Key Benefits:
TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC UNION AND MONETARY
The Constitutional Council was seized by the President of the Republic on 13 July 2012, pursuant to Article 54 of the The Constitution, the question whether authorisation to ratify the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic and Monetary Union, signed in Brussels on 2 March 2012, must be preceded by a revision of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Council,
In view of the Constitution of 4 October 1958, in particular Article 88 (1);
In view ofOrder No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958 Amending Organic Law on the Constitutional Council;
Seen Treaty on European Union;
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the monitoring of budgetary positions and of the Monitoring and coordination of economic policies;
In view of Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 above;
In view of Parliament's Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 European and Council of 16 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 Above;
The rapporteur has been heard;
1. Considering that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic and Monetary Union was signed on 2 March 2012 in Brussels by the Plenipotentiaries of 25 Member States of the European Union; Asked the Constitutional Council to assess whether this Treaty contains a clause contrary to the Constitution;
2. Whereas, according to Article 1, this Treaty is intended to " Strengthening the economic pillar of Economic and Monetary Union ' ; that it applies in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro; that the provisions of Title III, including Articles 3 to 8, lay down a set of rules designed to promote budgetary discipline by means of a ' Fiscal Pact " ; that the provisions of Title IV, including Articles 9 to 11, tend to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and convergence; that the provisions of Title V, including Articles 12 and 13, tend to " Improving the governance of the euro area " ;
3. Considering that Article 2 provides that this Treaty " Shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded '. And it " Shall apply to the extent that it is compatible with those treaties and with the law of the European Union " ; that, under Article 16, the Member States undertake to incorporate the content of the Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union within five years from the date of its entry into force;
On reference standards:
4. Considering that, by the preamble of the 1958 Constitution, the French people solemnly proclaimed " Its commitment to human rights and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the preamble of the 1946 Constitution " ;
5. Considering that, in its article 3, the Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 states that " The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation " ; that Article 3 of the 1958 Constitution provides, in its first paragraph, that " National sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it by their representatives and through the referendum " ;
6. Considering that the preamble to the 1946 Constitution proclaims, in its fourteenth paragraph, that the French Republic is " In accordance with the rules of international public law " And, in its fifteenth paragraph, that " Subject to reciprocity, France consents to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organisation and defence of peace " ;
7. Considering that, in Article 53, the Constitution of 1958 devotes the existence of " Treaties or agreements relating to the international organization " ; that such treaties or agreements may only be ratified or approved by the President of the Republic under a law;
8. Considering that the French Republic participates in the European Union under the conditions laid down in Title XV of the Constitution; that under Article 88-1 of the Constitution: The Republic participates in the European Union, consisting of States which have freely chosen to exercise in common certain of their powers under the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, such as Resulting from the Treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 ' ; that the constituent thus devoted the existence of a legal order of the European Union integrated into the domestic legal order and distinct from the international legal order;
9. Considering that, while confirming the place of the Constitution at the top of the domestic legal order, these constitutional provisions allow France to participate in the creation and development of a permanent European organisation, With legal personality and decision-making powers by means of transfers of powers granted by the Member States;
10. Considering, however, that, where commitments undertaken for that purpose or in close coordination with that purpose contain a clause contrary to the Constitution, challenge the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms or bear Violation of the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty, the authorization to ratify them calls for a constitutional review;
11. Considering that it is in the light of these principles that it is for the Constitutional Council to examine the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic and Monetary Union, which, Based on " The Treaties on which the European Union is founded are not the number of these treaties, but are excluded from the control of conformity with the Constitution those of the provisions of the Treaty which have previously entered into commitments Subscribed by France;
On stipulations relating to " Fiscal Pact " :
12. Considering, on the one hand, that under the first paragraph of Article 20 of the Constitution: The Government shall determine and conduct the policy of the nation " ; that the first paragraph of Article 39 provides that " The legislative initiative is in conjunction with the Prime Minister and members of Parliament " ;
13. Considering, on the other hand, that Article 14 of the 1789 Declaration proclaims that " All citizens have the right to see, by themselves or by their representatives, the need for the public contribution, to consent freely, to monitor their employment, and to determine the quotity, the basis, the recovery and the duration " ; that, in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the 1789 Declaration, the resources and expenses of the State must be presented in a sincere manner; that the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Constitution provides: " Parliament votes the law. It monitors the Government's action. It assesses public policies " ; that the first paragraphs of Articles 47 and 47-1 provide that Parliament shall vote on finance bills and social security financing bills under the conditions laid down by an organic law; that under the terms of the paragraphs Eighteen, ten nine, twenty-one and twenty-two of his article 34: " The financial laws shall determine the resources and expenses of the State under the conditions and under the reserves provided for by an organic
. The financing laws of social security determine the general conditions of its financial equilibrium and, in the light of their revenue forecasts, set its expenditure objectives, under the conditions and on the reserves provided for by a law Organic.
" The multiannual guidelines for public finances are defined by programming laws. They are part of the government's balance of accounts objective.
" The provisions of this Article may be supplemented and specified by an organic law " ;
With regard to the public finance balance rules:
14. Considering that Article 3 (1) of the Treaty strengthens the rules of budgetary discipline of the Contracting States by providing that, in addition to their obligations under the law of the European Union, States undertake that the situation The budget of their public administrations either in balance or in surplus; that (b) of this paragraph 1 defines this situation as the situation in which the " Annual structural balance of public administrations corresponds to the specific medium-term objective for each country, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower structural deficit limit of 0.5 % of the product Gross domestic product at market prices " ; that it provides for the parties to ensure a rapid convergence towards this objective according to a timetable which " Be proposed by the European Commission " ; that (c) and (d) of that paragraph (1) define the cases and conditions in which the requirement of convergence towards that objective may be relaxed, or temporarily in the case of " Exceptional circumstances ", or, within the limit of a structural deficit of up to 1 %," When the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly less than 60 % " And " Risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances are low " ; that (e) provides " A correction mechanism "in case of significant deviations" In relation to the medium-term objective or the adjustment path capable of achieving it ', which imposes on the Contracting State of ' Implement measures to correct these differences over a specified period of time " ;
15. Considering that France is already bound to comply with the requirements arising from Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, relating to the fight against excessive deficits of States, and Protocol No 12, Annexed to the Treaties on the European Union, on the excessive deficit procedure; that these requirements include a reference value of 3 % for the ratio between the planned or actual government deficit and the gross domestic product at prices Market;
16. Considering that the abovementioned Regulation of 7 July 1997 as amended by the regulations of 27 June 2005 and of 16 November 2011 referred to above fixed at-1 % of gross domestic product the medium-term objective of structural balance; that the provisions of paragraph 1 Article 3 of the Treaty reproduces the provisions laid down in those regulations and also lowers from-1 % to-0.5 % of the gross domestic product this medium-term objective; that, in this way, these provisions should be adopted by strengthening the provisions Implementing the commitment of Member States of the European Union to coordinate their Economic policies in accordance with Articles 120 to 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; that they do not carry out transfers of powers in matters of economic or budgetary policy and do not authorise such transfers Transfers; that, no more than the previous commitments of budgetary discipline, that of respecting these new rules does not affect the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty;
With regard to the taking of effect In the national law of the balancing of public finances:
17. Whereas, according to Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty: The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties no later than one year after the entry into force of this Treaty, by means of binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, Or whose full compliance and strict observance throughout the national budgetary processes are guaranteed in some other way. The Contracting Parties shall establish, at national level, the correction mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 (e) on the basis of common principles proposed by the European Commission, in particular the nature, extent and The timetable of the corrective measures to be implemented, including in the event of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence of the institutions responsible, at national level, to verify compliance with the rules laid down in paragraph 1. This correction mechanism fully respects the prerogatives of the national parliaments " ;
18. Considering that, once France has ratified the Treaty and it has entered into force, the rules set out in paragraph 1 of Article 3 will be imposed on it; that France will be, in application of the rule " Pacta sunt servanda ", bound by such stipulations that it shall apply in good faith; that the budgetary position of the public authorities shall be in balance or in surplus under the conditions laid down in the Treaty; The application of article 55 of the Constitution, an authority superior to that of the laws; that it will be for the various organs of the State to ensure within the framework of their respective powers for the application of this Treaty; that the legislator will be In particular in accordance with its provisions in the adoption of the laws of finance and Social security financing laws; Article 3, paragraph 2, also requires the adoption of provisions in national law for the rules set out in paragraph 1 of that article to take effect;
19. Considering that the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 3 contain an alternative according to which the Contracting States undertake to ensure that the rules set out in paragraph 1 of Article 3 take effect in their national law, namely " By means of binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional ", or by means of provisions" Whose full compliance and strict compliance throughout the national budgetary processes are guaranteed in some other way " ;
20. Considering that, in the first part of this alternative, the rules on the balance of public finances must take effect by means of ' Binding and permanent provisions " ; that this option requires the direct introduction of these rules into the domestic legal order so that they are required by the laws of finance and social security financing laws;
21. Considering that the Constitution establishes the prerogatives of the Government and of Parliament in the drafting and adoption of financial laws and social security financing laws; that the principle of annuality of financial laws derives Articles 34 and 47 of the Constitution and apply in the framework of the calendar year; that the direct introduction of binding and permanent provisions requiring compliance with the rules on the balance of public finances requires the Amendment of these constitutional provisions; therefore, if France In accordance with the rules laid down in Article 3, paragraph 1, by means of binding and permanent provisions, the authorisation to ratify the Treaty shall be preceded by a revision of the Constitution;
22. Considering that, in the second part of the alternative, the above-mentioned stipulations give the States the freedom to determine the provisions whose full compliance and strict compliance guarantee " In some other way " That the rules on the balance of public finances take effect in national law; that, in this case, compliance with the rules set out in paragraph 1 of Article 3 is not guaranteed by provisions " Binding " ; on the one hand, it is for the Member States to determine, for the purposes of fulfilling their commitment, the provisions having the effect imposed by paragraph 2; that, on the other hand, the Treaty provides that compliance with the rules set out in paragraph 1 of the Article 3 is not guaranteed in national law by means of a standard of higher authority than that of laws;
23. Whereas this second part of the alternative implies that the provisions adopted to ensure effect of the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 3 shall apply " Throughout the budget process " ; that they must therefore be of a permanent nature; that they must also concern the whole of the Public administrations " ;
24. Considering that the twenty-second paragraph of article 34 of the Constitution provides for the adoption of provisions of an organic nature to establish the framework of programming laws relating to the multiannual financial guidelines That, on that basis and on that of the eighteenth and nineteenth paragraphs of Article 34 of the Constitution with regard to the laws of finance and social security financing laws, the organic legislator may, For the rules set out in Article 3 (1) of the Treaty to take effect in The conditions laid down by this second part of the alternative, adopt provisions governing these laws relating, in particular, to the medium-term objective and to the adjustment path of the budgetary position of the administrations To the public, the correction mechanism of the latter and the independent institutions involved throughout the budgetary process;
25. Considering that the " Correction mechanism " Provided for in paragraph 1 above, which States undertake to implement, shall be " Triggered automatically if significant deviations are found in relation to the medium-term objective or the adjustment path to be achieved." And must have " The obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct those differences over a specified period " ; that the provisions of the Treaty imply that the implementation of this correction mechanism will lead to measures relating to all public administrations, in particular the State, local and regional authorities and social security; Provisions do not define the manner in which this mechanism is to be triggered or the measures to be applied to the implementation of which it is to be carried out; that the Member States have the freedom to define such arrangements and measures in the Respect for their constitutional rules; that the last sentence of the Paragraph 2 that this correction mechanism cannot affect the prerogatives of the national parliaments; that it is not contrary to the free administration of the local authorities or to the constitutional requirements mentioned above;
26. Considering that the independent institutions provided for by the Treaty must verify compliance with all the rules contained in paragraph 1 of Article 3; that their opinion will be on compliance with the rules on budgetary balance and, where appropriate, On the correction mechanism " Triggered automatically " ; that there is no constitutional requirement that one or more independent institutions be charged at the national level to verify compliance with the rules set out in Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Treaty;
27. Considering that the Constitutional Council is responsible for monitoring the conformity with the Constitution of the programming laws relating to the multiannual guidelines on public finances, financial laws and security financing laws Which, in the context of Article 61 of the Constitution, it must, in particular, ensure the sincerity of those laws; that it will have to exercise that control by taking into account the opinion of the independent institutions already in place ;
28. Taking the view that it follows from all the foregoing that, if, in order to comply with the undertaking set out in paragraph 1 of Article 3, France elects to take, on the basis of the second part of the alternative of the first sentence of paragraph 2 Article 3, the organic provisions having the effect imposed by paragraph 2, the authorisation to ratify the Treaty shall not be preceded by a revision of the Constitution;
With regard to Article 8:
29. Considering that Article 8 defines the cases and conditions in which, following a report by the European Commission which concludes that a party has not complied with Article 3, paragraph 2, the Court of Justice of the European Union may Seized by one or more parties to the Treaty; the last sentence of Article 8, paragraph 1, provides that " The judgment of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the parties to the proceedings, which shall take the measures necessary to comply with the judgment within a time limit to be determined by the Court of Justice ' ; that, in the event of a lack of knowledge of the requirements of the Court, it may still be seized by a party to the Treaty in order to impose financial sanctions against that State;
30. Whereas paragraph 2 of Article 3 does not require a revision of the Constitution, the provisions of Article 8 do not have the effect of enabling the Court of Justice of the European Union to assess, in that context, the Conformity of provisions of the Constitution with the provisions of this Treaty; that, if France decides to take effect the rules laid down in Article 3 (1) of the Treaty in accordance with the rules laid down in the second part of the The alternative of the first sentence of Article 3, paragraph 2, Article 8 shall not Infringement of the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty;
As regards the other articles of Title III:
31. Considering that Article 4 deals with the excessive deficit due to non-compliance with the debt criterion; that it contains no provisions contrary to the Constitution;
32. Considering that Article 5 introduces an obligation for a party subject to an excessive deficit procedure to set up a budgetary and economic partnership programme subject to the approval of the Council of the European Union and The Commission; that the existence of such a programme does not have binding consequences on domestic law;
33. Considering that Article 6 provides for the parties to communicate in advance to the Council of the European Union and to the European Commission indications on their plans for public debt issuance; that it only introduces an obligation of information ;
34. Considering that Article 7 stipulates that the parties undertake to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where the Commission considers that a State does not meet the deficit criterion, except if a qualified majority Member States are opposed to the proposed or recommended decision; it contains a simple undertaking to apply a rule of majority which is more binding than that provided for by the law of the European Union in the context of the commitment of the procedure Concerning excessive deficits; that this modification of the rules of decision Applicable does not replace the unanimity rule;
On other terms of the treaty:
35. Considering that the provisions of Title IV, on the coordination of economic policies and convergence, contain commitments relating to measures for the implementation of the Treaties on which the European Union is founded; Title V, on the governance of the euro area, similarly contain commitments concerning this governance; none of these provisions contains a binding new clause which would be in addition to the provisions contained in the Treaties Relating to the European Union and would be contrary to the Constitution;
On the whole treaty:
36. Considering that, for the reasons set out above, under the conditions laid down in recitals 21, 28 and 30, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic and Monetary Union does not contain a clause contrary to Constitution,
Decides:
In the conditions defined in recitals 21, 28 and 30, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance within Economic and Monetary Union, signed on 2 March 2012, does not contain a clause contrary to the Constitution.
This Decision shall be Notified to the President of the Republic and published in the Official Journal From the French Republic.
Issued by the Constitutional Council at its meeting on 9 August 2012, attended by Mr Jean-Louis DEBRÉ, President, Mr Jacques BARROT, Mrs Claire BAZY MALAURIE, MM. Guy CANIVET, Michel CHARASSE, Renaud DENOIX de SAINT MARC, Valéry GISCARD d' ESTAING, Mme Jacqueline de GUILLENCHMIDT, MM. Hubert HAENEL and Pierre STEINMETZ.
The President,
Jean-Louis Debré
