in the site, organization and personnel, radiation protection, Radioactive waste, the radiological situation and the latest science and technology. This report contains the results of the systematic security assessment and provides information on the outstanding issues with the IFSN, on the events and findings, on the changes to the facility and on the work of the Maintenance.

To be made no later than 1 Er March of the following year.

Calendar Year

Annual Security Report

Report on nuclear facilities containing the essential data on the organisation of security and a summary of events in this field during the year. In particular, it provides information on the staff and the organisation of security, the special operations of the guards of the company, the use of third-party undertakings for security purposes, the observations made in the field of Security during the stop for review, the frequency and the results of examinations and tests of the operation of security equipment, the faults having affected important components of the security, the modifications made to the buildings, the Special events and observations, and the statistics of badges giving access to the zones Security. This report must be classified.

To be made no later than 1 Er March of the following year.

Calendar Year

Quarterly Report

Report of the Central Warehouse, deep geological deposits and Paul Scherrer Institute. In particular, it provides information on individual doses, dosimetry of installations and perimeter, discharges of radioactive substances with gaseous and liquid effluents, monitoring of the surroundings, radioactive waste, campaigns Packaging, events and findings, changes, and maintenance jobs.

To be completed by the end of the month following the quarter.

Quarter

Monthly report

Report of nuclear power plants on the operation of the facility and comparisons with previous months (trends), focusing in particular on exploitation and safety, chemistry, radiation protection, with indications on dosimetry Individual, discharges of radioactive substances, radioactive waste, events and findings, organisation, staff and training, as well as projects, analyses, feedback, events in Comparable facilities, activities and results of maintenance work.

To be completed by the end of the month following the quarter.

Month

Technical Review Report

Report of nuclear power stations, with the description and appreciation of the measures taken, the results and lessons learned during the revision work and which count for safety.

Time Limits:

A.
First report: 4 working days prior to the planned installation of the facility;
B.
Final report: no later than 3 months after the installation is in service.

Every revision of the installation

Revision Report Radiation Protection

Report of the nuclear power stations on the revision, with detailed information on the measurement of radioactivity and the lessons to be learned, with an assessment of the operator and proposals for measures to further reduce Doses.

To be returned no later than 3 months after the installation is in service.

Every revision of the installation

Physical Review Report

Report of the nuclear power stations, with the results and the assessment of the measurements of the physics of the reactor made during the reactivation after the revision, for different levels of power.

Time Limits:

A.
Results of zero-power and start-up measurements: before the launch above 5 % of the nominal power of the facility;
B.
Final report: no later than 3 months after the installation is in service.

Every revision of the installation

Dosimetry report

Report of nuclear power stations containing indications on collective doses, dose distribution, personal doses and specific collective doses of an activity.

To be made no later than 1 Er March of the following year.

Calendar Year

Report on the monitoring of the area

Report of the nuclear power stations, the central warehouse, the deep geological deposits and the Paul Scherrer Institute, containing indications concerning the release of radioactive substances and the monitoring of radioactivity and Direct radiation in the vicinity of facilities. This report can be integrated with the monthly report or quarterly report.

To be made no later than the end of the month following that quarter.

Quarter

Report on Radioactive Sources

Nuclear facilities report with a list of all radioactive sources in the facility.

To be made no later than 1 Er March of the following year.

Calendar Year

Report on the Comprehensive Security Review

Report of nuclear power stations on the periodic review of security, its results and its assessment.

To be issued according to IFSN instructions.

Every 10 years

System and Component Outage Data

Nuclear power plant report. In case of unavailability of important components for risk which have been taken into account in the APS model, indicate the date and duration of the outage, with a brief description of its cause and the designation of the affected component.

To be made no later than 1 Er March of the following year.

Calendar Year

List of installation changes to be considered in APS

Report of nuclear power stations listing the modifications to the facility that could play a role in the APS but have not yet been taken into account in the APS model.

To be made no later than 1 Er March of the following year.

Calendar Year


1 New content according to the c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN, in force since 1 Er Jan 2009 ( RO 2008 5747 ).


State 1 Er May 2012

Annex 6 1

(art. 21 and 38)

Reports on events and findings in the security field

Report

Content

Periodicity

Event Report

Report on events and findings, which will have the following content:

A.
Classification according to the criteria below, summary of the event or current findings and conclusions;
B.
The state of the installation before the event or when the event occurred;
C.
The conduct of the event and the behaviour of the facility, or the nature of the observation;
D.
Origin of the event or observation;
E.
Immediate action;
F.
Annexes.

For each event or finding to be notified

Consecutive Measures Report

Report on events and findings, which will have the following content:

A.
Consecutive measures;
B.
Appreciation of the importance of security;
C.
Annexes.

For each event or finding to be notified

Classification of events and findings

Events and findings should be classified according to the IAEA International Rating Scale, depending on their security implications. The scale predicts 7 levels of decreasing severity from 7 to 1. Level 0 is reserved for events and findings with no effect on security (but nevertheless worthy of note). Events and findings with no nuclear significance are not classified (see INES User's Manual 2008, IAEA, Vienna 2009). Events and public interest findings, which are visible outside the facility, are assigned to the class Ö in addition to their classification from a security point of view (INES scale).

1. ...

2. International Assessment Scale by IAEA-INES

Level

Description

Criteria

7

Major Accident

-
Rejection in the vicinity of the site of a significant portion of the reactor core inventory, generally in the form of a mixture of short-and long-term radioactive fission products (in equivalent quantities, from a radiological point of view, to More than 10,000 TBq of iode-131).

6

Severe Accident

-
Rejection of fission products in the vicinity of the site (in equivalent quantities, from a radiological point of view, to a rejection of the order of 1000 to 10 000 TBq of iode-131).

5

Accident resulting in endanging the vicinity of the site

-
Rejection of fission products in the vicinity of the site (in equivalent quantities, from a radiological point of view, to a rejection of the order of 100 to 1000 TBq of iode-131).
-
Serious damage to the heart with release of a large amount of radioactivity inside the facility.

4

Accident without significant danger in the vicinity of the site

-
Rejection greater than the permitted limits of radioactive substances in the vicinity of the site, resulting in a dose of a few millisieverts for the most exposed individual.
-
Partial range of reactor core due to mechanical effects and/or fusion.
-
Irradiation of personnel likely to result in death in the short term.

3

Severe Incident

-
Rejection greater than the permitted limit values of radioactive substances in the vicinity of the site, which may result in a dose of a few tenths of a millisievert for the most exposed person outside the site.
-
Irradiation of staff strong enough to expect acute effects on workers' health. High level of contamination in the facility.
-
Failure after which an additional breakdown of safety equipment could result in an accident or situation where safety equipment could not prevent an accident if certain events occurred.

2

Incident

-
An event or finding with major deficiencies in certain safety equipment, but with sufficient preventive measures to correct further errors. Level 1 event or observation, but with significant deficiencies in the organization or in the safety culture.
-
An event that resulted in personnel irradiation in excess of the allowable annual dose limit. Significant dispersion of radioactivity in the installation, exceeding the limits allowed when sizing.

1

Issue

-
Issue causing the installation outside the prescribed operating conditions. It may be due to equipment failure, human error or lack of procedures. An event or finding with no direct importance to safety, but with significant deficiencies in the organization or in the culture of safety.

0

Events and findings with no meaning to security

-
Events and findings not leaving the limits and conditions attached to the operation and requiring only the application of the appropriate procedures.

Examples: Single failure in a redundant system discovered during periodic checks. Automatic reactor shutdown followed by normal installation behavior. Leakage not exceeding operating condition limits.

All of these examples are not directly related to the safety culture.

Time limits for notification of events and findings in the field of security

Event or finding INES > = 3

Event or finding INES 2

Event or finding INES 1

Event or finding INES 0

Event or finding Ö

Announcement by telephone (first info)

Suite

Suite

24 Hours 1

24 Hours 1

Suite

Written confirmation of announcement

Within the framework of the IFSN emergency organisation

Within 6 h. After 1 Re Informing-tion

Within 6 h. After 1 Re Informing-tion

30 days

Within 2 h. After 1 Re Information

Event Report

36 hours

10 days

10 days

Monthly report 2

Consecutive Measures Report

As required

30 days

30 days

1

Within 24 hours between 08 and 5 pm.

2

If a monthly report is not required, notify it in the quarterly or annual report.


1 Update as per c. 12 of the annex to the O of 12 Nov 2008 on the IFSN ( RO 2008 5747 ) And art. 20 hp. 3 of the O of 20 Oct. 2010 on emergency protection, in force since 1 Er Jan 2011 (RO) 2010 5191).


State 1 Er May 2012

Annex 7

(art. 81)

Amendment of the law in force

The following orders are amended as follows:

... 1


1 Changes can be viewed in the RO 2005 601 .


State 1 Er May 2012