80/2011 Coll.
FINDINGS


Constitutional Court
On behalf of the Republic


Constitutional Court decided under ref. Nos. Pl. US 55/10 of 1 March 2011
Plenum, composed of Stanislav Balik, Frantisek Duchon, Vlasta Formánková,
Vojen Güttler, Pavel Holländer, Ivana Janu, Vladimir Kurka, Dagmar
Lastovecká, Jiri Mucha, Jan Musil, Jiri Nykodým, Paul Rychetský
Miloslav Vyborny, Elizabeth Wagner (rapporteur) and Michael
Židlická a petition from a group of deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic
, represented by deputy Mgr. Bohuslav Sobotka, headquartered
Prague 1, Sněmovní 4, to annul Act no. 347/2010 Coll. Amending
certain acts in connection with austerity measures in the scope
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, as
participation of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament and Senate of the Czech Republic as parties


Follows:

Act no. 347/2010 Coll., Amending certain laws in connection with
austerity measures by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
abolishing the expiry on 31 December 2011.
Reason


I.
Recap draft


First A group of 45 deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic
a proper proposal [see. Article. 87 paragraph. 1 point. a)
Czech Republic Constitution and § 64 para. 1 point. b) Act no. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court]
delivered to the Constitutional Court on 9. 12. 2010 seeking the annulment of Act no. 347/2010 Coll
. amending some laws in connection
with austerity measures by the Ministry of Labour and social Affairs (hereinafter
"the contested Act").

Second The essence of the opposition petitioners themselves summarized so that the contested Act was not adopted
constitutionally prescribed manner. Each individual procedure
majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, namely a)
Institute misuse of legislative emergency, b)
unpredictable convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, c) unjustified launch a general debate
d) denial the right to vote elected senators, according to the petitioners
disproportionate, inadequately reasoned and arbitrary manner
violates fundamental rights, constitutional principles and values, namely Art. 1, paragraph. 1
Art. 2. 3, Art. 5, 6, 26 and 36 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Art. 4 paragraph.
2 and 4, Art. 21 paragraph. 1 and 4 and Art. 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (| || "Charter"). Penetration of such interference
those fundamental rights and principles of the petitioners even more significant that this happened in
adopting the law, which itself significantly extends the sphere of fundamental
rights of individuals, in particular social rights. His argument
petitioners firstly focused on defining the general principles governing
legislative process with which then confront particular, the draft
portrayed in detail the manner and circumstances of the process of adopting the contested
Act which deemed unconstitutional and, therefore,
demanded its abolition.

I. A) The constitutional norms and principles of controlling the legislative process

Third When the general definition of basic principles and values ​​of the controlling
legislative process petitioners proceeded from our knowledge
legal theory, both from the conclusions drawn from the case law of the Constitutional Court, or
. foreign courts. Especially extensively quoting the conclusions that
Constitutional Court concluded in its judgment. Nos. Pl. US 77/06 of 15. 2. 2007 (N 30/44
SbNU 349; 37/2007 Coll.), Where the Constitutional Court clearly defined the requirements
and minimum requirements that present democratic rule aims to | || parliamentary debate on bills. A fundamental principle
petitioners particularly marked presence
public adversarial parliamentary debate, because legislation should have a character
rational legal discourse in which "(...)
all participants were given an opportunity to present the matter
acquainted in detail and informed comment on it. It is also proper that such a process which allows
open discussion between proponents of competing views, including minority views
.. "(Cf. cited judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06, point
38).

Fourth The petitioners referring to knowledge of legal theory presenting menus opinion that
parliamentary debate and parliamentary debate fulfills at least double
function, the function of creation and function of legitimation.
Creationist function is based on the premise that parliamentarianism in the political decision

Arises through debate, or at least discussion of such decisions possible.
Political decision and there is a confrontation of arguments and counterarguments
in the parliamentary debate that follows also allows
settlement or compromise of competing interests into account. Although the ruling coalition
a fairly significant parliamentary majority in the Chamber currently has the ability
Deputies smoothly and enforce political decisions are actually made outside
Parliament, yet according to the petitioners should be seen as a minimum requirement
arising from Article . 15 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, real (i
time) the possibility of the opposition to prepare and submit to the government bills
their amendments. Only then can the opposition to fulfill its functions in
democratic political system.

Fifth In the context of the constitutional review, however, according to the petitioners, more importantly
legitimizing function of parliamentary debate. Even if the real
political decision was made outside Parliament, it remains a parliamentary debate
purpose of legitimation, ie. Publicly lay out the arguments for and against,
which played a role in political decisions. The public is so familiar and
confronted with basic aspects of the decision, which allows it
you do things your own judgment, assume or reject submitted
arguments and accordingly result
adapt their future behavior - whether during elections, or any other form of political participation.
Debate and in its legitimation function does not lead to a decision, but has already made a decision
justifies and legitimizes make transparent the reasons
supporters and opponents of that decision.
Legislator mediation intention and purpose of the Act, parliamentary debate is also important for
legal awareness of citizens and helps as one of the elements of interpretation of the law also
legal certainty as one of the principles of the rule of law which protects
Art. 1. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. The petitioners claim their re
supported the conclusions of the cited judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06 (paragraphs 55 and 56
) as well as the conclusions set out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Rapporteur
E. Wagner to judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 24/07 of 31. 1. 2008 (N 26/48
SbNU 303; 88/2008 Coll.).

6th Moreover, the petitioner in the way of adoption of the contested Act found
failures cited judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06, paragraphs 57 to 60
defined policies constitutionally consistent performance in the legislative process
(which are gradually Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, respectively.
Presiding over its meetings, the Senate and the president), because in order first
and a third of them (ie. President of the Chamber of Deputies and the President of the Republic)
refused to intervene, and the other (the Senate) due to lower divorced
accelerate the legislative process could not intervene.

I. B) The process of adopting the contested law and its constitutional defects

7th In light of the foregoing, according to the petitioners should be interpreted
provisions of Law no. 90/1995 Coll., On the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies,
amended, (hereinafter "SOAD") and Act no. || | 107/1999 Coll., on the Senate rules of Procedure, as amended,
(hereinafter "JRS"), which was used when discussing the draft of the contested
Act, the petitioners stated that the proposal in detail || | divorced circumstances receiving itself the legislative process for
contested Act were undoubtedly in conflict with the předestřenými
constitutional principles and values. This contradiction petitioners saw
namely a) the misuse of emergency legislation Institute [see IBA)], b)
unpredictable in an emergency meeting of the Chamber of Deputies [see I.
Bb)], c) in unwarranted denial general debate [see IBCs)] d) the denial of the right to vote
elected senators [see IBD)]. In all these processes
petitioners found inadequacy of intervention, inadequate reasoning and traits
arbitrariness. According to the petitioners' view, should the above-mentioned steps
deciding to declare a state of legislative emergency
even during its lifetime pass the three-step test of proportionality, which uses
Constitutional Court to assess the collision
constitutionally protected values. State of legislative emergency and abbreviated hearing to defend themselves
threat to fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, endangering national security or significant economic damage
(legitimate aim), but this is interference in the above rights
parliamentary minority (impaired value) . such intervention

Is constitutionally possible only if it is also appropriate, necessary and proportionate.

IBA) Misuse of emergency legislation

8th In relation to the institute of legislative emergency and the conditions under which they
announcement according to § 99 par. 1 of the SOAD petitioners argued that publication
legislative emergency and abbreviated negotiations without conditions pursuant to § 99 paragraph
. 1 SOAD would not only breaking the law, but because of time "over"
also significant retrenchment constitutionally protected freedom of parliamentary debate and rights
Members submit proposed amendments, and that his rights
properly perform his elective office, as well as equality deputies because
government MPs are obvious advantages. In this context they referred to the
part of the Constitutional Court judgment. Nos. Pl. US 12/10 of 7 9. 2010
(269/2010 Coll .; paragraphs 17 and 18), in which the Constitutional Court reviewed the general
conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency and their fulfillment.
For the Constitutional Court, the petitioners can infer that understands
decision on emergency legislation largely a political decision
but warns against its use as a tool to curtailment of rights
parliamentary minority. In this case, the petitioners have
serious doubts whether the declaration of a state of legislative emergency and abbreviated hearing
was likely to prevent significant economic damage state; Government is to
unlike previous cases, declaring a state of legislative emergency,
failed to convince opposition MPs about the need to approve the change
associated with the adoption of the law on the state budget so that
came into effect no later than 1 January 2011 did not convince the opposition that
declared savings of nearly CZK 24 billion, which represents roughly 2%
planned budgetary expenditures, the essence of the proposal rather than
major political decisions restricting certain social rights.

9th At the level of need, therefore, to determine whether it really was an
minimum interference with the freedom of parliamentary debate and the rights of MPs
necessary to achieve the objectives of preventing significant economic damage
State, according to the petitioners need to see government
had to offer an alternative approach, especially to achieve that objective
timely submission of the bill. From the sequence of steps majorities
can but conclude pursue the parallel policy objectives: firstly
did not discuss the unpopular bill at the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies
before municipal and Senate elections and after consideration of the bill in the Senate
before termination of a mandate senators elected six years ago.
These objectives, of which the second particularly effectively prevents participation in decision
newly elected senators, but can not be seen as legitimate. About
necessity of declaring a state of legislative emergency for preventing significant economic damage
state can thus petitioners also have doubts.

10th Likewise, the petitioners questioned the appropriateness alone
declaring a state of legislative emergency and abbreviated hearing. While the rate
risk of considerable economic damage is quite controversial, the rate
curtailing the freedom of parliamentary debate and the rights of MPs is indisputable.
In a state of legislative emergency, which allows approval of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies
a single day, a member can not properly study the bill
and qualified to comment on it. He does not have time to prepare
amendments; not consulting with experts to obtain precise
knowledge about the contents of the bill and its various implications and can also
respective parliaments to convey the views of their constituents and possibly
legitimate interest groups that may be on the ground heard the parliamentary
Members of mouth alone. In addition to the curtailment of rights
Members are curtailed and the rights of citizens to listen to an adequate range of arguments for and against
to the Act, which in this case there is a limit to the statutory
narrowing the scope of social rights, at least in terms of reducing
sickness rates, abolition of social bonus contribution decreased
care, narrowing entitlement to unemployment benefit for certain groups or withdrawal of the childbirth
most families with newly born child.

Of IBB) Unpredictable an emergency meeting of the Chamber of Deputies

11th As indicated above the three-stage proportionality test petitioners
subjected and the manner of convening an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, where

Also there is a conflict of rights or protected values. On one side stands
interest in the expeditious consideration of the bill because
facing considerable economic damage, on the other hand, the aforementioned freedom
parliamentary debate, MPs and rights of citizens to participate in the management of public affairs and
moreover, even during short periods of extreme right MEPs
ever to attend a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies.

12th According to § 51 paragraph. 6 SOAD about convening a meeting of the House must be
deputies notified at least five days in advance. Unless this period
complied with, a Member may propose the adjournment of the meeting, when on such
proposal by the House without debate. The law thus
failure to comply with the five-day period as a result of combining the sole right to propose
adjournment of the meeting, which will decide on the House.
Parliamentary majority and enforce an emergency meeting and failure to comply with statutory deadlines.
The petitioners are convinced, however, that § 51 paragraph. 6
SOAD is to be interpreted in the light of constitutional principles and values ​​within the meaning of Article
. 22 of the Charter, under which statutory regulation of all political rights and freedoms
and the interpretation and application must protect the free
competition among political forces in a democratic society. The five day period according
petitioners in § 51 paragraph. 6 SOAD used to make
Members to familiarize themselves with the proposed agenda of the meeting and prepare his body and that,
in extreme cases (eg. The filler when it was his duty to Members
business travelers, but consideration of the contested Act
definitely want to participate), not on the meeting heard. The law allows the
consent of Deputies shorten this period, undoubtedly in the interest
timely and effective response to the current political situation. Proposers should
but considered arbitrary if it was a five-day period shortened
without giving a reason, the shorter the time between convening the meeting and
its beginning, the more serious reasons must be provided for such reductions,
however, at a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies was heard no argument or reason
why it is so rapid convening of a meeting necessary.

13th In the first step, the suitability test, the petitioners referred to the above-mentioned
; if it is accepted that the adoption of Act 1 1. 2011 prevents impending
considerable economic damage, the rapid convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies is eligible
tool to avoid them.

14th In the test of necessity, however, according to the petitioners
quick convening of an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies no longer stand. The same objective would be achieved
and discussion of the bill 3. 11., 4. 11. 5. 11.
or 2010, but it was necessary to convene an extraordinary meeting for 40 minutes.
Such intervention, therefore, discuss and approve the draft law on such dubious
convened a meeting, it's according to the petitioners, arbitrary walked
political rights of opposition MPs under Article. 21 paragraph. 1 and 4 of the Charter and citizens by
Article. 21 paragraph. 1 of the Charter. Such haste seems necessary
except with respect to other possible objectives pursued, namely to discuss
adopted the bill in the Senate to 13. 11. 2010, the date of termination of the mandate
Senators elected six years ago. This objective, excluding from participation in decision
Senate has elected senators, however petitioners
deemed illegitimate.

15th Since convening and holding of an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, according to the petitioners'
clearly fails the test of necessity, it is not necessary
already addressed the reasonableness test. Furthermore, however, the petitioners stressed that
interference with the rights protected, and there is enormous value. Particularly Members
who were duly excused from the meeting 7th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on
second 11. 2010, was trampled their legitimate expectation that that day
concerned four bills including the contested will be discussed.
But this legitimate expectation was also affected members who are already in a hurry
acquainted with the submitted bills they are
consult and prepare them amendments. An emergency meeting with
within 40 minutes contrary to the habits and the meaning of § 51 paragraph. 6 SOAD and
deteriorated significantly impact the actual declaration of a state of legislative emergency and
led ultimately to the fact that the submission of a draft law and his approval
passed only four days, two of them working. This four-day

Consideration of the bill additionally at the beginning of the fourth day was not
predictable.

IBCs) Unreasonable refusal of the general debate

16th The petitioners also questioned a procedure that was impossible
holding a general debate in the adoption of the statute. According to § 99 paragraph
. 7 SOAD House may decide on emergency legislation that
from the general debate at second reading is waived. This may all
discussing the bill in the plenary of the House to reduce the depth
debate the second reading and third reading immediately following, ending
final vote. The cited provisions of § 99 para. 7 SOAD
the petitioners' view, should also be interpreted with respect to
constitutional principles and values ​​within the meaning of Article. 22 of the Charter.
It is also necessary to take into account the different functions of a detailed debate pursuant to § 93 and 94
SOAD, when the general debate is conceived as a space for political
debate and detailed debate as a space only for submitting amendments
proposals with brief explanatory statement. This practice petitioners
corroborated by comprehensive quotations and recitations from the observations of former and current officials
presiding at meetings of the Chamber of Deputies,
proving that actually require differentiation
general and detailed debate. Waiving the general debate thus petitioners
represents another significant curtailment of freedom of speech and freedom of parliamentary deputies
debate because it leads deputies (except for deputies with preferential
rightly speak) to speak only in connection with the submission
amendment or any other proposal and his speech
restricted to justify such a proposal. Otherwise, they expose the intervention of the chairman
Chamber of Deputies, as was the case in the present case, which occurred just
day after the Chamber of Deputies adopted the contested law.
Procedure parliamentary majority, which decided that the general debate in the second reading
waived, although the committee for social policy recommended
discuss this bill at second reading in both the general debate, and all in
detailed debate, that constitutes interference with the constitutionally guaranteed rights
Members pursuant to Article. 21 paragraph. 1 and 4 of the Charter and citizens under Article. 21 paragraph. 1
Charter. Therefore the petitioners hit his
subjected to the test of suitability, necessity and proportionality.

17th Waiving the general debate, although according to the petitioners
eligible to accelerate the negotiations of the House, but again, in relation to an interest
to discuss the bill still "old" Senate because
in relation to the entry into force of the Act for the first 1. 2011 is the resulting time savings
absolutely marginal. Procedure majority in parliament, however, the petitioners
fails the test of necessity. Limitation of parliamentary debates waive
general debate seems totally unjustified, because of the general debate
no way compromise the declared objective, namely the acquisition
force of Act 1. 1. 2011 in order to avoid significant economic
damage. On the sidelines of the petitioners noted that opposition MPs
no way nezavdávali cause for government officials
articulated concerns that they resort to obstruction, thus delaying or impeding the
parliamentary hearing. Any concerns of today's opposition and obstruction
was nothing substantiated.

IBD) Denying the right to vote elected senators

18th Finally, the petitioners argued that because the use of a truncated
hearing under § 118 JRS proposed by the government and the Senate majority decision not to admit
adjournment and drawing of the remaining 21 days of the thirty-day deadline
under Article. 46 paragraph. 1 of the Constitution Czech Republic proposal was contested Act
debated in the Senate has 12. 11. 2010, in the interim between
Senate elections in which the mandate was new senators, and the time of termination of the mandate
senators elected six years ago. Although in the past
year terms in such meantime usually one Senate meeting held
(only in 1998 and 2004 are not), and by the experience and knowledge of legal doctrine
newly elected senators for such a meeting can not vote || | petitioners believed that the venue for the second meeting of the Senate in the
meantime, moreover, 12. 11. 2010, the penultimate day of the mandate
senators elected in 2004, already possesses the characteristics of arbitrariness governing majority that
has denied the newly elected senators the right to vote, or to ensure
vote at the last possible moment when the government camp in Senate

Majority.

19th Abridged hearing under § 118 JRS is because the petitioners
should be seen in the context of the above-mentioned defects
legislative process under the law. Were it not for accumulation of non-standard procedures governing majority, thus
declaring a state of legislative emergency, without consensus and a convincing justification
, an emergency meeting of the Chamber of Deputies with drastic cuts
five-day period and consideration of the bill without a general debate in the evening
one day it would not be
discuss the bill in the Senate before the termination of the mandate of senators elected in 2004.
from the sequence of steps of the government and government majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
claimants will appear as the main objective prevent a proper discussion
proposal at a meeting of the Senate, which would no longer be able to participate in the newly elected senators,
respectively. on which he would not have a majority government camp. This process but according
petitioners interferes with the constitutional rights of Senator
exercise its mandate, which arises already choosing. The senator is right in the constellation of the
be compared with the competing constitutional values, which are both
opportunity to comment on the Senate bill in the Constitution of the Czech Republic set
thirty day period, partly interested in the resolution of the Senate repudiated

any decision of the Supreme administrative court on the invalidity of elections. The present practice only
meeting of the Senate in the meantime, where are pending bills in
which expires in thirty days before the first meeting of the new term
period, in this regard, according to the petitioners reasonable and equitable
solution to this conflict.

20th On the contrary, consideration of the contested Act at the 25th meeting of the Senate on
12th 11. 2010 petitioners rated as a clear interference with the right of Senator
to uninterrupted exercise of his mandate, without prima facie evident
reasonable grounds for such a procedure. The petitioners also underwent this intervention as indicated above
proportionality test, and concluded that the only
declared by a legitimate aim may again be defending
considerable economic damage allegedly threatened if the law would not come into effect no later than
1st 1, 2011. the plane suitability
petitioners admitted that the discussion of the draft of the contested act in accordance with § 118 JRS already
12th 11. 2010 is eligible to accelerate the legislative process.

21st However, according to the petitioners already in the test of necessity follows
speedy Senate discussion draft of the contested act fails. This
petitioners corroborated by verdict Vice-President of the Senate P. Pithart at the beginning of the impugned
meeting: "It is not true that if we do not proceed in a shortened
negotiations, not the proposed changes in laws
enter into force on the first day next year. They can. They just have more
all those steps, from which they will be expected to do it sooner than
farthest end of the statutory period. Democracy is beginning to empty when
of majority rule, corrected protection of minorities and the rights of individuals
becomes a mere majority rule. ". The petitioners in this context
recalled that the thirty-day period for consideration of the Senate
contested Act ended 3. 12. 2010. Back then no longer be able to attend the hearing
newly elected senators and could run a full debate on
which they could be prepared. If the Senate rejected the bill or returned
amendments to 3. 12. 2010, the Chamber of Deputies would
about it in the proper mode (ie. Not to be emergency legislation) could again
act in ten days ( cf. § 97 para. 3 or 4 SOAD), ie. already
week from 13. 12. 2010. Given the public statements of the President of the Republic
proposers seemed possible use of its veto in Article.
50 Constitution of the Czech Republic as completely improbable and the expectation that
will be contested law the president signed soon fulfilled when he did so
fourth day after it was passed.
Promulgation even before the end of this year should the petitioners nothing stood in the way even in the case
its consideration by the Senate and then by the Chamber of Deputies on
few days later, which would allow the Senate fulfill its role and
opposition effectively exercise its rights in the legislative process.
Way discussion and adoption of the contested bill in the Senate and the petitioners
disproportionate interference with the right of Senators elected in 2010
exercise their mandate under Art. 21 par. 4 in conjunction with Art. 4 paragraph. 4

Charter; Senator can carry out its mandate to taking the oath, but
deliberate and arbitrary displacement substantial political decision against
parliamentary practice before a possible moment of taking the oath lavishes
essence and meaning of such power limitation senator's mandate. As a result
artificially preserved the government's Senate majority was facilitated approval
already after the general debate (§ 108 paragraph. 2 JRS), so the opposition senators could
amendments (unlike MPs, who just had to
prepare them adequate time) to make at all.

I. C) Description of the circumstances of the legislative procedure for adoption of the contested Act


22nd The allegations contained in the Constitutional Court also confronted with
transcripts of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and their committees
further their resolutions and Assembly Print
freely available in the digital library on the website of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate || | Parliament of the Czech Republic and www.psp.cz www.senat.cz.

23rd On 5. 10. 2010, the Government of the Chamber of Deputies a bill
amending certain acts in connection with austerity measures
in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, approved by Resolution of the Government
no. 672 of 22. 9. 2010, requesting consideration of the draft
law so that the Chamber of Deputies to express its consent already in
first reading (§ 90 par. 2 SOAD). This proposal was on 8. 10. 2010
distributed to the deputies as Parliamentary print no. 120/0 - Vl.
nz in the context of austerity measures within the competence of the MLSA. The bill by 26
sides amends 18 other acts, the proposal was attached
explanatory report of 80 pages in length. The Organizing Committee of 14. 10. 2010
recommended discussing the bill, designated a rapporteur, and proposed assigning
to the committee for social policy (Resolution no. 32). 1st reading
was started at 16:00 on 26 10th, 2010 at the 7th meeting, where the
proposal was discussed in the general debate. In the course of Deputies
he disagreed with the processing so as to allow the bill pronounce
agreement at the first reading, and then, after they appeared in print
information about forthcoming proposal of the Government to declare a state of legislative | || distress, asked the CSSD deputies at 17:20 pm for a break.
This request was granted and the discussion of the draft was adjourned until 9:00 pm
on 27. 10. 2010. The government actually under resolution no. 758 of 26
10. 2010 this bill (together with three other government bills
) took on 27 10th, 2010 during the first reading back.
Itself 7th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies continued until 14:02 pm on 29 10th
2010, when it was adjourned until 2 11. 2010 at 14:00 pm.

24th In the meantime, the government under Resolution no. 759 dated 26. 10. 2010
secondly proposed Chair of the Chamber of Deputies, to declare a state of legislative emergency
period from 1 11th to 5th 11. 2010 to discuss || | same government bill (along with those of three government bills
) and also requested the Chair of the Chamber of Deputies to
decided that those government bills will be discussed in shortened
negotiations within the framework of the declared state of legislative emergency,
and the President of the Senate, the Senate referred to government bills discussed in shortened
negotiations. At the same time instructed the Prime Minister to set out the government's proposals
laws again by the chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies for further discussion
, as well as proposals adopted on the basis of that resolution
government.

25th Government draft Act was contested by the Government on 29. 10. 2010
repeatedly submitted to the Chamber of Deputies and the same day was sent
Members as Parliamentary print no. 155/0 - Vl. nz in connection with
austerity measures in the competence of the MLSA (as well as the other three mentioned
government bills - Parliamentary Press no. 156-158).

26th Subsequently, the President of the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of the above
draft Government Decision No. 7 dated 29. 10. 2010 announced pursuant to § 99 paragraph
. 1 SOAD state of legislative emergency for the period from 1 11th-15th 11th 2010
The decision also stated that the request of the Prime Minister P. Nečas was justified
"threat of significant economic damage.". Immediately after
President of the Chamber of Deputies decision no. 8 on the same day decided
according to § 99 par. 2 SOAD, that the present government bill (along with the other three
) will be discussed in the summary consideration (minus 1. reading) and

According to § 99 par. 3 SOAD told the Parliamentary Press no. 155 Committee
social policy, while for their consideration set
"impassable deadline for submitting resolutions to the 2nd 11. 2010 12:00 || | hours. ".

27th On 2 11. 2010 at 14:02 pm was launched interrupted
7th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, where deputies first approached
assess whether conditions continue to exist for the state of legislative emergency. Of
petitioners' claims and the stenographic records of the meetings it is clear that the general debate
against this procedure chairwoman of Deputies
several opposition MPs argued that it is a violation of SOAD, as
according to § 99 paragraph . 4 SOAD Deputies to assess the state of legislative emergency
always "before discussing the draft agenda of the meeting", while
show ongoing 7th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies approved
already on 26 October 2010 and the Parliamentary press no. 155 in it was not (and could not even
) included. Conversely, Chairman of the ODS P. Tluchoř
in its course (at 15:19 hrs) announced that it is proposing a coalition
deputies called for the convocation. Extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and
recommended convening this meeting on the same day from 16:00 hours.
Chair of the Chamber of Deputies this proposal immediately meet (at 15:20 pm) and
broke off negotiations 7th meeting until 16:00 pm, when it will be launched on 8
meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. As the petitioners stressed the interruption
seventh meeting convened and thus starting the 8th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies passed
time of 40 minutes.

28th 8th meeting by the President of the Chamber of Deputies convened pursuant to §
51 paragraph. 4 SOAD, and at the request of 108 deputies, was launched in
16: 01 hours. The petitioners in this context pointed to the fact that
President of the Chamber of Deputies did not observe SOAD that her
to § 51 paragraph. 6 imposes notify the convening of any meeting of the Chamber of Deputies
all Members at least 5 days in advance, which was
alleged deputy V. Filip. According to the petitioners' claim was an invitation
at the 8th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies organizational
Department of the Chamber of Deputies circulated to Members electronically
just 7 minutes before the meeting so convened and opposition not only lacked
opportunity at this meeting properly prepare, but some MPs from the opposition
also had the opportunity to hold even attend. On the deadline
responded and chairman of CSSD deputies' group under the same provision SOAD
filing a motion for adjournment of the meeting the next day, ie. To 3. 11. 2010
9:00 pm., Reasoning that, so that all Members to this meeting
proper way to prepare. This proposal was not accepted (see
vote no. 2).

29th After the launch of the eighth meeting of the Chamber of Deputies again they spoke in the debate
opposition MPs, who pointed to the non-fulfillment of the conditions
for declaring a state of legislative emergency, respectively. abuse of this institute
government majority to the detriment of the rights of political minorities.
Chairman of the CSSD deputies 'group then asked for a break in the plenary session in the
range of two hours for the purpose of meeting CSSD deputies' group.
This request was rejected (vote no. 3). Subsequently, the Chair of the ODS
procedural proposal, "the Chamber of Deputies
discussed and voted on laws even after 19, 21 and zero hour tomorrow
day." Deputies this proposal in voting no. 4
approved and proceeded to assess whether conditions continue to exist for the state of legislative emergency
to discuss the Parliamentary Press no. 155-158, while
adopted Resolution no. 111, which It confirmed the duration of a state of legislative emergency
(vote no. 5, the ratio of votes of the deputies present, 151 voted for
105 against 46). Subsequently, the program was approved by the 8th meeting
(vote no. 6), and could thus be approached to discuss
individual agenda items.

30th Before discussing the draft law was contested
Chamber of Deputies this time examined whether the conditions exist for
consideration of the contested act in the summary consideration while
Deputies adopted Resolution no. 112, which stated that
conditions for consideration of the contested act in the summary consideration
continue to exist (voting no. 7 in the ratio of votes of those present
134 deputies voted 90 for, 39 against). So it could be approached to discuss the proposal
contested bill in the second reading. The petitioners in this

Respect attention to the fact that since the submission of the bill to
launch of its discussion in the Chamber of Deputies passed
mere four days, ie. From 29. 10. 2010 (Friday), including Saturday and Sunday, while
discussion of a bill as early as 2 11. 2010 was not for opposition MPs
sufficiently predictable, did not get a chance to present
detail about the matter and informed comment on it, especially with
view of the fact that as described above, and was ranked
discussed not only the design under the law, but three other proposals
acts (Parliamentary Press no. 156-158).

31st Based on the above decision of President of the Chamber of Deputies
no. 8 to the Committee on Social Policy discussed the bill on 2
11. 2010 issued a resolution, delivered to Members as print no. 155/1
(amendments) in which the Chamber of Deputies, secondly recommended that
proposal "discussed in general debate; reviewed all its parts in
detailed debate, until Friday, November 5, 2010 to 16:00 hours ";
Secondly Deputies recommended the bill with these supplements
approve. As the petitioners pointed out, despite the fact it was based on
vote no. 8 decided to dispense with a general debate in
second Reading the adoption of the contested Act, and was immediately opened
detailed debate, in which the following six deputies and minister J. Drabek
as a newsletter design. Immediately afterwards was under § 99 par. 7
SOAD started the third reading of the contested Act, which was first
vote on the amendments of the rapporteur of the Committee and some
deputies and subsequently vote on the actual adoption of the contested || | Law in the version approved amendments, the draft
contested Act was adopted (resolution no. 113) after him
deputies consent, when the 156 deputies present and
MPs voted for the Bill 108 , 47 against (voting no. 17 at 20:45 pm
).

32nd Deputies transmitted on 3 11. 2010
contested draft bill to the Senate, where its organizing committee on the same day as publication no. 363/0
commanded Committee on Health and Social Policy as a guarantee
Committee. Committee on Health and Social Policy discussed the proposal and
on 11. 11. 2010 adopted Resolution no. 76, which recommends that the Senate approve
proposal and sent it as a print no. 363/1. The Senate included this
printing on its 25th meeting, which was convened by the Chairman of the Senate in accordance with §
118. Jrs 3 to 12. 11. 2010. Immediately after its launch
was voted the above application Government dated 26. 10. 2010 to
Senate draft of the contested act (along with the other three)
discussed in the summary consideration within the meaning of § 118 JRS, with a vote no.
3 was the request by the Government and upheld the contested draft bill was discussed in a shortened
negotiations. After the end of the debate (in accordance with § 108 JRS is
not held a detailed discussion with the possibility to introduce amendments)
adopted Resolution no. 601, which the Senate approved the bill, as amended
ceded his Deputies. For
resolution voted 42 senators out of 77 present, 30 were against, abstained fifth

33rd The law was on 19. 11. 2010 delivered to the president for signature
Republic, which rejected it on 23. 11. 2010 signed.
Adopted Act was then on 30. 11. 2010 delivered to the prime minister's signature. The law was on 8
12th 2010 promulgated in the Collection of Laws under no. 347/2010 Coll.
with effect from 1st 1, 2011 with the exception of Art. XXIX Section 1
which takes effect from the date of publication of Law. The petitioners pointed out in this connection
contrast between the speed of the legislative process (
draft bill was presented 29. 10. 2010, the Chamber of Deputies approved the second
11th 2010, approved by the Senate 12. 11. 2010, and signed by the president
Republic 23. 11. 2010, just 25 days after the filing of the bill) and
slowness announcing adopted law in the Official Gazette (8. 12. 2010
ie 15 days after the president's signature). Although the petitioners
unusual speed in the legislative process, the Government
justified by extraordinary circumstances, when the state faces serious economic damage (§ 99 paragraph
. 1 SOAD), promulgating the Act after its signing by President
executive vice versa lasted longer than usual. Thus, deferred publication
adopted the law on the one hand shortened foresee a deadline, and therefore the possibility of citizens with

New legislation in time become familiar and also greatly complicates the possibility
constitutional review because the petitioners be realistic effects
unconstitutionally adopted law effectively prevented only if
contested Act by the Constitutional Court canceled even before its efficacy.
As a result of actions of bodies of executive power, which led to the promulgation of Law No.
. 347/2010 Coll. to 8. 12. 2010, so he could be a proposal to repeal this Act
filed just 24 days before the effective date.

I. D) Summary

34th In conclusion, the petitioners proposal briefly recapitulated so that
due to the procedures described above proposal was contested Act
approved by the Chamber of Deputies has the second working day after submitting his
while only during this second day has become apparent ,
that this day will be the last day. Due to the short time it was not possible to draft
properly prepare and discuss amendments and because
accumulation of short time and launch a general debate would be fundamentally hampered
option argue against the bill in parliamentary debate
in the Chamber of Deputies. Government coalition petitioners also
deliberately avoided the thorough critical discussion in the Senate, the possibility to submit amendments
there and the potential use of discretionary powers of the Senate
renewed in elections to reject or return the Bill to the Chamber of Deputies
. It has achieved this accumulation abuse emergency legislation, unpredictable
an emergency meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as
shortening the time for consideration of the Bill in the Senate just nine days
of constitutional thirty day period. In the bill, which not insignificantly
restricts the fundamental rights and freedoms and Parliament utterly failed in his constitutional role
legitimizing instance. The petitioners pointed out that
invading all laws adopted by Parliament during the November 2010
emergency legislation, even though they can say most of
following defects. Adoption of the contested law, however, was accompanied by extreme arbitrariness
government majority and from a broader perspective, the petitioners in the way of adoption of the contested Act
saw continuation of the trend, which is very dangerous
for the development of democracy in the Czech Republic. It's a trend
marginalization of Parliament and parliamentary debate, which also commemorated
reference to the circumstances of adoption of Act no. 261/2007 Coll., On
stabilization of public budgets, the manner of its adoption, as well as || | way of the adoption of the contested act shows the tendency of most
government cut back the possibility of free debate in both chambers of Parliament.
Parliamentary debate loses its adversarial nature
so important for the fulfillment of its functions. These are all manifestations of a tendency to degrade
both Houses of Parliament to a mere voting machine, which has
as quickly as possible without unnecessary speech translate into political decision
government majority adopted into law. Unless the contested law
canceled and will not be so clearly pointed out the unconstitutionality of such crowding out
parliamentary debate, according to the petitioners may become such
way of the adoption of fundamental laws purporting
legal restrictions on the fundamental rights and freedoms, very soon rule and normal phenomenon, which
petitioners wanted to prevent their proposal.

II.

Recap observations of the parties

35th The Constitutional Court, under § 42 para. 4 and § 69 of Act no.
182/1993 Coll., On the Constitutional Court, as amended, (hereinafter
"the Constitutional Court Act") sent the petition
annulment of the contested provisions of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

36th Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic represented
chairwoman Miroslava Nemcova in its statement dated 22. 12. 2010
particularly described in detail the procedure of adoption of Act no. 347/2010 Coll.
Amending some laws in connection with
austerity measures in the Ministry of Labour and social Affairs. In conclusion after
noted that the contested act was adopted after a properly conducted
legislative process and it is up to the Constitutional Court to evaluate the constitutionality
.

37th Czech Senate President Milan represented
Štěch in a statement dated 22. 12. 2010
also presented this detailed description of the assessment process under the Act no. 347/2010 Coll. Senate
accompanied by a copy of the stenographic report of the 25th meeting of the Senate dated 12. 11.
, 2010.


38th Moreover, the Senate on the proposal of deputies, namely the plea
denied the right to vote by the newly elected Senators, presented this legal analysis
issue of verification of the validity of election of senators, while
came to the conclusion that the newly elected senators in the October Senate elections could
be granted access and voting (ie. power mandate)
meeting of the Senate held in the previous seventh term from 12 November 2010
because at that time it was not confirmed that the mandate of the senator actually arose.
Mandates Senators elected in the October elections to the Senate because
Mandate and Immunity Committee of the Senate to verify at its meeting held on
24th November 2010 upon presentation of a certificate of election.
He began the same day the first meeting of the Senate in the new eighth term on which
newly elected senators passed the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the prescribed oath and began
carry out its mandate resulting election.

39th The Constitutional Court, by letter dated 18. 1. 2011
requested a statement from the Prime Minister P. Nečas on specific reasons for the adoption of Government Resolution No.
. 759 dated 26. 10. 2010, which the government proposed Chair of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament
Czech Republic to declare a state of legislative emergency
, and also asked her about the decision that, among other things. And the government's draft law will be contested
discussed in shortened negotiations within
announced emergency legislation (see paragraph 24).

40th Prime Minister P. Nečas in his statement delivered to the Constitutional Court on 28
1, 2011 first recapitulated the circumstances of the legislative procedure for adopting
original proposals governmental laws that preceded
adoption of the Government Resolution no. 759 (see paragraph 23 ). Subsequently over
beyond the desired comprehensively express my opinion on the issue
declaring states of emergency legislation in general, the legislation
this institute and its use in the past. The actual reasons for which
government declaring a state of legislative emergency in this case suggested
Prime Minister stated that in case the government to adopt these bills would
Czech Republic threatened significant economic damage.
In addition, said the measures included in the reform of laws should
bring annual savings of up to EUR 45 bn. CZK, while their timely
rejection would lead to significant economic losses amounting to tens of units to
billion CZK and also on tax and accounting issues.
With regard to the fact that all the government bills followed the
draft law on the state budget, not accepting them would mean either higher
state budget deficit, which would, according to the provisional budget
itself controlled economy the volume of income and expenditure budget approved
2010, or should be lowered the outlook of the Czech Republic expressed
share of the deficit to GDP ratio from 4.6% to 5.5%. Both
situation would mean for the Czech Republic considerable damage
stopgap budget would signal instability and internal signal that
government is unable to enforce such reforms to keep the deficit
public finances viable this would reduce the credibility of the government and
Czech Republic. This would ultimately be the opinion of the Prime Minister
impact on attitudes of rating agencies and market participants
ECAF Czech Republic
domestic and foreign capital market, and would thus significantly increase | || cost of servicing the national debt, which the Prime Minister in his statement
further described on a specific example of a credit rating of long-term foreign liabilities
Czech Republic, according to the rating agencies.
In the conclusion of his statement the Prime Minister stated that "at a time when the government
at its meeting on 22. 9. 2010 specified set of reform laws approved
been aware that their late acceptance may
Czech Republic cause serious economic damage and that it is also
due to relatively limited time available for the adoption of those laws
are given the extraordinary circumstances comparable
extraordinary circumstances in which the state of legislative emergency announced in
past. The proposal to declare a state of legislative emergency
however, the government decided to proceed only when it was clear that the use
other procedural tools that the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies
provides (especially assent on a proposal already in the first reading or

Reduce the time to discuss the proposal so as to ensure the effectiveness of the acquisition
reform bills simultaneously with the Law on State Budget
Czech Republic in 2011), due to the attitude of the opposition
can not be used effectively. The institute uses state of legislative emergency was thus
government effectively forced the attitude of the opposition. "(See p. 9-10). Therefore
Prime Minister's statement concluded by saying that the government
when deciding on the use of the procedure according to § 99 para. 1 of the SOAD
acted fully in accordance with the law both regarding the withdrawal of proposals for reform of laws, and with
requests for declaring a state of legislative emergency for the period from 1
11th to 5. 11. 2010 for consideration.

41st On 4. 2. 2011 the Constitutional Court received unsolicited personal statement
President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament. In it
especially states that it was her duty to declare a state of legislative emergency
according to § 99 SOAD that she is not entitled to review and
decide whether conditions for its publication and whether the state | || emergency legislation promulgated. Furthermore, Chair of the Chamber of Deputies
recapitulates the process of adoption of the law from the stage when the
submitted the original draft government law after the approval of the draft
under the Act within the legislative emergency at an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies
. Objections party group of MPs failure
five-day deadline for convening the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies President
rejects the reference to part of the second sentence after the semicolon § 51 paragraph. 6 SOAD with
that SOAD does not specify any minimum period which must be respected
and below which it would not be basic five-day period be shortened.
Opposition MPs had the opportunity to comment on the bill and raise their
amendments as they debated the bill
Committee on Social Policy and the participation of opposition MPs and took him to his
amendments which opposition MPs also submit directly to
meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in the 2nd reading. If the Chamber of Deputies
decided to waive the general debate in the second reading,
acted in accordance with § 99 para. 7 SOAD and, moreover, despite the failure to hold a general debate
to express opposition MPs with preferential rights performance.
Chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies rejects the unevenness of time that was devoted
bill in Parliament compared with the time that was needed for
its publication in the Official Gazette. Chair of the Chamber of Deputies and
denies that in this case there was abuse Institute
legislative emergency, and an emergency meeting was, in its opinion
carried out in accordance with the statutory rules. In its own procedure even
process of Deputies President sees opposing traits
arbitrariness, respectively. Fuse failure constitutionally conforming legislative
process. It also disagrees with the opinion (of course, not appellant
neprezentovaným), according to which the announcement of the state of legislative emergency
should agree a clear majority of deputies to be able to talk about his
accordance with the law, respectively. rejects the view that if the ratio
poll lower, ie. corresponding to the actual proportion of political forces in
Deputies, regards the procedure illegal. It considers that the Constitutional Court
should the matter subjected to the test of proportionality between the alleged violation
rights of minorities in the Chamber of Deputies and the possible serious consequences
associated with the eventual repeal of the Act, even with regard
the principle of minimizing its interference. In conclusion, the President of the Chamber of Deputies
astonishment that although the
under the emergency legislation adopted four laws, the petitioners at the Constitutional Court
attacked only two of them.

III.

Findings from media and public sources

42nd To ensure a sufficient understanding of the political context and circumstances
declaring a state of legislative emergency, the Constitutional Court has made
publicly available sources and media findings below:

- On 18. 10. 2010 in connection with the results of the first round of elections to the Senate of
days 15 and 16. 10. 2010 Prime Minister P. Nečas gave interviews to the media,
in which the question of occurrence setback for government reform in the possible acquisition of a majority
Social Democrats in the Senate after the second round of elections (held on 22 and
23rd 10. 2010) stated, inter alia: "(...) although it would on reform

Government efforts, nothing has changed, it would mean a tremendous destructive
complication, because this would be an extension of the legislative process and
conflicts "(Source: Lidove noviny, 18. 10. 2010)," (... )
social democracy can not be statist opposition is absolutely
negative wave that complicate and spoil what may. Orange
Senate would be a huge negative force that would only increase the potential
political conflicts. This would unnecessarily polarized
this company. "(Source: MF Dnes, 18. 10. 2010).

- Immediately after the approval of the government resolution on the application for
declaring a state of legislative emergency, to discuss the draft of the contested
government law (and the other three proposals) Prime Minister P. Nečas this step
media commented as follows: "(...) it was only do the
way we went ours. That means their withdrawal and their new
mission with a request for declaration of legislative emergency. (...)
Clearly shows that these standards due to obstructions, which makes
social democracy are neschvalitelné. Respectively high risk
schvalitelnosti the end of this year, to be effective from 1
January next year, which is bound to draft the state budget.
Means that there is a significant way the financial markets threatened the reputation
Czech Republic, there is a risk of rating downgrade, there is a risk
increase in debt service, there is a risk of increasing the deficit in the state budget and even
in some aspects the risk of tax evasion.
It all creates the risk of major economic damage and in this situation
is the duty of the government to prevent major economic damage and declare a state of legislative emergency
. "(Source: CT 24 - Events, comments, 26. 10. 2010,
similarly also see Rádio Czech - Interview on the current issue, 27. 10.
2010). "We had no choice. (...) Given the absolutely
obstructive and destructive behavior of social democracy. (...) Failure to adopt laws on
underlying the budget for next year, the Czech Republic
cause economic damage. "(Source:" The cuts and back cuts. Coalition landslide swept away the opposition
"Lidove noviny 3. 11. 2010).

- The reasons for declaring a state of emergency legislation has also expressed
Chairman of the ODS P. Tluchoř: "(...) Well, because
Czech Republic threatens vital economic damage. Substantial economic harm,
if laws were submitted to the Chamber of Deputies government
not adopted until 1 January. It would be impossible to adopt the budget at the
as it was presented. And that would be paid
many other steps. We've tried, even on Monday and Tuesday, we clearly
offering to discuss these laws in a reasonable standard mode. We offer
shortening the deadline to 15 days. Which on the one hand, richly
allow comitology, on the other hand, it would allow
adoption of laws or their effect on January 1st, 2011. Therefore
still talking about that situation where social democracy announced by absolute
blockade in the Senate, where social democracy has decided these laws
the block. So the reason is clear. "(Source: Radio 1 - Advice -
happened today, 29. 10. 2010).

- Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Club VV K. Koci to the topic
stated that "(...) a state of legislative emergency has been in the past
Deputies used several times already, its purpose is to enable faster
consideration of bills. Obviously, I prefer
classic legislative process, but the destructive behavior of the opposition coalition could
choice. (...) We did not want and I personally I consider
state of legislative emergency for up to extreme solutions. I was really for that
us to approve the classic way. However, opposition
us last week prevented approve these key laws in summary proceedings so
we managed it, he clearly declared that in the Senate, which has the most
after these senatorial elections, ME just giving us all those
laws zavetuje and returns, which means it would be impossible to really catch
at the proper time by the end of this year. Therefore that state of legislative emergency
. ". At the same time he expressed the belief that the bills could go to the House
earlier and then the state of legislative emergency was not necessary to use.
"(...) It's simply a fact that some of the ministers of this government, whether because of
options, or something else, not to say completely asleep, but

After all, it had not been transmitted to the Chamber of Deputies. "(Source: CT 24, 3. 11.
2010 or" Koci: chased us into a corner. That's why we took after
legislative emergency ", Parliamentary leaves 8. 11. 2010, available at http
: //www.parlamentnilisty.cz/parlament/180705.aspx).

- In the same spirit was also noted by the Chamber of Deputies Vice
K. Klasnová: "(...) in any way I can believe that our coalition partners
maybe with the presentation of unpopular cuts waited until after
elections in October, annoyed me the hysteria state of legislative emergency
provoked." (source: "November in the Chamber's Vice-eyed"
9th 12. 2010, available at http://katerinaklasnova.cz/komentare-23-
Nov-in-the House-eyes-her-member) .

- The same belief went out and open letter
coalition deputies, headed by the Chairman of the parliamentary parties of the coalition of political parties
, which turned to various government ministers to appeal to
speeding up the preparation of the reform laws. "(...) With regard to knowledge
parliamentary deadlines and procedures minister wants to ask that of them were
can still talk to the clubs and that everything since the beginning of 2012 could
pay (... ) We do not want such fundamental laws were approved
time pressure, such as emergency legislation. "(source:
HN.Ihned.cz, 8. 12. 2010).

IV.

Oral hearing before the Constitutional Court

43rd In a hearing before the Constitutional Court, which was held on 8. 2.
2011, the parties in their pleadings bequeathed to its opinions
which was contained in their written submissions delivered to the Constitutional Court.
Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by Vice-President A.
Gajdůšková, moreover stressed circumstances
legislative procedure for adopting the contested bill in the Senate and stated that if the petition was
bill in the Chamber of Deputies discussed in shortened negotiations
within the declared state of legislative emergency, the wording of § 118 JRS
clearly oblige the Senate to discuss the law has been forwarded to the Chamber of Deputies
set the legislative process, ie.
shortened in negotiations. In other words, the decision of Deputies
discuss the bill in question under the emergency legislation
dictated the nature of the legislative process in the Senate and also its very
result.

44th The Constitutional Court as a witness summoned by the Prime Minister of Czech Republic
P. Nečas to comment on the facts of acceptance
government resolution, which the government proposed Chair of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament
to declare a state of legislative emergency, and
also asked her about the decision that, among other things. i
government's proposal under the bill will be discussed in the summary of negotiations within the framework of the declared state of legislative emergency
. To request the Chairman of the Constitutional Court P. Rychetský
specifically what led the government to adopt such a decision, P. Nečas
replied that the behavior of the opposition here, there was a real threat that mentioned
proposal under the Act, along with other reform laws will be adopted before 1
1, 2011, whereby the Czech Republic incur substantial
economic damage and should result in a change of attitude
credit rating agencies and market participants in evaluating credit risk
Czech Republic domestic and foreign capital markets. The query
Vice-President of the Constitutional Court, E. Wagner, P. Nečas whether it could
express an opinion, to where in case of compliance
ordinary legislative process in the Parliament of the Czech Republic was real
approval under the bill, P. Nečas said that probably in January or February
2011. further inquiry Vice-President of the Constitutional court to
P. Necas expressed his opinion, what amount (in absolute terms)
, increasing the budget deficit compared to the originally planned
already deemed considerable economic damage, P. Nečas for help analogy with
amount of economic damage eg. Flood said amount
around CZK 45 billion. Subsequently, the Vice-President of the Constitutional Court asked whether
P. Nečas was able to specifically quantify the economic damage that would
emerged when the contested Act under the ordinary legislative
process, which in his opinion ended in January , eventually.
February, 2011. This P. Nečas said that the month was an
economic damages in the range of units billion CZK. P. Nečas opinion regarding

Implied threat of a change of attitude of rating agencies in the assessment of credit risk
Czech Republic, on domestic and foreign capital markets
Vice-President of the Constitutional Court confronted
statistical data published by the Czech National Bank and themselves
credit rating agencies, stating inter alia that, for example, or a significant increase
state budget deficit compared with a projected deficit
budget for 2009 actually meant it announced a reduction
rating and the change of attitude of rating agencies in assessing the credit risk
Czech Republic, and therefore beyond this threat
expressed doubts. The inquiry judge V. Güttler and the neighboring query
Vice-President of the Constitutional Court to the selected procedure Government, namely
why the reform laws adopted after the adoption of the draft state budget
respectively. Why were changes in the form of cuts envisaged by the contested
bill adopted in the form of individual amendments to the relevant laws
P. Necas said that accepting proposals for reform of laws and their impact assessment
is a very complex process that must
be discussed as a whole in a single package, to avoid unexpected and unforeseen
interference in its structure. In a similar way, he responded
P. Nečas also asked Judge S. Balik whether the Government should consider the possibility and its implications
where would the adoption of the contested draft law has been under the ordinary legislative procedure and
remaining reform laws would be
adopted under emergency legislation. The petitioners' representative queries at some
specific circumstances and reasons for the procedure chosen by the government (non-publication
extraordinary meeting of the Chamber of Deputies earlier knowledge or opinions
opposition) P. Nečas responded similarly in its observations of 28
. 1, 2010. further inquiry petitioners' representative whether the Government for its decision to propose
chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies publication
state of legislative emergency because of the threat of considerable economic damage
had any specific analysis or documentation, P. Nečas said that
wide range of expert views and opinions, of course, in the form
forecasts and likely scenarios and estimates. The query Judge I.
Johns, whether it considers that participating Members can have doubts about
how about if resubmitted proposal under the law
act, and if necessary. on what basis they were dispelled those doubts, P
. Necas said that he believes that every deputy must have
awareness about the specific content of this matter, as is repeatedly
assured themselves and proposers of the draft.

45th During the hearing, a representative of the petitioners, B. Sobotka
presented a proposal to supplement the evidence in the form of questioning a witness -
President of the Chamber of Deputies M. Nemcova. The Constitutional Court for this purpose
adjourned the hearing on 22. 2. 2011.

46th In the time before the odročeného hearing, the Constitutional Court
14 2. 2011 receipt of the petitioners' written observations
President of the Chamber of Deputies M. Němcová of 4. 2. 2011 Additional
written statement by the Chairman Minister P. Nečas of 27 1
2011 and his testimony before the Constitutional court of 8. 2. 2011.

47th In relation to the written observations of Deputies President
petitioners again presenting menus one relied
already in its proposal, and confront it with concrete assertions
President of the Chamber of Deputies, in particular, that Members had enough time with || | introduce proposals under discussion, including with regard to the fact that the subject
government bills were presented for the second time. Furthermore
they disagreed with the statement President Chamber of Deputies that
to the issue despite the failure to hold a general debate to express opposition MPs
with privilege speech, as curtailing debate on the bill
only speakers with the law to be given precedence words
deemed discriminatory, as indeed has been criticized in
cited Constitutional court judgment. Nos. Pl. US 24/07. In this context
drew attention to the fact that compared to the previous electoral term
opposition MPs have significantly limited the opportunity to present their views through
persons with preferential right words
due to the reduced number of officials of Deputies. Finally, the petitioners
stressed that the President of the Chamber of Deputies declared a state

Emergency legislation in conflict with § 99 para. 1 of the SOAD, according to which the Chairman of the House
declares a state of emergency legislation proposed by the government for a certain period of time
because contrary to the proposal of the government declared a state of legislative emergency for
period from 1. 11. 2010 to 15. 11. 2010 (not to 5. 11. 2010, as proposed by the government
).

48th Also, a written statement of the Prime Minister petitioners
confronted with the arguments already raised the proposal. Specifically
they disagreed with the statement of the Prime Minister regarding the obstructive conduct of the opposition, which is trying to justify
process of government and government majority in the Chamber of Deputies
and which designates an application of the exception under § 90 par. 3 SOAD,
prevent approval of the bill in the first reading, and objections by
§ 91 para. 2 SOAD, preventing the shortening of the statutory deadline for consideration
bill in committees for more than 30 days.
The petitioners are convinced that the implementation of rights that SOAD in those two provisions
admits parliamentary minority can not be considered as obstruction, thus
for abusing the Rules of Procedure to delay parliamentary hearing.
The purpose of these provisions is to guarantee parliamentary minority
minimum time for a proper assessment of bills, while at the Institute
approval of the law in the first reading (§ 90 par. 2-6 SOAD) is an obvious
it is intended only for the approval of simple and uncontroversial proposals
laws. The petitioners her claim disputed by § 90 par. 3
SOAD so they could against the submitted draft laws apply
amendments, and thus to realize the role of the opposition
consisting in offering alternatives. The Institute of the bill is approved in the first reading amendments
administration does not.
The petitioners are convinced that their interest in shortening the sixty-day period for
consideration of the bill in committees maximum of 30 days was legitimate
having regard to the seriousness of the political decisions on the proposals contained therein,
primarily involving restrictions statutory range of economic and social
rights guaranteed by the Charter. "We believe that our interest
on a fair and thorough consideration of bills
was easily predictable, and therefore can not be legitimately used by Prime Minister
as grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency." (P. 5)

49th In conclusion, the petitioners disputed with some observations
Prime Minister put forward at the hearing before the Constitutional Court.
The assertion that without the opposition procedure, which vetoed both the procedure pursuant to § 90
SOAD, thus shortening the time limits for committee meetings for 15 days, "it was fully
second reading even from the point of view deadlines should discussed this proposal | || Senate has in its new composition, "the petitioners pointed out that if the original
bill counting the Prime Minister that it
after approval in the Senate Chamber of Deputies will discuss the new constitution, it seems illogical
that after his withdrawal and znovupředložení this bill the Senate debated
still in its old structure, although it was submitted to the House three weeks
later than the original government bill. The petitioners also subjected
response to criticism of the Prime Minister regarding the impact of the government
draft law on the state budget and the consequences of its rejection, while
noted that already the explanatory memorandum to the draft contested Act
vyčíslovala its impact on the state budget 2011 differently, and it
so that on the expenditure side, there was a decrease of 11,283 billion. CZK and side
income increased by 12.22 billion. CZK. Do an annual review of the state budget for 2011
so this amendment has a total impact of around EUR 23.5 billion. CZK.
When the projection is therefore, according to the petitioners, the overall impact of the contested act to
Annual balance the state budget the amount of approximately 23.5 billion. CZK, then
situation where this law came into effect later than 1 January
2011 would put the state budget impact to its balance sheet in the amount of approximately
1.96 billion. CZK per month. Consequently, if the contested Act came
efficiency, eg. To 1 February 2011, which at its proper discussion
without declaring a state of legislative emergency was completely realistic, reflected by
it to balance the state budget by CZK 1 96 bn. CZK, efficiency
Act on March 1, 2011 an amount of about 3.92 billion. CZK etc. Even such time
suspension would certainly not be eligible to increase the public deficit

Finance "in the order of several tens of billions" as reported by the Prime Minister.
The prime minister presented data that impacts all subject to the laws
state budget by more than a third inflate, according to the petitioners
can not be considered justified. The petitioners also pointed to the fact that
according to the statements of the Prime Minister the government when the request for consultation on the bill
under emergency legislation did not have to determine the status
threat of considerable economic damage
any analysis or other substrate processed by competent authorities. Such an analysis can not let
process or at the time of the contested
draft law, while the government in such a situation should respectively. could, in the opinion of the petitioners
require the processing of such materials, especially
Ministry of Finance and the Czech National Bank. Finally
petitioners identified themselves even with repeated references to the Prime Minister
rating agencies, because the petitioners opinion
rating agencies bear no relation to the acceptance or rejection, respectively.
way to discuss and thus time efficiency contested bill
much less to specific budgetary consequences of measures introduced him
a view to preventing the possible emergence of significant economic damage.

50th Furthermore, on 17. 2. 2011, the Constitutional Court, President of the Chamber of Deputies
overview of legislative emergency declared in
Chamber of Deputies from 1995 to the present. In this report, as
states, the Constitutional Court is to gain insight in how many and in what
case in the past state of legislative emergency announced
and in which cases the laws are present in this mode are assigned on | || agenda of the current meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. The survey was
given that in the mentioned period, the state of legislative emergency announced
23 times.

51st On 22. 2. 2011 oral hearing before the Constitutional Court resumed hearing of the witness
- President of Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic
M. Nemcova, who was on the petition, the Constitutional Court
summoned to especially express to the facts
adoption of its decision dated 29. 10. 2010, which granted the applications
government and declare a state of legislative emergency, and also decided to discuss, among other things.
also contested the government's draft bill in summary consideration within the renowned
the state of legislative emergency.

52nd Chair of the Chamber of Deputies of the first questions from Deputy
P. Holländer Constitutional Court commented on the arguments and reasons which
it specifically led to the adoption of its decision, stressing that
based on the wording § 99 para. 1 SOAD from current practice
Chamber of Deputies, it is obvious that it is not authorized to assess and evaluate
reasons which led the government to submit a proposal to declare a state of legislative emergency
. That her opinion was subsequently Vice
Constitutional Court is confronted with the fact that in its decision no. 7
dated October 29, 2010 declared a state of legislative emergency for a period longer than
proposed by the Government, President of the Chamber of Deputies again
justify the current practice of the past, as well as providing
enough time for proper consideration of all government bills in the legislative
need although its position has consulted with the legal department of the Chamber of Deputies
with the legislative department.

53rd The query Vice-President of the Constitutional Court E. Wagner, whether and how
President of the Chamber of Deputies rationalized taking its decision on
discuss, among other things. I contested the government's draft bill in summary consideration
within declared emergency legislation adopted pursuant to § 99 par. 2
SOAD that it provides a certain degree of discretion, President of the Chamber of Deputies
stated that based on the current course
debating this bill in the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister's statement on possible
economic damage, which because of its early acceptance
encounter, expressing belief that the result has been re-submission
contested bill were all Members discussed the contents with
familiar enough. Her opinion was subsequently
Vice President of the Constitutional Court is confronted with the fact
namely, the concrete, the above described circumstances in finding acceptance

Contested bill, both with expressions ODS deputy chairman M. Benda or
TOP 09 F. Lauda, ​​mentioned in the media, which responded to
fact that an amendment to the Law on Income Tax were Members
taxable perquisites and thus reduced income, giving them when discussing
was not told this was not obvious. Therefore
Vice-President of the Constitutional Court repeatedly asked whether the President of the Chamber of Deputies
maintains its position of sufficient awareness and knowledge of the contents
deputies now under consideration, undoubtedly complicated
draft law and its possible impacts, while President
Chamber of deputies stressed that this is only a subjective expression of individual
deputies. Subsequently, Vice-President of the Constitutional Court, referring to Article. 68
paragraph. 1 of the Czech Constitution, enshrining the government's responsibility
Chamber of Deputies chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies questioned
presented its position on the proposals put forward her commitment by the government, which rather suggests
on the opposite attitude, ie. That the parliamentary majority is
responsible government.

54th To request the Chairman of the Constitutional Court P. Rychetský whether the current practice
Chamber of Deputies in the promulgation of the state of legislative emergency
there was a similar situation, ie. The withdrawal of the government bill during
a proper hearing and in a state znovupředložení
legislative emergency, as in the case now under consideration, President of the Chamber of Deputies
stated that in a situation such recollection.

55th Constitutional Court Judge V. Güttler their questions directed to the 8th
emergency meeting by the President of the Chamber of Deputies convened, and
circumstances of its convening and conduct, to which President Chamber of Deputies
responded by stating that the terms themselves
forms of convocation, everything was orderly manner, and in terms of its agenda and
this matter, for all Members
sufficiently predictable manner.

56th Constitutional Court Judge J. Musil, the chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies interviewed
particular its subjective motives and reasons which can justify such
MEP its consent to the proposed procedure governments, while
President of the Chamber of Deputies referred to the Government's argument | || promoters of the bill and the observations of the Prime Minister of
hearing before the Constitutional court of 8. 2. 2011, that her
were decisive. To a query whether as chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies
for its decision to declare a state of legislative emergency
sought some expert evidence and opinion (eg. CNB) said that not since
assessment and evaluation of the reasons that Government led to the application for
declaring a state of legislative emergency belong to the Chamber of Deputies as a whole
.

57th The query Constitutional Court Judge S. Balik, whether
Chamber of Deputies or the individual members of a process through which they can defend
against its decision to reject the declaration of a state of legislative emergency
or in case of its inaction, President | || Chamber of Deputies stated that such a situation can not arise, because according
SOAD must act and approve this proposal. Subsequently, S. Pack asked whether
before discussing the contested Act was a proposal to declare a state of legislative emergency
reasoned opinion to the government, eg. If
will be the ordinary legislative procedure and the law would be adopted at the end | || February arises not so pity about CZK 24 billion per year, but
damage "only 1960000000". Chairwoman of the Chamber of Deputies stated that
not.

'58. Subsequently, the President of the Chamber of Deputies has faced a wide range of queries from
party representative petitioners, B. Sobotka, leading to the reasons for its
decision to convene an extraordinary meeting of destination insurmountable deadlines
Committee to submit an opinion and to specific procedural
decisions in the context of discussing the contested bill.
To these questions, President of the Chamber of Deputies constantly
responded by stating that it was a standard, widely used in the past
procedure that is in accordance with the Rules. Subsequently, the President of the Chamber of Deputies
B. Sobotka questioned the circumstances that resulted
effect that before convening an extraordinary meeting has been changed
chairman, the deputy chairman L. Zaorálek that before, same day

Presided regular 7th meeting of Deputies, before the start of the eighth extraordinary meeting
just replaced her, to which the President of the Chamber of Deputies
responded that it is a matter of "internal" agreements and it is a common || | procedure, which was the case under consideration, moreover, necessary because the original
Vice President L. Zaorálek be due to the dedication
party affairs failed to comply with the specified time, which should be a pause
in the Chamber of Deputies continued, and so did not want to face criticism
deputies.

59th Subsequently, a judge of the Constitutional Court V. Kůrka interviewed a representative
petitioners that when discussing the draft law, which was subsequently
accepted and published under no. 120/2010 Coll. and concerned the taxation of employee benefits
- meal vouchers (Act no. 120/2010 Coll., which
amending Act no. 235/2004 Coll., on Value Added Tax, as amended
) , which was debated in the Chamber of Deputies
from 26 February 2010 until March 2, 2010 as emergency legislation and whose rapporteur was just
B. Sobotka, although he had voted or otherwise
opposed to such a procedure and, if not, on what grounds.
Interviewee should give a specific reason, which is anticipated § 99 para. 1
SOAD, and what they saw as its fulfillment. Deputy petitioners stated that
did not oppose, because this was a different situation than now considered
case. The situation then took place for a long time
negotiations between the government and trade union representatives and there was the possibility of a strike in the transport sector, which would
In the opinion of the government could lead to serious economic damage, and further
they were extraordinary solutions social
conflict between representatives of the unions and government, where the government on the basis of the negotiations came to
Chamber of Deputies with the proposal of the practice. The existence of those
considerable economic damage, the Government was not specifically documented and
vote interviewee was based only on the opinion of the government.
This opinion was by Judge V. Kůrka confronted with now before
case and the petitioner raised objections, ie. That the government
grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency and the existence of economic damage
failed to substantiate qualified manner. Representative of petitioners
repeatedly responded that it was a different situation and is now offeror
proposal under consideration is perceived differently, as in the first case dealt
extraordinary social conflict, as in the case under consideration
preparing the state budget for 2011 so as to prepare
every year, and thus were clearly quantifiable effects of any decision
Chamber of Deputies. In the first case, the damage could not be quantified precisely
because it was not possible at the moment when the strike until
threatened to accurately quantify its economic impact. The inquiry judge
V. Crust, whether it is the time interval came to the same conclusion - ie.
The former state of legislative emergency has been declared in accordance with the law, even
if it applied the terms contained in the proposal now under consideration
, a representative of the petitioners said that, yes, because the situation then
avoid such an accumulation proposal
criticized steps by the government majority in this case.

60th Subsequently, the parties in their final observations
repeat and summarize their views, which were contained in their written submissions
delivered to the Constitutional Court.

V.

Terms of reference for the evaluation of the proposal

V. A) Sources of parliamentary rights and democratic principles in the legislative process


61st In Art. 1, paragraph. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Czech Republic
characterizes as a democratic state of law based on respect for the rights
and freedoms of man and citizen, is included
normative principle of rule of law. Respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals
is therefore also one of the principles of the draft law, which was adopted
Constitution of the Czech Republic, respectively. the purpose of the functioning of the state and state power.
Respect for the same purpose is also reflected in the Article. 2. 3 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
under which state authority may be asserted only in cases
limits and in the manner prescribed by law. It follows that neither
Parliament, respectively. its two chambers unable to adopt laws
act arbitrarily, but are bound by the law (constitutional and
its light received and interpreted parliamentary law - see below).


62nd The Constitutional Court has in the past in its case dealt with a wide range
constitutional aspects to the legislature or other constitutional
authorities to observe the various stages of the legislative process [see, eg.
Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 21/01 of 12. 2. 2002 (N 14/25 SbNU 97;
95/2002 Coll.), Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 5/02 of 2. 10. 2002 (N 117/28 SbNU 25;
476/2002 Coll.), Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 12/02 of 19. 2. 2003 (N 20/29
SbNU 167; 83/2003 Coll.), Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 77/06 of 15. 2. 2007
(N 30/44 SbNU 349; 37/2007 Coll.), Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 24/07 of 31
first 2008 (N 26/48 SbNU 303; 88/2008 Coll.)]. In Judgment file. Ref.
Pl. ÚS 5/02, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly laid out principles for which - among other things also
as a requirement stemming from the concept of the rule of law - respect for procedural
(procedural) rules necessary "only in a procedurally flawless process
( constitutionally conforming proceedings) may arrive at a legal
constitutionally conforming result (decision), and therefore
procedural integrity of the decision making process (control) is necessary to pay attention and
provide considerable protection. If these principles
relate to the constitutionality of proceedings before public bodies and in their
decision issued (the prescribed procedure under Art. 36 para. 1
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms), there are no reasonable
reason to diverge from these principles in matters of control of the legislative process and in
enactments (rules of law), because, although the decision-making process
legislative activity to a certain extent from the decision-making processes
proceedings before other public bodies - and in that sense it can
understood as a decision making process sui generis - the guiding principles of decision making,
in which reaching a final result, in both cases
identical; Moreover, one can not lose sight of the fact that the consequences arising from
legislative acts are to their societal impact
certainly more significant than in cases of individual (defective) decisions
other public authorities. Thus emerges - in the legislative process -
to the forefront requirement constancy, persuasiveness and indispensability of legal
acts upon which the rule of law, and correlatively the life of citizens in it,
rests; such acts, and the attainment of the necessary authority
legislatures can not be achieved otherwise than by respect for the rules
(principles of legislative activity), which the Assembly of Deputies
prominent bearer of the legislative power for its own activity law
set itself. ".

63rd These rules are contained in the legislative process in various
sources (parliamentary) rights, among which belongs primarily
Constitution of the Czech Republic; furthermore in conformity therewith interpreted the rules of procedure of both chambers of Parliament
(SOAD and JRS); detailed rules of conduct adopted Resolution
individual chambers of Parliament on the basis of § 1 para. 2 of their conference
orders (ie. an autonomous resolution); and also established practice
parliamentary chambers and their bodies, "which may be due to long-term repetition
considered as an unwritten part of the legislative process, if it can be held for
harmony with the higher values ​​of law-making, democratic political
system, etc. "(see paragraph 38 of the cited Judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06) -
so. unwritten rules, which are capable to address issues specifically
modified rules of procedure and that "
Parliament optimize self-organization." [Schneider, HP - Zeh, W. (eds.): Parlamentsrecht
Parlamentspraxis und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland , Berlin 1989, p. 385
cited according Wintr J. Czech parliamentary culture, Prague 2010, p.
43rd].

64th The last three mentioned sources of parliamentary law are an expression of the autonomy of Parliament
respectively. its chambers, consisting of self-regulation
parliamentary procedure, which is to some extent necessary because the Constitution
Czech Republic, of course, governed by the rules of the legislative process
(scope and role of both chambers of Parliament, the basic organizational structure
, quorum and majority required for different types of resolution,
parliamentary immunity, the basic rules for the conduct of meetings of both chambers
etc.) and generally only itself foresees the adoption of detailed rules
legislative process in the form of laws on the rules of procedure of each || | chambers of Parliament. The German Federal Constitutional Court in one of its
decision (judgment of 21. 7. 2000 2 BVH 3/91, available in electronic form on


Http: //www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/hs20000721_2bvh000391.html) said
that the object of self parliamentary chambers also considered treatment
legislative process, if not contained in the Constitution itself as well | || function, composition and method of work of the committees further implementation of the rights exercise
legislative initiatives, information and control, as well as creating and editing rights
political factions and parliamentary exercise the rights of free speech and
parliamentary debate. The court also stressed that the
catalog of objects and instruments of self-regulation
parliamentary autonomy is not final. That's because that catalog must be
again and again concretized in the light of the changing political situation so as to enable
adaptation to changed working conditions. May acquire
parliamentary constitutional autonomy compared to earlier epochs
new topicality through the fact that it has already opposed worth
parliament and government, as envisaged by the classical theory, but extends across the border
parliamentary plenum, while the government and it supports the parliamentary majority consists compared
opposition political unity. Parliament must also respond to the increasing complexity
regulatory needs. Therefore, you must
modern parliament to develop strategies divisive work of interaction and coordination
political formation will, does not want to lose his
agility. This self-regulating powers of Parliament relating to
its own affairs shall be not infinite and subject to constitutional limitations
, which result in demands on the design and interpretation of particular
rules of procedure of the parliamentary chambers [see. dissenting opinion of Judge
E. Wagner to the Constitutional Court judgment. Nos. Pl. US 24/07 of 31
first 2008 (N 26/48 SbNU 303; 88/2008 Coll.)].

65th Fundamental constitutional basis of parliamentary and legislative procedures
Constitutional Court formulated especially petitioner
frequently cited judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06, where the Constitutional Court
repeatedly stressed the need for compliance with the rules of the legislative process, as well
elementary requirement of a formal law is understood
eliminating arbitrariness of decisions of public authorities, the non
rules may lead not only to challenge the legitimacy of the decision taken
(the Act), but also its legality, which in this case actually led to
annulment of the contested provisions of the Act, for the treatment of contradiction
acceptance of the constitutional principles of democratic law . "Respect
procedural rules contained in the mentioned sources of law must require
because although the addressees of these standards are not private individuals
their failure ultimately can significantly affect their
fundamental rights." ( see paragraph 38).

66th The Constitutional Court not only strongly appealed to the Parliament of the Czech Republic
in terms of the need to observe the principles of creating harmonious, transparent, and predictable
rights as one of the attributes materially
understood the rule of law, but constitutionally justified the need to respect democratic principles
in the legislative process (with support in Art. 1 paragraph.
1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) that need to be considered as the treatment,
and the actual performance of the procedure for adopting laws. In other words -
of these principles derive certain demands on the design and interpretation of particular
rules of procedure of the parliamentary chambers. These principles must be found
in conjunction with the principle of separation of powers principles and functions of the legislature, and
especially in the constitutionally enshrined principle of representative democracy,
based on the free exercise of the mandate of members of Parliament, members on equality
Parliament as representatives of the people, freedom of expression and free parliamentary debate
(Art. 15, Art. 23 paragraph. 3 and Art. 26 of the Constitution
Czech Republic).

67th The Constitutional Court in Judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06
called the basic principle of parliamentary decisions and the principle of pluralism that
deduced from the principle of free competition of political forces (Art. 22 of the Charter) and
that as a characteristic feature of each free society consists
one of the essential requirements for a democratic state of law within the meaning of Article
. 9, paragraph. 2 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. "Recipients of legal norms
undoubtedly have the right to legitimately expect that any restrictions on their fundamental rights
implemented by the Act are the result
discourse conducted across the political spectrum, and this discourse, in which all participants

Were given an opportunity to present the matter in detail about a
informed comment on it. It is also proper that such a process which allows
open discussion between proponents of competing views, including minority views
. Therefore come to the fore procedures ensuring
hand, the hearing parties, secondly, the formal quality of legislative work.
The legislative procedure in this perspective, becomes "the actual source
legitimacy of the law. '" (See paragraph 38).

68th through extensive links to Czech and foreign literature dealing with the issue of parliamentary
decisions in terms of a comparison with
judicial decisions of the Constitutional court recently cited findings justify the requirement
draft legislation in the form of performance
rational legal discourse. "Parliamentary decision applies to cases general; in his favor
sounds reservation is essential decisions taken in
parliamentary procedure which ensures considering the subject of which is decided,
participation of political parties that represent the interests
organized civil society. Act as a result of parliamentary deliberation is
compromise between interests, to which is projected societal consensus
which must be considered as a criterion of acceptance of the statute. Each
institutions forming or applying law is defined by formal
characters, among others. procedures, which serve the purpose of the institution.
Procedures also forms negotiations Parliament, as well as the division of labor
between the authorities and should guarantee democracy, the legitimization of authority, rationality
legislation, procedural justice (hearing the parties
debate), etc.. ( Kysela, J. Legislative process in the Czech Republic as
form of rational legal discourse ?, Lawyer, 2005, no. 6).
Parliamentary procedures also constitute an important element in the completion
form of power-sharing and political conditions of competition in the State (Kabele, J.
From Capitalism to Socialism and back.
Theoretical Examination of the Transformations of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. Prague : Karolinum, 2005, p. 205).
(...) Finally, for C. Schmitt parliamentarianism as a form of government
open argumentative discourse in which they are confronted and differences
opinions - political power is thereby forced to a debate that allows the public
control (Schmitt, C. the Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, London,
1994, cit. Kysela, J. Legislative process in the Czech Republic as a form of rational
legal discourse? Jurist, 2005, n. 6). " (see paragraphs
41 and 43).

69th Similarly as in judicial decision-making in the parliamentary decision
requires the idea of ​​"fair decision", which is immanent
rule of law, observance of the natural principles hear all parties.
Transparent hearing of parties representing the public contributes to its
identification with the decision-making process in this case
law. For determining the characteristics of a parliamentary decision-making it is so
also be considered, fundamentally principle applied when
discussing laws that directed both inside and outside the parliamentary chamber
. Operation serves the free formation of opinions to members
parliamentary chamber, external operation serves to inform the public
.

70th Finally, it must be between democratic principles
legislative process to include the principle of majority decision-making and it is inseparable from
principle of protection of minorities (Art. 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
), which are represented by the respective parliaments Parliamentary
opposition. Its basic features include articulation especially minority
opinions, presenting alternative proposals to the majority opinions and decisions and control
ruling majority, all this before the eyes of the public, thus
civil society, which in this way forms and states
feedback. These characteristics are clamped to the essential characteristics
democratic state (see below).

71st Enumeration of democratic principles in the legislative process as
related demands on the fairness of the application of rules governing
process of creating the political will can be subsumed under the essential requirements
democratic rule of law, respectively. its essence and in its summary
paint a picture "of parliamentarism nazíraného material, ie.
understood as an institutionalized exchange of views between the representatives
opinions competing groups present in society with the aim of

Find a compromise that would satisfy most originally opinions
fragmented society. "(Cf.
Cited the dissenting opinion of Judge Rapporteur to judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 24/07).

V. B) The role of the parliamentary opposition in the legislative process

72nd Although the above-mentioned principle of majority decision (Art. 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
) are among the defining features of democracy and democratic decision
and most governments in parliamentary democracies is
reliant on support for (trust) parliamentary majority made up of | || representatives of one or more political parties represented in Parliament, not
Parliament is the body that most, but is based on free
execute the mandate of its members, their gender, because everyone
are representatives of the people, continue to freedom of expression and freedom of
parliamentary debate (Art. 15, Art. 23 Sec. 3, Art. 26 and Art. 27 paragraph. 2
Constitution of the Czech Republic), regardless of what the
political faction or to a belief current individual members of Parliament belongs.
Representatives of the parliamentary opposition, which is composed of representatives of political parties represented in Parliament
, in the exercise of governmental power is not directly
do not participate therein and in the number usually find themselves in a numerical minority
must be considering on the constitutionally guaranteed principle of protection of minorities
(see above) allowed under legislative procedures
undisturbed exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights and must not be arbitrarily prevented from
fulfill the above, democracy irreplaceable function
parliamentary opposition [ cf. Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
Europe (PACE) no. 1601 (2008) on "Procedural guidelines on the rights and responsibilities
of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament" of 23
1, 2008]. "The presence of the opposition (and the media) make even the most coherent
government to explain and justify their decisions - guaranteed
is so adversarial principle, based on the free exchange of ideas and opinions
to seek broader consensus and possibly removal | || shortcomings of the proposed law. This principle is actually
ideological basis for the work of parliament as a place to exchange views, persuasion
opponents of truth and justice, as well as a place of negotiation.
Parliamentarism is in this sense an attempt by the government discussions. "(Quoted
Kysela, J .: Legislation without parliaments, Prague 2006, p. 23).

73rd Among the fundamental rights of the parliamentary opposition or its
individual members, which should be in a democratic legal state
constitutionally guaranteed, especially include law guaranteeing parliamentary
minority participation in parliamentary procedures;
law allowing parliamentary opposition to exercise oversight and control of the ruling majority and the government
itself. Furthermore, it is a law allowing parliamentary opposition
block or postpone the decision taken by the majority, as well as the rights
allowing the opposition to seek constitutional review decisions taken mostly
(laws), and finally, last but not least it is about protecting the rights | || parliamentary opposition and its individual members from persecution and
despotism of the majority. Degree (depth) and the level of adjustment of these rights
parliamentary opposition in the system, as well as the width of the space where the
parliamentary opposition is allowed to perform its essential function, are not only a sign
level of political and parliamentary culture of the company ,
but reflect the degree of democracy in the political system.
One of the necessary conditions of adequate regulation of those rights and privileges
parliamentary opposition or minority should be in any case
requirement that these rights have been modified so that the ruling majority
impossible to disturb them or is fundamentally changed only by
own discretion, or at least prevent it from making such
was no sufficient gap from coming to power. [Cf.
report of the Venice Commission, CDL-AD (2010) 025 "Report on the role of the Opposition in parliament and Democratic
" dated 15. 11. 2010].

74th European and international level (European Convention for the Protection
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
) are rights protected by parliamentary opposition
protection of fundamental and political rights of the parliamentary minority.
It eg. Their right to free and fair elections, freedom

Expression, freedom of association and assembly and others. Similarly, this is the
in the Czech Republic. The Czech Constitution does not explicitly mention
Institute of the parliamentary opposition and the rules of procedure of the parliamentary opposition
(the term "non-governmental political parties") refers only to SOAD,
and in § 78 para. 4. However, you can with the backing of the constitutionally
normative democratic principle applying also in demand on
internal democratic parliamentary processes and procedures, make
conclusion that the aforementioned rights of the parliamentary opposition, ie. the rights of non-governmental
parliamentary factions or individual MPs and senators,
in the Czech Constitution and constitutionally interpreted
Rules of Procedure of both parliamentary chambers either explicit [see, eg
. Art. 27, 28, 30 or Art. 87 paragraph. 1 point. a) the Constitution of the Czech Republic
projected to § 64 para. 1 point. b) the Constitutional Court Act], or
are in the Constitution of the Czech Republic immanently present just for normative democratic principle
action. With the help
constitutionally consistent interpretation of individual provisions of the Rules of Procedure in the light of the above-mentioned requirements
emanating from the application of the principles that must
control the ordinary legislative procedure, may also current form
meeting of both chambers recognized that their purpose is to guarantee these rights.
Formally thus provide sufficient legal basis for their performance and thus
also allow fulfillment of the functions of the opposition as such.

75th As already stated above, as may be considered appropriate only
a legislative process that allows for rational discourse, hearing
parties and open debate among proponents of competing views, including minority views
, supported the possibility of active participation of participants || | during it (cf.. succinct but pithy quote: "the Principle
an underlying Parliamentary procedure is that the minority should have iTS
say and the majority should have iTS way" - Laund, P. Parliaments in || | the Modern World, Aldershot 1989, p. 95). It is therefore necessary to define and specify the amount
raised the rights of the parliamentary opposition, which
guarantee a parliamentary minority, active and passive participation in parliamentary
procedures. This is because of their low and implementation is one of
necessary conditions for the fulfillment of the requirements for proper and fair
democratic legislative process.
Cited resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe included in the scope of those rights
parliamentary opposition, which is associated with its participation in legislative procedures, in addition to guaranteed
her simple participation in the parliamentary discussion associated with
option and right to vote actively speak during the debate and comment on
discussed item or interrogate zúčastěného member governments, as well
guarantee the possibility to influence the agenda itself (program)
next parliamentary session, which would not only be in the hands || | ruling majority, including the ability to invoke extraordinary meeting, to achieve
inclusion of a new item on the agenda, or vice versa options
its blocking or delaying discussion of a particular item on the route called.
obstruction. It is also necessary to include in this list was also included
right to participate in the parliamentary opposition in committees and control commissions
the parliamentary chambers, which the opposition can effectively exercise its
supervision and control over decisions of the parliamentary majority and over | || decisions of the government. Finally, it is necessary to include this circle
the right of the opposition to participate actively in the fundamental political and organizational decisions
the parliamentary chamber.

76th When deciding on the amount of the guaranteed level and breadth of any of those rights
parliamentary opposition, as well as in their actual
performance, it is always necessary to seek and evaluate the balance between the legitimate interests
ruling majority and parliamentary opposition or minority. On the one hand
namely the refusal of some of the aforementioned rights and opposition, respectively.
Factual impeding their proper and uninterrupted performance due
meetings of the governing majority, can not only lead to a weakening of the legitimacy of the exercise
power, but the constant restriction or even violation of basic democratic principles
can lead to threats to democracy || | political system itself. On the other hand, excessive rate and breadth
guaranteed individual rights, parliamentary opposition may lead to

Frequent overuse to abuses by the opposition, which could result in weakening
or disabling the effective exercise of power of the ruling
majority (cf. Cited a report by the Venice Commission). Therefore, it is necessary to
individual rights and privileges guaranteed parliamentary opposition
corresponded certain obligations and responsibilities for their performance.
The parliamentary opposition is so with the use of rights, the requisite respect for the rule of law
owe (not only to their electorate) to fulfill the role of so-called.
Responsible and constructive opposition. Although it is rather a moral
appeal, depending on the general level of political culture prevailing in the
society, a necessary condition for the orderly and efficient performance of the functions
parliamentary opposition is precisely the fact that it is conducted in a constructive and responsible
manner consistent with the legitimate functions
opposition as a real alternative to the governing majority, respectively. corresponds to the functions of supervision and control over the activities
ruling majority. This requirement is also to
manifestation of the principle of government at a time when both the current ruling majority and minority
should keep in mind that in one or the other group
not fall forever, and the current ruling majority may
soon find themselves in the position of parliamentary minority, and vice versa. Therefore, there should not be
taking such decisions, which would effectively make it impossible
exercise the rights guaranteed by either group (the temporal aspects of creating
parliamentary majorities and minorities, the Constitutional Court expressed in the cited judgment file
. Nos. Pl. US 21/01).

V. C) The constitutional criteria for declaring a state of legislative emergency and
consideration of the bill in summary consideration pursuant to § 99 SOAD

77th Institute of declaring a state of legislative emergency is a legal institute
aiming for extraordinary circumstances to accelerate the negotiation government
bills in a shortened meeting. Content or purpose
purpose of this institute is to prevent irreversible or difficult reparovatelným
damage to the fundamental interests of society members or prevent real
considerable damage to property (existing or anticipated) state.

78th The method declaration of a state of legislative emergency, and his reasons alone
consideration of bills in the state of legislative emergency is regulated
esp. SOAD in § 99 ( "The legislative process in the state of legislative emergency").
State of legislative emergency may be declared "under extraordinary circumstances
which are fundamentally compromised the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens ...
or when the state faces serious economic damage" (§ 99 para. 1 of the SOAD).
Emergency legislation announced his decision
chairman of the House of Representatives, on the proposal of the government. At the same time, at the request of the Government may decide
that the government submitted a draft law will be discussed in a "shortened
negotiations." (§ 99 para. 2 SOAD). In this case, the command this proposal
one of the committees and set a deadline for its insurmountable
decision. The Chamber of Deputies will discuss the bill within
second reading, and is entitled to decide on waiving the general debate, as well as
limit speaking time to five minutes and on a proposal from the relevant committee also
restrictions on detailed debate on only some part of the Act.
Immediately thereafter, may take a third reading of the bill. In brief
told the Chamber of Deputies as a whole has the state of legislative emergency
also very abbreviated hearing completely in your hands - has the right
when discussing agenda of the meeting state of legislative emergency
cancel or decide not to act in a shortened hearing if it considers that the conditions for its
ceased publication or the conditions for a shortened hearing
not given. The actual procedure of the draft law in summary
negotiations within the framework of the declared state of legislative emergency, then
closely regulated in § 99 para. 3-9 SOAD.

79th Given the fact that this is an institution shortening procedure
receipt of government bills, there is not necessarily a limitation or curtailment
above rights of the parliamentary opposition (namely the omission
first reading and the possibility to skip the general debate, as well as
option to shorten the speaking time of 5 minutes, respectively.
disabling make some procedural suggestions in relation to the meeting agenda as well as its course
etc.), but ultimately there is also distortion or relativisation

Set forth above, the principles governing democratic legislative process
. This is because due to its speed in adopting submitted
government bills is impossible thorough preparation and familiarization with
matter under consideration and generally are limited and shortened
parliamentary procedure and debate. Therefore, it is a constitutional requirement, according to which the state has
legislative procedure controlled by the above-mentioned democratic principles
"the actual source of legitimacy of the law", within the renowned
emergency legislation, and it applied the accelerated discuss government proposals
laws seriously disturbed and relativized.
There is thus significantly reducing the amount of parliamentary debates and debates and
Deputies in such a situation can easily become mere
approver Government of bills without these
been subjected to thorough investigation and deliberation, or.
faced without criticism or presenting alternative proposals, not only from the opposition
. Said disadvantage becomes all the more serious, in the case of so-called
. Reform government bills with impacts not only on the state budget,
but especially impacts the sphere of fundamental rights and freedoms of addressees
follows the statute. Although they are therefore entirely legitimate institute
modified only rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, it is clear that
consequences of its application clearly exceeds the statutory level.

80th The Constitutional Court must in this respect take account of the fact that
constitutional order explicitly recognizes the possibility to discuss the government proposal
bill in summary consideration only pursuant to Article. 8 Constitutional Law no.
110/1998 Coll., On safety Czech Republic, during the state of emergency
or state of war. When provided therefore constitutional order such option
only in one case, it is obvious that in other situations it
generally not possible. This is not a gap in the Constitution of the Czech Republic, if the constitutional order
opportunity to discuss the bill in shortened
negotiations knows. The framers chose this option only admit only
extreme and emergency situations. While one can admit that at
law (Rules of Procedure) enshrining other cases in which laws
discuss in summary proceedings (emergency legislation), but because it is a modification
praeter Constitution and the constitutional sense because | || regimentation shortened discussing the protection of the rights and principles
controlling the legislative process in a democratic legal state, use
institute emergency legislation is possible only if a broad consensus in Parliament
(acclamation, or at least that the majority of which | || is comparable with the majority required for adoption of the constitutional Act) or
(a) only when the severity of the type of situations where the emergency legislative
used corresponds to the gravity of the situation envisaged in order to zstavní
abbreviated discussion of the draft law (state of emergency, state of war
).

81st The Constitutional Court is the issue of adopting laws in the state of legislative emergency
touched in its judgment. Nos. Pl. US 12/10 of 7 9. 2010 (
269/2010 Sb.). The Constitutional Court formulated the proposition that the legislature is not obligated
"to measure the fulfillment of the prerequisites for declaring a state of legislative emergency
in the form of an impending considerable economic damage to draft a specific law
who is a threat of significant economic damage averted. The decision about whether
threatened economic damage, not a decision on damages in the legal
sense, but based on considerations of broader political consequences.
Decision whether the state faces serious economic damage in accordance with § 99 paragraph
. 1 SOAD, assessment in relation to that, to what extent has submitted
bill the impending considerable economic damage in some
analogy to § 417 paragraph. 1 of the Civil Code to prevent or reduce
impending damage may not contain . "(paragraph 17). The Constitutional Court added that
 »in this matter can not be overlooked that in voting to confirm
state of legislative emergency for always expressed considerable majority
deputies that during the discussion of the law in the Chamber of Deputies or the
its committees to formulate a distinct minority whose rights could
seem shorter, and that the vote on the third reading and vote at
after the bill by the Senate was the most significant

Deputies. In this particular case, the Constitutional Court, Considering
principle of minimizing interference and nodded opinion of the Chamber of Deputies, that
'bill discussed in a state of legislative emergency in compliance
legal conditions. "Â" (paragraph 18 ).

82nd In that judgment the Constitutional Court emphasized that in assessing the reasonableness
declaring a state of legislative emergency has
Chamber of Deputies wide measure of discretion. This rate is already given
very purpose of this institution, which is to allow immediate reaction to the legislature
some extraordinary circumstance, due to which the law threatens
predicted serious consequences for fundamental rights and freedoms, or the security of the state
property values. And the nature of potential damage is not
precisely controllable, their occurrence and extent varies only in the plane
probable tendencies and requires weighing a number of facts or
contexts - eg. The interests of various entities concerned, the impact from the perspective of public
finance, internal and external policy
context. From the nature of the case, it may be necessary in many cases
respond immediately without having to be familiar with all relevant
information that might otherwise any conclusion about the merits of adoption
Act in a shortened procedure to relativize. Now with regard to these
context of the assessment of these circumstances is entrusted in the first place
government whose applications are declaring a state of legislative emergency conditional,
because it can be assumed that it is the government's view of its scope
and a range of competencies most appropriate body to make
managed adequately and in a relatively short period to evaluate the severity
certain circumstances, even in the event
limited range of information, and on this basis to assess the reasonableness of accelerated
discussion of a particular bill in a state of legislative emergency.

83rd However, while in Judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 12/10, the Constitutional Court,
particular reference to the degree of political consensus in relation to the evaluation of the merits of the renowned
state found no reason to further define the limits of that discretion
, in the case now under consideration contrary, it deemed necessary
. As already stated, even though the Institute of declaring a state of legislative emergency
entirely legitimate institute, it must be interpreted through the prism
principles that are derivable from the normative principle of democracy
(Art. 1, paragraph. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) and therefore must be
conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency interpreted very restrictively
. The reasons for its application must be indisputably legitimate and constitutionally
aprobovatelné, their evaluation must be subject to the strictest standards of
. In order to avoid arbitrary (or despotism)
ruling majority must be such reasons in detail, correctly interpreted and reviewable way it
doctrine requires restriction of fundamental rights and as is clear from the ideas imposed on claims
fair decision. Equally exacting standards, if they are already
specific reasons for declaring a state of legislative emergency
assessed as legitimate and constitutionally aprobovatelné, it is then necessary to measure and
above all respect for these rights and principles governing
legislative process this time within the procedures foreseen for the state of legislative emergency
. Especially because within it there first, to shorten
distinct legislative procedures and restrictions on the rights
parliamentary opposition, as well as relativisation democratic principles
proper legislative process, and therefore, any further reduction or restriction of rights
and principles must be regarded as an extremely serious
because there is a denial of the rights of the opposition, as well as the principle of democracy, which could affect
seriously and permanently the quality of democracy itself, at least in its social perception
civil society.

84th Specifically, it should be noted that a condition for declaring a state of legislative emergency
not only the threat of certain negative consequences, but
notably the existence of exceptional circumstances, which has the potential to jeopardize
fundamental rights and freedoms fundamental way, or when the state faces serious || | economic damages (§ 99 para. 1 of the SOAD). An exceptional circumstance
(judged through the prism of constitutional principles) can be seen only
such a circumstance, which is obviously beyond ordinary course
political processes, both internal and external, or it may be a circumstance which constitute natural disasters
. Now she justifies the exceptional

Need for an immediate response by the legislature and the related restrictions
constitutional principles that apply to the parliamentary procedure
. Conclusion on the existence of exceptional circumstances must be
reasonable basis and must be supported by facts.
Severity of its type yet to be comparable to Art. 8 of the Constitutional Act on
Czech Republic's security.

85th The very legitimacy of declaring a state of legislative emergency is necessary
assessed with regard to decision-making time and extent of the information used in this
time available. It is also necessary to measure the intensity of the reasons also
emergency legislation in relation to the restriction in question
constitutional principles, as interest in the prevention or elimination of its consequences would
had with regard to the values ​​protected by § 99 para. 1 of the SOAD
particular case outweigh the interest in the ordinary course of legislative procedures.
It must be clear what specific consequences threatened by the government for the value
defined in this provision, therefore, what justifies the conclusion that the threat
considerable economic damage or threat to fundamental rights and freedoms or
national security. These reasons must not be arbitrary and specific
bill whose consideration under an accelerated negotiations Government proposes
must constitute an appropriate means to prevent or
duration of the threat to public interest.

86th Moreover, can not be left unnoticed nor the fact that, unlike
from similar institutions, which also shorten the legislative procedure
(procedure for the approval of the bill in the first reading pursuant to § 90 par. 2 SOAD
or abridged by the constitutional negotiations Act no. 110/1998 Coll., on security
Czech Republic), not when using the institute
state of legislative emergency qualified minority virtually no chance
prevent the use of this procedure. It is announced at the government's request,
who is acting with the knowledge of support from his parliamentary majority.
Is addressed to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, elected Chamber of Deputies
controlled by the same parliamentary majority, whose decision
such a request is accepted (or not) and if necessary. directly determines
guarantee committee with impassable deadline for issuing the resolution.
Existence of conditions for declaring a state of legislative emergency, then the general and subsequently
conditions for consideration of the bill in shortened negotiations
time before discussion of individual points agenda of the meeting assessed
Deputies, again controlled by the same parliamentary majority (cf.
Syllová, J. et al., the Czech Parliament, 2nd ed. Prague 2008, p. 244
). An agreement broad majority, although it can not be denied
importance in relation to the review of the merits of the emergency legislation (cf..
Cited judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 12/10, paragraph 18), is not a precondition discuss || | bill in summary consideration. The purpose of this institute is in fact
shortened parliamentary procedure due to the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances
not due to reach consensus in parliament, even if it is achieved even
across the political spectrum. Obstacle to a possible misuse of the process, so
remains the only statutory definition of the grounds on the basis of which the state of legislative emergency
declare that they are unquestionably legitimate, constitutionally
aprobovatelné and reviewable.

87th The practice of the Chamber of Deputies, however, is such that
grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency are very general and
interpreted quite broadly. The actual state of legislative emergency is certainly
used rarely and with respect to the rights of the opposition and to basic democratic principles
controlling the legislative process [especially in the 2nd
election period in 1996-1998 and in the 3rd legislative term
in the years 1998-2002 was in a state of legislative emergency
discussed a number of important bills, eg. an amendment to Act no. 247/1995 Coll., on
elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic and amending and supplementing certain | || other acts, as amended budget rules
Republic, laws on state bond programs, the amendment to Act no.
168/1999 Coll., on liability insurance for damage caused by
vehicle and amending some related acts (the insurance Act
vehicle liability), or an amendment to Act no. 483/1991 Coll., on
Czech television, as amended, no. 484/1991 Coll., on heská || | Radio, as amended, and no. 468/1991 Coll.

Radio and television broadcasting, as amended
legislation]. State of legislative emergency is announced, although for some time, but
reason was the adoption of such a bill, which was allegedly
prevent considerable economic damage, respectively. should be the case
acceptance jeopardize the security of the state [eg. In November 2001, the government pushed through
thus preserving existing wage regulations in order to avoid budgetary
provisional situation on the ground for security threats
case of rejection of the budget in the period after September 11, which was in the debate in plenary
Chamber of deputies held on 15. 11. 2001
criticized the whole series of the then opposition deputies. E.g. their ranks when
belonging to the current finance minister and now a deputy from the ranks of the ruling majority
M. Kalousek, these arguments the government described as "
exceeding limits", "targeted", "immoral" and hiding "
own inability (government) "; current Constitutional Court Judge M. Excellent
pleaded for a thorough justification of the proposal the government to declare a state of legislative emergency
- cf. Wintry, J. Czech parliamentary culture, Prague
2010, p. 157 or Syllová, J. et al. Czech Parliament, 2nd ed.
Prague 2008, p. 243].

88th Institut emergency legislation is not generally seen, Czech
particularity. Similar institutes are enshrined in the constitutions (!)
Federal Republic of Germany (Art. 81 GG) and Austria (at the federal level in Art. 18
paragraph. 3-5 B-VG). When comparing these institutes in the respective countries
is quite obvious that their purpose, regulation of their use,
constitutional limits and frequency of application from the Institute of legislative emergency in the adjusted
SOAD vary considerably. As stated in the Federal Republic of Germany is
declaring a state of emergency legislation provided for in Article. 81 GG. This allows
adoption of laws without being required proper resolution
Bundestag (Bundestag, lower house of parliament). [
Since the adoption of laws in the state of legislative emergency is necessary to distinguish between the adoption of laws for
state of emergency, respectively. for state defense (Verteidigungsfall)
within the meaning of Article. 115a GG-115 l] state of legislative emergency declared only
Federal President on the proposal of the Federal Government with the prior approval
Federal Council (Bundesrat, the upper chamber of parliament).
The president, however, is not obliged to grant the request for declaration of a state of legislative emergency,
has a limit player own political discretion.
Ústavněsoudní constitutional and control of such a decision must then be confined to review
formal requirements for declaring a state of legislative emergency
or to review the eventual abuse of the president's discretion (see
Schmidt-Bleibtreu, B. Klein F. Kommentar zum Grundgesetz; 9. Auflage,
Kristel 1999, p. 1251). State of legislative emergency is limited to
period of 6 months from its publication, while after that period has elapsed
not be the next state of legislative emergency is announced, for
term of office of the chancellor, who requested publication .
Provisions of Article. 81 GG has never in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany
applied, since its application is practically superfluous,
with regard to the smooth democratic development in the Federal Republic of Germany
, in which the political system speaks for everything that
political parties were forced to seek mutual consensus, possibly
to seek solutions in the new parliamentary elections [see. Kunigami, P. (Hrsg.):
Grundgesetz - Kommentar, Band 3, 3. Auflage, München, 1996, p. 311].

89th In Austria, the institute emergency legislation at the federal level
foreseen in Article. 18 paragraph. 3-5 of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG).
These provisions form the legal basis for handling abnormal situations (Non
however state of emergency, which are dealt with in Art. 9a and 79 et seq.
B-VG), the legislative body at the federal level is not For various reasons
quorum. State of legislative emergency is defined in Article. 18 paragraph. 3 B- VG
defined as a situation where you avert the obvious and irreparable harm to the company asking
under the Constitution, the immediate adoption of resolution
National Council (Nationalrat, the upper chamber of parliament ), but at the time
not in session, not in time to meet her conduct or force majeure prevents
activity. In this case, the Federal President on the proposal
federal government to take on the responsibility of the Federal Government and its called. Interim

Regulation (Notverordnung), which may change the law and to adopt measures to avert damage
. Proposal to adopt measures under the first sentence may
federal government filed only with the consent of the Standing Subcommittee of the Main Committee of the National Council
(contained in Article. 55 paragraph. 3 B-VG), and such regulation must countersign the federal government
( cf. Mayer, H. Bundes-Verfassungsrecht.
Kurzkommentar. 2nd Auflage. Vienna 1997, p. 212). Each
issued an interim regulation, the Federal Government shall submit to the National Council convened either
Federal President (in the event that the National Council is not in session), or
chairman of the National Council (if currently in session) within eight days from the submission || | provisional regulation. Within 4 weeks from the submission of the draft National Board
required either to adopt a regulation instead of the responsible federal law or resolution
ask the federal government to immediately abolish the regulation.
Proposal to repeal the federal government must immediately comply. In the event that
Federal Government canceled the provisional regulation, enter the effective date of repeal of Regulation
again force statutory provisions repealed by Regulation.
Constitutional limits of the provisional Regulation, Article. 18 paragraph. 5 B-VG.
Provisional Regulation shall not modify the provisions of the Federal Constitution
Act and shall not constitute a permanent financial burden on the State
provinces, districts or municipalities or financial commitment by citizens. Furthermore
not cover theft of state property, take action in matters under Article
. 10 paragraph. 1 item 11 B-VG (the area of ​​labor law,
social and contractual insurance and workers 'and employees' chambers)
or in spolčovacího rights and protection of tenants.
The available sources indicate that the state of legislative emergency as envisaged by Article. 18
paragraph. 3-5 B- VG in modern history, Austria has never occurred.
It is however to be noted that the terms were ústavněhistorického
provisional regulation during the government of the Federal Chancellor E. Dollfuss
(1933-1934) used to dictatorship and the elimination of virtually all the attributes
democratic state ( to see. Hoke, R.
deutsche und Österreichische Rechtsgeschichte. Wien 1996, pp. 474-476).

VI.
The Review


90th The Constitutional Court turned to evaluating the merits of declaring a state of legislative emergency
, which was under a bill passed.
President of the Chamber of Deputies decision no. 7 dated 29. 10. 2010
well as Government Resolution no. 759 dated 26. 10. 2010 justifying the declaration of state of legislative emergency
briefly "threat of significant economic damage" .
Further justification for declaring a state of legislative emergency may be inferred from
remarks of Prime Minister P. Nečas at the 7th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on
27th 10. 2010, and its eighth meeting on the second 11. 2010, which are closer
elaborated in the above statement sums up the Prime Minister dated 27
first 2011. From those observations show that the reason for declaring a state of legislative emergency
was the need to adopt all subject
government bills by the end of the year because the draft law on the state budget
Czech Republic for 2011 was based on the fact that these laws come into effect on 1
1, 2011. the threat of considerable economic damage state
therefore should lie in the fact that the state budget would be based on a nonexistent
legal status, which would result in the deepening deficit | || public finances. This should also influence the evaluation
credibility of the Czech Republic in the financial markets, which would
reflected in rating downgrades and rising debt service.
Extraordinary circumstance was seen with regard to the alleged "obstruction" by
parliamentary opposition, which in a situation where it was not possible to discuss all the proposals in question
government laws normal procedure, so that
come into force no later than the the end of the year, prevented their immediate
consideration in the first reading (§ 90 par. 2 SOAD) or curtailed
deadlines for their discussion in the relevant committees for 15 days (§ 91 paragraph
. 2 SOAD). Similarly, these reasons the Prime Minister also formulated
at the hearing held on 8. 2. 2011 (see above), where he was questioned as a witness
. From his observations that it is precisely in that "obstruction"
by the parliamentary opposition She found the government pivotal reason for
which had to accede to the withdrawal of the original bill and

Adoption of the resolution, which proposed the renegotiation
in a state of legislative emergency in a shortened meeting.

91st The Constitutional Court dealt with the question whether the above-defined
"obstruction" of opposition MPs can be considered an exceptional circumstance within the meaning
§ 99 para. 1 of the SOAD. According to § 90 par. 3 SOAD, two parliamentary
clubs or a group of 50 MPs to oppose the proposal that
Chamber of Deputies approved the bill in its first reading
. Applying this objection is a way of discussing the draft Law
impossible. A similar objection might be from the same subjects to be
according to § 91 para. 2 SOAD applied in relation to the proposal that was
shortened 60-day period for consideration of the bill in committee
designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this provision under 30 days. Both provisions are
manifestation of protecting the rights of the parliamentary opposition (minority) in this case
protection fundamental limitations of the structure and duration
legislative procedures, since legislation only allows a shorter
approval for broad majority more than three quarters of their
total.

92nd If during consideration of the contested Act were applied
objections, which were directed solely to comply with the proper legislative procedure
during debate on the bill, not the opinion of the Constitutional Court in this process
parliamentary opposition seen any element of exceptionality.
It was the usage rights to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies
entrusts qualified minority deputies to protect their rights.
The opposition procedure can not be regarded as an extraordinary circumstance even in the context
that the draft law on the state budget of the Czech Republic for 2011, the government submitted
Chamber of Deputies together with the original proposals
laws, assumed the the structure of its income and expenditure in question acceptance
all government bills by the end of 2010.
In this context, the Constitutional court of the specifics of the law on the state budget
terms of its substantive requirements, as well as its functions | || within the constitutional and political system. Law on State Budget
contains a summary of the expected revenues and estimated expenditures of the state
budget for the financial year. In terms of content it is only
law in the formal sense (cf. Judgment dated 10. 9. 2009 sp. Nos. Pl.
US 27/09; 318/2009 Coll.) As its contents can not be determining the rights and obligations
. Despite the fact that law is of major political significance, because
binding manner determined mainly the structure of expenditures of the state budget
, allowing through income redistribution
from the state budget to implement the government's policy priorities (cf.
Cited judgment sp. Nos. Pl. US 21/01). However, even in this direction is not
discretion of the government and the Chamber of Deputies unlimited because
when determining the amount and structure of revenues and expenditures of the state budget must be based on valid
laws that enshrine the rights and obligations affecting the || | state budget in the form of mandatory expenditures. Put the priorities of the government in
law on the state budget that is usually also accompanied by the necessary change
special laws designed to achieve the required changes to income or expenditure
the state budget.

93rd If the government justifies the need for adoption of the contested act in the summary consideration
negative consequences arising from the fact that
its draft law on state budget counts with these changes, such arguments can not be
terms defined by law for reasons announcement | || emergency legislation considered acceptable.
It is the responsibility of every government in the drafting of the bill on the state budget
based on applicable legislation, and if it considers it expedient to achieve their
changes to timely implement its entitlement to make an adequate
bill through which they reached
required changes (to see. above statements
some coalition MPs). Extraordinary circumstances is not a situation where
with regard to certain political context, there is no admission alone
law on the state budget before the first day of the financial year.
In this case until its adoption by the state controlled economy
rules a provisional budget within the meaning of § 9 of the Act no. 218/2000 Coll.

On budgetary rules and amending certain related acts
(budget rules), as amended. Even in these cases
So it is a periodic process of adopting
state budget and standard way to enforce budgetary policy
governments through appropriate legislative changes.

94th Disagreement parliamentary opposition to shortening procedures
therefore does not constitute an element of extraordinary even in the context of an understandable interest
government on the adoption of the contested law before the beginning of the financial year. If
Constitutional Court in the present case, the government formulated
reason for declaring a state of legislative emergency has criticized as constitutionally aprobovatelný,
could in future have negative consequences, which would be effectively
whenever possible to substantially reduce (or even eliminate)
parliamentary debate, thus preventing consideration of the bill in the proper
legislative procedure, not only with reference to the fact that
own draft law on the state budget for next year, the adoption of these legal norms
anticipates and is bound to their existence. The revenue and expenditure of the state budget is
yet reflected almost every bill that they should not permit such
parliamentary opposition to comment on draft laws and
would render it wholly dependent on the will of the parliamentary majority.

95th Above conclusions can not be interpreted in such a way that the Constitutional Court
any decreases or relativized legitimate interest of the Government to
credibility of the Czech Republic in the financial markets, reflected in
favorable credit ratings. On the contrary, it is aware of the importance
mentioned facts on the state of public finances, as well as the possibility
Czech Republic to pursue its interests and the interests of its citizens. Said
interest, which translates into a long-term budgetary and economic policies
individual governments, however, does not relieve public authorities
obligation to proceed with enforcement under the law and within its limits (Art.
2. 3 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic). Questions related to the reduction or
raising public revenue and expenditure budgets, taxes and levies, as well
well as social benefits or entitlements from the state budget and are usually
are not subject to social consensus. Finding ways and tools
their solution is always subject to political-ideological orientation of the government
respectively. parliamentary majority. The role of the Constitutional Court is to evaluate
laws contested measure their effectiveness, and thus interfere in the political
competition. The Constitutional Court is called upon to provide protection
political competition democratic forces, as well as others, landed
above constitutional principles that apply to the procedure laid down for
receiving bills. The Constitutional Court on its constitutionality
protection feature can only resign because of a hypothetical
risk, unsupported by any concrete data that the award rendered
in proceedings to review the standards could have a negative impact on the assessment of Czech || | Republic by rating agencies respectively.
elicit a negative reaction from the financial markets.

96th The Constitutional Court is aware that in Judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 12/10
accepted the adoption of Act no. 418/2009 Coll., Amending Act No.
. 236/1995 Coll., On salary and other compensation related to performance
office of representatives of state power and some state bodies and judges and
MEPs, as amended, and Act No.
. 201/1997 Coll., On salary and some other essentials
state representatives and amending and supplementing Law no. 143/1992 Coll., On salary and remuneration
for work readiness in budgetary and some other organizations
and bodies, as amended,
in a state of legislative emergency, although its subject, which was to reduce salaries
public officials also pointed to a reduction in expenditures of state budget
. This case, however, differed significantly from now
case. H Act. 418/2009 Coll. It was together with the Law no. 362/2009 Coll
. amending certain acts in connection with the proposal
law on the state budget of the Czech Republic in 2010, admitted as
exceptional political circumstances (abolition of early elections cited
finding sp. Nos. Pl. ÚS 27/09) and under the influence of major threats and
unplanned increase in the public deficit as a result of

Crisis, when the urgency of the situation and the need for rapid action
prevailed, with regard to the continuing economic crisis
agreement across the political spectrum, which the Constitutional Court implicitly acknowledged the relevance
(cf. Finding sp . Nos. Pl. US 12/10, paragraph 18).

97th Conclusion of the extraordinary circumstances that would justify declaring a state of legislative emergency
considered the case after all
challenges the fact that, as confirmed during his interrogation by the Prime Minister, the government plans
contained in all four government bills discussed
in shortened negotiations were already well known long in advance.
In this context, it may be pointed out that the presentation of the former government
bill was first on 4 October 2010, with the first reading
Act was held to 26 October 2010. The explanatory memorandum to the draft law
or from the relevant discussions at the seventh meeting of the Chamber of Deputies held on
26th October 2010 does not imply that the government adoption of this proposal
Act stated that the existence of exceptional circumstances. Conversely
promoter of this Act, as well as representatives of the governing majority has repeatedly emphasized
only concern that the legislative process concerning all
government bills, which were subsequently discussed in a state of legislative emergency
will not be completed until the end of the year 2010

98th Based on the above, therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded that the only reason
discussion and approval under the Law of Deputies
emergency legislation in the shortened meeting was endangering his
early adoption, so that became effective at the latest by the end of the year
2010, which had prevented the opposition procedure under § 90 par. 3 and § 91 paragraph
. 2 SOAD. Detected reason, however, can not be considered legitimate and constitutionally
aprobovatelný grounds for declaring a state of legislative emergency
according to § 99 para. 1 of the SOAD. Therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded that in the present case
all decisions of organs of Deputies
taken in order to draft the government as well as its own decision on the duration of the state of legislative emergency
duration and conditions for discussing the contested Act
accelerated negotiations (with the launch of the first reading within the meaning of § 99 para. 6
SOAD - see resolution no. 112 of the 8th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies -
voting no. 7) was made contrary to the above-explained aspects || | characterizing the constitutional democratic principle. It was therefore possible to conclude the constitutional review
already at this stage, noting that in the process
passing the contested Act were violated Art. 1, paragraph. 1 and Art. 6 of the Constitution
Czech Republic and Art. 22 of the Charter (and a fortiori in a situation where
objections to the content of the law have not been relevantly applied).

99th In this situation, it was not necessary to address other purported defects
process that has proceeded in terms of legislative emergency and summary consideration
. In particular, it was not necessary to examine the competence of the Senate
in relation to the composition, which voted on the contested law. Yet
Constitutional Court considers it necessary to add only as obiter dictum that
defects in the subsequent process in the Chamber of Deputies industry lay partly in the fact that
not meet the deadline for convening an extraordinary meeting, when the draft law submitted
Government to discuss the regime of legislative emergency and summary
hearing was delivered to Members in such a hurry that only
opposition, but government MPs were not actually able to check even
only identity documents with the previous draft government bill ,
let alone gain familiarity with its content, and thus to assess its possible impact
(it is not a mere hypothesis can be illustrated on
expression of some coalition deputies presented in the media after receiving one of
government bills in question within
legislative emergency - see above recapitulated
oral hearing before the Constitutional court of 22. 2. 2011). Further doubt was withheld
already limited democratic procedure for adopting the contested Act
launch of the general debate in the second reading, despite the resolution no.
16, which was adopted by the Committee for Social Policy at its fourth meeting | held on 2 || 11. 2010, the Chamber of Deputies recommended
discuss the draft of the contested act in the general debate (see paragraph 31).

100th Consideration of this matter, as well as experience with announcing
state of legislative emergency in the past, among others. Weighting rate limitation and reduction of rights

Current parliamentary opposition, and especially the interference in the democratic
principles governing the legislative process leading to the Constitutional Court
serious doubts about the constitutionality of the current state of the institute of legislative
emergency. Approve of could be existing statutory provisions only
provided that the maximum will be interpreted strictly, constitutionally helpfully
and responsibly. This, however, in this case, and often in the past
happened. The Constitutional Court has held that the deputies should consider
amendment to its Rules of Procedure in the indicated direction, so to SOAD
reflected constitutional principles explained above.

VII.

Enacting terms of finding and suspension

One hundred and first The Constitutional Court has in the past stated that "any assessment
(...) violation of the legislative process in the past with the test
proportionality in conjunction with the protection of citizens' trust in
law, legal certainty and acquired rights or in relation to other
constitutionally protected principles, fundamental rights, freedom and public
goods. "(judgment of 27. 3. 2008 sp. Nos. Pl. US 56/05 N 60 / 48 SbNU
873, 257/2008 Coll., paragraph 44). In this judgment, the Constitutional Court noted
necessity for the assessment of procedural errors in the adoption of laws
without simultaneously questioned their constitutionality
material, were taken into account and weighed the consequences of the annulment || | Act for other constitutionally protected values. If the Constitutional Court started
comply with reasonable proposals "only mentioned
procedural grounds on the edge of the constitutional order and reglementovaného
law would create a state of considerable legal uncertainty, particularly where
would otherwise not contested law in terms of content can not criticize
'(paragraph 44 of the judgment), while also pointed out that "
formal repeal legislation ... (anything else would in this case
not come into consideration) would mean danger that the same regulation be adopted again,
with the only difference that they comply with all the requirements
legislative process. "(paragraph 45 of the judgment).

102nd Those legal conclusions should be taken into account when deciding
Constitutional Court in the matter, but it is necessary to further clarify.
The role of the Constitutional Court, when considering whether legislation was adopted
legally prescribed manner, is to be the final arbiter in disputes
about whether there were "only" a violation of the rules of procedure of both chambers
parliament or other procedural regulations. The functions of the Constitutional Court
constitutionality, and therefore must assess whether the adoption process
legislation were met by the Constitution of the Czech Republic set
requirements for the adoption of the Law (cf.. Judgment dated 18. 8. 2004, file. Ref.
Pl. US 7/03; N 113/34 SbNU 165; 512/2004 Sb.). Thus only assesses the constitutionality
procedures, rather than the content of the final shape of the legislation.

103rd The logical consequence of a literal acceptance of the above conclusions
contained in its judgment. Nos. Pl. US 56/05 would be that the violation of constitutional safeguards
legislative process could never lead to derogačnímu
finding. Such a conclusion would be withdrawn meaning of those constitutional principles that
hit the course of legislative procedures, since it would no longer be
benchmark for review of the constitutionality of legislation. Moreover
would become obsolete and dysfunctional command stemming from the Constitutional Court concludes
§ 68 of the Constitutional Court Act (examine whether laws were passed
prescribed manner), while the algorithm review, the Constitutional Court has already
expressed in Judgment file. Nos. Pl. US 77/06, paragraph 61. However
with regard to Article. 87 paragraph. 1 point. a) the Constitution of the Czech Republic
not acceptable because that provision of the Constitutional Court is
its implementation. The Constitutional Court had to in this case
expressly deal with the question of whether they are given certain physical limitations that would
under certain circumstances prevented the repeal legislation only on grounds of unconstitutionality
legislative procedure. In this context, it is necessary
distinguish between whether with respect to an object defect in the legislative process
all the conditions for the adoption of a law (eg.
Because of lack of consent of one of the chambers) or whether it is a defect in
whose result was hit by a constitutional guaranteed rights
individual participants in the legislative process, the use of which is fully
their disposal.


104th The Constitutional Court in this matter, decides on a proposal laying
group of opposition deputies seeking the annulment of the contested Act
immediately after its adoption because it was shortened to its
constitutionally guaranteed rights in the legislative process. Other
situation would not occur if a group of deputies filed a similar proposal
a longer interval, ie. After several months or even
years after the adoption of the law. Such a lapse of time could be considered as
(additional silently given) the consent of the Members concerned with
procedure parliamentary majority. At the same time would not allow such a procedure already
real protection violated rights of the Members concerned, as Parliament should
decide on the bill under the changed circumstances, or in another
balance of forces in his chambers. The Constitutional Court would simultaneously have more
take into account the principle of legitimate public confidence in the law, legal certainty and
to the principle of acquired rights (cf. Judgment dated 2. 12. 2009, file. Nos. Pl. US || | 4/07; 10/2010 Coll .; paragraph 28). Repeal of such legislation would
fell due to the passage of time in the ever-growing set of his
addressees, while his existing applications might not be burdened in terms of content
finding of unconstitutionality.

105th For these reasons, the Constitutional Court can not remain on
verbatim spoken earlier conclusion that the law is not to abolish
proceed only on grounds of faulty legislative procedures (see Judgment.
Nos. Pl. US 56/05, points 44 and 45). Thus strongly worded conclusion
is not compatible with established case law of the Constitutional Court
related to this issue. It is not the role of the Constitutional Court to consider whether the discussion
bill constitutionally conforming procedure led to a different result
(Content of the Act), but it was based on faulty procedure.
Its mission is to protect the constitutional principles that apply to prescribed procedure
(cf. Cited judgment file. Nos. Pl. ÚS 5/02). However, it is always obliged to take into account also other
context, particularly to take into account the possible effects on
individuals in terms of respect for the principle of legal certainty and good faith
force of law. However, since in this case filed by a group
deputies for the annulment of the contested act immediately after being
published in the Official Gazette, and in its proposal raised objections to the relevant
during the legislative procedure, nothing prevented the | || constitutional court proceeded to repeal the law, and that the above described
procedural errors parliamentary majority
reaching constitutional relevance.

106th The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to explain why it approached only
to the annulment of the amending law, not the law amended, as
corresponds to his vast experience [cf. Finding sp. Nos. Pl. US 5/96 of 8
10th 1996 (N 98/6 SbNU 203; 286/1996 Coll.) Resolution file. Nos. Pl. US
25/2000 dated 15. 8. 2001 (U 27/19 SbNU 271), finding sp. Nos. Pl. US
21/01 dated 12. 2. 2002 (N 14/25 SbNU 97; 95/2002 Coll.) And finding sp.
Brand. Pl. US 33/01 of 12. 3. 2002 (N 28/25 SbNU 215; 145/2002 Coll.)].
It should be noted that the petitioners have made a proposal in relation to
novelizujícímu law and the Constitutional Court, as is well known, constantly feels
bound by the petition. This approach, however, the fact that he was only questioned
process of adopting the contested act, no relevant
objections in relation to its content were raised. Thus, the present
thing clearly distinguishable from cases dealt with by the Constitutional Court in the past
with reference to paragraph 98 of this judgment can not be done
review of the amended provisions. However, it should be emphasized that
amended provisions in terms of their validity and enforceability
share the fate now under consideration amending statute.

107th Given that the Constitutional Court found a discrepancy contested Act
with Art. 1, paragraph. 1, Art. 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Art. 22 of the Charter, decided
according to § 70 para. 1 of the Constitutional Court on its
cancel expiry on 31st December 2011. The Constitutional Court in determining the date of annulment of the contested
Act, taking into account the negative consequences that could arise in the event
repeal of the law on the date of its publication in the Collection of Laws, respectively. when
abolition of ex tunc, both in terms of legal certainty mailing
affected legal norms and with respect to the impact of this procedure on
state budget. It should be added that, if not to the point

Effective date of the judgment rendered derogative adopted new legislation, revived
1 January 2012 provisions contained in the legal system before
effect of the Act no. 347/2010 Coll., Annulled by this judgment.

Chairman of the Constitutional Court:

JUDr. Own hand

Dissenting opinions according to § 14 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., On the Constitutional Court,
amended, took to the plenary decision
judge Stanislav Balik, Ivana Janu, Vladimir Kurka, Dagmar Lastovecká, George
Mucha and Michael Židlická.