195/1999 Coll.
DECREE
The State Office for nuclear safety
of 21 June 1999. August 1999
about the requirements for nuclear facilities to ensure nuclear safety,
radiation protection and emergency preparedness
State Office for nuclear safety shall be determined according to § 47 para. 7 to the
the implementation of § 13 para. 3 (b). (d)) and paragraph i.2. the annex to the Act No.
18/1997 Coll. on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation
(Atomic Act), and amending and supplementing certain laws:
PART THE FIRST
GENERAL PROVISIONS
The subject of the edit
§ 1
This Decree lays down the requirements for the solution of the nuclear device to
to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection and emergency
preparedness.
§ 2
For the purposes of this Ordinance, means the
and the lowest achievable in real terms values) doses of ionizing radiation
values optimized in terms of radiation protection under the Special
^ Law 1)
(b) the normal operation of all States) and operation of the planned operation
nuclear installation in compliance with the limits and conditions of safe operation
a nuclear installation; they are, in particular, to the marketing of the reactor again
a critical state, stable operation and decommissioning of the reactor, the raising and
reducing its performance, maintenance, repair, and replacement fuel,
(c) abnormal operating conditions), the operation and the event, departing from the
normal operations that are unplanned, but the occurrence of which may be used in
the operation of a nuclear installation is expected; they are for example. fast shutdown,
a sudden drop in load, failure of the turbines, the loss of AC power,
the main circulation pump failure, etc.; These operating modes
may result in damage to the fuel system or a breach of the fuel
elements and to the violation of the integrity of the primary circuit; after their closure,
respectively. the removal of the cause and effect is a nuclear device capable of
normal operation,
(d) the fuel element design) unit whose basic ingredient is
nuclear fuel; includes cover, fuel tablets, filling gas,
Springs, fastenings, etc.,
e) fuel fuel elements grouping file that is commonly
discussed in the exchange of the fuel in the reactor; includes in addition to the fuel
distance of the grid elements, the top and bottom Sockets, if they are
used guide tube for internal instrumentation or for volumes
regulatory branches or for neutron sources or for files with the
discrete vyhořívajícími absorbers and cover fuel file
f) fuel system fuel files and their components, internal
Active components such as control zone regulatory twigs, leaves with
vyhořívajícími absorbers, if used, dowsing rods with neutron
source, backing boards, etc.
g) breach of the fuel elements, and hermetičnosti disruption of coverage
the possibility of leakage of fission products into the environment,
h) damage to fuel system fuel element or violation
breaching the dimensional tolerances for conditions or change function
skills outside the boundary of the subject in the safety analysis,
I) project limits for normal and abnormal operation values
the parameters to the achievement of which is ensured by the ability to meet project
function and to prevent the illegal leak of radionuclides to the
environment,
j) breakdown terms all of the events caused by failure or
violation of building structures, technological files and devices,
external influences or operator errors, which lead to infringements and
conditions of safe operation and that can cause damage to the fuel
system, or breach of the fuel elements,
the project accident accident) considered in the project's nuclear solution
the device, which may result in release of radionuclides,
ionizing radiation or exposure of individuals
l) maximum design accident project accident considered in design
nuclear facilities with the greatest radiation consequences,
m) limit parameters of fuel elements maximum fuel parameters
elements and their degree of damage that must not be exceeded when
normal and abnormal operation
n) simple disorder event leading to the loss of the ability of a
perform control function, while all other elements
are working properly; subsequent disturbances caused by the initial simple
disorder are considered part of this simple breakdown.
PART TWO
THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO ENSURE NUCLEAR SAFETY,
RADIATION PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
§ 3
Protection-in-depth
Nuclear safety of a nuclear facility shall be ensured
through the protection-in-depth based on the use of multiple
physical barriers to prevent the spread of ionizing radiation and radionuclides to the
of the environment and with the repeated use of the technical and
organizational measures to help protect and preserve the effectiveness
These barriers, as well as the protection of workers and other persons, the population
and the environment.
§ 4
Quality requirements
(1) building construction, technological files and devices (hereinafter referred to as
a "device") important for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and
radiation protection must ensure their reliable function when
normal and abnormal operation and the ability to limit the consequences of the failures and
accidents.
(2) this device is important for nuclear safety of a nuclear installation shall
be designed to allow you to perform a health check and during operation
tests their functionality and reliability methods
corresponding to the current state of science and technology. The technical solution
These devices must include security measures to compensate for
the incidence of undetected damage to the operation of a nuclear installation.
(3) the quality and suitability of calculation programs used to analyze
an important nuclear safety must be verified.
§ 5
Radiation protection at nuclear facilities in and around objects
Nuclear facilities must have radiation protection on his premises and
in its surroundings under special legislation. ^ 1)
§ 6
Emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities in and around object
Nuclear facilities must have benefited from emergency preparedness to the object and
around nuclear facilities under special legislation. ^ 2) ^ 3)
§ 7
Protection against device failures
Important for nuclear safety device must under normal and
abnormal operation during the tests and in emergency conditions
ensure not to damage due to other disorders
the device placed inside a nuclear installation. Therefore, you must be able to
bear the environmental changes associated with these disorders and be suitably located
and adequately protected from dynamic and other effects (drop items
vibration of pipes, leakage of liquids, the overload of a higher pressure).
§ 8
Heat dissipation
(1) the technological files and devices that are involved in the evacuation of
heat released by fission, the residual heat, must match the production for
normal and abnormal traffic and emergency conditions reliably
to ensure adequate cooling of the reactor.
(2) heat dissipation Systems shall to the extent necessary to back up, physically
separate and connect to fulfil their function and
When a simple malfunction.
§ 9
Fire protection
(1) important in terms of nuclear safety must be dealt with, and
positioned to meet fire protection requirements, and other requirements
provided for by specific legislation. ^ 4)
(2) the equipment in terms of nuclear safety must be
use non-flammable or flame retardant materials.
(3) the Objects of a nuclear installation shall be equipped with an electric fire
signalling and stable fire-fighting equipment designed so that in the case of
fault condition or accidental putting into operation was not affected
the functional ability of equipment in terms of nuclear safety
the nuclear device.
(4) for the objects of importance for the nuclear safety of nuclear
the equipment must be handled by the assessment of fire danger.
(5) nuclear facility, which includes a nuclear reactor with an output of over
50 MWt must be from the stages of construction to ensure fire protection unit
the holder of the permit.
§ 10
Protection against phenomena caused by natural conditions or human
the activities of nuclear installations
(1) important for the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation shall
be dealt with so that when natural events that can be realistically
assume (earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, etc.), or events
caused by human activities outside the nuclear devices (the plane crash,
explosions in the area around the power plant, etc.) It was possible to
and safely shut down the reactor and) keep in podkritickém State,
(b) pay the residual power reactor) for a sufficiently long period of time,
(c)) to ensure that any radioactive leakage does not exceed the value of the
laid down specific legislation. ^ 1)
(2) in the design of a nuclear installation must consider
and the most severe natural phenomena), historically recorded in the site and
its surroundings, extrapolated, taking into consideration the limited precision values and time
(b)) combination of effects of natural phenomena or human-induced phenomena
activities and emergency conditions caused by these phenomena.
§ 11
Physical protection
A nuclear device shall be designed so as to ensure a natural
protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. ^ 5)
§ 12
The common use of equipment
The nuclear device on multiple blocks that assume common usage
equipment to ensure nuclear safety, must be
shown that this does not affect its safe operation. In so doing,
consider the case of the emergency conditions in one block and
the possibility of correct weaning and cooling of the remaining blocks.
PART THREE
THE ACTIVE ZONE OF REACTOR
section 13 of the
The active reactor zone solutions
(1) the active zone and appropriate cooling, control and protection systems must
caution ensure that the limits are not exceeded, the project laid down
during any operating condition.
(2) an active zone of reactor and subsequent cooling, control and protection
systems must ensure that the resulting effect of immediate feedback in
Active zone, he worked against the rapid increase in the reactivity in all
operating modes with a critical reactor.
(3) mechanical parts that make up the active zone or the mechanical parts
located in its vicinity, including fixing them, must be designed so as
to be capable of withstanding the static and dynamic effects in the normal and
abnormal operation. When emergency conditions of their possible
violation of safe shutdown shall not prevent the reactor and active cooling
zone.
§ 14
Solutions for fuel system
(1) fuel system must withstand the projected exposure in an active zone,
without damage occurs in conditions of normal and abnormal
operation despite all the processes considered, the deterioration in the material
the characteristics and environmental conditions that may occur during operation.
(2) deterioration in the material properties of the considered processes and conditions
the environment must include the action of external pressure of the refrigerant, the increase
the internal pressure in the fuel element due to fissile products, exposure
fuel and other materials of the file, changes in the fuel pressures and
temperatures, arising from performance of changes, chemical influences,
static and dynamic stresses, including stress caused by flow
the refrigerant and the influence of the mechanical vibrations and changes in heat transfer, which
may occur due to deformation or chemical influences. Uncertainty in
data, calculations and manufacturing tolerances must be respected, with the
the corresponding margin.
(3) set out the project limits fuel for normal and abnormal operation
including the permissible leakage of fissile products must not be exceeded when
normal and abnormal traffic conditions that may
Active zone occur during operations, must not cause the abnormal
additional projected a significant deterioration in the characteristics of the fuel
the system. Leakage of fissile products must be kept below the minimum value,
which is practically achievable.
(4) in emergency conditions, the project of an accident must fuel elements and
the files remain in place and will not succumb to such damage,
that would prevent the insertion of absorbent bodies or impede effective
Active cooling zone.
(5) set out the project limits fuel for emergency conditions
the project of an accident may not be exceeded.
(6) the design of the fuel assemblies must allow a reasonable
control of their parts.
(7) the implementation of fuel assemblies must be sufficiently experimentally
or operational and documented.
§ 15
The layout of the neutron flow
(1) for all levels and distribution of neutron flux, which can
occur during the active zone all States, including States after weaning and
during or after the transhipment of fuel and conditions arising during abnormal
operation and during emergency conditions must be complied with to § 14 para. 1 to
5.
(2) a device to determine the layout of the neutron flow must be able to
to reveal the active zone, in which the level and distribution of
neutron flow could cause the exceeding of the limits of the project of fuel
for normal and abnormal operation and emergency conditions. Design
the active solution must support the ability to zone control system for
to maintain the levels and courses of neutron flow within the prescribed limits in
all States of the zone is active during normal and abnormal operation.
(3) the active zone and appropriate cooling, control and protection systems must
be designed so as to ensure that the power oscillations, which could
cause the exceedance of project fuel limits, cannot
occur or will reliably and immediately detected and suppressed.
PART FOUR
CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS
section 16 of the
Control systems
(1) control systems at nuclear facilities shall be equipped with the device
so that they can track, measure, register and control the operating
important parameters for ensuring nuclear safety during normal and
abnormal operation and in emergency conditions. The tell-tales, and drivers
shall be designed and positioned so that the Waitstaff was always enough
information on the operation of nuclear facilities and could, if necessary,
surgically intervene. Control systems must give the required signals
deviations of important operating parameters and processes from the allowable
limits.
(2) the control systems must continuously on a regular basis, or according to the
If necessary, record the values of the parameters that are based on emergency
analyses of important nuclear safety of a nuclear installation.
(3) when emergency conditions must Instrumentation
provide
and information about the current state of) nuclear devices, on the basis of
protective measures can be made,
(b)) basic information about the course of the accident, and their record,
(c) information to characterize the spread) of radionuclides and radiation into
around the nuclear device so that it was possible to take measures to
protection of the population.
§ 17
Protective systems
Nuclear facilities, which includes a nuclear reactor must be
equipped with safety systems that must be
and able to recognize abnormal conditions) and automatically be activated under
the systems, including the system to shut down the reactor under section 21
so, in order to ensure that the project limits are not exceeded,
(b) able to recognize emergency conditions) and put into operation the appropriate
systems intended to mitigate the effects of these conditions,
(c)) take precedence over the activities of the control systems and the operator of a nuclear installation, in the
all States considered in the design of a nuclear installation, and operation
must be able to indicate the protective system into operation manually.
section 18
Backup protective systems
(1) protective systems must be designed with a high functional reliability,
násobností and the independence of the individual channels to
and no simple disorder did not cause) the loss of the protective function of the system,
b) disconnection (decommissioning) of any component or channel
not result in a reduction in the number of independent (redundant) components
or channels to one, if you cannot in this case demonstrate
an acceptable reliability of the protection system.
(2) protective systems must enable the periodical tests of function
each independent channel when operating the reactor and test
common circuits of independent channels, at least when shutdown
the reactor. These common circuits must be designed so that they can
disorders leading to the shutdown of the reactor, not more, and not to the loss of protective
function.
§ 19
The relationship of the protection and control systems
(1) Protection and control systems must be separated, so that the failure of
control systems do not affect the ability of protective systems
the required safety function. Functionally necessary and appropriate connection
protection and control systems must be limited to a maximum of
significantly did not affect nuclear safety.
(2) protective system must be designed and set up to prevent
the project exceeded the limits, even when the control system malfunction.
Protective interventions are in all States considered in the design of nuclear
the device take precedence over the activities of the control system and the operator of a nuclear
device.
section 20
Control Centre
(1) nuclear facility, which includes a nuclear reactor must be
equipped with at least one operating dozornou, from where you can safely and
to control and operate reliably in normal and abnormal operation and
even when emergency conditions.
(2) the operational control centre must be so designed as to the protection of
operating staff access, staying safe and its
wholesomeness, even under emergency conditions.
(3) a nuclear device must allow unset and maintain the reactor in
safe condition, even if the operational control centre becomes unusable.
The device must be sufficiently physically and electrically isolated from
operational supervisory room.
section 21
Shutdown of the reactor
(1) Reactor must be equipped with systems that are able to wean
in normal and abnormal operation and under emergency conditions. Must
keep it aside, even in situations that cause the highest reactivity
the active zone. Efficiency, speed and the provision for decommissioning must guarantee
that provided for the project limits are not exceeded.
(2) a device to shut down the reactor must consist of at least two
various independent systems based on different principles and
capable of performing his duties even for simple faults.
(3) at least one of the systems referred to in paragraph 2 must itself be
able to quickly bring the reactor from the normal or abnormal condition and
emergency conditions in podkritického State with reasonable headroom for
the assumption of a simple failure.
(4) at least one of the systems referred to in paragraph 2 must itself be
able to bring the reactor from normal operation to podkritického status and
keep the reactor in podkritickém State with reasonable caution in a situation
causing the highest reactivity of the active zone.
(5) when showing the required properties of the device for unsetting
the reactor must be special attention to faults resulting from the
anywhere in the nuclear device that could decommission part
These devices.
(6) the Device to shut down the reactor must be able to prevent
spontaneous formation of a critical state. This requirement must be met and
for activities to improve the reactivity of the reactor (e.g. When you shutdown.
removal of the regulatory authority for the purpose of maintenance or reloading of fuel), and
even assuming a simple failure of these devices.
(7) the measurement and testing Systems must ensure that the device for unsetting
the reactor is in the appropriate State.
(8) the portion of the equipment intended to shut down the reactor can be
its operation is used to control the reactivity or for shaping
Neutron field if it is constantly maintained the provision for decommissioning.
PART FIVE
REACTOR COOLING SYSTEMS
section 22
The principles of the solution of the primary circuit
(1) the primary circuit and its support, control and protection systems must
be designed so as to
and with a sufficient margin) was ensured under normal and abnormal
operation of the required strength, life and reliability of their
parts and appliances,
(b) avoid undue evasion) of the refrigerant,
(c)), were sufficiently resistant to the emergence and development of failures and ensure
the slow development of possible failures and their early detection,
d) large scale disorders have been excluded,
e) impressing device for reducing pressure (insurance)
did not cause the leakage of radionuclides from nuclear facilities,
f) components of the primary circuit pressure refrigerant containing as
container, pressure pipes, tubes and their connections, valves, seals
etc. including fixing them withstand the static and dynamic load
the anticipated during all operating conditions and emergency conditions.
(2) the design of the device of the primary circuit must
and certified materials) provide for these purposes and corresponding to the relevant
legislation, technical standards or technical conditions,
(b) demonstrate the theoretical calculation and) experimental verification of their
sufficient dimensioning,
(c) include a provision for the deterioration) of material properties that can
occur during operation due to erosion, corrosion, metal fatigue, chemical
environment, exposure and aging, and reserve for the uncertainty determination
the initial state of the components and the speed of the deterioration of their properties.
d) contain an analysis of the limit States due to the emergence and spread of disorders
integrity,
(e)) provide a way of production and Assembly quality card available
modern methods and provide a way for the licence required tightness,
(f)) to determine the program and methods of detection of his condition.
(3) the application of the device of the primary circuit shall contain the conditions of its
testing and maintenance, the conditions of normal and abnormal operation, emergency
conditions, analysis and solution of all effects detrimental to this device.
(4) the equipment of the primary circuit must include measures to maintain
quantity or pressure of the refrigerant so that the stated project limits
are not exceeded in any of the conditions of normal and abnormal operation
considering the volume changes and losses.
(5) the systems for keeping quantity or pressure of the refrigerant must be
adequate capacity (flow rate or volume), to meet the requirements according to §
22 paragraph 1. 4 and § 24 para. 1.
Article 23 of the
To check the status of the primary circuit during operation
(1) this device must allow the primary circuit throughout the operation
the nuclear device to perform periodically or continuously checking their
the status of the operation and tests necessary for the verification of nuclear safety.
(2) part of the design of the device of the primary circuit are
and health checks), the program and methods of diagnosis,
(b)) criteria for the evaluation and control of the test results.
section 24
Cleaning and refilling the coolant system
(1) refrigerant refilling system must be able to compensate for leaks and
volume changes of refrigerant during normal and abnormal operations, taking into account the
the subscription of the refrigerant for cleaning, to set out the project limits were
complied with.
(2) the system of cleaning the refrigerant must be able to remove the corrosion
products and fission products that are escaping from the fuel elements in the
their possible infractions, and maintain the required parameters
the purity of the primary circuit.
§ 25
Residual heat removal system
(1) the residual heat removal System must ensure that when the shutdown
the reactor project have not exceeded the limits of fuel elements and
the primary circuit.
(2) the system of residual heat extraction must ensure adequate
backing up important residual heat removal system device,
appropriate link, disconnect parts of the system, and leak detection
the possibility of their capture so that the system worked reliably, even when
a simple malfunction.
section 26
The emergency cooling system
The emergency cooling system must ensure
and) reliable cooling for emergency conditions, active zone caused by
loss of refrigerant to
1. the temperature of the fuel elements coverage does not exceed the values laid down in
design limits,
2. the energy contribution of chemical reactions (cover, water, garbage collection
hydrogen) does not exceed the permissible value,
3. avoidance of changes of fuel elements, the fuel assemblies and home
parts of the reactor, which would affect the cooling efficiency,
4. the residual heat has been dissipated long enough for
(b) adequate backup,) its a good idea to link the possibility of disconnection of parts
leakage detection system and the possibility of their capture so that the system
worked reliably even during a simple malfunction.
section 27 of the
Check the status of the emergency cooling system is in operation
The emergency cooling system must allow the implementation of periodic tests
and tours of the
and the strength and tightness of the system),
(b)) of active elements and their functional evaluation system,
c) emergency cooling systems as a whole and its functional evaluation for
conditions appropriate to its operation (a sequence of operations that
indicate each device in operation, switchover to alternative systems
power supply, to another system, cooling water, etc.).
section 28
Secondary circuit
Solution to the secondary circuit must ensure
and) reliable heat dissipation from the primary circuit
(b)) the detection of leaks from the primary to the secondary circuit, and
If these leaks found must allow restrictions on its further dissemination
so as to not exceed the limits of radionuclides into the outlet
around.
PART SIX
ENERGY POWER SYSTEMS
section 29
Energy power systems
(1) the outlet of the power supply of the nuclear facilities and its own consumption
must ensure that the
and) their external and internal fault divorce affected the least traffic
the reactor and heat dissipation systems,
(b)) for the operation of the power plant equipment important could be powered from two
various sources (their own generator and network power system).
(2) electrical wiring for the power supply of control and protection systems
the device of the primary circuit, the residual heat removal systems,
the emergency cooling systems and protective envelope must in addition
allow the emergency power source, i.e.. be backed up without limits
After the time required for the performance of the systems and independent of
whether you are running your own generators or electric system.
Control and protective systems must be powered continuously.
section 30
Backup power supply systems
(1) systems, which are given to ensure nuclear safety
backed up, it must be supplied with energy so as to guarantee their
functional independence by power supply systems and their
resources are independent of each other. If the number of sources is less than the number of
independent systems, the proposal must demonstrate that it does not reduce their
reliability.
(2) If a simple failure of supplied systems will not disrupt their
function, it is accepted and a simple failure of the electrical system, or
source.
(3) if it is necessary to ensure nuclear safety operating
the ability of a system, you must ensure that the power supply system
needed power even when a simple malfunction without restriction.
section 31
Emergency power
(1) systems, which must be powered without interruption (appliances I.
category), are powered from the sources that provide the energy instantly
(the battery the inverter).
(2) resources and power systems, which are expressed in activity after a
the duration of the emergency conditions (appliances category) must be
listed on the performance you need in less than the start time
(II) appliances. category.
(3) must be able to perform functional testing of emergency
sources of electrical power.
PART SEVEN
THE SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE ENVELOPE
§ 32
Purpose and meaning
Nuclear facilities, which includes nuclear reactor with an output of over 50
MWt, must be equipped with a system of protective envelope that when an
emergency conditions, including maximum design accident, associated with the
releases of radionuclides and ionizing radiation they emitted by limiting these
leaks into the environment so that they are in accordance with the particular legal
Regulation, ^ 1) If this function is not ensured by other technical
resources.
§ 33
The policy resolution
(1) the system of protective envelope consists of airtight wrapper sized
for all project accident, from the closing of the institutions, systems, reduction of
pressure and temperature and ventilation and filtering systems.
(2) the system of protective envelope must ensure that its required
the tightness of the preserve when emergency conditions and sufficiently long
period of time after their completion.
(3) the system of protective envelope must ensure the desired function for
the maximum pressures and temperatures and possible podtlaky of project accidents. Is
need to consider the impact of systems reduce the pressure and temperature inside the hermetic
the envelope, the impact of other potential sources of energy, bushings and
passes, a lack of calculation models, experiments and results
operational experience.
(4) the system of protective envelope must meet the requirements of protection against
external influences in accordance with § 10.
(5) the system of protective envelope must ensure the fulfilment of their functions
and to limit the impact on other systems and equipment essential to the nuclear
safety.
§ 34
Check tightness of sealed envelopes
(1) the Hermetic cover and important for its equipment-tightness must
ensure that it is possible to
and to test its soundness) project pressure after incorporation
all penetrations and passes
(b)) to perform a nuclear device during operation periodic tests
the tightness of the system of protective envelope project or at lower pressure
pressures that allow extrapolation.
(2) the Hermetic cover and important for its equipment-tightness must allow
leak tests carried out by the repair project pressure.
§ 35
The pressure test of the hermetic envelope
Hermetic cover must allow before placing the nuclear device to
operation to demonstrate the pressure test its integrity at the test pressure,
that is higher than the project.
section 36
To check the status of the protective envelope of operation
The system of protective envelope must be able to operate a nuclear
the device can be carried out
and periodic inspections of its individual) parts and appliances,
(b) functional testing of its individual) parts and appliances.
§ 37
Glands walls airtight envelope
Pipe and cable gland passing through the walls of the hermetic
the space shall be designed so as to
and carry out leakage detection), their detection and collection,
(b)) could carry out regular leak tests of their project
pressure independent of hermetic tightness tests of the envelope,
(c) ensure their protection) the effects of dynamic forces.
§ 38
Sealing elements
(1) primary circuit Pipes that pass through the walls of the hermetic
envelopes, or pipes, which are directly linked to the atmosphere inside the
sealed envelope, must be provided with reliable seals, of which
each must have at least two closing elements included in the series, which is
are placed inside and outside the hermetic envelope and are independently and reliably
to operate. Outer closing elements are placed as close to the hermetic
the envelope.
(2) other pipes passing through walls, sealed envelopes, you must have
at least one external shut-off element, which is placed as close as possible
airtight envelope.
(3) the closing elements shall be designed so that they can regularly
perform tests of their tightness.
(4) the function of the sealing element must be ensured even if
a simple fault outside of its mechanical part.
§ 39
Passes the walls of hermetically sealed envelopes
The operating envelope must be hermetically sealed passes as a feature
double doors controlled so that the leak has always been
assured. The tightness of the Assembly passes must match the tightness of the system
protective envelopes.
section 40
The internal breakdown of the hermetic space
Between the individual parts of the hermetic space must be sufficient
flow paths to pressure differences arising during emergency conditions
they prefer the envelope or other protective device
the envelope.
§ 41
The system pressure drop and heat dissipation of the hermetic space
(1) the Hermetic room must be equipped with a pressure relief outlet
the heat, which would together with other systems after their emergency
conditions associated with the release of matter and energy to ensure sufficient
a rapid reduction in pressure and temperature are in the area and that would further
ensure that the permissible values are not exceeded.
(2) the system must ensure the reliability, back up and functional
the diversity of its relevant facilities and to ensure the function of systems in the
a simple malfunction.
§ 42
Other systems protective envelopes
(1) the system of protective envelope must be equipped with systems that ensure
control of fissile products and substances that could enter into it would be when you
emergency conditions. These systems must be able to together with the
other systems
and to reduce the volume and activity) to modify the composition of the fissile products,
(b)) to check the volumetric concentration of explosive substances, in order to ensure
the integrity of the sealed envelopes and reduce the amount of leaking
radionuclides.
(2) important equipment of these systems must be backed up to
work in a simple malfunction.
PART EIGHT
RADIATION PROTECTION
§ 43
Monitoring of ionizing radiation and radionuclides
Monitoring of ionizing radiation and radionuclides shall be provided in
accordance with the specific legislation. ^ 1)
§ 44
Ventilation and filtration systems
A nuclear device must be equipped with
and ventilation and filtering systems), which under normal and
abnormal operation must
1. to prevent the uncontrolled escape of radionuclides and dissipation in the
the individual areas of a nuclear installation in accordance with the requirements of their
accessibility,
2. reduce radionuclide activity concentration below the values set out in
special legal předpisu1) in case of leakage of radionuclides into the variance and
accessible areas of nuclear facilities,
3. keep the prescribed climatic conditions,
4. keep the releases of radionuclides into the environment below specified levels,
(b)) reliable filters with sufficient efficiency of detection and allow the
tests of their effectiveness,
(c) critical devices, backup) so that ventilation systems can
work in a simple malfunction.
§ 45
Effluents of radionuclides into the environment
Effluents of radionuclides into the environment must meet the requirements laid down
special legislation. ^ 1)
PART NINE
NUCLEAR FUEL HANDLING AND STORAGE
§ 46
Fresh nuclear fuel handling and storage
Equipment for handling of fresh nuclear fuel and its storage
must
and) spatial location or other physical means and procedures
prevent achieving criticality with caution and under the terms of the most effective
slowing down of neutrons (moderation), and thereby prevent the
1. the excess of an efficient multiplication coefficient values of 0.95 neutrons when
the anticipated emergency situations (including water),
2. the value of the effective coefficient of 0.98 cant multiplication of neutrons in
the optimal conditions of moderation,
(b) ensure that the implementation of periodic) inspections and tests,
(c)) to reduce to a minimum the possibility of damage or loss of fuel,
(d) to prevent the fall of fuel) during transport,
e) prevent falling heavy objects on a fuel Assembly, i.e.. objects with
mass greater than the weight of fuel, file
f) storage elements or fuel assemblies for construction and operating
units, which is the nuclear reactor.
§ 47
Handling irradiated and spent nuclear fuel and its storage
Equipment for handling irradiated and spent nuclear fuel, and its
storage and handling and storage of other substances containing
fissile materials and radioactive substances shall be designed so as to
possible
and) spatial location or other physical means and procedures
prevent achieving criticality with caution and under the terms of the most effective
slowing down of neutrons (moderation), and thereby prevent the
1. the excess of an efficient multiplication coefficient values of 0.95 neutrons when
the anticipated emergency situations (including water),
2. the value of the effective coefficient of 0.98 cant multiplication of neutrons in
the optimal conditions of moderation,
(b)) to ensure an adequate removal of residual heat for normal,
abnormal traffic and emergency conditions,
(c) ensure that the implementation of periodic) inspections and tests,
(d)) to prevent the fall of irradiated fuel during transport,
e) reduce to a minimum the possibility of damaging fuels, IE. in particular, avoid
exposure to fuel the fuel element or file an undue
stress during handling,
(f)) to prevent the fall of heavy objects on a fuel Assembly, i.e.. objects with
mass greater than the weight of fuel, file
g) storage of broken or damaged fuel elements
fuel assemblies for construction and operational units, which includes
nuclear reactor,
(h)) to ensure workers ' radiation protection of nuclear installations,
I) for wet with water to ensure stores
1. control of the chemical composition and the radioactivity of all the water in which the
the irradiated fuel is stored, or in which it is handled,
2. monitoring and control of water level in the pool of spent fuel
and detecting the memory leaks.
PART TEN
FINAL PROVISION
§ 48
The effectiveness of the
This Decree shall take effect on the date of publication.
President:
Ing. Böhm in r.
responsible for the management of the Office
1) Decree No 184/1997 Coll., on ensuring radiation
the protection.
2) Decree No. 217/1997 Coll., on details to ensure emergency
the readiness of the nuclear installations and sites sources of ionizing
radiation and about the requirements for the contents of the internal emergency plan and the
the emergency order.
3) Government Decree No. 11/1999 Coll., on the emergency planning zone.
4) for example, Act No. 133/1985 Coll., on fire protection, as amended by
amended.
5) Decree No. 144/1997 Coll., on the physical protection of nuclear materials and
nuclear facilities and their classification in each category.
