Key Benefits:
the final for "among others" testing the legislation against the Invite-
Invite Basic State of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 "; the nearly identical terms
found in Section 9 of the paragraph (1) Invite-
Invite Number 12 Year 2011 on Formation of Regulation
The Invitation that says "In terms of the Act
allegedly in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of the Republic
Indonesia of 1945, its condemnation was carried out by the Court
Constitution";
4. Based on descriptions 1 to 4 above, there is no
any doubt for the applicant to conclude, that
the Constitutional Court is authorized to prosecute the application
of the testing of the Act, as Please in
Request this.
II. THE APPLICANT HAS A LEGAL POSITION (LEGAL STANDING) TO APPLY FOR THIS INVITE-INVITE TEST 1. That Section 51 paragraph (1) Act No. 24 of 2003
on the Constitutional Court says that the applicant testing
The Act is " a party that considers the right and/or
of the constitutional authority being harmed by the Invite-
invite "in case a" individual of the country
5
Indonesia ". Furthermore, in an explanation of Article 51 of the paragraph (1)
it is mentioned that the constitutional right "is
" rights governed in the Constitution of the Republic of the Republic
Indonesia Year 1945;
2. That jurisprudence remains the Constitutional Court as it
is changed in the Decree No. 006 /PUU-III/2005 juncto Putermination
Number 11 /PUU-V/2007 and subsequent rulings have
provided the comulative understanding and limitation. about what
referred to "constitutional losses" by the enactment of a
norm of the Act, i.e.: (1) The applicant ' s constitutional right
granted by the Republic of the Republic Basic Law
Indonesia In 1945; (2) That the constitutional right
is considered by the applicant have been harmed by an Act
which is tested; (3) the intended constitutional loss
is specific (special) and actual, or at least be
a potential that according to reasonable reasoning may be It is confirmed that
occurs; (4) Adanya the causal relationship (causal verband) between
the loss and the enactment of the Act to
be tested; and (5) Adanya is likely that by obscured
invocation, then the controlled constitutional loss will not be
or no longer occurred;
3. That in conjunction with this plea, the applicant
confirms that the applicant has the constitutional rights that
granted by the 1945 Constitution, whether direct or indirect
is not direct. The direct constitutional right is between
another is the right of recognition, assurance, protection and certainty
fair law as well as the same treatment before the law,
as set in Section 28D paragraph (1) of the Constitution 1945. In addition to
the right, the applicant also has the right to a sense of security and
protection of the threat of fear to do something or not
doing something that is the applicant's right to be guaranteed
by Article 28G verse (1) UUD 1945;
4. That in addition to constitutional rights expressly
provided by UUD 1945 to the applicant as described
6
in the 3 above, the applicant also has constitutional rights
which was given indirectly by the 1945 Constitution. Rights
constitutionally granted constitutional, revocable
of understanding or refinement to one of the states ' principles,
the statement that "The State of Indonesia is a legal country"
as is set forth in Article 1 of the paragraph (3) of the Constitution of 1945. Wrong
one state of the law, first formulated by A.V. Dicey
and then generally accepted, is the recognition
of human rights and the presence of recognition of "due
process of law" in the presence of a right and fair vetting process,
in case if one time a citizen, must be confronted
directly with his own country's law enforcement apparatus because
he was allegedly involved in a A felony. Rights like this deliberately
are given to each person, widest to a citizen
state, given when one is declared a suspect
A criminal offense, he is in a weak position facing
with the state law enforcement apparatus that has
authorized the authority among others to withstand, interrogate,
prosecute and execute court rulings. In practice,
a suspect, a defendant or a convict, often helpless
facing a law enforcement apparatus that sometimes acts
the wenanges;
5. That to ensure legal certainty, guarantees a person free
of the fear of doing or not doing something to be
his right and guarantees a "due process of law" which is right and
fair, then the law of the show The criminal used in the entire process
examination, ranging from investigation, inquiry, prosecution and
execution of court rulings, must be
guarantees the constitutional rights of a person who has been
given by UUD 1945. The laws of criminal events that apply in the country
this, now known as the Code of Law
The Criminal Event (KUHAP) contained in Law No. 8
In 1981, once it contained a guarantee of legal certainty,
loading a person's free guarantee of fear to do
7
something or does not do something in its right, and
guarantees the same "due process of law" which is a process of vetting
that is fair and correct. The norm of the Act must flow from
The Basic Law. Only then this country
may be referred to as "constitutional state" which is the country that
upholds its Dasts Act;
6. That in line with the warranty of the "due process of law" which
is guaranteed by Article 1 of the paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, then conceptionally,
The applicant understands that if one time the applicant
is charged for committing a follow-up criminal and be decided guilty and
already have a fixed legal force (inkracht van gewijsde),
but the court ruling did not meet the provisions as
set in Article 197 of the paragraph (1) the letter k KUHAP, then according to
provisions of paragraph (2) of the section, such ruling is "void
for the sake of law". If the ruling is "null and void", then according to
the applicant's understanding, that ruling should be considered never
exists and thus cannot be executed by anyone elseevel and
the last of which is final is final to test the Act
4
against the Basic Law. Article 10 of the paragraph (1) of the letter a Invite-
Invite Number 24 Year 2003 on the Constitutional Court
as amended by Act Number 8 of the Year
2011 on Changes to the Law Number 24 Year 2003
about The Constitutional Court affirmed the same, that
mentions the Constitutional Court in authority to prosecute in
the first and last level of which the verdict is final, among others
" tests the Act against "The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945".
3. That in addition to the norm that has been put forth in the number 2 above,
Act No. 48 of the Year 2009 on Power
The judiciary also states: " Constitutional Court of authority
prosecute uences if the order is not
listed, then the ruling the court is null and void.
Thus, it is not true that Trimoelja's opinion that the order
for the defendant to be detained or remain in custody in Article 197 of the paragraph
(1) the letter k is of a discretionary. If it is
discretionary, then there will be no norm in Article 197
paragraph (2) of the KUHAP which says that if the provisions of Article 197
paragraph (1) the letter of the k is not listed, then the result of the ruling is
Cancel for the law. As such, the requirement of an idation verdict
lists the order for the defendant to be held, remaining in custody
or release is not a recidiver, but is
imperatives or is mandatory, which is a must or
obligations to be implemented;
9. That by remembering that to specify the provision
Article 197 paragraph (1) of the letter k in any ruling ruling is
the command is imperative, then the examination process
the case is complete. The command is, however, distinct from the
issuing a restraining order for interest
a case check that is limited in time by the KUHAP.
Your term of detention which is the authority of the judge
at every level of examination everything has been exceeded and
the accused must be removed from custody by law, then if
the word " the order is for the defendant detained or remain in custody "
must be contained in a court ruling, then by itself
the order becomes a counteract against the law. Because of this,
the word "withheld" or "stay in custody" in Article 197 paragraph (1)
the letter k must be interpreted as an order to perform
execution of a pretrial ruling;
10. That in the applicant, the term "withheld" or "remains in
the prisoner" in Article 197 of the paragraph (1) the letter k of the KUHAP is different
18
meaning with the term "detention" as defined
in Article 1 of the number 21 and Section 26, 27 and 28 of the KUHAP. The term
"withheld" or "stay in custody" is a process for
carrying out the ruling ruling according to criminal sanctions
which was dropped. If the defendant is sentenced to temporary imprisonment
the accused is outside, then to the prosecutor is instructed to
"hold" the defendant and then submit it to the Head
Correctional Institution. If the defendant is held at the time
the criminal is dropped, then the prosecutor is ordered to remain
put the accused in custody, and the subsequent verdict
is executed by changing the defendant's prisoner status to
convicts. Similarly, if the defendant is sentenced
the death penalty, while the defendant is outside, then to him
is ordered to be held to serve the execution of the death penalty.
If the defendant is in custody, then The detention was
continued until the execution of the death penalty was executed;
11. That the constituent of the KUHAP is like a lack of a term for
calling the follow-up to the ruling that was dropped by
the court, which should use the term "withheld" or
"remain in custody" with intent. as an order to the prosecutor
to execute one of the known types of idlers in
KUHAP in accordance with the ditum of the diidanaan verdict. With
understand the term "withheld" or "stay in custody" as
order execution, then the order becomes logical, because without
there is a judge's order to execute the judgment of the idleper, then
the prosecutor is not have any legal basis to execute
the verdict. This circumstance is the same as uninitiated
provisions to be contained in the ruling ruling
as set out in Article 197 of the paragraph (1) KUHAP, for example not
lists the name, age, job, address, nationality
the convicted person, then who should be executed? If
does not list how many years of prison criminal charges are dropped,
then how will the prosecutor execute that verdict? Because of that,
19
unstated provisions of Article 197 of the Criminal Code are
logically if the ruling is declared "null and void";
12. That the KUHAP has clearly governed the authority-
the authority of the law enforcement apparatus in the criminal justice system
Indonesia. The KUHAP has governed clearly the authority
investigators and investigators, that is until the completion of the entire process
the investigation when the suspect, legal reasons and the evidence tools have been
assembled so that the investigation process is declared Done. Next
the investigator ' s authority shifted to the public prosecutor in charge
bestoting the matter and committing the prosecution to the court.
Next a judge on any level of judicial authority to
prosecute the case Which is not a public prosecutor. Once
The Judge's Assembly cut off the case and its verdict has
The power of the law remains, hence the judge's authority in handling
the case is over. Further authority turned to the prosecutor
as an executor of the court ruling as set in
Article 270 of the KUHAP that says " Execution of the ruling
The court that has had the legal power to remain in place
by the Prosecutor, who for that Panitera sent a copy of the verdict letter
to him ";
13. That in connection with what is described in the number 10 in the
top, the question then is, whether in terms of the ruling
the court was "null and void" would the Attorney also be obliged
carry out that ruling? Is the implication of the verdict null and void
law? If the verdict is null and void at the Court level
High, is it thus the ruling that has the power
the law remains the previous ruling, the Court's ruling
The country? Whether or not if the ruling is void for the law it occurs in
the review rate of Review is returned, then the applicable is
the verdict at the Kasasi level? KUHAP does not provide any of the above arrangements
this issue, so there is a legal vacuum. Kevakuman
such laws are soot in the absence of certainty
the law harms the constitutional rights of every person in the country
this;
20
14. That against the term "verdict void for the sake of law" itself, KUHAP
does not provide any explanation. Criminal jurists such as
Yahya Harahap means the verdict null and void is
a ruling that has originally been thought to never exist (never existed)
so it does not have any power "legally null and void"
or"van rechtswege neiting". Thus, such a ruling
cannot be executed by the prosecutor as the executor of the ruling
the court. Dr. Rudi Satrio in his research of the null verdict
by law, suggested that, by null and void
the law of a court ruling did not specify
the provisions contained n the judge does not need to withhold the defendant. In this context,
the opinion of Trimoelja D. Soerjadi is the correct one, the act
17
issuing a restraining order is the authority
the judge ' s discretionary in the context of the case checks;
8. That the term "withheld" or "remain in custody" in Article 197
paragraph (1) of the letter k of the KUHAP is something that should be listed
in the ruling ruling, with the conseq in Article 197 of the paragraph (1) KUHAP, then which
applies and has an ecsequtorial legal power is the ruling
that existed before. If the ruling is null and void
occurs at the level of the Cassation ruling, then the prevailing is
the verdict on the high court or state court, if
against that case, it is directly to the case without through
stage of appeal. In the applicant, the second opinion of the criminal expert
this further guarantees the legal certainty and guarantees the presence of "due
process of law" as provided in Article 1 of the paragraph (3) and the Article
28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution;
15. That in the Treatise of the Supreme Court's National Assembly
Republic of Indonesia With the Jajteachings of the Court of Appeal From
Four Judicial Environment All over Indonesia held
in Palembang from 6 to 10 October 2009 that
titled SOLVING LEGAL PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE AT
PN/PT CRIMINAL FIELD, page 12, over the issue
laws filed by the High Court (PT) Jambi are
questions, " be justified if in the ruling Judge
declare that the accused is proven lawfully and assured
guilty of committing a felony and sentenced to a prison criminal
against the accused, but there is no amar ruling about the order
so that the defendant is detained or remains held in custody or
acquitted, The solution is clear, that is: not justified
due to the ruling ruling should contain an order to
21
The defendant is detained or remains in custody or released
(Article 197 paragraph (1) of the letter k KUHAP). If this is not satisfied then the verdict is null and void (Evidence P-11);
16. That refers to the Treatise on the Working Meeting of the Commission III of the House of Representatives
People of the Republic of Indonesia with the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia
on 11 June 2012 that discussed actual issues
related to the task and authority of the Attorney General, above
questions of the Commission III of the House of Representatives requesting the Attorney General's explanation
regarding execution of the court ruling that
a force of law remains, but there are some flaws
(defect) as it is not in accordance with the legal provisions of the criminal event
(Poaks of the Purifiable Number 7), the Attorney General granted
an explanation that as long as it was found in some of the Supreme Court's "Supreme Court" that did not list "orders for the defendant to be detained
or remain in custody" as set out in Article 197 of the verse
(1) the letter k of the Code of KUHAP, however such an MA termination
was never disputed and was never a constraint
for the Prosecutor to conduct an execution of the ruling
(Number 16). The Commission II of Representatives meeting concluded that,
"The Commission III of the House urged the Attorney General to pay attention to the layout
the manner and deadline of execution of the execution of the court ruling
in accordance with the provisions of Article 197 of the Criminal Code" (Decision/Conclusion
Number 2) (Proof P-12); 17. That the formulation of the legal norms of criminal law and criminal event law
must be rigid, rigid, and should not contain the nature
of multitapsir, given the norms of criminal law closely related
with the recognition of human rights. With the norm of criminal law
and the law of the criminal event in effect, one can be called
to be examined, detained, forfeiture, until charged to
the court with the legal threat from the lightest to
The death penalty. Enforcement of criminal law and criminal event law
carried out by law enforcement apparatus acting on behalf of
state in conducting examination, arrest, detention,
demanding until carrying out the execution of a court ruling Which
22
has a fixed power. Therefore, if the norm of criminal law
and the law of the criminal event are multitaped, it would
bring implications for the arbitrary arbitrariness of
the name of the country against its own citizens. The action
arbitrariness such as that is contrary to the state principle
law and justice, as well as contrary to the principle of recognition
against human rights as set in the Constitution of 1945.
The applicant argues the norm Article 197 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of KUHAP
as has been suggested above cannot be kept-
is continuously multicultural, in order that it may be able to guarantee
"due process of law", fair legal certainty, as well as guarantee the right
any person is free of fear to do or not to do
something which is its constitutional right;
18. That of the description put forth in the number 1 to the
number 15 above, it is clear that the norm Article 197 paragraph (1) letter k
and paragraph (2) of the KUHAP contain a multitapic nature, so
eliminates the asas of legal certainty as set out in
Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The multicultural norm
also eliminates the existence of "due process of law" that is the process
a fair and correct examination in criminal event law, and
giving the opportunity to law enforcement authorities, in the case of the law enforcement agency. this is the prosecutor
as executor of the court ruling, in order to make an authority-
the authority to a person. Norm of the Act that is
and eliminates "due process of law" and opens
the door for the arbitrariness of the law enforcement apparatus is
contrary to the legal state principle as set in
Article 1 of the paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution. Norm Article 197 paragraph (1) letter k and verse
(2) The KUHAP has also led to a loss of safe taste and
instead raises fear for someone to do
something or do not do something in its right
as guaranteed by Article 28G paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution;
IV. Conclusion Before it comes to this request, allow
The applicant to address the conclusion of the whole description and
23
The applicant ' s arguments are expected in this plea
as follows:
1. The applicant pleads to the Constitutional Court to test the norm
Article 197 paragraph (1) of the letter k and paragraph (2) Act Number 8 of the Year
1981 on the Law of Criminal Events against Article 1 of paragraph (3), Article
28D paragraph (1), and Section 28G verse (1) Country Basic Law
Republic of Indonesia Year 1945;
2. The applicant has constitutional rights as guaranteed in
Article 1 of paragraph (3), Article 28D paragraph (1), and Article 28G of the paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution,
and that constitutional rights have been congruently discrete and
factual has been aggrieved by the enactment of the norm Article 197 paragraph (1)
letter k and verse (2) Act Number 8 of the Year of 1981 on
The Criminal Event Law eliminate asas " due process of law",
gives rise to legal uncertainty, and leads to loss of feel
safe and raises fears to do or not to do
something, all of which is constitutional rights
provided by UUD 1945 to the applicant. As it is, the applicant
has a legal position or legal standing to submit e cassation or the ruling that the PK is pleading for.
2.2. In casu, PK judicial ruling Number 157 PK/Pid Sus/2011 dated
September 16, 2011, "rejected" PK plea filed
The defendant HPR against the case of the Cassation Number 1444 K/Pid
Sus/2010 dated October 08, 2010. Then according to the yusticial technicality:
the PK judicial ruling, "approving" and
"justify" the opinion and consideration that
is put forth in the K/Pid Number of Cassation of Cassation
Sus/2010 is referred to;
• It's "violation" of the provisions
Section 197 of the paragraph (1) letter k of the KUHAP, so according to Section 197
paragraph (2) KUHAP, the case from the original "void for
law" and "limit" is "absolute
absolut/absolute";
Meaning, according to the yusticial technical , PK judicial ruling Number 157
PK/Pid.Sus/ 2011 which "reject the HPR Defendant PK",
"agrees" and "justifies" the full violation of
Section 197 of the paragraph (1) of the letter k KUHAP attached to the Putermination
Cassation Number 1444 K/Pid Sus/2010. In other words, the ruling PK
No. 157 PK/Pid.Sus/ 2011 approved and justified
"breach" and "breach" attached to the Cassation
No. 1444 K/Pid.Sus/2010.
2.3. The ruling PK No. 157 PK/Pid.Sus/ 2011
must "correct" and "straighten" errors and errors
as well as the breach inherent in the Cassation of Cassation Number 1444
K/Pid.Sus/ 2010 dated October 08, 2010. The way it should be
done the PK judiciary in order for the Cassation Number 1444
K/Pid.Sus/ 2010 changed to "valid verdict" (wettig, lawful)
is:
31
1) PK Number 157 PK/Pid.Sus/ 2011 must be "correcting"
and "straighten" the fault/error of the breach
Section 197 paragraph (1) letter k KUHAP attached to the verdict
the case;
2) The way "correction" and its "concern" should be done
The PK Judiciary in the ruling Number 157 PK/Pid.Sus/ 2011,
is as follows:
a) PROSECUTING: "ACCEPT PK
Defendant HPR";
b) Next PK Ruling Number 157 PK/Pid.Sus/2011,
"Canceling" The Number Of Kasation Numbers 1444 K/Pid.Sus/
2010 dated October 08, 2010 referred to;
c) In conjunction with the "cancellation" of the case of the case,
The Judiciary of the PK "PROSECUTING ITSELF" with amar:
(1) Declared the HPR Defects to be legally proven and
(2) Convicted HPR Defendant with prison criminal
(3) In order to ...
(3) Defendant HPR Defendants pay a fine
amounting to ...
....(4) ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT HPR
DETAINED (according to the ordered Article
197 paragraph (1) of the letter k KUHAP)
2.4. The application of law enforcement is "CORRECTING" and
"righting" the null verdict, as not
lists the provisions of Article 197 paragraph (1) of the letter k KUHAP in
the ruling ruling, among other things described and asserted in
Putermination of MA Number 169 k/Pid/1988 dated March 17, 1988 which
states in consideration: "High Court is wrong
applying law for not listing" STATUS
TAHRIGHT " The defendant as referred to Article 197 of the paragraph
(1) the sub b and the sub k KUHAP. Therefore, in accordance with Article
32
197 paragraph (2) KUHAP, the High Court ruling must:
"DECLARED NULL AND VOID" (capital letter of the Expert);
Next consideration it says further:
"That in such a case it should be the Court Height
was ordered again to disconnect the case, but
considering the High Court already checked the case
and given the Supreme Court justice, the Supreme Court
will judgment itself
That by due reason the Court ' s ruling Height as well as
consideration of the State Court's ruling of its evidence
indictment, by the Supreme Court is judged to be appropriate and correct
then the charges against I and II should be declared legitimate and
assuring that the defendant should be convicted"
(See, Yurisprudence MA RI, PT Pilar Yuris Ultima, Volume IV, Criminal
General, Jakarta 209, h. 702)
Can be seen, in this case MA at the level of cassation
"CANCEL" the ruling Judex Facti (High Court).
Next "CORRECTING" and "righting" violation
conducted Judex Facti against Section 197 paragraph (1) letter k
KUHAP by means of the provisions of Article 197 paragraph (1)
letter k KUHAP in amar ruling which reads:
"Requires the defendant to remain in custody". Amar
this corresponds to the fact, that at the time of the cassation verdict
dropped, the defendant was in custody.
2.5. Reject from the case of the Putermination MA No. 169 K/Pid/1988 that
described above is linked to the case of the Terdakwa/
Criminal HPR Number 1444 K/Pid.Sus/ 2010 dated 08 October
2010 juncto ruling PK Number 157 PK/ Pid.Sus/2011 dated 16
September 2011, may be withdrawn by the following legal constructions:
1) The MA of the Law at the level of Number 1444 K/Pid Cassation. Sus/2010
has "cancelled" the ruling Judex Facti (in this case
canceling the ruling PN Banjarmasin Number
1425 /Pid.Sus/2009/PN Bjm dated 19 April 2009) which
"freed" the HPR Defendant of the entire indictment and
33
in conjunction with the cancellation it "punished" HPR with
prison criminal;
2) However at the time the case was dropped, the defendant HPR
"not in custody". Since it is based on
the provisions of Article 197 paragraph (1) of the letter k KUHAP, the case of the case
should list an amar: "Command of the Defendant
HPR to be withheld". But it turns out that what was ordered
Article 197 of the paragraph (1) the letter k of the KUHAP is not met and
is not adhered to MA in the case of the case. As such
by Article 197 of the paragraph (2) KUHAP, Putermination Number
1444 K/Pid.Sus/ 2010 dated October 08, 2010 it was from the beginning
"Cancel for the Law";
3) Apparently a PK Request was filed against HPR
"REJECTED" by the Justice of the PK. Whereas if the Judiciary PK wants
"CORRECTING" and "STRAIGHTEN" The Discourse of Numbers
1444 K/Pid.Sus/ 2010 to not contradict
Article 197 paragraph (1) letter k KUHAP, should the Putermination PK
No. 157 PK/ Pid.Sus/2011 must follow enforcement
the law applied in MA Putermination Number 169
K/Pid/1988 is in the way:
(1) "Received" Plea PK Defendant HPR;
(2) Next "cancel" Termination of Cassation No. 1444
K/Pid Sus/2010; and
(3) Concurrent with it, PROSECUTE ITSELF:
i) Says the HPR Defendants are proven to be legitimate and
convinces to commit a criminal offens of "the cassation that refuses" The defendant's request
The defendant or JPU contains the juridical meaning that MA as
Judex Juris at the rate of "approve" and "justify"
the verdict of Judex Facti;
30
The same is the case in an extraordinary legal effort. The PK judicial ruling
that "rejects" the defendant's PK Plea, contains the meaning
yuridis, that the Judiciary of the PK, "agrees" and
"justify" the ruling of th nducting detention or
continued detention and or changing the status of the prisoner after
the device was remedied by investigators;
d. created an indictment letter;
e. Delegate a question to the court;
f. Send a notification to the defendant about the provisions
The day and the timing of the matter with the call letter,
either to the defendant or to the witness, to come at
the trial has been determined;
g. conducting the prosecution;
h. CLOSING THE MATTER FOR THE SAKE OF THE LAW; i. hold other actions in the scope of duty and responsibility
as a public prosecutor according to the provisions of this Act;
j. exercised the assignment of the judge.
10. Issuing a prisoner for the law, due to a prison term Article 24
65
(1) The restraining order provided by the investigator as
referred to in Article 20, applies only to the longest of twenty
days.
(2) The term as such in paragraph (1) if
is required in the interest of an uncompleted examination, may be extended by the public prosecutor who is authorized to
at most forty days.
(3) The provisions such as those in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) do not close the possibility of the suspect from custody prior to the end of such detention, if the examination interest is fulfilled.
(4) After a time of sixty days, investigators must already issue a suspect out of custody for the sake of the law.
Section 25
(1) The restraining order provided by the public prosecutor
as referred to in Section 20, it only applies the most
for the length of twenty days.
(2) The term as such is in paragraph (1) if
required for the purposes of an uncompleted examination, may be extended by the chairman of the authorized state court
for the most prolonged thirty days.
(3) The provisions as such in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) doesn't close the possibility of the suspect in custody before it ends time. The detention, if the examination of interest is fulfilled.
(4) After the fifty-day time, the public prosecutor must have issued a suspect out of custody for the law.
Article 26
(1) Judge of the Court The country that judges the case as
referred to in Article 84, in the interest of the examination of the authorities issuing a restraining order for the longest thirty days.
(2) The term as such in paragraph (1) if
is required in the interest of an uncompleted examination,
66
may be extended by a state court chairman who
is concerned for at least sixty days.
(3) The provisions as such in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) do not close the possibility of being released. the defendant from custody prior to the end of the detention, if the examination interest is fulfilled.
(4) After ninety days even if the case
has not been broken, the defendant must have been removed from the A PRISONER BY LAW.
Article 27
(1) The judge of the high court that judges the case
referred to in Article 87, in the interest of the appeal of the authorities to issue a restraining order for the longest thirty days.
(2) The term as such in paragraph (1) if
required in the interest of an unfinished check, may be extended by the high court chairman who
is concerned for the longest sixty days.
(3) The provisions as such in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) do not close the possibility of the defendant from custody prior to the end of such detention, if the examination interest is fulfilled.
(4) After ninety days even if the case
has not been severed, the defendant must have been removed from custody for the sake of law.
Article 28
(1) Supreme Court Justice of prosecuting matters as
referred to in Article 88, for the benefit of the examination of the case of the authorities issuing a restraining order for at least twenty days.
(2) The term as such in paragraph (1) if
is required in the interest of an uncompleted examination, may be extended by the Chief Justice for the most
a long time sixty days.
67
(3) The provisions as such in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) do not close the possibility of the defendant from custody prior to the end of such detention, if the examination interest is fulfilled.
(4) After a hundred and ten days of time although the case
has not been severed, the defendant must have been removed from custody for the sake of law.
section 29
(1) is excluded from the term of such detention
in Section 24, Section 25, Section 26, Section 27 and Section 28 for the purposes of examination, the detention of a suspect or defendant may be extended by reason and not
can be avoided due to:
a. A suspect or a defendant is suffering from a physical or
mental illness, as evidenced by the caption letter
doctor, or
b. The case that is being examined is threatened with a criminal
prison nine years or so.
(2) The extension is in paragraph (1) given for the longest
thirty days and in terms of such detention still
is required, can be extended again for at most thirty
days.
(3) The detention extension is on the basis of request and
the examination report in level:
a. The inquiry and prosecution are given by the court chairman
country;
b. examination in a negary court granted by the chairman
high court;
c. A band-check is granted by the Supreme Court;
d. The examination of the cassation is granted by the Chief Justice.
(4) The use of the authority extension of the detention by the official
in paragraph (3) is done in stages and with
full of responsibility.
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(5) The provisions as such in paragraph (2) do not close the possibility of the suspect or the defendant from custody before terminating such detention, if the examination interest is fulfilled.
(6) After sixty days, although the case is not yet
completed or unbroken, the suspect or defendant should be removed from custody for the sake of law.
(7) Against the extension of such detention on paragraph (2)
the suspect or defendant may file an objection in
level:
a. Investigation and prosecution to the high court chairman;
b. State court vetting and appeal hearing
to the Chief Justice.
11. CASE STOPPED BY LAW Article 109
(1) In case investigators have begun conducting an investigation
an event that is a criminal, investigator
notifying it to the public prosecutor.
(2) In terms of The investigator stopped the investigation because there was no
enough evidence or the event turned out to be an
criminal or ase for legal interest by the public prosecutor as referred to in Article 14 of the KUHAP:
Article 14
The general charge has the authority:
a. receive and check the investigation files of the investigator
or the helper investigator;
b. Hold the sentence if there is a deficiency in
the inquiry with regard to the provisions of Article 110 (3)
and paragraph (4), by providing a hint in order
the preparation of the investigation of the investigator;
c. provide the extension of the detention, co the ruling ruling always contains the defendant/penal status because
the authority of the withholds given by The Act or
KUHAP to law enforcement officers and judges, including judges
on the Supreme Court, is over after the court
reciting a ruling containing the idlers. Therefore, KUHAP
governs about the defendant/convict status that must be or mandatory
put into the wrong dictum of the diidation verdict against
the accused. The dictum which contains "the order that the defendant is detained
or remains in custody or is released" as the basis of the law for
the prosecutor as executor to label the contents of the ditum is
order for the defendant to be detained or fixed in custody or
be released. The action of detaining the accused/convict who does not exist
orders that the defendant be detained or remain in custody
dictum of the ruling containing the idlers is doing the deed
against the law is detaining (if previously In no status
arrest) or resume detention (if previously in status
withheld) is charged/convicted of the prosecutor as executor and judge
who no longer has the authority to withhold
is penalized.
3. Regarding the constitutionality of the legal norms contained in Article
197 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) KUHAP, according to Expert, the legal norm that
is contained in Article 197 paragraph (1) and verse (2) of KUHAP already
73
meets legal constructions that provide protection of protection
the laws against the legal rights of a person who are made
charged/convicted under the Basic Law of 1945, by
because, all forms of intelligence the law against the legal norm that
is contained in Section 197 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) KUHAP must be performed
based on the "legal illates" of Article 197 of the Criminal Code, specifically the letter k, and
corroborate and affirm the warranty of legal protection against
the legal rights of a person who is made a defendant/convict who
is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945.
5. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Tahir Azhary, S.H. I. ABOUT LEGAL STANDING PEMOHON
judicially constitutionally, the applicant H. Parlin Riduansyah,
the individual of Indonesian citizens, housed in Sutoyo Street
No. 23, Inner gulf, Banjarmasin, which in this case is represented by
Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, S.H., M. Sc and comrades of Ihza &
Ihza Law Firm as the legal authority of the applicant to the Court
Constitution Concerning Test Applications Materiel Article 197 Act
No. 8 Year 1981 on Criminal Event Law (KUHAP) Against
The Basic Law of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 (UUD
1945), under the provisions set out in Article 51 of the paragraph (1)
Act Number 24 of 2004 on the Constitutional Court (Act
MK) underline Judicially that the Applicant Testing-
Invite is "a party that considers the right and/or authority
its constitutionality is harmed by the law" which in
the letter a mention "the individual of the State of the State". "Indonesia". Therefore the applicant is entitled to have the authority and competence
the law to apply for the Testing of Section 197 of KUHAP
Against the 1945 Constitution.
II. THE ABSOLUTE COMPETENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE APPLICANT THE Constitutional Court in connection with the applicant ' s plea
is in doubt having absolute competence (absolute authority) for
conducting testing The materiel of Article 197 of the KUHAP Against the 1945 Constitution.
74
The absolute authority of the Constitutional Court is definitively set in
the provisions of Article 24C paragraph (1) of the Constitution of 1945 state that the Court
The Constitution of the Constitution is to prosecute at the first and last level which
The verdict is final to test the Act against
The Basic Law. Article 10 paragraph (1) letter a Law Number
24 Years 2003 on the Constitutional Court as amended
with Act No. 8 of 2011 on Change of the Upper Amendment
Act No. 24 of 2003 on the Court Constitution
mentions the Constitutional Court in order to prosecute in
the first and last level of which the verdict is final, among other things,
" testing the legislation against the State Basic Law
Republic 1945-1945. Act Number 48 of the Year 2009
on the General Judicial Act that states "Constitutional Court
authorities prosecute at first and last rate of its verdict
is final to" among others " test the Act "The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945". Therefore, the Constitutional Court has no reason whatsoever
to declare it unable to accept the request of the applicant a quo.
Thus the Constitutional Court is authorized and entitled to
receive, check, consider carefully and
cut off the applicant's request listed below
Number 69 /PUU-X/2012.
III. REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL YURIDIS ON ARTICLE 197 OF THE LAW NUMBER 8 OF 1981 ON THE LAWS OF THE CRIMINAL EVENT 1. Since the law does not provide an autentic interpretation
(official) against Article 197 either paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) KUHAP,
consequently that article a quo is interpreted on the basis of individual perception-
of the Bachelor of Laws.
2. There are two different issues that are interpreted differently: (1)
About against any court ruling (the general judiciary)
the provisions in Article 197 of the paragraph (1) KUHAP apply? Trimoelja D.
Soerjadi, S.H. and Dr. Indrianto Seno Adjie, S.H., M.H. argues
that the provisions in Article 197 paragraph (1) letter a, b, c, d, e, f, h, j, k,
75
and I only apply and bind to the Court ' s severing
the State and the High Court. According to them the Court's ruling
the Great is not bound to the provisions of Article 197 clause (1) of the Criminal Code because
the Supreme Court ruling is the final verdict; (2) About
the position of the ruling void by law as set in
in Article 197 of the paragraph (2) of the former Chief Justice M. Yahya
Harahap, S.H. argues that the definition of the ruling is null and void
the law is the ruling judge a quo never existed or never happened (never ). In addition to Dr. Rudi Satrio, S.H., M.H. argues that the prevailing ruling is the ruling that
earlier that complied the provisions of Article 197 paragraph (1) KUHAP.
In relation to the second interpretation of the jurists namely M. Yahya
Harahap, S.H. and Dr. Rudi Satrio, S.H., M.H., Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza
Mahendra, S.H., M. Sc. in this case acting on behalf of the applicant
provide a comment a positive that reads as follows "At
save the applicant, the opinion of these two Criminal Code
is codified as a matter of the court ruling that must
present in addition to the material contained in Article 197 of the paragraph (1) letter h and I
KUHAP. The verdict is null and void.
cannot be executed and execues a judgment that
void by law including violation of legal norms in the KUHAP
(including deeds against the law).
2. The definition of "order for the defendant to be detained or fixed in
the prisoner or release" contains the contents that in the making of the dictum