Key Benefits:
President of the Republic,
On the report of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Considering articles 52 to 55 of the Constitution;
Having regard to Act No. 2004-351 of 23 April 2004 authorizing the ratification of the decision of the Council at the level of Heads of State or Government of 21 March 2003 on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the statutes of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank;
Having regard to the amended Decree No. 53-192 of 14 March 1953 concerning the ratification and publication of the international commitments undertaken by France;
Having regard to Decree No. 94-80 of 18 January 1994 on the publication of the Treaty on the European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992;
In view of Decree No. 2003-246 of 18 March 2003 on the publication of the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on the European Union, the treaties establishing the European Community and certain related acts, signed on 26 February 2001,
Decrete:
The decision of the Council at the level of Heads of State or Government of 21 March 2003 on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the statutes of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank will be published in the Official Journal of the French Republic.
The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs are responsible for the execution of this Order, which will be published in the Official Journal of the French Republic.
D E C I S I O N
OF THE UNIVERSAL COUNCIL ON THE STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF 21 MARCH 2003 ON A MODIFICATION OF ARTICLE 10.2 OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANQUES AND THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANQUES
The Council of the European Union, meeting at the level of Heads of State or Government,
Having regard to the statutes of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (see note 1), in particular Article 10.6;
Considering the recommendation of the European Central Bank (see note 2);
Considering the opinion of the European Parliament (see note 3);
In view of the Commission’s opinion (see note 4),
Considering the following:
(1) The enlargement of the euro zone will result in an increase in the number of members of the Board of Governors of the European Central Bank (ECB). It is necessary to preserve the ability of the Board of Governors to make decisions in an efficient and timely manner in an expanded euro area, regardless of the number of Member States that adopt the euro. To do so, the number of Governors with the right to vote must be below the total number of Governors serving on the Board of Governors. A rotation system is a fair, effective and acceptable process to assign voting rights to Governors serving on the Board of Governors. The allocation of fifteen voting rights to governors makes it possible to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the continuity of the current system that includes a balanced distribution of voting rights between the six members of the board and the other members of the Board of Governors and, on the other hand, the need to ensure the effectiveness of the decision-making in a substantially expanded Board of Governors.
(2) In view of their appointment at the European level in accordance with a procedure set out in the Treaty and their role in the ECB whose jurisdiction covers the entire euro area, each member of the Executive Board must maintain a permanent voting right within the Board of Governors.
(3) The voting procedures within the Board of Governors are adapted on the basis of Article 10.6 of the Statutes. Since this article only provides for the amendment of Article 10.2 of the Statutes, the adaptation of the voting procedure does not affect the vote on the decisions taken under Articles 10.3, 10.6 and 41.2 of the Statutes.
(4) The constituent elements of the chosen rotation system reflect five fundamental principles. The "one vote per member" principle, which is the key decision-making principle of the Board of Governors, continues to apply to all members of the Board of Governors entitled to vote. All members of the Board of Governors continue to participate in the meetings of the Board on a personal and independent basis, whether they have the right to vote or not. The rotation system is strong in that it is able to adapt to any enlargement of the euro zone to the maximum number of Member States currently envisaged. In addition, the rotation system avoids situations in which governors with the right to vote come from national central banks (BCN) of member states that, considered globally, are perceived as not representative of the economy of the euro area as a whole. Finally, the rotation system is transparent.
(5) The distribution of Governors in Groups and the allocation of specific numbers of voting rights to these groups are designed so that Governors with the right to vote come from BCN Member States which, as a whole, are representative of the economy of the euro area as a whole. Governors will be entitled to vote on a different frequency depending on the relative size of the economy of the Member State of the concerned BCN within the euro zone. The distribution of the group governors therefore proceeds from a classification of the member states of the concerned BCN based on an indicator with two components: the size of the share of each of the member states of the concerned BCN i) in the total gross domestic product (GDP) at the prices of the Member States that have adopted the euro, and ii) in the aggregate balance of the monetary financial institutions (MIF) of the Member States that have adopted the euro. The economic weight of a Member State as reflected in its GDP at market prices is an appropriate component because the impact of central bank decisions is higher in the Member States whose economy is greater than in those with a smaller economy. Similarly, the size of the financial sector of a Member State is also of particular importance to central bank decisions, as the counterparties of central bank transactions belong to that sector. A weighting of 5/6 is attributed to GDP at market prices and 1/6 to the aggregate balance of IFM. This choice of weights is adequate as it implies that the financial sector is sufficiently and significantly represented.
(6) The installation of the rotation system is carried out in two stages to ensure its smooth running. First, the governors will be divided into two groups, as soon as their number exceeds fifteen. The frequency of the voting rights of the first group governors will not be less than that of the voting rights of the second group governors. Then, when a significant number of new member states become members of the euro zone, i.e. when the number of governors is greater than twenty and one, the governors will be divided into three groups. Within each group, the Governors have the right to vote for the same duration. The detailed terms and conditions of application of these two principles and any decision to defer the application of the rotation system so as to avoid the situation in which the governors of any group have the right to vote on a frequency of 100%, will be adopted by the Board of Governors, ruling by a two-thirds majority of all its members, having or not the right to vote.
(7) The shares of the Member State of each BCN concerned in the total GDP at market prices and in the aggregate balance of the IFM of the Member States that have adopted the euro, will be adapted whenever the total GDP at market prices will be adapted in accordance with Article 29.3 of the statutes, or whenever the number of Governors sitting on the Board of Governors will increase. The new shares resulting from regular adaptations will be taken into consideration on the first day of the following year. When one or more governors become members of the Board of Governors, the reference periods used to calculate the shares of the Member State of the BCN concerned in the total GDP at market prices and in the aggregate aggregate balance of the IFM of the Member States that have adopted the euro, should be identical to those used during the last five-year adaptation of the shares. The new shares resulting from these special adaptations will be considered as of the day the Governors become members of the Board of Governors. These operational details are part of the procedures to be decided by the Board of Governors,
Decides:
Article 1
The statutes of the European Central Bank System and the European Central Bank are amended as follows:
Section 10.2 of the Regulations is replaced by the following text:
"10.2. Each member of the Board of Governors has one vote. From the date on which the number of members of the Board of Governors is greater than twenty and one, each member of the board has one vote and the number of Governors with the right to vote is fifteen. These voting rights are assigned and rotated as follows:
- from the date on which the number of governors is greater than fifteen and until it is twenty-two, the governors are divided into two groups, according to a classification according to the size of the member state of the national central bank concerned in the total gross domestic product at market prices and in the aggregate balance of the monetary financial institutions of the Member States that have adopted the euro. The shares in the total gross domestic product at market prices and in the total aggregate balance sheet of monetary financial institutions are weighted by 5/6 and 1/6 respectively. The first group consists of five governors and the second group of other governors. The frequency of the voting rights of the first group governors is not less than that of the voting rights of the second group governors. Subject to the previous sentence, four voting rights are assigned to the first group and eleven voting rights are assigned to the second group;
- from the date on which the number of governors is twenty-two, the governors are divided into three groups according to a classification based on the above criteria. The first group is composed of five governors and four voting rights are assigned to it. The second group is comprised of half of the total number of governors, with any fraction being rounded to the top integer, and eight voting rights are assigned to it. The third group is composed of the other governors and three voting rights are assigned to it;
- in each group, the governors have their right to vote for the same duration;
- Article 29.2 is applicable to the calculation of shares in the total gross domestic product at market prices. The aggregate balance of monetary financial institutions is calculated in accordance with the statistical framework applicable within the European Community at the time of calculation;
- whenever the total gross domestic product at market prices is adapted in accordance with Article 29.3, or whenever the number of governors increases, the size and/or composition of the groups are adapted in accordance with the above principles;
- the Board of Governors, by a two-thirds majority of all its members, with or without the right to vote, shall take all necessary measures to implement the above-mentioned principles, and may decide to defer the application of the rotation system until the date on which the number of governors is greater than eighteen.
The right to vote is exercised in person. By derogation from this rule, the rules of procedure referred to in section 12.3 may provide that members of the Board of Governors may vote by teleconference. The Regulations also provide that a member of the Board of Governors who is unable to attend meetings of the Board of Governors for a prolonged period of time may designate an alternate to replace him as a member of the Board of Governors.
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be without prejudice to the right to vote of all members of the Board of Governors, whether or not they have the right to vote under articles 10.3, 10.6 and 41.2.
Unless otherwise provided in these statutes, the decisions of the Board of Governors shall be taken by a simple majority of the members entitled to vote. In the event of a vote-sharing, the president's vote is preponderant.
In order for the Board of Governors to vote, the fixed quorum is two thirds of the voting members. If the quorum is not reached, the President may convene an extraordinary meeting during which decisions may be made without that quorum. »
Article 2
1. This decision will be ratified by all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional rules. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic.
2. This decision will enter into force on the first day of the second month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification of the signatory Member State which will proceed to this formality.
Done in Paris, August 13, 2004.
Jacques Chirac
By the President of the Republic:
The Prime Minister,
Jean-Pierre Raffarin
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Michel Barnier
Done in Brussels on 21 March 2003.
by the Council at the level
Heads of State or Government:
The president,
C. Simitis
