Key Benefits:
The Prime Minister,
On the report of the Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry and the Minister of Ecology and Sustainable Development,
Given the environmental code, including the title Ier and the Title IV of book V;
Given the code of public health, in particular Chapter III of Title III of Book III;
Given the Labour Code, in particular Title III of Book II;
In view of Act No. 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on transparency and Safety in nuclear matters, in particular Article 29;
In view of Law No. 2006-739 of 28 June 2006 on the sustainable management of radioactive materials and waste;
In light of Decree No. 63-1228 of 11 December 1963 on the Nuclear installations;
In light of the amended Decree No. 95-540 of 4 May 1995 on the discharge of liquid and gaseous effluents and water withdrawals from basic nuclear installations;
In the light of the decree of 10 August 1984 on the quality of the Design, construction and operation of basic nuclear installations;
In view of the amended decree of 31 December 1999 laying down general technical regulations to prevent and limit nuisance and external risks Arising from the operation of the basic nuclear installations;
In view of the request made on 9 May 2006 by Electricité de France and the files attached to this application;
In view of the record and the record of the public debate held on 19 October 2005 to 18 February 2006;
Due to the results of the public inquiry conducted from 15 June 2006 to 31 July 2006;
In view of the opinion of the inter-ministerial commission of the basic nuclear installations of 8 December 2006;
In view of the opinion of the Authority Of February 16, 2007;
Due to the Minister of Health's assent of March 20, 2007,
Describes:
I. -The characteristics of the
I-1 nuclear boiler. Thermal power of operation
Within the limit of the thermal power of design referred to in Article 1, the Nuclear Safety Authority fixes the maximum operating thermal power by decision Of the nuclear boiler, particularly in view of the results of the reactor start-up tests.
1-2. Nuclear fuel
The nuclear boiler is designed to be able to use fuel with fissile material consisting of either low-enriched uranium-235 or an oxide mixture Of uranium and plutonium oxide.
II. -Accident Prevention
The reactor must be designed, constructed and operated to prevent the occurrence of the following situations:
II-1. The rupture of the components of the primary circuit
and certain pressure pipes
Provisions are made to ensure, throughout the life of the installation, the integrity:
-of the reactor tank, of The envelope of the steam generators as well as the pressure pressurizer and the volutes of the primary pumps of the primary circuit;
-main primary and secondary pipes for which the occurrence of a circumferential rupture doubly Discussed in the security report.
These provisions must cover all of the following aspects:
-the quality of the design and the associated verification;
-the quality of the manufacturing and the associated controls;
-the monitoring in service to render highly improbable not only the appearance of alterations of the equipment questioning the prevention of the different modes of damage but Also the lack of timely detection of these alterations if they were, however, surprising.
II-2. Heart smelting accidents that can lead
to significant early-level radioactive releases
Heart-fusion accidents that can lead to significant early releases are the subject of prevention measures, Based on design provisions, supplemented if necessary by operating provisions, the performance and reliability of which must allow to consider this type of situation as excluded.
The Accidental Situations Identified To date are:
-the merging situations of the heart occurring while the primary circuit is at high pressure;
-the situations of fusion of the heart in the spent fuel deactivation pool;
-the accidents of reactivity Resulting from a rapid introduction into the primary circuit of cold water or water which is insufficiently rich in soluble neutron absorption;
-the situations of fusion of the heart with circumvention of the confinement either via the steam generators or the Circuits connected to the primary circuit leaving the confining enclosure, either when the confining enclosure is opened during the stopping states;
-the global hydrogen detonations as well as the tank steam explosions and An unfired tank that could damage the integrity of the containment enclosure.
III. -
III-1 security core functions. Control of
III-1.1 responsiveness. In the
III-1.1.1 reactor vessel. Monitoring the nuclear reaction
As long as a fuel assembly is present in the tank, the concentration of water in the primary circuit in soluble neutron is continuously monitored.
From then on That the fuel required for the normal operation of the reactor is loaded into the tank, the nuclear reaction is continuously monitored. The means of measurement in place make it possible to carry out this monitoring beyond the thermal power of the design of the reactor.
These means of measurement and the intensity of the associated counting sources are chosen and maintained at a level of Performance such that the operator never has to initiate the water circulation of the primary primary circuit or to initiate the decrease in the concentration of this water in soluble neutron absorbance without having a measurement
The monitoring of the power distribution in the heart is performed by different neutron measurement systems in and out of the heart.
III-1.1.2. The means of control of reactivity
At any level of power, when the heart is critical, the balance sheet of neutron counterreactions must ensure an intrinsically stable behavior in case of excursion of Power.
In particular:
-the fuel temperature coefficient must be negative by design;
-the vacuum coefficient of the primary refrigerant must be negative by design;
-the temperature coefficient of the Moderator must be negative from the hot zero power conditions to the nominal operating conditions; after each load of the nuclear fuel reactor, this point is systematically checked during the physical tests of Restart and, if necessary, a limited number of control arrays can be temporarily inserted into the heart to meet this criterion at the beginning of the cycle.
The heart's reactivity is controlled by two independent means, including One neutron absorbant included in the control clusters, and the other a neutron-soluble absorber in the heart cooling water, provided that at least one of these means is capable of maintaining the subcritical end of the Reactor.
Any deformation of fuel assemblies in normal operation or as a result of a transient, incident or reference accident shall not prevent the collapse of clusters of Command to stop the reactor.
In addition to the system used in normal operation to regulate the neutron absorption concentration of the primary circuit water, the reactivity control function is ensured, without soliciting The opening of the primary primary circuit pressurizer safety valves by another neutron absorbing injection system consisting of two subsystems capable of stopping the reactor as a result of a transient, incident or Reference accident other than primary refrigerant loss.
III-1.1.3. The protection of the reactor
In the case of abnormal changes in the physical parameters linked to reactivity, automatic devices allow the reactor to stop, particularly in the event of a significant exceedance of the power Maximum reactor operating thermal.
III-1.2. In the storage rack
of the fuel under water
The design of the water storage rack for the fuel assemblies must be able to exclude criticality, not only under conditions Storage, but also in the case of a zero concentration of water in the pool with dissolved neutron absorption.
III-2. The cooling of
III-2.1 nuclear fuel. In the
III-2.1.1 reactor vessel. Normal situation cooling
Cooling systems allow for all normal operating situations to ensure that the thermal power of assemblies is permanently removed from the Fuel by ensuring, with sufficient margins, the integrity of these assemblies.
When the primary pumps are in operation, the flow rate of the water in the primary circuit shall ensure a satisfactory discharge of the Heat produced within the fuel assemblies without the force exerted by the circulation of the water adversely affects the maintaining or integrity of the fuel assemblies in the heart.
Situations requiring Design a lowering of the water level in the primary circuit during the stopping states where the heart is in the tank must be defined and justified, as well as the provisions implemented to deal with the associated risks, including the Adequate design margins, instrumentation, and procedures.
III-2.1.2. Cooling Monitoring
As long as a fuel assembly is present in the tank, the primary circuit water inventory and the fuel cooling efficiency are continuously monitored.
III-2.1.3. Protection of the
reactor and backup cooling systems
Automatic devices cause the reactor to shut down in the event of abnormal changes in the physical parameters of the water inventory or The efficiency of the cooling of the heart.
Cooling cooling systems of the heart must allow, for any incident or accident of reference and for the operating conditions with multiple failures considered in The safety report, ensure sufficient water inventory in the primary circuit, and remove residual power from the heart.
Although arrangements are made to prevent the occurrence of a doubly circumferential rupture Discussion of a primary primary pipe, one of the emergency cooling systems shall be able to perform its functions for a breach with a mass flow rate equivalent to that resulting from such a failure.
Water supply back-up system for the steam generators must allow:
-for any reference transient, to ensure the cooling of the primary circuit, then the evacuation of the residual power of the heart;
-for all Incident or accident of reference as well as for operating conditions with multiple failures without total loss of cooling by the secondary circuit, to ensure the cooling of the primary circuit up to the conditions of Operation of a core backup cooling system.
III-2.2. In the
III-2.2.1 water fuel storage rack. Cooling Monitoring
Throughout the operation of the water-fuel storage rack, a monitoring of the water inventory of the swimming pool and the efficiency of its cooling Is always maintained.
III-2.2.2. Cooling facilities
Systems carrying out the water inventory management functions of the rack and cooling pool ensure that the remaining power of the fuel is Storage is permanently evacuated.
Cooling systems have a dimensioned exchange capacity to permanently remove the residual power of the fuel stored by maintaining the water temperature of the Pool of the rail link below its boiling point. They must also be designed to be able to start and operate in a boil water situation of the swimming pool.
Any leak or breach occurring on a circuit likely to carry water from the swimming pool:
- Is considered to be excluded by a set of provisions covering the same aspects as those mentioned in II-1 of this Article;
-should not lead to a direct discovery of the fuel assemblies being handled Or stored in the rack.
For stored assemblies, this absence of discovery must be obtained even in the absence of any isolation action.
In accidental partial emptying situations rendering the suction inoperative Of the water in the swimming pool of the rails by the cooling systems, a water back-up system must allow:
-to avoid the discovery by boiling of the fuel assemblies stored in the rack;
-from Return sufficient water to service a cooling system.
III-3. Containment of radioactive substances
III-3.1. Containment in
by Fuel Pencils
A monitoring of the containment of nuclear fuel radioactive material by the sheathing of fuel crayons is implemented. This monitoring is adapted to the different phases of storage, handling and operation of fuel assemblies on the site.
Only fuel assemblies whose sheathing has been designed and constructed in such a way as to be integrated Under normal operating conditions and during the most probable incident transients can be loaded into the nuclear reactor.
Storage conditions for the fuel assemblies in the deactivation pool must be Ensure the prevention and protection of fuel crayons from damage.
III-3.2. The containment provided by the primary circuit
From the moment the primary circuit is closed, its activity and leaks are continuously monitored and a balance sheet is carried out periodically.
For the Operating situations where the evacuation of the heat from the primary circuit is ensured by the steam generators, an adapted instrumentation is more particularly capable of continuously monitoring the maintenance of the integrity of the primary circuit at the Level of the tubular beam of each steam generator.
In order to reduce the risk of releases to water of the primary circuit in the environment in the event of failure of one or more tubes of steam generators, the pressure of return of the A backup cooling system that provides water injection into the primary circuit in these situations is less than the opening setpoint for secondary circuit protection valves.
III-3.3. Containment by Buildings
The reactor vessel is placed in a containment enclosure comprising:
-a prestressed concrete inner wall coated on its inner face of a sealant skin;
- An annular space maintained at a lower pressure than the outside pressure;
-an outer wall of reinforced concrete protection.
The inner wall of the confining enclosure is designed and constructed to deal in particular with the conditions The temperature and pressure resulting from the complete failure of a primary primary line. It is also designed and carried out in such a way that its integrity is ensured:
-without the short-term need to remove residual power out of the enclosure, including after an accident with fusion of the heart;
-in case An overall explosion of the maximum amount of hydrogen that could be contained within the confining enclosure during a low pressure heart fusion accident.
Any leakage from the inner wall of the containment chamber is Collected and filtered before release into the environment. The activity of these collected and filtered releases is subject to ongoing monitoring and accounting.
With the exception of water and steam crossings at the main secondary circuit, bushings and openings The containment facility leads to peripheral vessels with adequate containment capabilities.
The fluids in the confines of the containment chamber have containment facilities to limit the containment. Release of radioactivity into peripheral buildings. Except for those placed on systems required for the accidental management of accidents, these isolation units either provide for an automatic closing function in the event of an accident or are in a closed position as long as Nuclear fuel is present in the tank.
In order to avoid the crossing of the radiant from the containment chamber in the case of an accident with fusion of the heart, a device for the long-term recovery and cooling of the material Melted radioactive material from the nuclear reactor is in place.
The operator must, throughout the life of the facility, ensure the reliability of the active organs and the overall performance of the containment devices that permit :
-in case of an accident without fusion of the heart, to avoid putting in place measures to protect the population living in the vicinity of the plant;
-in the event of an accident with fusion of the heart at low pressure, of Use only very limited population protection measures in extent and duration.
For this purpose, the seal of each of the walls of the confining enclosure and their bushings is tested prior to the first loading of the Fuel in the reactor vessel, and then periodically monitored. In particular, the internal wall seal controls are carried out by means of tests performed at the sizing pressure.
The building that houses the fuel-water storage rack has:
-systems of Ventilation ensuring its dynamic containment under normal operating conditions and in the event of a handling accident of a fuel assembly;
-a device for detecting leaks resulting from a potential leakage of the Cuvelling of the swimming pool.
This building is also designed to collect any leaks from the swimming pool and pipes connected to this swimming pool.
IV. -The installation protection against internal
risks or caused by its
IV-1 environment. Internal risks
Security systems that are located outside the confining enclosure are divided into divisions that are designed so that the total loss of a division as a result of an event Internal, in particular a fire or flood, shall not prevent the three basic safety functions referred to in III, by postulating a single failure on the systems of the other divisions in accordance with the rules of the Security demonstration for transients, incidents, and reference accidents.
IV-2.
induced risks to the installation environment
Installation design is such that equipment failures and damage to structures likely to result either from natural events or Events related to human activities external to the facility, or likely combinations of these events do not prevent the completion of the three basic security functions referred to in III.
Beyond the cases of charge withheld at The design, the risks induced by the installation environment must not represent, to the commissioning of the facility, a major part of the risk of fusion of the heart, in particular due to the margins of design.
The operator shall be informed of any project resulting in a modification of the environment of its installation in relation to the description of the file attached to the application for an authorisation of creation referred to above and having or may have consequences for Compliance with the provisions of this Order. It shall inform the Nuclear Safety Authority of such projects as soon as possible and shall specify the consequences identified in the light of foreseeable normal and accidental situations.
IV-2.1. The risk of accidental fall of an aircraft
The ability of the facility to perform the three basic safety functions in the event of an accidental fall of aircraft is ensured by geographic separation of systems Redundant, or by physical protection of buildings against the direct and indirect effects of the accidental fall of an aircraft.
Buildings that may contain nuclear fuel, two divisions housing systems In order to ensure the performance of the three basic safety functions referred to in III, the main control room and the reactor fallback station are physically protected by an outer wall of reinforced concrete.
Cases of The design of this wall shall be defined by considering, on the one hand, general aviation traffic and its foreseeable development and, on the other hand, by convention, the accidental fall of a military aircraft.
IV-2.2. The earthquake
The operator shall exhaustively identify the equipment not necessary for the performance of the basic safety functions referred to in III, which, in the event of an earthquake up to the level chosen for the design, May result in equipment failure as required. Depending on the risk of aggression identified, measures are taken either to prevent these risks or to ensure the protection of the necessary equipment.
To cope with the possibility of a long-lasting loss of electrical sources External, all backup power sources must be dimensioned and qualified at the earthquake level chosen for design.
IV-3. The risk of
unavailability in the main control room
The main control room and its habitability provisions are designed to limit the availability of the main control room as much as possible. Causes internal or environment-induced events in the installation.
For situations where the main control room is likely to be unavailable, an accessible, operational, and habitable fallback station allows To ensure:
-the shutdown of the reactor;
-the maintenance and monitoring of the three basic security functions referred to in III.
V. -Qualification of the
participating hardware in the security demonstration
The demonstration must be that the hardware installed in the installation meets the functional requirements assigned to them In relation to their roles in the security demonstration, in the environment conditions associated with the situations for which they are required.
Although arrangements are made to prevent the occurrence of a rupture Doubly debated circumferential of a primary primary pipe, the qualification of the equipment located within the confining enclosure and participating in the demonstration of safety shall take into account the resulting conditions
The education, testing, control, and maintenance provisions are defined and implemented in order to ensure the durability of equipment qualification in accidental situations.
VI. -Control the impact of the installation
on the populations and the
VI-1 environment. Water Levies and Releases
Any provision is made in the design and operation of the facility, in particular by using the best available industrial technologies at a cost Economically acceptable, to limit freshwater withdrawals and the impact of discharges on populations and the environment.
The operator is responsible for periodic environmental controls.
VI-2. Waste
Every provision is made in the design and operation of the facility, in particular by using the best available industrial technologies at an economically acceptable cost, for Limit the volume and activity of radioactive waste generated.
No definitive storage of radioactive waste is permitted within the scope of the plan annexed to this Decree.
VII. -The technical information of the
Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
A reliable and secure link allows, when the facility's internal emergency plan is triggered, to transmit continuously to The Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) information directly extracted from the supervision of the controller, concerning the state of the installation, the nature and the level of the possible releases to the environment
Information so transmitted shall enable the IRSN to establish its own diagnosis of the situation on behalf of the public authorities, in particular the Nuclear Safety Authority.
I. -The introduction into the perimeter of the installation of nuclear fuel for the first load of the reactor shall be subject to the authorization of the Nuclear Safety
. No later than six months before the intended date for the introduction of nuclear fuel within the perimeter of the facility, a file containing the elements of the documents referred to in II relevant to that operation, unless they already have Transmitted to the Nuclear Safety Authority for the loading operation referred to in II.
II. -The time limit for the first shipment of nuclear fuel for the reactor is set at ten years from the publication of this Decree in the Official Journal of the French Republic. This period shall constitute the time limit for placing in service mentioned in the I of Article 29 of the aforementioned Law of 13 June 2006.
In order to obtain the authorisation of the operation referred to in the preceding paragraph, the operator shall transmit to the Nuclear Safety Authority, to the No later than twelve months before the date scheduled for the first nuclear fuel load of the reactor, in addition to the other documents required by the regulatory provisions applicable to basic nuclear facilities:
-a safety report Containing the updates to the preliminary safety report;
-the general operating rules that the operator intends to implement for the protection of the interests referred to in section 28 of the Act of June 13, 2006;
-a Internal emergency plan.
The Nuclear Safety Authority shall be informed of the modifications of the installation or the conditions of operation in the cases and in accordance with the procedures laid down in the aforementioned Law of 13 June 2006 and the texts These
, where they do not require the intervention of a new authorisation under Article 29 of the same Law, may be subject to the prior agreement of the Authority of Nuclear safety in the cases and in the manner defined by the same Act and the regulations made for its application.
The final shutdown and dismantling of the installation are subject to prior approval. The application for authorisation shall include the elements contained in the V of Article 29 of the aforementioned Law of 13 June 2006 and in the regulations made for its application.
This Order is valid under Article L. 1333-4 of the Public Health Code for the import, export and possession of radioactive sources and appliances Emitting ionizing radiation necessary for the operation of the facility.
The Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, the Minister of Ecology and Sustainable Development, and the Minister Delegate to Industry are responsible for the implementation of the This Order, which will be published in the Official Journal of the French Republic.
Done at Paris, April 10, 2007.
Dominique de Villepin
By Prime Minister:
Finance and Industry Minister
Thierry Breton
Minister of Ecology
and Sustainable Development,
Nelly Olin
Industry Minister,
François Loos
