Regarding The Constitutionality Of Certain Provisions Of Law No. 1115-Xiv Of 5 July 2000 On The Modificareaşi Completion Of The Constitution Of Moldova (The Mode Of Electing The President) (Referral No. 48B/2015)

Original Language Title: privind controlul constituţionalităţii unor prevederi ale Legii nr. 1115-XIV din 5 iulie 2000 cu privire la modificareaşi completarea Constituţiei Republicii Moldova (modul de alegere a Preşedintelui) (Sesizarea nr. 48b/2015)

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regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (the mode of electing the President) (Referral No. 48b/2015)



Published: 18.03.2016 in Official Gazette No. 59-67 art no: 10 date of entry into force: 04.03.2016 In the name of the Republic of Moldova, the Constitutional Court, acting as part of Mr. Alexandru Tanase, President, Mr. Aurel BĂIEŞU, Mr. Igor DOLEA, Mr. Victor POPA, judges, with the participation of Mrs. Ludmila Chihai, Registrar, considering the appeal filed on 12 November 2015 and recorded at the same time, examining the appeal referred to in public plenary considering the acts and proceedings of the Chamber, Acting for the Council, Pronounce the following judgment: 1. The origin of the case lies the appeal lodged with the Constitutional Court on 12 November 2015, pursuant to articles 25 lit. h) of the law on the Constitutional Court and 38 para. (1) (a). h) of the code of constitutional jurisdiction of the 18 members of the parliamentary faction of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova Valeriu Tudor Deliu Ghiletchi holds a degree, Liliana Palihovici, Angel Agache, Maria Ciobanu, Vladimir Hotineanu, Shyam, Canon, Vadim Pistrinciuc, Iurie tap, Benge, N-Simion plesca, Stefan Creanga, Octavian Grama, Gheorghe Mocanu, Mihaela Goţa, Abdol Azim, Victor Roşca, regarding the constitutionality of section 2 in full and the phrase "except as provided for in article 10. 78 para. (5) "of paragraph 5 of article I of law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution, which changed the method of electing the President of the Republic of Moldova.
2. The authors of this question, the referral, request verification of the conformity of certain provisions of the law No. 1115/2000, concerning the amendment of articles 78 and 85 paragraphs 2 and 3. (4) of the Constitution, taking into account their adoption procedure, articles 135 para. (1) (a). 142 c) and paragraphs 1 and 2. (1) of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of the rule of law, enshrined by the Constitution's preamble and article 1 (1). (3) of the Constitution.
3. At the hearing, the author of the referral of the public expressed object of referral, specifying that only calls constitutionality of amendments aimed at the Presidential election mechanism with a vote of 3/5 of the votes cast. The author of the referral does not dispute the other amendments which do not change the essential content of the project originally approved by the Constitutional Court and which does not affect the unity and balance of the constitutional matter.
4. In the same context, the authors of the referral asking the Court, using the interpretation of paragraph 1 of article 135. (1) (a). c) in conjunction with article 141 para. (2) of the Constitution, explaining that: "1) and/or mandatory advising repeated by the Constitutional Court amendments accepted by Parliament deputies in second reading a draft law on revision of the Constitution, subsequent project presentation in Parliament, accompanied by the opinion of the Constitutional Court?
2) is violated the procedure for the adoption of a draft constitutional law having been fined substantially and conceptually by deputies in the second reading without repeated endorsement by the Constitutional Court?
3) in the event that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly endorsed a Bill to revise the Constitution, amended substantially in the second reading in Parliament, this project is going to go through all the procedures exhibited at art. 143 para. (1) of the Constitution? "
5. By decision of the Constitutional Court of 7 December 2015 referral has been declared admissible, without prejudeca Fund case.
6. In the process of examination referral, the Constitutional Court requested the opinion of the Parliament, President and Government.
7. In the plenary session of the Court, the appeal was supported by Mr. Valeriu Ghiletchi holds a degree, Member of Parliament, author of the referral. The Government was represented by Mr. E. Taha, Deputy Minister of Justice. Parliament has presented his opinion in writing to the Court, but not to delegate a representative to the meeting.
CONTEXT 8. On May 23, 1999, in the framework of the consultative referendum, which was attended by 58.33% of voters, 55.33% responded positively to the question "are you for changing the Constitution for the purpose of setting up a presidential system of Government in the Republic of Moldova, in which the Chief would be responsible for training and leadership of the Government, as well as the results of the governance of the country?". The same question 30.85% of voters have a negative response.
9. By decision No. 32 of 15 June 1999, the Constitutional Court confirmed the results of a consultative referendum, but decided that it "wears Advisory and its results do not produce legal effects".
10. Contrary to the choice expressed by the participants in the consultative referendum by the law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000, the Parliament reviewed the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and amending, inter alia, to article 78. Thus, if by that date the President was directly elected by the citizens, following the constitutional revision of Parliament was empowered with the right to elect the President of the Republic of Moldova the majority of 3/5 of the members (61 members).
11. Immediately after the constitutional review, Parliament failed to elect a President in two rounds (4 and 6 December 2000), since none of the candidates obtained the required number of votes to elect the head of State. Parliament failed to elect the President of the Republic of Moldova under the second failed attempt of repeated elections (21 December 2000), due to non-submission of the required number of Deputies. As a result, by Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova nr. 1843 from 31 December 2000, Parliament was dissolved, being the early parliamentary elections.
12. On 4 April 2001, the newly-elected Parliament voted the President of Moldova, in accordance with article 78 of the Constitution, in the first round.
13. On 4 April 2005, Parliament elected the President of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with article 78 of the Constitution, in the first round.
14. On 20 may, 2009, the Parliament has held ordinary elections for the Office of President of the Republic of Moldova, but none of the candidates obtains the required number of votes. Parliament failed to elect the President of the Republic nor the repeated elections in June 2009, as none of the candidates obtains the required number of votes. Accordingly, by Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova nr. 2243 from June 15, 2009, Parliament was dissolved, being the early parliamentary elections.
15. After the resignation of the President-in-Office on 11 September 2009, interim exercise was taken over by the speaker of Parliament.
16. On 10 November, 2009, at the ordinary elections for the Office of President of the Republic of Moldova has one person, the candidate who obtains the required number of votes. In the context of repeated elections of 7 December, 2009, for the Office of President of the Republic of Moldova was proposed the same candidacy, which again has not accumulated the required number of 61 votes.
17. On 5 September, 2010, during a referendum to amend the Constitution for the purposes of the introduction of direct election of the President by the citizens, but it has not been validated because of low voter turnout.
18. In this context, Presidential Decree No. interim 563 of 28 September 2010, the Parliament was dissolved.
19. the interim office of the President has been assured by the speaker of Parliament, elected in the December 30, 2010 by decision of the Parliament. 6.20. On March 16, 2012, under repeated elections, Parliament elected the President of Moldova, in accordance with article 78 of the Constitution, thus calling an end to a period of nearly three years of interim.
PERTINENT LEGISLATION. The relevant provisions of the Constitution (Official Gazette, no. 1, 1994) are as follows: preamble: "[...] CONSIDERING the rule of law, civic peace, democracy, human dignity, rights and freedoms, the open development of human personality, justice and political pluralism are supreme values [...] "


Article 1Statul "[...]
(3) the Republic of Moldova is a democratic State of law, in which human dignity, rights and freedoms, the open development of human personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values and are guaranteed. "


Article 134Statutul "[Constitutional Court] (1) the Constitutional Court is the sole authority of constitutional jurisdiction in the Republic of Moldova.
[…]
(3) the Constitutional Court shall guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution, ensure implementation of the principle of separation of State power into legislative, Executive and judicial power and guarantee the responsibility of the State towards the citizen and of the citizen towards the State. "


Article 135Atribuţiile "(1) the Constitutional Court:

a) enforces, Parlamentary control and decisions of Parliament, Presidential decrees, Government decisions and ordinances, as well as international treaties to which Moldova is a party;
b) interprets the Constitution;
c) to pronounce on initiatives aimed at revising the Constitution; […]”


Article 140Hotărârile of the Constitutional Court "(1) the laws and other normative acts or some parts thereof become null and void from the moment of adoption of the corresponding decision of the Constitutional Court.
(2) decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and cannot be appealed. "


Article 141Iniţiativa revision "(1) revision of the Constitution may be initiated by: [...]
b) a number of at least one third of the members of Parliament;
[…]
(2) constitutional bills will be presented to Parliament only together with the opinion of the Constitutional Court, adopted with a vote of at least four judges. "


Article 142Limitele revision "(1) the provisions concerning the character of the sovereign, independent State and the unit, as well as those relating to the permanent neutrality of the State may be revised only with the approval by referendum, the majority of citizens registered in the electoral roll.
(2) no revision shall be made, if it results in the Suppression of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or of their guarantees.
(3) the Constitution cannot be revised during the State of emergency, martial law and war. "


Article 143Legea concerning the amendment of the Constitution "(1) Parliament is entitled to enact a law on amendments to the Constitution after at least 6 months from the date on which the appropriate initiative. The law shall be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members.
(2) If, at the presentation of the initiative with regard to the amendment of the Constitution, the Parliament failed to adopt for a year the corresponding constitutional law, the proposal shall be deemed null and void. "
22. The relevant provisions of the regulations, Parliament adopted Law No. 797-XIV of 2 April 1996 (text republished on 7 April 2007) are as follows: Article 81Transmiterea of the draft legeconstituţională special permanent Commission seized on the saucomisiei "(1) After approving the first reading of the draft constitutional law, Parliament Speaker asking the opinion of lawmakers on the implementation of the project as soon as the vote on the second reading of the Commission or its special or Standing Committee dealing with the amendments and to consider cross-country project preparation for the debate on the second reading.
(2) where at least 25 will ask lawmakers introducing bills Special Constitutional Commission or Standing Committee, seized on the President has it. Otherwise, the project is put to the vote at second reading and final. "


Article 82Dezbaterea and voting on amendments "(1) where the constitutional Bill is forwarded to the Commission or the Permanent Commission, appealed within 15 days after the adoption of the first reading parliamentarians prepare and transmit to the Commission the amendments in question. This period may be extended, upon the proposal of the President of the Parliament, by a majority vote of deputies present.
(2) in the second reading can be debated and subject to the amendments to a vote only in writing and signed by at least 5 members. Amendments cannot establish introducing elements that are not present in the project endorsed by the Constitutional Court and can just keep respect: (a));
b) changes that do not affect the essence of the provisions proposed by the author;
c) papers or omission of articles, if it does not affect the essence of the project.
(3) the Special Commission or the Commission notified the permanent debate and subject to vote each amendment separately. After this, she draws up a report for submission to the constitutional bill for debate in the second reading, in which he expounds upon the position each article. "


Article 83Dezbaterea of the draft legiconstituţionale in second reading "(1) the debate in the second reading by the Parliament of the draft constitutional law consists in: (a) each amendment) presentation by the authors;
b) hearing the opinions of the parliamentary factions, put two speakers on behalf of each of the factions and independent legislators;
c) hearing of the Special Commission's opinion or the Permanent Commission appealed to each substantive amendment;
d) voting each amendment separately.
(2) amendments to the constitutional Bill is approved by a majority vote of deputies present.
(3) If the amendment did not obtain the required number of votes, shall be deemed adopted the provision passed in the first reading the draft. "
In LAW 23. From the contents of the referral, the Court observes that it is aimed at essentially the possibility of amending the draft law to the Parliament to revise the Constitution, endorsed by the Constitutional Court.
24. Thus, the appeal relates to a set of elements and principles with constitutional value related to the principles of supremacy of the Constitution, its stability, unity and balance matter values enshrined by the law on the Constitutional Court, Supreme power to rule on initiatives to revise the Constitution in the context of shared competence of the Parliament and by the Court in the process of amending the Constitution.
A. ADMISSIBILITY Of 25. In accordance with its decision of 7 December 2015 (see § 4, supra), the Court noted that, under article 135 paragraph 1. (1) (a). (b)) of the Constitution, article 4 para. (1) (a). b) of the law on the Constitutional Court and to article 4 para. (1) (a). (b) constitutional jurisdiction) of the Code concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, to refer to the competence of the Constitutional Court.
26. Also note that Court under article 135, paragraph 1. (1) (a). the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova), empowers the Constitutional Court with the constitutionality of all laws adopted by Parliament, without making any distinction between them.
27. Articles 25 lit. h) of the law on the Constitutional Court and 38 para. (1) (a). h) of the code of constitutional jurisdiction shall grant the right of factions seize the Constitutional Court.
28. the Court note that issues addressed by the authors of referral have not been previously subject to court interpretation of constitutional law. In addition, the Court has not been pronounced previously over the disputed provisions, the process concerning the constitutionality of the law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova being cancelled by decision No. 5 of 18 May 2001, the Court declinându and competence ratione materiae-.
29. In this context, the Court recalls that the acts of the Constitutional Court are final and without appeal. However, in terms of their effects, a distinction must be made between the various types of documents.
30. The Constitutional Court's Rulings for the acceptance of complaints on the merits have effects erga omnes and neafectând only for future legal certainty that citizens are entitled to expect from a law that apply to them.
31. On the contrary, the decisions by which the appeal is rejected, including when the process is stopped, the dissatisfiers inter partes litigantes, showing that it is still open to the path of constitutional courts, because of the possible developments of State constitutionalism, requiring, at an interval of time later, a solution of the initial referral.
32. Thus, as a result of the fact that the State of constitutionality evolves with the changing socio-economic conditions, political and moral guidelines, the reasons for rejection initially justified the referral may not subsist anymore, instead, new ones may cause subsequent admission.
33. Reconsideration of the practice of the Court of constitutional law is therefore a natural consequence of the evolution of society and, consequently, the way in which it treats the values enshrined in the fundamental Law level. In this sense, when you proceed to exercise control of constitutionality, the Court examines the social and environmental impact of certain legal provisions.
34. the Court notes that, in the present case, the contested provisions were found to be a source of instability and institutional bottlenecks. It is for this reason that the rules in question have been the subject of repeated complaints of unconstitutionality, this being is, in the opinion of the Court, in a novelty item, such as to require a review of the solution adopted in both precedent and considerations on which it is based and, therefore, the reconsideration of the case-law in the matter. At the same time, the Court did not remember that the contested provisions have undergone changes since their adoption in 2000, so they have not been validated through a successive modification.

35. In the light of new arguments-as well as the evolution of the alleged State of constitutionalism since the adoption of the contested provisions to the present case, the Court considers it necessary to break away from the previous approach and to reconsider position on notification constitutionality of laws concerning the examination of the revision of the Constitution.
36. In the light of the Court's jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution to check the constitutionality of laws [article 135 paragraph 1. (1) (a). a)] and to rule on initiatives to revise the Constitution [c], note that Court shall have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a law to revise the Constitution.
37. the Court indicates that, every time, when you ask the constitutionality of certain legal acts together with the interpretation of certain provisions of the constitutional interpretation of the constitutionality of the provisions in question includes by default.
38. In these circumstances and in accordance with article 6 para. (2) the Constitutional Court jurisdiction, note that in this question, concerning the constitutionality of the interpretation request absorbs the constitutional norms.
39. the Court considers that the appeal cannot be rejected as inadmissible and there is no other reason to interruption of the process in accordance with the provisions of article 60 of the code of constitutional jurisdiction. Please note that Court was referred to legal and shall have jurisdiction over the interpretation of paragraph 1 of article 135. (1) (a). c) in conjunction with article 141 para. 143 (2) and paragraphs 1 and 2. (1) of the Constitution, as well as the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the Act No. 1115/2000. Therefore, the Court will examine further referral to the Fund.
40. in order to elucidate the issues addressed in the referral, the Court will operate, in particular, with the provisions of articles 1 (1). (3) paragraphs 1 and 2, 135. (1) (a). c 141, 142), para. 143 (2) and paragraphs 1 and 2. (1) of the Constitution, with its previous case-law and with the principles enshrined in constitutional law, using all methods of legal interpretation.
B. the CASE of alleged infringement of the FUND article 141 para. (2) in conjunction with articles 135 para. (1) (a). c, para. 142) 143 (2) and paragraphs 1 and 2. (1) of the Constitution 41. According to the authors of the referral, the provisions under scrutiny in the constitutionality of the procedure for the adoption, in breach of article 141 para. (2) of the Constitution, according to which: "(2) the draft laws will be submitted to the constitutional Parliament only together with the opinion of the Constitutional Court [...]."
42. Furthermore, the contested provisions infringe the competence of the Constitutional Court, provided by 135 para. (1) (a). c) of the Constitution, according to which: "(1) the Constitutional Court: [...]
c) to pronounce on initiatives aimed at revising the Constitution; […]”
43. In the same context, it was expressly provided for in the procedure bypassed the Constitution in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 143. (1) of the Constitution to adopt constitutional amendments: (1) Parliament is entitled to enact a law on amendments to the Constitution after at least 6 months from the date on which the appropriate initiative. […]”
44. In the authors ' vision of referral, adoption of amendments challenged without Constitutional Court resulted in blockages and imbalances affecting the institutional balance, the constitutional matter, contrary to the limits of the review provided for in paragraph 1 of article 142. (2) of the Constitution: "(2) no revision shall be made, if it results in the Suppression of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or of their guarantees."
1. Arguments of the authors referral 45. According to the authors of the referral, on 5 July 2000, deputies in Parliament have deliberately adopted amendments to the Constitution without knowledge of the Constitutional Court, contrary to the procedure laid down by the Constitution for reviewing it.
46. The failure to inform the Constitutional Court had repeatedly rejected the amendments in the Bill originally caused the blockages and institutional imbalances.
47. In this context, the authors consider that the disputed amendments referral are hit by both the constitutionality under the intrinsic aspect, since they affected the balance constitutional matter, and extrinsic aspect, being adopted in breach of the procedure laid down in the Constitution.
2. Arguments of the authorities 48. In the opinion of the President of the Republic of Moldova by the adoption of a draft constitutional law, fined substantially and conceptually by the MPs in second reading, by definition constitute a breach of the adoption process, which is inadmissible. However, according to the Parliament's regulation amendments cannot establish introducing elements which are not present in the project approved by the Constitutional Court, but can hold only: respect; changes which do not affect the essence of the provisions proposed by the author; the omission of some articles or parts of articles, if it does not affect the essence of the project.
49. the Chairman assumed that the Constitutional Court has the right, guaranteed by article 6. 135 para. (1) (a). of the Constitution, to) exercise on notification constitutionality control procedure for adopting the law on revising the Constitution. The claim is based both on the Court, the obligation laid down in article. 134 para. (3) of the Constitution, to counter any abuse of Parliament, including as a constituent Assembly, and the general rule of invalidity of the Act adopted in breach of the procedure.
50. At the same time, the President of the Republic of Moldova claims that examination notification constitutionality law No. 1115/2000 with regard to the amendment and supplementing of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova is the responsibility of the Constitutional Court, but the scope of the legislative process. Or substantial amendment and constitutional law has conceptual project in the second reading constitute a breach of this legal act.
51. in its written opinion, Parliament stated that in accordance with the basic law, the existence of the opinion of the Constitutional Court is a prerequisite and compulsory and judicial aspect of the opinion refers to all issues of law concerning the Bill constitutional.
52. Thus, the Parliament claims that, although so far the Court has not checked on notification constitutionality a bill amending the Constitution, the issues raised in the complaint are multiaspectual and will be examined in relation to the size of the applicability of constitutional rules and ensuring the functionality of institutions. 53. According to the Government, any change in the provisions of the Constitution, evading provisions of art. 141, 142 and 143 of the Constitution, would constitute a default of her review, regardless of the reasons and the process used, which would be a violation of the Constitution. The amendments to the draft constitutional laws are to be such as to fall within the limits of the Constitutional Court's opinion, such an opinion repeated unnecessary Court.
54. Reiterating the constitutional jurisprudence of the Court, the Government pointed out that after the approval of the Constitutional Court are not allowed in the text of the draft law interventions aimed at revising the Constitution, while ignoring or overcome them may serve as grounds for nullity of amendments.
55. At the same time, the Government has not exhibited the opinion concerning the third question formulated by the authors of the referral, targeting procedures to be completed at a draft for an opinion repeated amendments to the Constitution, it being left to the discretion of the Court.
3. Assessment of the Court 56. The authors of the report I have doubts about the constitutionality of certain provisions of the law amending the Constitution, taking into account the procedure for adopting them. Thus, in order to solve this case, it is necessary to clarify the content of provisions expressly and implicitly by the Constitution with regard to the revision of the Constitution.
3.1. General principles 57. Constitutional provisions relating to the revision of the Constitution, is determined by the nature and purpose of the concept of the Constitution itself.
3.1.1. The principle of the supremacy of the Constitution 58. The Constitution is the Supreme law. The source of the Constitution, the nation is a national civic community itself. The Constitution reflects the social contract-an obligation accepted democratically by all citizens of the Republic of Moldova in relation to current and future generations to live in accordance with the fundamental rules enshrined in the Constitution and to respect them, to ensure the legitimacy of government authority, the legitimacy of its decisions, and to ensure the human rights and fundamental freedoms, so that there should be harmony in society (HCC No. 36 of 5 December 2013 , HCC nr. 9 February 14, 2014).
59. Being a supreme legal force act and the social contract, the Constitution is founded on the universal values and undeniable, as well as the fact that sovereignty belongs to the people, democracy and the recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms and compliance, enforcement and the rule of law, the system of balances and weights, the duty of State institutions to serve the people and their responsibility towards society , public spirit, the judiciary, the civil society open, fair and harmonious and the rule of law (opinion of the Constitutional Court No. 1 of 24.07.2015).

60. With the adoption of the Constitution, legal document with legal force Supreme, was devoted to the State as a common good of the whole company. One of the most important obligations of a democratic State based on law and justice is to respect, defend and protect the values, and the human rights and freedoms, that is the Constitution itself, whose consecration, effective protection and defence constitute the raison d ' être of the State itself. Otherwise, it would not be possible for the State to be considered the common good of the whole company.
3.1.2. Stability of 61 of the Constitution. As the Constitutional Court highlighted in its judgment No. 57 of 3 November 1999, the stability of the Constitution represents a major constitutional value. The stability of the Constitution is one of the preliminary conditions to ensure the continuity of the State and respect for law and order and constitutional legislation and for ensuring the implementation of the objectives stated in the Constitution, which is based upon the Constitution itself.
62. The stability of the Constitution is one of the characteristics which, together with the other features (inter alia, and, primarily, with legal force, Supreme Constitution), distinguishing legal rules regulating the constitutional legal (ordinary) provided by legal acts with legal force.
63. to this end, the basic laws are inserted into various technical modalities for the protection of the Constitution, the stability by ensuring a certain degree of stiffness of the Constitution. This is a fundamental feature of all constitutions by (Unlike ordinary laws), which contain provisions which allow for your own review. In nearly every State Constitution revision is much more difficult than ordinary legislation and usually requires either a parliamentary decision by a qualified majority, a calendar and a special time intervals or a combination of these factors [see report on constitutional amendments (CDL-AD (2010) 001 of 19 January 2010), the European Commission for democracy through law, hereinafter referred to as Venice Commission].
64. In the same vein, in the report on the constitutional amendments (CDL-AD (2010) 001 of 19 January 2010), the Venice Commission stated the following: "[E] xistenţa rigid procedures for revising the Constitution is an important principle of democratic constitutionalism, which encourages political stability, legitimacy, efficiency, quality of the decision-making process, as well as protecting the rights and interests of non-majority. [...]
65. In this context, the Court noted that the Constitution of stability imperative would be ignored where it might intervene in its text whenever certain social relations to be regulated legally undergo changes (for example, the technological possibilities of certain types of activities extending to a degree that was perhaps impossible to predict at the time of drafting the text of the Constitution).
66. In this context, the Court notes that the training and the development of constitutional jurisprudence, inter alia, constitutional provisions cover jurisprudențială official and also determined by case law by reinterpreting the constitutional amendment allows particularly high potential disclosure of the Constitution without changing the text, and, in this sense, adaptation to changes in the Constitution of social life and to continue changing the living conditions of society and the State and ensuring the sustainability of the Constitution as the Foundation of society and the State (HCC nr. 9 on February 14, 2014, HCC No. 32 of 29 December 2015). The formation and development of constitutional jurisprudence is a function of constitutional justice. Thus, you don't have to intervene over the text of the Constitution where such intervention is not necessary in terms of contributing to the stability of the legal text of the Constitution and the constitutional order.
3.1.3. The unity of matter and equilibrium values of 67 of the Constitution. Any revision of the Constitution Law modifies the content of its provisions and the relationships between these provisions and, in addition, could alter the balance of values enshrined by the Constitution.
68. In the event of a change of certain provisions of the Constitution, they might turn up and the contents of the other provisions thereof and the legal constitutional settlement as a whole.
69. Thus, in the case of a change in the Constitution, it should be borne in mind that this is an act in full all provisions of the Constitution being linked up to the degree to which the contents of certain provisions of the Constitution determines the other provisions thereof. The provisions of the Constitution forms a harmonious system, so that no provision of the Constitution cannot be contrary to the other provisions thereof. The nature of Constitution act with legal force and constitutionality the Supreme idea implies that there can be no gaps or contradictions of the Constitution (Opinion No. 1 of 22 September 2014).
70. In this perspective, the amendment of the Constitution can't do that or else the Constitution enshrined by its provisions to come into conflict with each other. No amendment to the Constitution was unable to create a new constitutional regulations pursuant to which a provision of the Constitution would cancel or would be contrary to a provision of the Constitution, the other so that it would be impossible to consider that those provisions are in harmony. Thus, there can be no change to the adopted Constitution, which would affect the harmony of the Constitution or the harmony of values enshrined by them.
71. The concept, nature and purpose of the Constitution, the Constitution constitutional stability and harmony between the imperative provisions of the Constitution, mentioned supra, implies some substantive and procedural limitations on amendments to the Constitution.
3.1.4. substantive and procedural Limitations on amendments to the Constitution 72. Substantive limitations on amendments to the Constitution are those enshrined in the Constitution with regard to the adoption of the constitutional amendments with a particular content; procedural limitations on amendments to the Constitution also refers to the special procedure for amendment of the Constitution laid down by it.
73. the procedural Limitations on amendments to the Constitution arising from the constitutional settlement as a whole and are intended to protect the universal values on which it is based, the Constitution as supreme law and social contract, and the State as a common good of the whole company, and to maintain the harmony of these values and harmony of the Constitution.
substantive Limitations of 74). Article 1 of the Constitution enshrines the fundamental constitutional values-independence of the State, democracy and the Republic, and the rule of law, human dignity, rights and freedoms, the open development of human personality, justice and political pluralism. They are inseparably interlinked and form the Foundation of the State of the Republic of Moldova as a common good of the whole company, enshrined by the Constitution. Therefore, they should not be denied under any circumstances.
75. In this context, the imperative that no amendment to the Constitution do not affect the harmony of the Constitution or the harmony of values enshrined by them does not allow adoption of amendments which are contrary to at least one of the values being at the basis of the constitutional State as common good of the whole company enshrined by the Constitution-State independence, democracy, Republic and intrinsic character of human rights and fundamental freedoms with the exception of cases in which article 1 of the Constitution would be amended in the manner provided for in paragraph 1 of article 142. (1) of the Constitution.
b) adoption process Particularities of 76 amendments to the Constitution. As mentioned previously, procedural limitations on amendments to the Constitution are related to the special procedure for amendment of the Constitution laid down by it. This procedure is provided for in Title VI "the revision of the Constitution".
77. The stability of the Constitution is a feature of the Constitution, which, along with its other characteristics, inter alia, and, primarily, in conjunction with the legal force of the Constitution, the Supreme, constitutional legal regulation sets rules (ordinary) provided by legal acts with legal force. The stability of the Constitution shall not preclude the possibility of modifying the Constitution when this is necessary, but the procedure for amending the Constitution is more difficult and more complex in comparison with the procedure for amendment of organic laws and ordinary.
78. the Court note that paragraphs (1) to (4) of article 72 of the Constitution provide for the powers of the Parliament to adopt the amendments to the Constitution and for the adoption of laws.
79. In this context, the Court points out that the adoption of laws, inter alia, the adoption of constitutional laws, is governed by articles 72 to 74 of the Constitution, while modifying the Constitution-in Title VI "the revision of the Constitution" (articles 141-143).

80. the provisions of title VI "the revision of the Constitution" of the Constitution enjoys a broader protection. Thus, according to paragraph 1 of article 142. (1) of the Constitution, provisions can be amended only through a referendum approved by a majority vote of the citizens registered in the electoral roll, while the provisions of articles 72 to 74 of the Constitution can be amended by Parliament.
81. Thus, the Constitution provides for different procedures for changing the laws and constitutional organic laws or ordinary. Special procedure for amending the Constitution cannot be identified with adoption laws. To ensure the stability of the constitutional provisions have been made for a special procedure for amendment in order to ensure that the amendment of the Constitution to be performed only when necessary, and to prevent any hasty change of the Constitution.
82. the Special Procedure for amendment of the Constitution, which is provided for in the Constitution, includes, inter alia, the following special requirements: (1) according to paragraph 1 of article 142. (3) of the Constitution, the Constitution cannot be changed during the imposition of a State of emergency, martial law and war. There was no such prohibition in respect of adoption laws.
(2) according to article 142 paragraph 2. (1) and (2) of the Constitution, the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited: the provisions of article 1 may be modified only by approval in a referendum by a majority vote of the citizens registered in the electoral roll, and those that result in the Suppression of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens or of their guarantees cannot be adopted.
(3) article 141 (1) of the Constitution provides for subjects which receive by way of the right to submit a proposal for amending or supplementing the Constitution: a number of at least 200 000 Moldovan citizens with the right to vote from at least half of the territorial-administrative units of the second level; a number of at least one third of the members of Parliament; Government. People referred to are different in essence from those persons who have the right of legislative initiative-deputies in the Parliament, the President of the Republic of Moldova, the Government, the people's Assembly of the autonomous territorial unit Gagauzia-which are laid down in article 73 of the Constitution.
(4) paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 143. (1) of the Constitution provides for a special procedure for the adoption of amendments to the Constitution in the Parliament: amendments may be considered and voted on by Parliament after at least 6 months from the date on which the appropriate initiative. The Constitution does not provide for such a requirement relating to the term of prohibition of examination and voting in respect of adoption laws.
(5) paragraph 1 of article 143. (1) of the Constitution provides for the requirement of a qualified majority of the votes of deputies in the case of adoption of a law amending the Constitution: a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution is considered adopted by Parliament if at least 2/3 of the total number of deputies have voted in favour of it. No such requirement concerning the qualified majority votes with respect to the passing of laws: according to article 74 of the Constitution, ordinary legislation is deemed to be adopted if a majority of the deputies attending the meeting voted in favour (paragraph 2), and an organic law is adopted if more than half of the total number of deputies voting in favour (paragraph 1).
143. Article 83 para. (2) of the Constitution provides for a special limitation for submission for review by Parliament of an amendment to the Constitution that has not been adopted: it can be filed again after at least one year. The Constitution does not provide for such limitation with regard to the adoption of laws.
84. Article 141 para. (2) of the Constitution stipulates that the constitutional draft laws will be submitted to Parliament only together with the opinion of the Constitutional Court, adopted with a vote of at least four judges. The Constitution does not provide for such limitation with regard to the adoption of laws.
85. the Constitutional Provisions which place limitations in terms of reviewing the legal value and cannot be circumvented, base its position on the existence of principles and provisions of the constituent legislator native, appropriate constitutional power.
86. the Court note that review procedures, allowing time for public debate, and institutional, is likely to contribute significantly to the legitimacy and acceptance of the Constitution, and to the development and consolidation of democratic constitutional traditions. Instead, where the rules and procedures concerning the constitutional revisions are subject of interpretation and controversy, or if they are applied too hastily or without democratic debate, this could undermine political stability and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the Constitution itself.
87. With reference to the necessity of verification procedures for revising the Constitution, the Venice Commission noted the following: "237. [...] Venice Commission will strongly support all systems which allow efficient supervision and democratic manner in which the procedures for constitutional change were respected and followed. And if there is reason to believe that the amendments were adopted in breach of the constitutional requirements, then this is a problem that can be resolved before a proper court. "
[Report on the constitutional amendments (CDL-AD (2010) 001 of 19 January 2010)] 88. Thus, in the realm of protecting the constitutional order and the rule of law guaranteeing fundamental constitutional jurisdiction is involved. Establishment of constitutionality control practice marks a profound change in the constitutional logic of State power, making the transition from the rule of political forces-and the rule of the majority that decides, at the beginning of the 20th century, the principle of limited self-government (limited rule), beginning with the post-1945 period and subsequently, after the fall of communism, with post-1989 period.
89. This logical necessity for a constitutionality control of an independent body by Parliament arises from the perception that, if Parliament itself is the judge of its own legislation, can easily be tempted to resolve any doubt in his favour.
90. In other words, control of constitutionality, that guaranteed the supremacy of the Constitution, and limited the runways at the same time, democracy.
91. In this context, the lack of sanction would put into question the efcacitatea provisions which place limits on the review. Efcacitatea constitutional provision providing for limitation of the review depends on the ability of the commitment to the responsibility of those who have been guilty of disregard of this provision.
92. In this connection, even if disregarding the limits of constitutional revision would be confirmed by a vote of Parliament, such a vote cannot cover up the fraud to the Constitution.
93. In this context, the Court points out that a draft bill on revising the Constitution substantially altered should be regarded as a new Bill-a new proposal for amending or supplementing the Constitution, which can only be submitted in compliance with the provisions of articles 138-143 of the Constitution.
94. Thus, for the purposes of paragraph 1 of article 135. (1) (a). c) in conjunction with article 141 para. (2) of the Constitution, after the delivery of the opinion of the Constitutional Court, neither the interventions in the text of the draft law on revision of the Constitution, while ignoring its being exceeded or may serve as a basis for a declaration of invalidity of such changes have been made.
95. In the case of amendments of Deputies supported by Parliament in second reading a draft law on revision of the Constitution, is binding on the repeated endorsement by the Constitutional Court.
96. In the event that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly endorsed a Bill to revise the Constitution, amended substantially in the second reading in Parliament, this project is going to go through all the procedures of paragraphs 2 and 3 article 143 exposed. (1) of the Constitution.
97. Another interpretation of the constitutional text, in the sense of being assigned a purely formal role of the Constitutional Court in this proceeding, namely to approve a draft law on revision of the Constitution which could then be amended in Parliament, would be likely to empty the content for this purpose. However, this jurisdiction was conferred by the legislator constituent in consideration of the role and position of the Constitutional Court occupies within the political system and the society that allows it to consider amendments impartially, away from the temptation of political actors to make decisions of conjuncture.
3.2. the practice of other States 98. The procedure of compulsory and systematic notification by the Constitutional Court before a proposed constitutional amendment to be adopted by the Parliament is a procedural mechanism, which can be found in other States.

99. In addition to the a priori verification of the proposals for the amendment of the Constitutional Court, there is a posteriori verification of the observance of fair procedures for amending the Constitution, which is much more widespread.
100. Among European States that a judicial review of the merits of the constitutional amendment, the best known is that of Germany. In accordance with article 79 (3) ["eternity clause '] from the German Constitution amendments are inadmissible if they affect the structure of the federal legislative powers of the States," or the principles laid down in articles 1 and 20 ". This is considered to be subject to the control of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), being examined on several occasions (BVerfGE (Official Gazette), 14-State Southwest (1951); 3, 225-equal rights (1953); 4, 157-status of the Saar (1955); 30, 1-Interception (1970); 34, 9-standardization of compensation (1972); 90-84, situated between kilometeres before 1949 (1991); 87, 181-the financing of broadcasting (1992); 89, 155-Maastricht (1993) 94; 12-exclusion of refund (1996); 94, 49-safe third countries (1996); 48-95, Restoration and avoidance of transactions (1996); 370-102, Jehovah's witnesses (2000); 109, 279-acoustic Surveillance (2004); 113, 273-european arrest warrant Act (2005); Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2009, 2267-Lisbon Treaty (2009).
101. Examples in which constitutional courts have invalidated the amendments to the Constitution may also be found in other countries, among them Austria [see Constitutional Court decision G 12/00 and others, of 11 October 2001 (2001/1, AUT-2001-003-1)] and Bulgaria [Constitutional Court decision 03/04 of 5 July 2004 (2004/2, BULB-2004-2-001) and decision 96/06 13 September 2006 (2006/3 , BUL-2006-3-002)]. It can also be referred to as an example in this regard, and South Africa.
102. In a landmark ruling in January 2014, Lithuania's Constitutional Court has invalidated from the amendments to the Constitution adopted in 2006, relating to the powers of the Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania, since they were adopted in breach of the procedure, the text of the draft law being amended in Parliament as unconstitutional.
103. Another country with a judicial review of the constitutional amendment is Turkey. In a judgment of 5 June 2008, the Court conducted a background check of a constitutional amendment adopted, which allowed the wearing of headscarves in universities, saying it violates the provision relating to the secular nature of the inamendabilă State, in article 2 of the Constitution.
2.1. Application of the principles set out in this question 104. Please note that Court of the arguments of the authors clearly emerges that the referral considers that during the adoption of the contested provisions the Parliament has not complied with the procedure for the approval of the Constitutional Court of the initiative to revise the Constitution, provided for in articles 135 para. (1) (a). (c)) and 141 para. (2) of the Constitution.
105. The doubts concerning the constitutionality of the authors of the referral provisions challenged are related to the fact that, in the course of their examination, the Commission and Parliament have significantly altered the content of the draft law on revision of the Constitution, which had been submitted by a group of 38 deputies.
106. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the law amending article 78 of the Constitution are relevant to this question.
3.3.1. The circumstances of the adoption law amendment 107. Before entry into force of the law being challenged, on 28 July 2000, article 78 of the Constitution provide that: "(1) the President of the Republic of Moldova shall be elected by universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed suffrage.
(2) to the position of President of the Republic of Moldova can run for Moldovan citizens who have reached the age of 35 years, have lived or are living in its territory for at least 10 years and speaks the State language. proposal of candidates is determined by organic law.
(3) it is declared candidate obtains at least half of the votes of the voters participated in the election.
(4) where none of the candidates obtains that majority, organised the second round between the top two candidates in order of number of votes obtained in the first round. It declared candidate who obtained the largest number of votes, provided that their number is greater than the number of votes cast against the candidate.
(5) No person may perform the function of President of the Republic of Moldova only for no more than two consecutive terms. "
108. Thus, article 78 of the Constitution provide for election of Moldovan President by popular vote.
109. Accordingly, article 89 of the Constitution stipulated that the President could be dismissed, as, by popular vote: "(1) in the case of committing serious offences infringing upon constitutional provisions, the President of the Republic of Moldova may be suspended from Office by the Parliament, with a vote of two thirds of the deputies.
(2) the proposal of suspension from Office may be initiated by at least one third of the members and shall, without further delay, to the attention of the President. The President may give explanations on the Parliament's actions for which he is charged.
(3) if the proposal of suspension from Office has been approved, no later than 30 days after a referendum is held to remove the President. "
110. On 2 august 1999, a group of deputies in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova (38 deputies) were filed with the Constitutional Court of a law project to revise the Constitution. Draft proposed amendments and additions to a number of articles, some being exposed in a new article 78 ("President elect"), Article 80 ("mandate of the President"), Article 85 ("the dissolution of Parliament"), Article 86 (' powers in matters of foreign policy "), Article 89 (" remove the President "), article 90 (" vacant "), Article 91 (" interim "), Article 98 (" Investiture "), Article 101 (" Prime Minister "), Article 102 (" acts of Government "), Article 102/1 (" legislative Delegation ") Article 135 ("Powers"), Article 136 ("structure"), Article 141 ("revision" Initiative). Explanatory note to the draft law clarifies that its purpose was to establish the parliamentary form of Government, including by changing the procedure of electing the President of the Republic of Moldova, replacing the popular vote the vote of the Parliament.
111. Legislative proposal provide that article 78 of the Constitution to be amended and worded as follows: ' (1) the President of the Republic of Moldova is elected by the Parliament by secret ballot.
(2) can be elected President of the Republic of Moldova any voting citizen, who has 35 years old, resided permanently in the territory of the Republic of Moldova 10 years and speaks the State language (3) the candidate obtaining a majority vote of the elected deputies. If no candidate obtains such majority, organised the second round between the top two candidates in order of number of votes obtained in the first round. "112. Bill Editorial Board has proposed a new article 89 of the Constitution, concerning the dismissal of the President:" (1) if it was committed through acts that violated the provisions of the Constitution the President can be dismissed by Parliament with the votes of two-thirds of the members.
(2) the motion requesting the suspension from Office may be initiated by at least one third of the members and shall, without further delay, to the attention of the President of the Republic of Moldova. The President may give explanations on the Parliament's actions for which he is charged.
(3) Judgment of Parliament dismissal from Office of the President shall be confirmed by the Constitutional Court. "
113. On 16 November 1999, the Constitutional Court has endorsed the initiative to revise the Constitution (Opinion No. 6).
114. the Legislative Proposal has been registered in Parliament on 24 November 1999, with the number 4098 (hereinafter referred to as "project No. 4098 ").
115. On 22 June 2000 was formed so-called Special Commission to examine the draft law on revision of the Constitution (hereinafter called "the Commission"). The Commission set up to examine the supposed three draft laws for the revision of the Constitution in Parliament being recorded at that time 6 such projects.
116. At its meeting on 5 July 2000, after 12 days from the creation of the Special Commission, Parliament examined 3 draft laws for revising the Constitution: (1) No. 3346 input of 26 October 1999 (Government delegate powers), initiated by 39 deputies in Parliament and endorsed by the Constitutional Court by the No. 4 of 14 October 1999;
(2) No. 3389 entry of 28 October 1999 (amendments relating to Prosecution), initiated by the Government and endorsed by the Constitutional Court by the No. 5 of 19 October 1999;
(3) No. 4098 input of 24 November 1999 (the choice of the President of the Parliament), initiated by the 38 deputies in Parliament and endorsed by the Constitutional Court by the No. 6 of 16 November 1999.

117. The three projects of constitutional laws were voted for by Parliament on first reading without amendments (decisions of the Parliament no. 1111, 1112 and 1113 of 5 July 2000).
118. At the same time, the Special Commission was empowered to "improve" the draft law said "taking into consideration the objections and proposals made by deputies, and present it to Parliament for review in the second reading.
119. At the same meeting, the Parliament has decided, "putting it all together in a unique project" of the three draft laws adopted in the first reading constitutional (Judgment No. 1114 Parliament of 5 July 2000) for consideration in second reading.
120. Accordingly, for the second reading was presented for examination to a single constitutional Bill. According to the transcript, including Parliament meeting after conexare, in the debate in the second reading deputies outlined in the plenary session a number of amendments, which were accepted.
121. In the take of article 78 of the Constitution, on 5 July 2000, Vladimir Voronin, Parliament Member, the proposal shall be worded as follows: ' [...]
Mr. Eugen Rusu (Chairman of the Special Commission): «in article 78 of the Constitution proposed in the draft. 4098 in a new editorial amendments have come from a group of lawmakers, which suggest that in paragraph 2 of this article to be substituted figure 35 Figure 36. Also, the article should be completed with 3 new paragraphs, amendments of deputies are distributed to you. The Commission has examined these amendments. We accept partially proposes to adopt the amendment to article 78 as follows: (1) to be accepted in the authors. (2) to be accepted in the authors meant to figure 35 Figure 36. Paragraph 3 shall read as follows: the candidate who obtains the majority of 3/5 lawmakers. If no candidate obtains the number of votes is held the second round of voting between the top two candidates in order of number of votes obtained in the first round.
[...]
Mr Victor Stepaniuc (Communist Party Faction): «I want to attract the attention of lawmakers, that we have countries where State President does not choose one each half year. The vote does not elect, pass on next week, is doing laps. In this case there are some problems, yet we choose the President and he must be protected by a sizeable majority of the deputies. In the present case, I believe, that 3/5 however it is normal, 3 laps, 3/5 and it was not until after the third round of the Parliament can be dissolved. It seems to me, that's a reasonable question that, three guided tours 3/5 ".
[...]
Mr Victor Stepaniuc (Communist Party Faction): «in fact candidates now in first tour took, Vădim Nikolaevich, its now here have not taken the required number. Because if we take one of them would be elected. So they go into the second round and never got and then Parliament thinks, stay, C'mon, that's going to be his third tour and if we choose not to, then we're taking, we're moved. And here people have to act and also to vote for someone if they so desire.
[...]
Mr. Eugen Rusu: «Yes, in fact here's a proposal that can be discussed, but this tour and we stop at 3/5. If you choose and in the second round 3/5 are called elections.
[...]
Mr Das Insisted: ' no less than 3/5, and 100 times if you haven't found the 3/5, the Chairman had agreed to scatter if they remember those in this room, no less than 3/5. Even 2, 3 or 20 laps (trad. aut.)».
[...]
Deputy Vladimir Voronin declared: «we are talking specifically of The President, if we want to raise the status of the President, he must be sure that it has the support of a majority of more than 50 plus 1. This majority gives his permission to be more independent, more independently in his work as President. We insist, the faction, to remove these two words that I don't know which tour with 50 plus 1 and repeat as many times as you need until you see these elections will choose a President that the world».
Eugen Rusu, Chairman of the Special Commission: «it is a clear formula. Exclude paragraph which provides three tour, the majority of parliamentarians ".
[...]
Chairperson, Deputy Dumitru Diacov: "Please put vote article 78 with proposals made, with the proposed amendment by Mr Voronin and accepted by the Commission. Who it's for, please vote. Thank you. Who is against it? mind there is none. Do you support».
[The verbatim record of the meeting of the Parliament of 5 July 2000, page 41 (40)-45 (46)] 122. In article 89 of the Constitution, concerning the dismissal of the Chairman, proposed in draft no. 4098 a new editorial board, the Special Commission was submitted amendments from a group of lawmakers, who have proposed to replace the words "is confirmed by the Constitutional Court" with the phrase "may be adopted only with the consent of the Constitutional Court". The Special Commission has examined these amendments and recommended their acceptance of article 89 of the project with the exception of paragraph 3, which proposed that such provisions should be included in article 135 of the Constitution, which concerns the duties of Court Con stituţionale. At the same time, the Special Commission has proposed that at the end of paragraph 1 of this article of the draft no. 4098 ' in mp "be replaced with the words" lawmakers ". These proposals were accepted by the members [of the verbatim record of the meeting on 5 July 2000, page 41 (40)-45 (46)].
123. The Special Commission has also proposed the completion of article 85 with a new paragraph with the following content, which is, in fact, paragraph 4: "the Parliament cannot be dissolved during the last six months of the mandate of the President of the Republic, except as provided in paragraph (5) of article 78 of the Constitution, nor during the State of emergency, siege or war". According to the transcript of the meeting of the Parliament, this amendment derive from amendment made to article 78 of the Constitution (p. 53-54).
124. The same day, 5 July 2000, Parliament adopted Law No. 1115-XIV on amendments and completion of the Constitution.
125. for the text as adopted, governing the manner of election and dismissal of the President of the Republic of Moldova have been exposed in the next Editorial Board (article. I): "the President's Choice of article 78 (1) the President of the Republic of Moldova is elected by the Parliament by secret ballot.     (2) can be elected President of the Republic of Moldova citizens with voting rights who has 40 years old, resided or resides permanently in the territory of the Republic of Moldova for no less than 10 years and speaks the State language.     (3) the candidate obtaining the vote of three-fifths of the votes cast. If no candidate obtains the required number of votes, a second ballot shall be held for the top-two runoff candidates in order of the number of votes obtained in the first round.     (4) if in the second ballot no candidate will meet the required number of votes, repeat elections shall be held.     (5) If after repeat elections the President of the Republic of Moldova is not elected, the incumbent President shall dissolve the Parliament and establish the date of new parliamentary elections.     (6) the procedure for electing the President of the Republic of Moldova shall be established by organic law.


Dismissal article 89 (1) in the case of committing offences infringing upon constitutional provisions, the President of the Republic of Moldova can be dismissed by Parliament with the votes of two thirds of the elected deputies.     (2) the motion requesting the suspension from Office may be initiated by at least one third of the members and shall be brought immediately to the attention of the President of the Republic of Moldova. The President may give explanations to the Parliament and the Constitutional Court with regard to the actions for which he is charged. "
126. Furthermore, under article 85, paragraph (4) was exposed in the next editorial board: "(4) Parliament may not be dissolved during the last six months of the Presidential term of Office, except as provided for in article 78 paragraph 1. (5), nor during the State of emergency, siege or war. "
127. The contents of the provisions challenged, as were exposed in the redaction of law No. l115 of 5 July 2000, the following changes have been introduced in relation to the text of the draft approved by the Constitutional Court:-in article 10. 78 para. (2) ' 35 "was replaced by the figure" 40 "and was added to the phrase" or lives ";
-in article 11. 78 para. (3) the words "a majority vote of the elected deputies" were replaced with the words "vote of three fifths of the votes cast";
-art. 78 was completed with 3 new paragraphs (4) to (6) with respect to repeated election and dissolution of Parliament;
-in article 11. 85 paragraph 4. (4) was added to the phrase "except as provided for in article 10. 78 para. (5)”.
128. On 28 July 2000, law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Moldovan Constitution was published in the Official Gazette, thus entering into force.
3.3.2. the provisions of the regulation relating to special Parliament for passing laws on amendments to Constitution

129. The Parliament's Regulation governing the submission of draft laws amending the Constitution, and the examination and adoption by Parliament are also important for this question.
130. The examination by the Parliament of the draft law No. 4098 and the Bill for second reading were in place, inter alia, the following provisions of the regulation relevant in context of this Parliament.
131. Article 74/2 (text in force on 5 July 2000) of Parliament's Regulation (text republished on 18 May 2000) that the draft constitutional laws were being debated in at least two readings (paragraph 2). For the examination of the draft constitutional law, Parliament was to create a Special Commission in which representatives of all parliamentary factions or to appoint Standing Committee hearing in the jurisdiction of the Fund which holds the project (paragraph 3).
132. For discussion of the draft laws to be constitutional, the opinions of all the standing committees, the opinion of the legal Directorate of the Parliament, as well as that of the Government if the initiative does not belong to them. On the basis of the opinions indicated, the Special Commission or the Commission receives a permanent fund was to draw up a report on the draft Constitutional Bill and present it to the standing Bureau within 15 days after the expiration of 6 months from the moment of the presentation of the project in question, together with the opinion of the Constitutional Court. The report was supposed to contain an assessment of the suitability of the planned changes and the possible consequences thereof (art. 74/3).
133. The debate on the first reading of the draft law on constitutional amendments cannot be made (article 74/4). At the conclusion of the debate, the Parliament can adopt one of the following decisions: a) to approve the Bill in the first reading;
b) submit the draft law to the Commission or the Commission appealed.
134. the decision on the draft Constitutional Bill debated in the first reading is adopted by Parliament, in the form of judgment, by a majority vote of deputies present.
135. Where the debates in Parliament were subject to several draft laws were based on the same constitutional issue, Parliament, on a proposal from the Commission or the Commission appealed to the Permanent Fund, could decide which of them will be debated as the Basic project, the others being considered as alternative projects (art. 74/5).
136. After the approval of the first reading of the draft constitutional law, Parliament had to ask the opinion of parliamentarians on the implementation of the project as soon as the vote on the second reading of the Commission or its special or Standing Committee dealing with the amendments and to consider cross-country project preparation for the debate on the second reading. At least 25 members could ask for introducing bills to Special Constitutional Commission or the Permanent Commission appealed. Otherwise, the project is put to the vote at second reading and final (art. 74/6).
137. Where the constitutional Bill was forwarded to the Commission or the Permanent Commission, appealed within 15 days after the adoption of the draft in the first reading, lawmakers could prepare and transmit to the Commission the amendments in question. In second reading could be debated only and subject to the amendments to the vote submitted in writing and signed by at least 5 members.
138. Under article 74/7, amendments could not target the introduction of elements that were not present in the project endorsed by the Constitutional Court and could just keep respect: (a));    b) changes that do not affect the essence of the provisions proposed by the author;    c) papers or omission of articles, if it does not affect the essence of the project.
139. The Special Commission or the Commission receives a permanent fund was to debate and vote on each amendment to subject. After this, it was prepared a report for submission to the constitutional bill for debate in the second reading, in which he displayed the position of each article.
140. The debate in the second reading by the Parliament of the draft constitutional law consists in: (a) each amendment) presentation by the authors;
b) hearing the opinions of the parliamentary factions, put two speakers on behalf of each of the factions and independent legislators;
c) hearing of the Special Commission's opinion or the Permanent Commission appealed to each substantive amendment;
d) voting each amendment separately.
141. The amendments to the constitutional Bill is aprobau by a majority vote of deputies present. If such an amendment again, not the number of votes required, shall be considered adopted the provision passed in the first reading of the draft (article 74/8).
142. After examining and voting on each item separately, speaker of Parliament was to submit to vote the Bill entirely constitutional, which shall be adopted by the Parliament with the votes of two-thirds of the deputies elected, whether it is considered void if not obtained through the number of votes required (art. 74/9).
143. In this context, the Court recalls that, pursuant to the principle of the autonomy of the regulations provided for in article 64 para. (1) of the Constitution, the Parliament has the right of disposal in respect of their own organization and procedures for the conduct of parliamentary works.
144. statutory Autonomy constitute the expression of the rule of law, democratic principles, but can operate solely within the limits laid down in the basic law.
145. Thus, statutory autonomy cannot be exercised in discretion, abusive, in breach of the constitutional powers of the Parliament or the rules relating to parliamentary procedure requirements (see HCC No. 27 of 17 November 2015, § 35-37).
146. In this context, the regulatory rules represent legal instruments which allow the parliamentary activities in fulfilment of the constitutional powers of the legislature and should be interpreted and applied in good faith and in a spirit of loyalty to the Basic Law (see HCC No. 9 of 21 may 2013).
147. the Court note that, according to legal regulation provided for in articles 74-74/2/9 of the Parliament's Regulation (text republished on 18 May 2000), draft laws on amendments to Constitution were to be examined in Parliament, essentially according to the same procedures that were examined other draft laws, with some features referred to in those articles.
148. To summarize the provisions of Chapter 2/1 of the Parliament's Regulation (reissued on 18 May 2000), the Court shall retain the following items:-no special requirements were laid down, inter alia, the restrictions relating to decisions regarding the content of the draft law on amendments to the Constitution that could be adopted by the Commission;
-the same text of a bill amending the Constitution had twice undergone voting in Parliament, but were not referred to explicit restrictions with regard to the submission of the text of a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution which was different from the one submitted by the subjects referred to in article 141 (1) of the Constitution, and entitled to propose to amend the Constitution;
-consideration of a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution in the first reading, groups of five MPs were entitled to propose changing text, although the review may not be initiated than 1/3 of the votes cast, in accordance with article 141 (1) (a). (b)) of the Constitution.
149. Applied in conjunction, Parliament's regulation allowed the Commission, inter alia, the adoption of a decision on the approval of amendments to a Bill and its "improvement", as specified in decisions of the Parliament. 1111, 1112 and 1113 of 5 July 2000 on the approval of the three bills to revise the Constitution, which were joined in a unique project.
150. Clearly, the exclusive right to propose to amend or supplement the Constitution accorded this right subject, point the article 141 para. (1) of the Constitution, does not mean that, in the examination, they can not change, in general, the text of a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution. However, changes to a draft law on revision of the Constitution may not cancel the exclusive right of the holders referred to in paragraph 1. (1) article 141 of the Constitution to submit to Parliament a proposal for amending or supplementing the Constitution. Parliament can examine and vote on a proposal for amending or supplementing the Constitution nor when it is lodged by persons other than those referred to in article 141 (1) of the Constitution.

151. Consequently, according to the Constitution when Parliament examines certain draft laws amending the Constitution, which had been submitted by the persons referred to in article 141 (1) of the Constitution, it may amend the draft proposed laws only to the extent that the amendments will not affect in their contents, namely, amendments aimed at editing of draft amendments to the Constitution proposed to improve the text in relation to the literary language and legislative technique or so formulating projects proposed to be more accurate, or more concretely, without having to modify the scope of the proposed regulation, without having to introduce essential means of reaching different pursued constitutional rules proposed or without proposing any amendment to the Constitution of an other.
152. With respect to this issue, note that the provisions of the Constitution Court does not grant the structural subunits of the Parliament, inter alia, its committees and individual members of Parliament, the right to submit a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution which differs substantially from the draft law on amendments to the Constitution which was submitted by the authorized subject.
153. the structural Subunits of the Parliament, inter alia, its committees and individual deputies, have the right to propose amendments to the draft law elements examined by Parliament, to propose the rejection of the draft law, as well as to propose that the subject who has submitted the draft law examined to submit a new draft law on the amendment of the Constitution, substantially altered.
154. Thus, the provisions of regulation Parliament opened the possibility, inter alia, to essentially change the contents of a draft law submitted by the people (inter alia, a group of 1/3 of deputies of the Parliament), set out in article 141 (1) of the Constitution, and entitled to propose to amend the Constitution. Such a possibility is contrary to the provisions and procedure of the revision of the Constitution contained in articles 135 para. (1) (a). c 141 and 143), para. (1) of the Constitution.
155. the court notice that, although the relevant legal regulation for this question was changed, its content has not been altered significantly.
156. Articles 76-84 of Chapter 3 of the Parliament's Regulation (text of 7 April 2007) enshrines the legislative solutions similar to those in force on 5 July 2000, laying down a procedure for the adoption of amendments to the Constitution. Thus, articles 82 and 83, insofar as they do not provide for the prohibition amendment essentially by the Special Commission or Permanent Commission hearing in the background, either by deputies, the draft laws amending the Constitution or prohibition to vote for the first time essentially modified the text of a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution, are in contradiction with articles 135 para. (1) (a). c 143) and para. (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
3.3.3. If provisions adopted essentially differ from the initial 157 legislative proposal. From the comparison of the Bill No. 4098 and discussed in second reading in Parliament has shown clearly that:-the project discussed in the second reading of the amended article 78 of the Constitution the required number of votes for the election of the President at 3/5 deputies in the Parliament, while the draft law No. most Commonwealth members 4098;
-the project discussed in second reading the complete article 78 with three new paragraphs, referring to repeated election and dissolution of Parliament, while the draft law No. 4098 not included such a proposal. The resulting debates in Parliament that had been attempted in this way strengthening the machinery for the purpose of determining pressure deputies to elect a President;
-the draft law discussed in second reading proposed to complete paragraph (4) of article 85 of the Constitution, relating to the exception from the prohibition of the dissolution of Parliament in the last six months of the term of Office of the President of the Republic of Moldova, although the draft law No. 4098 not included no proposal to amend it.
158. Thus, although both bills in question involved the same objective, namely the constitutional amendments to the preliminary choice of the Moldovan President by Parliament, the scope of the regulation proposed by the draft law No. 4098 amended the Bill discussed in second reading, proposing different essential means to achieve the objective referred to above in relation to the draft law. 4098 and contained, in addition, the proposal for amendments to some provisions in the Constitution: the number of votes needed to elect the President, the number of laps and the repeated elections, the dissolution of Parliament to elect the President in case of grounding. Therefore, as regards their content, the Bill No. 4098 and debated in the second reading differed substantially.
159. Thus, Parliament denied the right of a group of at least 1/3 of the total number of deputies to enforce his own initiative. More specifically, a subject that is not shown in article 141 para. (1) of the Constitution as the holder of the right to initiate the revision of the Constitution has changed in the initial text of the draft law on revision of articles 78 and 85 paragraphs 2 and 3. (4) of the Constitution.
160. Parliament can examine and vote on any proposal to amend or supplement the Constitution which would be submitted by persons other than those referred to in article 141 para. (1) of the Constitution.
161. Where the Constitution would be interpreted in a different way (inter alia, in the sense of a person other than those referred to in article 141 para. (1) of the Constitution, and entitled to propose to amend the Constitution, would be able to submit to Parliament a new motion to amend or supplement the Constitution-a new draft law on the amendment of the Constitution, would be denied the exclusive right to submit a proposal for amending or supplementing the Constitution which is provided for in article 141 para. (1) of the Constitution and would create the conditions for the adoption of a preliminary amendment to the Constitution with a practical content, variously under the pretext of the proposed amendment or add-ins.
162. Moreover, such an interpretation would be incompatible with the purpose of the abovementioned special procedure to amend the Constitution-Amendment to the Constitution only cases where necessary, and preventing any hasty change to the Constitution.
163. the Court note that in this question, to verify whether the provisions adopted shall comply with the conditions of substance concerning the limits of revising the Constitution, provided for in article 142 of the Constitution.
3.3.4. amendments Harmony and balance constitutional matter 164. The provisions of the law to revise the Constitution, challenged in this question, focusing essentially on the amendment to article 78 of the Constitution, which refers to the method of electing the President of the Republic of Moldova.
165. Several other provisions of the Constitution relating to article 78 of the Constitution.
166. Article 85 paragraph 4. (4) of the Constitution lays down that Parliament may not be dissolved during the last six months of the Presidential term of Office, except as provided for in article 78 (5).
167. Article 89 of the Constitution lays down the procedure for the dismissal of the President by Parliament.
168. In this context, it should be noted that according to the Constitution, the legislature, on the occasion of the election of a President would govern settlement, inter alia, establishes the grounds for and when the procedure for dismissal of President, must take into account the constitutional status and the mandate of their respective guarantees, as part of the institutional architecture of the State and therefore the system of balances and weights.
169. to summarise, it should be noted that the aforementioned constitutional imperatives relating to the unity of matter and balance values embodied in the Constitution, as a constitutional value, also involves a constitutional obligation not to adopt regulations which, inter alia, would create preconditions for conflict and blockages.
170. the Court observes that if the Parliament is unable to elect a President, the text of the Constitution not only allows, but also advertisement repeated dissolution of Parliament.
171. The solution applied in Moldova is not unique in terms of comparative constitutional law, but nevertheless it has its peculiarities.
172. In most European countries the Presidents are elected by the people. Countries in which the President is chosen by Parliament are considerably fewer (Albania, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Latvia). The trend is to change States the method of electing the President through popular vote, instead of election by Parliament, while retaining the shape of parliamentary Republic (recently, the Czech Republic, Turkey).

173. In some countries the choice requires an absolute majority, (Estonia and Latvia), while others go so far as to require a qualified majority [Albania (three-fifths majority), Hungary, Greece and Italy (two-thirds majority)]. Malta is the only country where a relative majority in the first round shall be considered sufficient. As a rule, the constitutions provide for rules concerning the future rounds of the presidential elections if the quota has been reached not required in the first round. In Moldova, the number of candidates is reduced to two in the next round; However, the three-fifths majority requirement remains unchanged.
174. similar Solutions (holding share and assume the dissolution of Parliament if the required majority was not met) can be observed in Albania (article 87 of the Constitution) and Greece (article 32 of the Constitution).
175. The constitutions generally provide for certain restrictions relating to take-overs. Their objective is to prevent political instability and to fight abuses relating to take-overs.
176. With regard to dissolution after the failure to elect the President, article 78 paragraph 1. (5) does not provide for any restriction on take-overs. Thus, the text of the Constitution not only allows but requires repeated dissolution of Parliament if it turns out to be unable to elect a President. Theoretically, it therefore can be dissolved for the same reason a number indefinitely.
177. The situation of the Republic of Moldova is unique from that standpoint and this peculiarity is due specifically to the amendment to article 78 of the Constitution in 2000.
178. All other constitutions contain provisions which are meant to avoid the vicious circle of early elections by decreasing share. For example, the President may be elected by an absolute majority (such as in Turkey, article 102, paragraph 3 of the Constitution) or a relative in the second round or one later elections (such as in the case of Italy, article 83, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, Hungary, article 29 (B), paragraph 4 of the Constitution). Even the Constitution of Greece, which appears to be most similar to the constitutional law of Moldova, only allow a dissolution in the event of failure to elect the President by a qualified majority (two-thirds and then three fifths). After this dissolution conditions for single majority are progressively reduced until only a relative majority should be required for the two best placed candidates. This rule ensures that after the election the President actually to be elected (art. 20.1 and 25.8 of the Constitution of Greece).
179. In this context, the Court recalls the conclusions of the Venice Commission expressed in its amicus concerning the interpretation of articles 78.5 and 85.3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (CDL-AD (2010) 002): "27. In the light of the circumstances in Moldova, the Venice Commission is of the view that constitutional reform is necessary in order to prevent political impasurilor that could once again take place in Moldova in the future. Take-overs, and asked who would succeed him at short intervals in just a few months, as she creates obstacles for political negotiations, which were necessary for a constitutional reform successfully. Venice Commission refers to its report concerning the Constitutional Amendment (CDL-AD (2010) 001), adopted in December 2009, she points out that constitutional amendments must comply with the procedures laid down in the Constitution in force. "
180. the Court note that political and institutional impasurile in Moldova results in the highest part of the modified provisions concerning the procedure for electing the President and the Parliament dissolution mechanism (Article 78). This opinion is shared by the Venice Commission's opinion regarding the amicus three questions with reference to article 78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted in the framework of the Plenary session 87 (Venice, 17-18 June 2011): "39. [...] Analyzing the Constitution as a whole, and the specific objective of the art. 78, which is to ensure the effective functioning of the constitutional bodies, there should be a limit to these rehearsals, in order to prevent repeated misuses of take-overs and ensure necessary political stability in the country. "
181. Such regulations reveals a violation of its own Constitution of the Republic of Moldova: while the constitutional provisions concerning the procedure for electing the Chairman should ensure the proper functioning of the constitutional bodies, in the present situation, by allowing infinite repetition of elections and preventing their break, effective and open the path of constitutional crisis. Moreover, their strict implementation leads to an accumulation of functions by the President of Parliament, who also exercised the function of acting President for a much longer period than that specified in the Constitution.
182. Indeed, contrary to other constitutions which provide for similar mechanisms for choosing the President, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova does not contain any rule which would allow the vicious cycle of elections and dissolutions, in case of lack of compromise between the main political parties, can be avoided, so as to ensure both proper functioning of State institutions and the stability of the constitutional system in the country.
183. the fact that these changes have generated and generates uncertainties with regard to the election of the President and the constitutional institutions is confirmed by the numerous requests for interpretation of article 78 of the Constitution (see HCC nr. 5 of 16 March 2010, HCC No. 17 of 20 September 2011 HCC No. 1 of 12 January 2012, HCC nr. 7 of 24 may 2012 Opinion No. 4 of the September 21, 2010, Opinion No. 2 of 12 June 2009), as well as initiatives for the revision of these amendments (see Opinion No. 2 of 4 May 2010, Opinion No. 3 of 6 July, 2010, Opinion No. 1 of 22 September 2014, Opinion No. 1 of 24 July 2015, Opinion No. 2 of 10 November 2015, Opinion No. 1 of 29 February 2016). Despite all these efforts, this source of constitutional deadlock and has not been ruled out. In this context, please note that no changes can not be done on the basis of a constitutional amendment, which is why it is necessary to settle the question of constitutionality of amending a previous Constitution before any further review.
184. in 2000 Intervention in the content of the constitutional rules has created an unusual situation, which led to the severing of the establishment of the constitutional norms.
185. Specifically to avoid this, the Constitution has provided for the need to refer the project to revise the Constitution by the Constitutional Court.
186. The need for repeated endorsement is shared and the interpretation given by the Venice Commission in the context of constitutional reform in the Republic of Moldova in year 2000, when it participated in the drafting of a compromise text on the basis of two draft laws on the revision of the Constitution: "196. [...] With the involvement of the Venice Commission was likely to form a municipality that presidential-parliamentary Committee was able to agree on a compromise text. However, in part because the proposed compromise would have to be sent back to the Constitutional Court for another round of endorsement, the parliamentary majority decided to adopt instead a text which had been approved in advance by the Court. Thus, the compromise in the Joint Committee was frustrated by being adopted a review against the President, which later proved to be a considerable source of political instability. "
187. In this submission the Amicus three questions with reference to article 78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, adopted in the framework of the 87 session Plenary of 17-18 June 2011, the Venice Commission noted, inter alia, that: "38. [...] Since the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova does not provide guidance on how to manage the current exceptional circumstances in the country, textual interpretation of article 78 might produce unsatisfactory results. This is due to the fact that lead to the repetition of the same endlessly procedures for electing the President, creating a vicious cycle of elections and dissolutions. In view of Parliament's inability to elect a compromise candidate and thus to avoid the continuation of the crisis, it might be more appropriate to review the interpretation of the Constitution: Analyzing the Constitution as a whole and the specific objective of article 78, which seeks to ensure the effective functioning of the constitutional bodies, there should be a limit to these iterations in order to prevent repeated misuses of take-overs and to provide the security necessary for political stability in the country. "

188. the Court notes that the norms of the Constitution forms a unified whole in a logical and legal bond unbreakable. In this context, the Constitution enshrines a tripartite division of the functions of the State, which is a fundamental principle of the Organization of the State. Thus, the constitutional text reflects the image of the State as a structure of organs, including the President. Therefore, based on the spirit of the Constitution, must ensure the functionality of all State institutions, strict adherence to the principles and supreme values, representing the practical test of the effectiveness of the Constitution as the Supreme Law of a State of law.
189. To cover the situations of failure of Parliament to elect the head of State, legislative constituanta referred to in article 78 of the Constitution the dissolution of Parliament, which operates both as a sanction for incapacity, and as a mechanism for providing institutional-unlocking the possibility of a new Parliament to choose and to allow the functioning of the institution of the President.
190. On the other hand, the Court observes that article 78 of the Constitution has created an unprecedented situation, when the possibility of the dissolution of the Parliament, the interim President, the function may be exercised. Moreover, in the period 2009-2012, the interim President has consumed nearly the entire duration of the mandate of an outgoing President. Thus, constitutional rule was circumvented that denotes intention to limit such situations within 2 months, so far as it would be necessary to organize the election of the President.
191. The structure of political choices in society, crystallised in recent years, consistent with previous experience (see § 7-19, supra), and various sociological studies do not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that, in the event of new elections, the Parliament forces report would be likely to not block again, President elect, any revision of the Constitution.
192. Therefore, the mechanism of article 78 of the Constitution, meant to assure State institutions, under the current circumstances, this unit has generated breaking constitutional, because it does not ensure the normal functioning of the institution of the President. Thus, by Parliament's inability to elect a candidate of compromise, have created a situation of political and institutional impasse, resulting in a vicious cycle of elections and dissolutions. Along the years, article 78 of the Constitution, designed as an exceptional mechanism, was used more often than ordinary mechanisms, being organized in early parliamentary elections, 3 2 only during the 2009-2010 period, during which Parliament failed to elect a head of State under the 4 failed attempts.
193. Furthermore, in the interim, no matter how long it would be, any ban for the person who has served two consecutive presidential mandates previously moment at which to intervene in the interim should be able to run for another presidential term.
194. It is evident that the rules and the spirit of the Constitution to ensure the perpetuation of the exercise of power by the State institutions, constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, as well as provisional and interim statements, designed to avoid creating a vacuum of power and ensure the elections of the new President, must be removed as soon as possible.
195. At the same time, the Court finds that the circumstances in which the amalgamation takes place, the Office of President of the Parliament, legislative power, with the President of the State, in principle part of executive power, for a period of time exceeding one half of the ordinary term of Office of a President of state clearly exceeds the Constitution's intent and is not compatible with the constitutional principle of separation of powers as well as lead to the diversion of the powers that the Constitution has given them the main organs of the State.
196. At the same time, the Court observed that these changes create the premise of a double constitutional stalemate and tension between the popular vote and the modern idea of representation. The ultimate effect is, undeniably, the weakening of constitutional democracy. In addition, it can be noted that, in the modified version, article 78 of the Constitution has no counterpart in any constitutional text.
197. Thus, the Court is in a position to eliminate the imbalance in generating mechanisms of constitutional institutions, thus saving the consistency of the Constitution.
198. the Court note that form of election of the President cannot be a constitutional crisis.
199. In the same context, note that the contested provisions of the Court have not undergone changes since their adoption in 2000, so they have not been validated through a successive change, which could have put the issue of legal certainty.
200. In the light of those exposed, following the Constitution and systemic coherence to ensure functionality, the Constitutional Court recognises the contested provisions unconstitutional.
201. At the same time, in view of the imperative to avoid a legislative vacuum, and taking into account the urgency of tackling the constitutional deadlock in the context of the expiry of the mandate of the current President close, the Court considers it necessary to revive previous legal mechanism of amending the Constitution what would ensure the election of the President.
202. Note that Court to enforce constitutional obligation referred to in article 134 of the Constitution relating to the Court's Constitutional role of guarantor of the Constitution, one of the fundamental tasks of the Constitutional Court consists of securing regulatory order born of the Constitution.
203. The Court's solution also needs to be an "effective" solution, which may not consist of a mere opinion, discretion, opinion, recommendation or solicitation. The Court cannot be limited to a mere finding of an infringement by the Parliament of its opinion, the more so as to amend the Court's opinion, contrary to the law in the case, has generated instability, institutional sharing of power in a non-transparent manner, undermining and undermining the idea of democracy.
204. In this context, the Court's opinions on amendments to the Constitution are aimed at protecting the fundamental values of the Constitution of the abusive practices of political actors, social or institutional. Therefore, ignoring or overrun these opinions will be able to serve as a ground for nullity of amendments.
205. it should be pointed out that the legislature, when regulating the election of the President, inter alia, the procedure for dismissal or dissolution of Parliament, must abide by the Constitution.
206. In this context, the Court note that modifying the conditions of eligibility for the Office of President, referred to in article 78 paragraph 1. (2), inter alia, censul age, censul of living and the requirement of knowledge of the State language, as well as the provisions of paragraph (6) of article 78 of the Constitution, according to which the procedure of election of the President shall be determined by an organic law, have not changed the essential contents of the project originally approved by the Constitutional Court and will not affect the unity and balance of the constitutional matter.
207. On the other hand, the fact that a constitutional reform in 2000 resulted in reality a system of Government with an imperfect, potential conflicts between State authorities, is a direct consequence of unwillingness by the Parliament of the opinion of the Constitutional Court.
208. In the light of the considerations above, the Court finds that the provisions for the amendment of paragraphs (1), (3), (4) and (5) of article 78 of the Constitution, taking into account the method of adopting them, but also disrupting the constitutional matter, and are in contradiction with article 142 (2) of the Constitution.
209. By the way, I'm struck by what provisions of non-constitutionality of correlative changed articles 85 and 89 of the Constitution, and the subsequent legal framework concerning the procedure for electing the President.
210. In the light of the considerations set out above, the Constitutional Court finds that the contested provisions are in contradiction with the principle of constitutional and rule of law, enshrined by the Preamble and article 1 (1). (3) of the Constitution.
211. the Court noted that the very nature of the Constitution as the Supreme legal force and constitutionality idea implies that the Constitution cannot exist, nor are there gaps or contradictions.
212. In this regard, the Court recalls that, in its judgement No. 33 of 10 October 2013 stated the following: "63. In this context, the Court retains the principle that legal provisions repealed by the text of the law declared unconstitutional re-entered active duty Fund, continuing to produce legal effects until the entry into force of the new regulations, which is an effect of the loss of constitutional legitimacy, penalty and much more serious than a simple repeal of a normative text.
64. Thus, in the event of outbreaks of certain rules about amending/repealing, until the change of rigor by the Parliament, to be bound by the provisions of an earlier modification/repeal, in a way according to its considerations to the case inferred its examination. "

213. In this connection, with regard to the constitutional settlement as a whole, namely the method of electing the President and the Parliament's dissolution, the Court note that recognition of neconstituționalității amending the provisions of paragraphs (1), (3), (4) and (5) of article 78 of the Constitution means that the text of those paragraphs of article 78 of the Constitution, which was applicable before entry into force of the law referred to , will again be applicable. The provisions of paragraph (5) of article 78 the previous amendment not because its extraordinary text was reproduced in an identical manner under paragraph (4) of article 80 of the Constitution, the law No. 1115/2000.
214. In the context of this case, the Court shall, in addition, that there are no grounds for dismissal of the President before the expiry of its mandate. Thus, Moldova's President, elected through the vote of the Parliament expressed on 16 March 2012, remain in Office until the expiry of the term for which he was elected, as provision is made in article 80, paragraph 2, the Constitution. Furthermore, this decision does not mean that the acts adopted by the President-elect on the basis of article 78 the provisions declared unconstitutional or the person who exercised interim office of the President are unconstitutional only for this to-do.
For these reasons, under articles 135 para. (1) (a). a), b) and (c)) and 140 of the Constitution, 26 of the law on the Constitutional Court, 6, 61, 62 lit. the a and b)), and 68 of the code of constitutional jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court DECIDES: 1. It is acceptable to refer to a group of 18 members of the parliamentary faction of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova Valeriu Tudor Deliu Ghiletchi holds a degree, Liliana Palihovici, Angel Agache, Maria Ciobanu, Vladimir Hotineanu, Shyam, Canon, Vadim Pistrinciuc, Iurie tap, Benge, N-Simion plesca, Stefan Creanga, Octavian Grama, Gheorghe Mocanu, Magdy Mahmud Aliona Goţa, Victor Roşca, regarding the constitutionality of section 2 in full and the phrase "except as provided for in article 10. 78 para. (5) "in paragraph 5 of article 1 of the law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of article 135. (1) (a). c) in conjunction with the provisions of article 141 para. 143 (2) and paragraphs 1 and 2. (1) of the Constitution: a) After delivery of an opinion by the Constitutional Court, neither the interventions in the text of the draft law on revision of the Constitution, while ignoring its being exceeded or may serve as a basis for a declaration of invalidity of such changes have been made.
b) in the case of amendments of Deputies supported by Parliament in second reading a draft law on revision of the Constitution, it is necessary to give an opinion repeated by the Constitutional Court.
c) in the event that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly endorsed a Bill to revise the Constitution, amended substantially in the second reading in Parliament, this project is going to go through all the procedures of paragraphs 2 and 3 article 143 exposed. (1) of the Constitution.
3. It is hereby declared unconstitutional:-texts: "(1) the President of the Republic of Moldova is elected by the Parliament by secret ballot."    "(3) the candidate obtaining the vote of three-fifths of the votes cast. If no candidate obtains the required number of votes, a second ballot shall be held for the top-two runoff candidates in order of the number of votes obtained in the first round. ' " (4) if in the second ballot no candidate will meet the required number of votes, repeat elections shall be organised. "" (5) If after repeat elections the President of the Republic of Moldova is not elected, the incumbent President shall dissolve the Parliament and establish the date of new parliamentary elections. "in section 2;
-the phrase "except as provided for in article 78 paragraph 1. (5) "of paragraph 5;
-paragraph 6 of article 1 of law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution, as contrary to the review of the Constitution limits imposed by the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 142. (2) paragraph 1 of article 135. (1) (a). c) in conjunction with article 141 para. (2) of the Constitution.
4. To recognize the constitutional texts:-: "(2) can be elected President of the Republic of Moldova citizens with voting rights who has 40 years old, resided or resides permanently in the territory of the Republic of Moldova for no less than 10 years and speaks the State language."    "(6) the procedure for electing the President of the Republic of Moldova is determined by an organic law." in section 2 of article I of law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution.
5. Declaring unconstitutional the law. 1234-XIV of 22 September 2000 on the procedure for electing the President of the Republic of Moldova.
6. Declaring unconstitutional the law. 1227-XIV of 21 September 2000 on the modification of the electoral code, with reviving the provisions which were the subject of a repeal.
7. Declares unconstitutional articles 82 and 83 of the rules of the Parliament, approved through the law No. 797-XIV of 2 April 1996, to the extent that the amendment does not provide for the prohibition in the draft law on amendments to the Constitution and to the extent that it does not provide for the prohibition to vote for the first time essentially modified the text of a draft law on the amendment of the Constitution, as being in contradiction with articles 135 para. (1) (a). c 141, paragraph 1). 143 (2) and paragraphs 1 and 2. (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
8. In order to execute this judgment: a) the provisions of paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of article 78 and article 89 of the Constitution, in force until the adoption of law No. 1115-XIV of 5 July 2000 on the modification and completion of the Constitution, subject to revision, invigorates and re-entered active right Trust Fund at the commencement of the present judgment.
b) in consequence of those laid down in paragraph 3 and paragraph 8 a) this device, articles 78 and 89 of the Constitution shall read as follows: "Article 78Alegerea President (1) the President of the Republic of Moldova shall be elected by universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed suffrage.
(2) can be elected President of the Republic of Moldova citizens with voting rights who has 40 years old, resided or resides permanently in the territory of the Republic of Moldova for no less than 10 years and speaks the State language (3) Is declared elected the candidate who obtains the votes of at least half of the voters participated in the election.
(4) where none of the candidates obtains that majority, organised the second round between the top two candidates in order of number of votes obtained in the first round. It declared candidate who obtained the largest number of votes, provided that their number is greater than the number of votes cast against the candidate.
(6) the procedure for electing the President of the Republic of Moldova shall be established by organic law.


Article 89Suspendarea to (1) in the case of committing serious offences infringing upon constitutional provisions, the President of the Republic of Moldova may be suspended from Office by the Parliament, with a vote of two thirds of the deputies.
(2) the proposal of suspension from Office may be initiated by at least one third of the members and shall, without further delay, to the attention of the President. The President may give explanations on the Parliament's actions for which he is charged.
(3) if the proposal of suspension from Office has been approved, no later than 30 days after a referendum is held for the President's impeachment. "c) Constitution will be in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova, given the texts in a way that editorial board in accordance with this device;
d) Parliament will adopt without delay the legislation relating to the election of the President by voting based on universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed suffrage;
e) effects of this ruling does not extend to the Moldovan President's tenure in Office; The President, elected by vote of Parliament expressed on 16 March 2012 remain in Office until the expiry of the term for which he was elected.
9. This decision is final, cannot be subject to any appeal, shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova.