Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 1 2005 in Riga in January (pr 4. 1. § 7) On (IV) memorandum of understanding between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Minister of national defence, the Canadian National Defence Ministry, the Danish Ministry of defence, Defence Minister of the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of defence, the Ministry of defence of the Republic of Greece, Iceland's Foreign Ministry, Minister for defence of the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg national force, the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence Ministers, the Ministry of defence of the Kingdom of Norway, the Defence Ministry of the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defence , The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Minister, Minister of defence of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Defence Minister, Minister of defence of the Republic of Poland and the United States Department of Defense for the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Issued under the cabinet installation article 14 of the law in the first part of paragraph 3 (IV) 1 memorandum of understanding between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Minister of national defence, the Canadian National Defence Ministry, the Danish Ministry of defence, Defence Minister of the Republic of , The protection of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic Minister of the Ministry of defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, the Minister of defence of the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg national force, the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence Ministers, the Ministry of defence of the Kingdom of Norway, the Defence Ministry of the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defence, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Minister, Minister of defence of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Defence Minister, Minister of defence of the Republic of Poland and the United States Department of Defense for the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (hereinafter referred to as the memorandum) to these provisions are accepted and approved. 2. the memorandum shall enter into force for the period specified in paragraphs 7.1 and the order. Prime Minister a. Halloween Foreign Minister a. PABRIKS (IV) memorandum of understanding between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Minister of national defence, the Canadian National Defence Ministry, the Danish Ministry of defence, Defence Minister of the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of defence, the Ministry of defence of the Republic of Greece, Iceland's Foreign Ministry, Minister for defence of the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg national force, the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence Ministers, the Ministry of defence of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Portugal Ministry of defence , The Kingdom of Spain, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defence, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Minister of defence of the United States, the Defense Ministry on the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System annex 1 AC/322 (SC/8) WP (2004) 0002 contains the article topic (I) introduction (II) General rules on secrecy III IV V the requirements and obligations of the visit of the General Financial Regulation VI VII entry into force, duration, amendment withdrawal, termination, disputes and the signing of the article I Introduction 1.1. United States Department of Defense (U.S. DOD) has deployed a NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS provides two levels of accuracy with precise positioning service (PPS) and the standard positioning service (SPS). PPS provides the highest accuracy. Access PPS by cryptographic controls. The SPA provides a lower level of precision, and it is available to all users. SP level of precision is determined in accordance with U.S. national security interests. Therefore, the Kingdom of Belgium, the National Defense Minister, Canadian Ministry of national defense, the Ministry of defence of Denmark, the French Republic Minister of defence, Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of defence, the Ministry of defence of the Republic of Greece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, the Italian Minister of defence of the Republic, the national forces of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Ministry of defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of defence of the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defence, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Minister of defence and the United States Department of Defense , hereinafter referred to as "Member States", have entered into this memorandum of understanding, in support of national defence interests and would not only US, but also other Member States ' national defence organizations to become GPS-PPS military lietotājiem1. This memorandum of understanding will include U.S. Agreement, countries that are not in the US, obtain and use GPS-PPS user equipment. Countries other than the United States, is allowed to produce or buy a GPS-PPS user equipment in accordance with the provisions of this memorandum of understanding. All activities under this memorandum of understanding are carried out in accordance with their national legislation. All Member States are dependent on the availability of financing granted by law. Article II general provisions 2.1 the USA GIVES: (a) provide access to the system and information about the system at the same level as the U.S. military forces in all areas of hostilities, continuous GPS availability, at any time, including in crisis and war conditions in two accuracy levels, technical feasibility. In accordance with the provisions of this memorandum of understanding, with respect to the availability or the operation of GPS, does not give any guarantees. (i) the Precise positioning service (PPS) provides the highest accuracy and protection against interference. Access PPS by selective control of availability (SA) and Pretizlikšan (A-S) technology, which uses the user receivers with hardware, software and/or firmware. PPS is defined in STANAG 4294 (NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) system properties), and is available to authorized users. Authorized users are those who have concluded the corresponding communications security (COMSEC) contracts in addition to this memorandum of understanding with the United States GIVES access to PPS and PPS security. (ii) the standard positioning service (SPS) provides a lower level of precision as the PP. SPS accuracy is available under u.s. national security interests. SPAM is defined in STANAG 4294, and its military, civil and commercial use. (b) provide access to information about the operating status of each satellite, transmitted from the satellite to use GPS navigation messages; (c) the use of Member States, harmonised transmission types in advance, in a timely manner provide: (i) all the information referred to in paragraph 2.1 (b); (ii) information about the features that affect the position, velocity and time determination accuracy both the PPS and SPS; (iii) the system plan, maintenance schedules or alerts, launch dates, plans, etc. change orbits, according to the current recommendations of the NAVSTAR users (NANU). Recommendation notifications and alerts are provided for the main military contact, which means each Member State. (d) timely and with sufficient precision to provide information to interfaces other than the United States, to develop and produce user devices to be able to connect to the GPS signal in space and with modules that need access to GPS-PPS. Information interfaces may refer to authorised national defense industry to support the Member States ' military objectives. (e) through the foreign military sales (FMS) channels ensure PPS security modules (PPS-SM) and additional output chips (AOC) or combined SM and AOC equipment necessary to access the PPA. Cryptography is the use of the future developed GPS hardware is limited to that which contains the security modules provided by authorized manufacturers. Not allowed new GPS hardware development, software which is used in the PPS security elements. PPS encryption codes are provided in accordance with U.S. National COMSEC policy. The US DOD has the rights to use or distribute the GPS user equipment and encryption codes to non-NATO countries and other areas of hostilities. Special news and information about aspects of the COMSEC is sent or the exchange of existing NATO COMSEC channels. (f) configuration control keep all us programs. Technology changes are approved in the UNITED STATES GIVE the configuration control Board (CCB), taking into account the NAVSTAR GPS STANAG 4294. This STANAG escalation time is assured through three types of force from covering, communications and Electronics Group (TSGC) 4. subgroups. 2.2. each Member State shall: (a) via the relevant national and international bodies active to provide permission to use GPS as an affordable navigation media those military people who want to make GPS navigation or at sea, to ensure their air navigation and precision approach and landing requirements, thus replacing other navigation AIDS, especially to the land-based and VOR/TACAN DME. (b) as soon as possible adopt national decisions on implementation in their GPS's military forces. (c) if the SPA is faced with existing civil navigation requirements, ensure that the relevant civil authority is informed of the potential benefits of the decision to allow GPS to other navigational aids. 2.3. each country not USA: (a) means the main military contacts, receiving notifications and warnings recommendations and further distribute it to his own forces. (b) allow you to use only same military PPA users. Non-military users requests, access to PP, is always GIVING US Secretary of Defense Helper command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), which examines each request individually, through the national defence ministries. 2.4. To the extent that the UNITED STATES is GIVING the right to act without the obligation of third pusēm2, the other Member States are allowed to buy the US GIVES to the user the device developed and related support via FMS procedures when buying from US industrial, commercial, or using a combination of the two options. 2.5. This memorandum of understanding does not determine the US DOD GPS-PPS cryptographic hardware or software technology and project or production information. Any U.S. manufactured PPS-SM, as well as the AOC and joined SM/AOC devices are purchased only from approved U.S. companies using FMS procedures. Countries not in the U.S., is individually responsible for the entire United States GIVES GPS PPS-SM, AOC and AOC devices for combined SM and uzskaitamīb that is bought using FM. The use of such devices in the Simulator and pseidolīto PPA is to identify and control the use of such a reply requesting country not USA. If a country other than the United States, decides to end the use of GPS-PPS, it returned to the UNITED STATES MAKES any such security devices, and withdraw from this memorandum of understanding. Cryptographic hardware, including security codes are assigned in accordance with the US national COMSEC policy. 2.6. when non-U.S., officially adopted, they have the right GPS themselves develop, produce and market the PPS hardware other signatories of this memorandum of understanding, which the UNITED STATES GIVES to this officially designated as authorized users of PP. 2.7. Members recognize that u.s. defense articles and services transfer under this memorandum of understanding takes place under the US arms export control Act (AEC) and other applicable U.S. laws, regulations, policies and procedures. The UNITED STATES GIVES protection sold items and services are provided through the FMS offers and letters of agreement (LOA). If you have any discrepancies between this memorandum of understanding and the introduction of a LO, the upper hand is the time coordinate LO. The General provisions of the LOA is not in question here. 2.8. Not subject to any other provisions of this memorandum of understanding this memorandum of understanding to Member States that had not been the first memorandum of understanding II addition of Member States subject to the following provisions: approach to PPS is achieved by just using the GPS user devices that use PPS-SM or SM/AOC of United devices. 2.9. Other than the USA, you can deploy agents GPS joint program Office (JPO) under a separate procedure for the appointment of staff. 2.10. Technical, operational or policy questions that are related to the GPS, are considered NATO the forum responsible for navigation (i.e., currently 4. subgroup TSGC), does not preclude a bilateral exchange of information as appropriate. Article III of the U.S. DOD 3.1 and Secrecy of countries other than the U.S., COMSEC authorities arrange all aspects of aid the U.S. GIVES COMSEC GPS-PPS program. 3.2. all classified information exchanged or provided under this memorandum of understanding is used, transferred, stored, processed and protected in accordance with Member States ' national information security rules and regulations. You must provide the degree of security that are no less stringent than what is provided to NATO classified information and material in accordance with the document "Secrecy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" CM (55) 15 (final), dated October 1, 1990, and its subsequent amendments. 3.3. the classified information and material is transferred only through official channels or through intergovernmental channels approved by the Member States designated security authority (DSA). To such information and materials are specified in the level of classification, country of origin, the disclosure rules and the fact that this information is related to this memorandum of understanding. 3.4. Each Member State shall take all lawful steps available to it to ensure that, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding provided or prepared classified information will be protected from further disclosure, except as provided in paragraph 3.8, if other Member States do not agree to such disclosure. Therefore, each Member State shall ensure that: (a) the recipient does not pass classified information in third-party Governments, national organizations or other subjects of third pušu3 without the prior written consent of the Member State from which such information was received; (b) the recipient does not use classified information for purposes other than those referred to in this memorandum of understanding. 3.5. the Member States shall investigate each case where you know, or have reason to believe that, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding provided or prepared classified information or materials are lost or disclosed to unauthorized persons. Each Member State shall also promptly and fully inform the other Member States of such cases and the final results of the investigation, as well as on the measures taken to prevent recurrence. 3.6. Member States that conclude contracts classified under this memorandum of understanding, DSA takes responsibility for security measures in its territory to protect the classified information or material in accordance with its laws and regulations. Before any of this in the framework of the memorandum of understanding received disclosure of classified information, the contractor or subcontractors contractors may the receiving Member State: (a) ensure that such contractors, contractors or potential contractors and their objects have the ability to adequately protect the information; (b) provide, where necessary, the right of access to the object (objects); (c) provide, where necessary, access rights, and responsibilities for staff requires access to such information; (d) ensure that personnel having access to information, are aware of the obligation to protect the information in accordance with national information security laws and regulations, as well as the conditions of this memorandum of understanding; (e) periodic security inspections of facilities, having been given access rights to ensure that information is properly protected; (f) ensure that the information is only available to people who need it for the purposes of this memorandum of understanding. 3.7. The DSA set contractors, contractor or subcontractor may, financial, administrative, political or in terms of management control in non-Member States or other foreign bodies can participate in contracts or apakšlīgumo who need access in accordance with the memorandum of understanding provided or prepared classified information, only if there exist real measures to ensure that non-nationals of the Member States or entities do not have access to classified information. If there is not a real measures to ensure that non-nationals of the Member States or entities do not have access to classified information, the Member State concerned shall consult the other Member States before giving such an approach. 3.8. for each object that is used for classified information or material, the Member State responsible or the contractor approved by the designated person or persons responsible for this practical memorandum of understanding information or material contained in such secrecy. These officials are responsible for restricting access to this memorandum of understanding contained classified information or materials to persons who are given access to information. Each Member State shall ensure that access to classified information is limited to persons who have the required access rights and a specific need for access to classified information, to participate in this memorandum of understanding. 3.9. in accordance with the memorandum of understanding provided or prepared classified information or materials may be awarded the degree of security to the hush-hush. The existence of the memorandum of understanding and the content is Not classified. Article IV visit 4.1. All Member States shall allow other Member States ' employees or contractors of other Member States employees to visit government offices, agencies, laboratories and contractor items, provided that the visit is sanctioned them relevant Member States and the staff have the appropriate access permissions and the need for information. 4.2. the visitor staff must respect the safety requirements of the host country. Visitors information provided is considered to be the provision of information to the Member State which visitors sponsored by and be subject to the provisions of this memorandum of understanding. 4.3. One staff member visits another Member State objects aligned through the official channels, and they correspond to existing host country visits procedures. Requests indicates visits the U.S. GIVES GPS Pro-gramm's name. 4.4. List with the staff of each of the Member States who have the need to regularly visit other Member objects, submitted through official channels in accordance with the procedures of international visits. Article v requirements and liability 5.1. Unless specified elsewhere in this memorandum of understanding does not provide otherwise, each Member State shall waive any claims against the other Member States of its personnel and/or damage to property caused by the personnel of the other Member States, in the exercise of official duties in connection with the execution of this memorandum of understanding. However, if such damage occurs in a Member State or its staff irresponsible act or omission, intentional infringements of the provisions or gross negligence, the cost of such liability shall be borne by the Member States alone. 5.2. third party claims for any damage caused by the staff of a Member State, examine and resolve one of the Member States concerned. 5.3. the memorandum of understanding covers only the GPS military use. 5.4 Recognizing 2.1. (a) the provisions of paragraph 1, non-U.S., refuses any claims against the UNITED STATES in connection with the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System defects or malfunctions. Article vi general financial provisions 6.1. in accordance with current US policy in this area, the GPS signal delivery, which the U.S. provides other Member States in accordance with point (a) 2.1, and this signal is free. 6.2. The GPS signal as well according to the use required information (points 2.1. (b), (c), (d) and (f)) is free. However, with the transfer of such information to link costs (for example, transportation or other similar costs) shall be borne by the Member States that have requested it. 6.3. Each Member State shall bear all other costs for your activities in connection with the implementation of this memorandum of understanding: your agent salaries, administrative expenses, travel expenses and other costs of the national. 6.4. The Member States shall ensure that, in the context of the memorandum of understanding are not identified in national taxes, customs duties and other charges, as well as quantitative or qualitative restrictions on imports or exports, except in accordance with the national legislation and the rules of the European Community. If such taxes, duties or other fees are imposed, then they shall be borne by the Member State which has imposed them. If it is necessary to impose customs duties, for the application of EC rules or changes, then the costs shall be borne by the final beneficiary of the EC. Article VII entry into force, duration, amendment, withdrawal, termination, and disputes 7.1. signing this memorandum of understanding shall enter into force on 1 January 1994, with the condition that the US DOD and all other Member States have signed it. After the memorandum of understanding shall enter into force for any other State which is not the United States, the date when each country other than the U.S., sign it. The memorandum of understanding will remain in effect until December 31, 2015. This may be extended by written agreement of all the Member States. 7.2. This memorandum of understanding may be amended at any time with the written consent of all the Member States. 7.3. This memorandum of understanding may be terminated at any time with the written consent of all the Member States. 7.4. any State other than the UNITED STATES who wish to withdraw from this memorandum of understanding, 90 days advance written notice to the other Member States. Member States shall consult the withdrawal to the TSGC 4. subgroups meeting convened before the end of the period of 90 days. If the United States GIVES wishes to withdraw from this memorandum of understanding, it means the termination of this memorandum of understanding, and the following conditions for the termination of the previously discussed between the Member States. 7.5. the Member State shall continue to participate in this memorandum of understanding until the end of the period of notice or the time when it unanimously agrees with all the other Member States, whichever condition is met in the past. A Member State which withdraws until this moment continue to receive information and to use other opportunities resulting from the project. 7.6. The obligations of the Member States relating to confidentiality shall continue to apply to any Member State which withdraws from this memorandum of understanding, and to all the Member States after this memorandum of expiration or termination. 7.7. Any disputes concerning this memorandum of understanding concerning the interpretation or application of Member States addressed only through mutual consultations, resolving not going-but the national or international tribunals or any third puses4. 7.8. the GPS related LO is amended and terminated in accordance with this LO. 7.9. The foregoing shows Member States ' agreement on the issues raised here. Signed in English and French. Both texts are equally authentic. The United States Defense Department signature of John Deutsvārd in Brussels, the place and date of 28.10.1993 Kingdom of Belgium, the National Defense Minister signed v. Bruninvārd in Brussels, the place and date of 28.10.1993 Canadian National Defence Ministry signed Raymond n. Sturgeonvārd in Brussels, 28.10.1993 place and date of signature by the Danish Defence Ministry e. Sørensenvārd in Brussels, 28.10.1993 place and date of the French Republic's Defense Minister signed Benoit Retatvārd in Brussels, 28.10.1993 place and date of the Federal Republic of Germany Defense Minister Gunnar Simonvārd signature in Brussels place and date of 28.10.1993, Italian Minister of defence of the Republic the signature Luciano Melonivārd in Rome, 15.11.1993 place and date of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Defense Minister signed j. Fledderusvārd in Brussels, 28.10.1993 place and date of the Kingdom of Norway, the Defence Ministry's signature in Brussels, 28.10.1993 Øivind Bækkonvārd place and date of the Kingdom of Spain Defense Minister Francisco Arenasvārd signature in Brussels, 28.10.1993 place and date of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Minister M.K. Mcintoshvārd signature in Brussels place and date of 28.10.1993, following the signature by the Member States, having regard to article II, paragraph 2.1: the Hellenic Republic Ministry of Defence signed d. Athanassiovvārd of 28.10.1993 place and date of signature of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland Sverrir h. Gunnlaugssonvārd in Brussels, 27.10.1993 place and date of the national forces of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Ministry of 28.10.1993 n. Leyvārd signature place and date of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Portugal's signature Luis Emilio contributing to the La Silvavārd in Brussels place and date of 28.10.1993, Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defense's signature Iskendervārd in Belgium, Nedim 28.10.1993 place and date annex 2 AC/322 (SC/8) WP (2004) 0002 NATO North Atlantic Council 2001 14 December note AC/322 (SC/8) N/128 NATO C3 Board the navstar GPS Navigation Subcommittee IV of the memorandum of understanding Addendum No. 1 Note 1 Secretary last week, Iceland signed the navstar GPS of the memorandum of Understanding Between no no 1. Appendix IV Appendix No 1 is Now signed by all NATO countries. 2. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are officially granted permission to use the GPS military capabilities. 3. the annexes attached to it all As NAVSTAR GPS IV of the memorandum of understanding Addendum No 1 (signature), j.-p. SAULAY annex 1 AC/322 (SC/8) N/Appendix No 1 to 128 (IV) memorandum of understanding between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Minister of national defence, the Canadian National Defence Ministry, the Danish Ministry of defence, Defence Minister of the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Greece, the Ministry of defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, the Minister of defence of the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Ministry of the national forces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Minister of defence of the Kingdom of Norway, the Ministry of defence The Portuguese Republic, the Ministry of defence, the Minister of defence of the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defence, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Minister of defence of the United States, the Defense Ministry on the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System 1. this memorandum of understanding by the Member States and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of defence in accordance with article 7.1 and 7.2 of the conditions agreed on rules that would allow the Czech Republic The Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and national defence organizations have the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS)/Precise positioning service (PPS) military lietotājiem5. Therefore: (a) on page 1 under "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Defense Minister" should be added to the "Czech Minister of defence", "the Republic of Hungary, the Defense Minister of the Republic of Poland" and "Minister of defence"; (b) in paragraph (I) of article 1.1 must be added to the "Minister of defence of the Czech Republic", "the Republic of Hungary, the Defense Minister" and "Minister of defence of the Republic of Poland"; (c) of article II (f) in point 2.1 "from three types of covering force communications and Electronics Group (TSGC) 4. Sub" should be replaced by "NATO C3 Board (NC3B) navigation Sub-Committee (Sub-Committee 8)"; (d) of article II, paragraph 2.10 "TSGC 4. Sub" is replaced by "8." Subcommittee NC3B; (e) of article VII, paragraph 7.4 "TSGC 4. Sub" is replaced by "8." Subcommittee NC3B. 2. other (IV) memorandum of understanding contains provisions is not amended. 3. This appendix contains two original copies, one in English and one in French. Both versions are equally authentic. The United States signed A Defence Ministry. Volkmanvārd in Brussels, place and date of 05.05.2001 Kingdom of Belgium, the National Defense Minister Dellourvārd in Brussels, signature place and date of 05.05.2001 Canadian National Defence Ministry signed Alan Williamsvārd in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Danish Ministry of Defence signed j. Hansen-Nordvārd in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 French Republic Defence Minister signature Yves Gleizesvārd in Paris, 29.08.2001 place and date of the Federal Republic of Germany Defense Minister Jorge Kaempfvārd signature in Bonn place and date of 07.07.2001, Italian Minister of defence of the Republic the signature Gianpaolo Di Paolavārd in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Netherlands Defense Minister signed j. Fledderusvārd in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Kingdom of Norway, the Ministry of Defense signature Leif Lindbackvārd in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Kingdom of Spain Defense Minister Miguel Valverde Gomezvārd signature in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Defense Minister Robert Walmsleyvārd signed in Brussels place and date 03.05.2001, such Member States signed this memorandum of understanding, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 2.8: Hellenic Republic Ministry of defence a Meletiosvārd of Issar 03.05.2001 signature place and date signature of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland in Brussels 05.12.2001 Skaldarsonvārd Stefan, the place and date of the national forces of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Ministry of Nicolas Leyvārd signed in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Portuguese Republic Ministry of Defence signed Antonio Cavalier de Ferreiravārd in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defense's signature Getinkayavārd Solih in Ankara place and date of 12.10.2001, Czech Defense Minister Jiri Soldatvārd signature in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Republic of Hungary Defense Minister Janos Karadvārd signature in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 Polish Defense Minister Grzegorz Wisniewskivārd signature in Brussels, the place and date 03.05.2001 annex 2 AC/322 (SC/8) N/128 addition no. 2 to memorandum of understanding between the IV of the Kingdom of Belgium Minister of national defence, the Canadian National Defence Ministry The Danish Ministry of defence, Defence Minister of the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Greece, the Ministry of defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, the Minister of defence of the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg national force, the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence Ministers, the Ministry of defence of the Kingdom of Norway, the Defence Ministry of the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Minister of defence of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defence, Minister of defence of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Defence Minister, Minister of defence of the Republic of Poland, the , The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Minister of defence of the United States, the Defense Ministry on the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System 1. this memorandum of Understanding Between the Member States and the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Slovenia, the Ministry of defence in accordance with article 7.1 and 7.2 of the conditions agreed on rules that would allow the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia The Republic of Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Slovenia national defence organizations have the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS)/Precise positioning service (PPS) military lietotājiem6. Therefore: (a) on page 1 under "Republic of Poland Defense Minister" should be added to the "Minister of defence of the Republic of Bulgaria", "Defence Minister of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia" Defence Minister "," Defence Minister of the Republic of Lithuania "," Romanian Defense Minister "," Slovak Defense Minister "and" Minister of defence of the Republic of Slovenia; (b) in paragraph (I) of article 1.1 must be added to the "Minister of defence of the Republic of Bulgaria", "Defence Minister of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia" Defence Minister "," Defence Minister of the Republic of Lithuania "," Romanian Defense Minister "," Slovak Defense Minister "and" Minister of defence of the Republic of Slovenia ". 2. other no IV and no no 1 in Appendix IV contains provisions not be amended. 3. This appendix contains two original copies, one in English and one in French. Both versions are equally authentic. The United States Department of ValstuAizsardzīb signature name place and date of the Kingdom of Belgium, the National Defense Minister signature name place and date of Canada's signature of the National Defence Ministry name place and date of signature by the Danish Defence Ministry name place and date of the French Minister of defence of the Republic the signature name place and date of the Federal Republic of Germany Defense Minister signature name place and date of the Italian Minister of defence of the Republic the signature name, location and date of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Defense Minister signature name place and date of the Kingdom of Norway, the Ministry of Defence signed the word place date of the Kingdom of Spain and the Defense Minister of the name signature place and date of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Minister signature name place and date of the following Member States have signed this memorandum of understanding, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 2.8: Hellenic Republic Ministry of Defence signed name place and date of the signature of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland name place and date of the national forces of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Ministry of the word signature place and date of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Portugal's signature name place and date of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of national defense's signature name place and date The Czech Republic's Defense Minister signed the name place and date of the Republic of Hungary, the Defense Minister of the name signature place and date of the Polish Defence Minister signature name place and date of the Republic of Bulgaria Defence Minister signature name place and date of the Republic of Estonia Minister of Defence signed name place and date of the Latvian Defense Minister signature name place and date of the Republic of Lithuania, the Defense Minister of the name signature place and date of signature of the Romanian Defense Minister name place and date of the Defence Minister of the Slovak Republic signed the name place and date Defence Ministers of the Republic of Slovenia signed the name place and date 1 military user is a public body, subject to the individual Member State, the Ministry of Defence. This memorandum of understanding military users in Iceland are government organizations (such as the coast guard, Civil Aviation Administration), which works for the protection and security purposes under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 third party is any entity other than the signer. 3 see. 2.4. point 4. 2.4. point. 5 military user is a public body, subject to the individual Member State, the Ministry of Defence. This memorandum of understanding military users in Iceland are government organizations (such as the coast guard, Civil Aviation Administration), which works for the protection and security purposes under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6 military user is a public body, subject to the individual Member State, the Ministry of Defence. This memorandum of understanding military users in Iceland are government organizations (such as the coast guard, Civil Aviation Administration), which works for the protection and security purposes under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.