Act 296 1996

Original Language Title: LEY 296 de 1996

Subscribe to a Global-Regulation Premium Membership Today!

Key Benefits:

Subscribe Now for only USD$20 per month, or Get a Day Pass for only USD$4.99.

ACT

(July 17)

Official Journal No. 42,842, July 26, 1996

By means of which the "Supplementary Agreement, Revised on the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia", signed in Vienna-Austria, is approved. January 11, 1993.

Vigency Notes Summary

THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC

DECRETA:

Having regard to the text of the "Revised Supplementary Agreement on the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia", signed in Vienna-Austria on 11 January 1993.

" REVISED SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT ON BENEFIT

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY THE INTERNATIONAL BODY

ATOMIC ENERGY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

COLOMBIA.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency" in this Agreement) and the Government of the Republic of Colombia (hereinafter referred to as "the Government" in this Agreement) decide to conclude this Agreement. Agreement on the provision of technical assistance by the Agency, or through its conduit, to the Government.

ARTICLE 1o. BASIC MODEL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT. The Government and the Agency shall apply to the technical assistance provided to the Government by the Agency or through the provisions of the Basic Model Agreement of Assistance concluded on 29 May 1974. between the Government and the United Nations Development Programme.

Ir al inicio

ARTICLE 2o. SECURITY RULES AND MEASURES. The Government shall apply to operations for which the technical assistance provided under this Agreement is used in accordance with the Agency's security rules and measures as defined in the document lNFClRC/18/Rev. 1 (Annex 1) and the applicable safety standards to be established by virtue of that document, with the revisions of their intended purpose.

Ir al inicio

ARTICLE 3o. OBLIGATION OF PEACEFUL USE AND SAFEGUARDS.

1. The Government undertakes to ensure that the technical assistance provided under this Agreement is used only for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and, in particular, that it is not used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the the promotion of military purposes and any other use which may contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, such as research, development, testing or the manufacture of explosive nuclear devices.

2. To this end, and to the extent that the Board of Governors of the Agency so requires, the rights and responsibilities prescribed in paragraph A of Article XII of the Statute shall be maintained and maintained in respect of any project subject to the present Agreement in accordance with an applicable Safeguards Agreement that is in force between the Government and the Agency or, in the absence of such an agreement, in accordance with a Safeguards Agreement to be concluded by the Government and the Agency before The assistance approved for the project will be provided.

Ir al inicio

ARTICLE 4. FISICA PROTECTION. To the extent appropriate, the Government shall take all necessary provisions for the physical protection of nuclear materials, equipment and installations directly related to the technical assistance provided by the Government. Body or through its conduit. The Government shall be guided by the recommendations of the Agency referred to in document INFClRC/225/Rev. 2 (Annex 2), with the revisions to be the subject.

Ir al inicio

ARTICLE 5o. OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT OR MATERIALS. Unless the Parties to this Agreement agree otherwise, the equipment and materials supplied to the Government by the Agency or through its conduit in connection with a project under this Agreement Agreement shall become the property of the Government when the Agency notifies that the provision of the technical assistance relating to the project is completed.

The government will assume full and exclusive responsibility for the equipment or materials cited and for its manipulation, operation, conservation, storage and final destination. The transfer of ownership of equipment or materials is made in the intelligence that the Government will ensure:

a) Because the equipment is properly used and preserved;

b) Because the equipment is made available to any expert provided by the Agency or through its conduit, which requires it to perform its professional functions; and

(c) Because equipment and materials, as appropriate, are subject to the provisions of Article III of this Agreement.

Ir al inicio

ARTICLE 6o. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT. Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement which cannot be settled by negotiation or by any other agreed procedure by common agreement shall be submitted to arbitration at the request of the of any of the Parties to this Agreement. Each Party shall appoint an arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint a third party to act as President. If within thirty days of the request for arbitration, one of the Parties has not designated an arbitrator, or if within 15 days of the appointment of the second arbitrator has not been designated to the third party, either Party shall not have been appointed. may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make the appropriate appointment. The majority of the members of the arbitration tribunal shall form a quorum and all decisions shall be taken by a simple majority. The arbitration procedure shall be determined by the arbitrators and the arbitration costs shall be borne by the Parties as specified by the arbitrators. The arbitral judgment shall contain a statement of reasons and shall be accepted by the Parties as a final settlement of the dispute.

Ir al inicio

ARTICLE 7o. ENTRY INTO FORCE. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives written notification from the Government that the constitutional requirements relating to that entry into force have been satisfied.

Done in Vienna, at 11 January 1993, in Spanish languages

and English, the text being equally authentic in both languages.

Annex 1 INFCIRC/18/Rev. 1

Annex 2 INFCLRC/225/Rev. 2

By the Government of the Republic of Colombia,

Unreadable Signature.

Cargo, Ambassador.

By the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Unreadable Signature.

Cargo, Director General.

BODY SECURITY RULES AND MEASURES

1. The safety and health protection agency's measures were approved by the Board of Governors on March 31, 1960, pursuant to Article III, paragraph 6, paragraph 6, and Article XII of the Statute of the Agency. On the basis of the experience gained with its implementation to the projects carried out by the Member States under agreements concluded with the agency, these measures were reviewed in 1975 and the Board of Governors approved the revised version of the February 25, 1976.

2. For information from all Member States, the revised version of the body's safety standards and measures is transcribed in this document.

1. Definitions.

1.1. 'Safety standards' means the rules, regulations, provisions or codes of practice laid down to protect man and the environment against ionizing radiation and to minimise the danger to persons and property.

1.2. The "safety standards of the body" means the safety standards established by the body under the authority of the Board of Governors.  These rules include:

(a) The basic safety standards of the body for radiation protection, which prescribe the maximum permissible doses and the limit doses;

(b) Special regulations of the body, which are safety requirements for certain fields of activity;

(c) The body's practical codes, which establish, for specific activities, the minimum conditions to be met in order to achieve an adequate level of safety, taking into account the experience gained and the state achieved by the technology. The practical codes are supplemented, where appropriate, with safety guides which recommend one or more applicable procedures to give effect to them.

1.3. 'Safety measure' means any provision, condition or procedure intended to ensure compliance with safety standards.

1.4. 'assisted operation' means any operation undertaken by a State or group of States receiving assistance from or through the body in the form of materials, services, equipment, installations or information under an agreement between the body and that State or group of States.

1.5. "Nuclear installation" means facilities such as fuel manufacturing and enrichment plants, reactors, fuel reprocessing plants and waste management facilities, which are part of the nuclear fuel cycle, but excluding those for which basic materials such as mines and crushing plants are intended.

1.6. 'radioactive substance' means any matter which spontaneously emits ionising radiation and whose specific activity is greater than 0,002 microcurios per gram.

1.7. 'Source of radiation' means any radioactive substance or any device producing ionising radiation.

1.8. 'Serious incident' means any event or situation whose effect is, or may be, to expose a person to a dose of ionising radiation exceeding twice the maximum permissible annual doses or the specified limit doses in the basic safety standards for radiation protection of the body.

2. Generalities.

2.1. Under its statute, the body is authorised to establish or adopt safety standards to protect health, persons and property, and to take provisions for the application of these rules to assisted operations; the body may also, if requested by one or more States, provide the necessary arrangements for the application of these rules to operations carried out under bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or to the activities of that State in the field of atomic energy. In order to enable the body to carry out these tasks, its status provides that it will have certain rights and responsibilities in respect of any project for which it provides assistance.

2.2. The exploitation of nuclear facilities and the use of radiation sources in good safety conditions is of great importance to all persons related to such facilities and sources, to the State authorizing such facilities. exploitation or employment, and for other persons and States which may be harmed by exploitation or employment in poor safety conditions. The main purpose which the body pursues in establishing safety standards and to recommend safety measures is to provide practical guidance and effective assistance to its Member States in the safe use of atomic energy for the purposes of this Directive. pacific.

2.3. Safety standards need to be appropriate as a means of responding to a risk and safety measures must be effective in order to ensure compliance with the applicable safety standards. As far as an assisted operation is concerned, the State may have considerable freedom of action to implement its own system of safety standards and measures, once the body resolves that the system is adequate.

2.4. In order to assess the adequacy of safety standards and measures to be applied to an assisted operation, a preliminary examination of these safety standards and measures as well as of the initial safety study and the operation plans is necessary. The effectiveness of the security measures can then be judged by means of security missions that the agency will send to the State, according to the State.

2.5. If the States Parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement request the body to apply security standards or to determine the security measures applicable to that arrangement, or if a State submits an analogous application with respect to its own activities, such application or determination shall be carried out by agreement between the body and the States or the State concerned.

2.6. The procedures prescribed in this document for the implementation of safety standards and measures shall give effect to the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations. Plus:

(a) Allow the State to request assistance from the body, or through the body, to study in advance what security measures are appropriate, taking into account the modality and scope of the assisted operation;

(b) Allow States Parties in a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to consider what security standards and measures should be applied to that arrangement, or to allow the State to act in an analogous manner with respect to its own activities, if it presents the a request for the application of security rules and measures.

3. Information to be provided when requesting assistance.

3.1. When requesting assistance from or through the body, the State shall provide the body with the following information:

(a) A description of the operation for which assistance is requested, with the detailed information necessary to enable the body to reach the conclusions referred to in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6;

b) An exposure of the safety standards that is proposed to be applied to the operation.

3.2. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4.6, it may be necessary to provide further information.

4. Applying security rules and measures for assisted operations.

4.1. In applying the Agency's security rules and measures to assisted operations, the State shall be responsible for all the security responsibility and the Agency shall not assume any responsibility whatsoever.

4.2. The safety standards shall apply to all assisted operations relating to nuclear installations and to sources of radiation, except possibly in the situations referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 4.5.

4.3. The safety standards applicable to an assisted operation shall be the safety standards of the Agency or other safety standards, proposed by the State, and which the body may also consider appropriate. If the Agency considers that the safety standards proposed by the State are not adequate, it shall indicate any modifications it deems necessary or shall stipulate the application of its own safety standards.

4.4. The agreement between the body and the State for the provision of assistance shall specify the safety standards to be applied to the assisted operation and shall prescribe the implementation of the Agency's security measures in accordance with the paragraphs 4.5. to 5.10.

4.5. The Agency may waive the application of its security measures to an assisted operation if it concludes, on the basis of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 3.1. that the assisted operation is not related to:

a) Nuclear installations;

(b) Producers of ionising radiation in quantity such that the intensity of the dose at any point, at a distance of 0,1 metres from the external surface of the device, is greater than 0,1 millirems per hour;

(c) natural or artificial radioactive substances in excess of the maximum permissible activities for the exemption from the notification, registration or authorisation requirements specified in the basic safety standards for radiation protection of the Agency;

4.6. The Agency may request the State to provide timely information necessary to assess the effectiveness of the security measures envisaged for an assisted operation if it concludes, on the basis of the information provided in the compliance with paragraph 3.1. that the assisted operation is related to:

a) Nuclear installations;

(b) Producers of ionising radiation in a quantity which may exceed the maximum permissible doses for exposure for professional reasons specified in the basic safety standards for radiation protection of the Agency;

(c) natural or artificial radioactive substances in quantities exceeding 100 times the maximum permissible activities for exemption from the notification, registration or authorisation requirements specified in the basic safety standards; the body's radiation protection material.

4.7. The information required to judge the effectiveness of the planned security measures includes:

(a) A description of the administrative organization created by the State for the security and administrative system issues that the State intends to use to judge and ensure the security of the assisted operation (e.g. the records to be kept, the reporting procedures, the inspections and the examinations carried out by supervisory bodies;

b) A security analytical report (4) or an analog document containing information on the following points:

i) Site of the nuclear facility;

(ii) Apparatus and equipment that it will have, including details about its design and an exposure of the main operating characteristics;

iii) Criteria for quality assurance;

(iv) Safety characteristics of equipment and equipment (e.g. for systems of radiological surveillance);

v) Rules for working under normal conditions and plans for foreseeable emergency cases;

vi) Quantities of radioactive waste likely to be produced and waste management methods to be used;

vii) Availability of suitably trained staff and training programs;

4.8. Once the Agency has determined that the intended security measures are adequate to ensure compliance with the safety standards specified in the agreement between the Agency and the State, or once the State has been In order to implement the additional security measures that the Agency asks, the Agency will agree to initiate the assisted operation.

4.9. The State shall notify the Agency without delay of any serious incident related to an assisted operation and shall submit a detailed technical report to the Agency as soon as possible. Until it submits that report, it shall immediately forward to the Agency an initial report and interim reports at intervals of three months at the latest.

4.10. The State shall send to the Agency copies of the reports concerning any examination by supervisory bodies which the State orders in respect of any assisted operation to which the Agency's security measures are applied, in order to ensure compliance with the relevant safety standards.

5. Security mission.

5.1. The Agency, in agreement with the State, may send security missions to provide advice and assist in the implementation of security measures for an assisted operation. The State shall be duly informed by the Agency of the results of these security missions and shall take full account of the recommendations of the Agency concerning an assisted operation to which security measures are applied. of the Agency.

5.2. By way of derogation from paragraph 5.1, the Agency may, in respect of an assisted operation and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations, send security missions to the territory of the State or States concerned:

a) If the State or States report a serious incident;

b) At the request of the Board of Governors.

5.3. The Director-General shall make the necessary arrangements for the security missions with the State concerned, and the State, in agreement with the Agency, shall carry out, or have the necessary for the Agency to carry out, the checks. and examinations which the Agency deems necessary.

5.4. The provisions relating to security missions related to an assisted operation shall be incorporated in the agreement concluded between the Agency and the State for the provision of assistance.

6. Modifying security rules and measures.

6.1. Any proposal by the Agency to amend its safety standards will be subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.

6.2. If the Agency introduces amendments to the safety standards or measures applicable to an assisted operation, or if the Agency resolves that the safety standards or measures initially accepted by it and applied by the State to such operation no longer appropriate, the Agency shall consult the State in order to reach an agreement on the amendments to be made to the security rules or measures applied.

6.3. If the State proposes to make amendments to the safety standards or measures accepted by the Agency and applied to an assisted operation, it shall consult the Agency in order to reach an agreement on the proposed amendments.

Physical protection of nuclear materials.

The recommendations are reproduced, for information from all Member States, which are the result of an update of the recommendations published by the Agency in 1977 (in document INFCIRC/225Rev /1).

Preface.

Physical protection against theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a cause of national concern or "

Although the obligation to create and operate a complete system of physical protection for nuclear installations and materials in the territory of a given State is entirely up to the Government of that State, that obligation is whether or not it meets, to what extent or to what extent, it is a thing that does not leave other states indifferent. It is here that physical protection has become a matter of international interest and cooperation. The need for international cooperation is evident in cases where the effectiveness of physical protection in the territory of a State depends on other States taking appropriate measures to prevent or fail to prevent hostile acts. directed against nuclear installations and materials, especially when it comes to materials that are transported across national borders.

The IAEA soon took charge that it could play a role in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. His first work consisted of the publication of the "Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Materials", prepared by a group of experts assembled by the Director General and who appeared in 1972. These recommendations were reviewed by another group of experts in cooperation with the IAEA Secretariat, and the revised version was published in 1975 in the INFCIRC series of documents (1)

This version was modified by an advisory group in 1977. The amended document (2) received a favourable reception in the Member States and has since become the standard reference document.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which entered into force on 8 February 1987, constitutes an important framework for international cooperation in the physical protection of nuclear materials used with peaceful purposes, when they are the subject of international nuclear transport. ' It is planned to be examined in 1992 (3)

In April and May 1989 a Technical Committee on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (4) met to advise, inter alia, on the need to update the recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/25/Rev. 1, and on the amendments deemed necessary.

The Technical Committee noted a number of changes, mainly reflecting: The international consensus established with respect to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; the experience gained since 1977; and, the the desire to grant equal treatment to the protection against theft of nuclear materials and the protection against sabotage of nuclear facilities.

The recommendations set out in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements that systems should satisfy for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. They are expected to provide useful guidance to Member States.

Director General

HANS BLIX.

Germany (Federal Republic of), Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Cuba, China, Egypt, United States of America, France, India, Iraq, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea Democratic Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. An observer from the Commission of the European Communities was also present.

1. Introduction.

1.1. Measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials during their use, transport and storage and of nuclear installations, as described in this document, are recommended to the States for use in this way. relevant in their physical protection systems.

1.2. Any State system of physical protection should be based on the assessment by the State of possible hazards. Other factors should also be considered, in particular the means of responding to emergencies available to the State and the measures already established and relevant to the State system for the accounting and control of nuclear materials. The recommended physical protection measures relate to all types of nuclear installations and shipments of nuclear materials.

1.3. The recommended measures should be understood, in all cases, as complementary but non-substitute measures for any other measures established for the purpose of safety in respect of nuclear materials during their use, transport and storage and nuclear facilities.

1.4. The recommended measures are based on the current state of technology in the sphere of physical protection components and systems and on the current types of nuclear facilities. It is essential that they be reviewed and updated from time to time in order to reflect on them the technological progress achieved or the emergence of new types of facilities. Moreover, it is assumed that the organisation of a physical protection system for a particular facility will be separated from these recommendations when the prevailing circumstances indicate the need for a different degree of physical protection.

1.5. States are urged to develop cooperation and consultation activities by implementing these recommendations, and to exchange information on techniques and practices for physical protection, either directly or through the use of international organisations.

1.6. On 8 February 1987, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274 Rev. 1) entered into force. The Convention obliges the parties to:

-Make specific arrangements and comply with defined physical protection standards for international shipments of nuclear materials;

-Cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear materials;

-Consider as punishable offences specific acts intended to misuse or threaten to misuse nuclear materials for the purpose of causing harm to the public; and

-Adopt extradition measures or subject the defendants to prosecution for such acts.

The convention also promotes international cooperation in the exchange of information on physical protection.

2. Objectives.

2.1. The objectives of a state physical protection system should be as follows:

a) Create conditions that minimize the possibilities of unauthorized withdrawal of nuclear or sabotage materials (1) and

b) Provide information and technical assistance in support of the rapid and comprehensive measures to be taken by the State to locate and recover the missing nuclear materials, and to minimize the effects of sabotage (2).

2.2. The objectives of the Agency are as follows:

a) Provide a set of recommendations on the standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials during their use, transport and storage, as well as nuclear facilities;

These recommendations are formulated for examination by the competent authorities of the States. The recommendations may serve as a guideline for states, but they are not binding on them or infringe on their sovereign rights and;

(b) to be able to advise the authorities of a State, at the request of the State, in respect of its State system of physical protection. However, the magnitude and the modality of the assistance required are issues to be decided by common agreement between the State and the Agency.

It should be noted that it is not for the Body to assume any responsibility for the organisation of a State physical protection system or for the supervision, control or implementation of such a system. The Agency shall only provide assistance when requested by the State.

3. Elements of a state system of physical protection of nuclear materials.

3.1. General considerations

3.1.1. Any State system for the physical protection of nuclear materials or installations must understand the elements described in Sections 3.2. to 3.6:

3.1.2. The assessment by the State of the danger of unauthorised withdrawal of nuclear material or of sabotage is an essential element of a state system of physical protection. The State should continuously examine this possibility and assess the impact on the degrees and methods of physical protection of any change in that possibility.

3.2. Regulation

3.2.1. Responsibility, authority and sanctions.

3.2.1.1. The responsibility of the organisation, implementation and maintenance of a system of physical protection in the territory of a State shall be the sole responsibility of that State.

3.2.1.2. The State should enact and revise at regular intervals wide-ranging regulations for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, whether they are state property or private property.

3.2.1.3. If the various elements of the state physical protection system are distributed between two or more authorities, provisions should be made for their overall coordination. Any State may delegate the administration of physical protection measures to a national body or to duly authorised persons.  In cases of delegation of authority, it is understood that the State has verified to its satisfaction that the provisions for physical protection are in accordance with the rules laid down by the State itself. In addition, duly authorised persons shall be fully responsible for verifying that physical protection measures are at all times observed in a comprehensive manner.

3.2.1.4. In the case of international shipments of nuclear material, liability for physical protection measures should be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

3.2.1.5. Sanctions aimed at enforcing the standards of physical protection do not themselves constitute a necessary element of the state system of physical protection, although they can be used to reinforce it. Sanctions aimed at preventing the unauthorised withdrawal of nuclear materials and sabotage are important in any effective state system of physical protection.

3.2.2. Grant of licences.

3.2.2.1. The State must grant licences by authorising activities only when they comply with the regulations on physical protection. It should be borne in mind that other regulations such as those relating to radiation safety may also apply.

3.2.3. Classification of nuclear materials into categories.

3.2.3.1. The State should regulate the classification of nuclear material into categories in order to ensure a proper relationship between the materials concerned and the protective measures to be applied. This classification into categories should be based on the potential risk posed by materials which, in itself, depends on several factors such as the following: type of material (e.g. plutonium, uranium or thorium), isotopic composition (e.g., fissile isotope content), physical and chemical form, degree of dilution, degree of irradiation and quantity.

3.2.4. Rules on the physical protection of nuclear materials during their use, transport and storage.

3.2.4.1. The State should define the requirements for the physical protection of nuclear materials during their use, transport and storage.

They must take into account the category to which the nuclear materials correspond, the situation in which they are located (in use, in the course of transport or in storage) and the particular circumstances that exist in the State or along the route that is remains in the transport.

3.2.5. Standards for the physical protection of nuclear installations.

3.2.5.1. The State must define the rules for the physical protection of nuclear installations against sabotage. They should take into account the potential for radioactive releases to occur, the location of the nuclear facility and the state's own circumstances.

3.2.5.2. Appropriate measures of physical protection should be applied in nuclear installations which may be subject to sabotage, irrespective of the classification in category, of the nuclear material contained therein.

3.2.5.3. There are several types of nuclear facilities that pose risks to the environment in case of sabotage due to the possibility of radioactive releases. Classification into categories of nuclear materials may not adequately reflect those risks. Consequently, it is important that the system of protection of the facility also takes account of these risks.

3.2.6. Information system.

3.2.6.1. The state system of physical protection must include a system of information enabling the State to keep informed of any changes occurring in a place where nuclear materials are found and of all transport of materials. nuclear power, which may affect the implementation of physical protection measures.

3.2.6.2. In addition, the state system of physical protection must have access to the information of the State system for accounting and control of nuclear materials.

3.2.7. Protection of detailed information on physical protection.

3.2.7.1. The State should take measures to ensure adequate protection of specific or detailed information concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials in use, in the course of transport or in storage, and of the facilities nuclear power in which there is potential for sabotage.

3.3. Implementation of the physical protection measures prescribed in the regulations

3.3.1. Physical protection measures may be implemented by the State itself, the operator or any entity duly authorised by the State.

3.4. Control of compliance with the prescribed physical protection measures

3.4.1. The State system of physical protection should provide for the necessary measures for a regular review of the authorised activities, as well as whenever a major modification takes place, in order to ensure that the conditions are met at all times. regulations for physical protection.

3.5. Quality assurance in the implementation of physical protection measures.

3.5.1. In order to ensure that physical protection measures are maintained in conditions capable of effectively responding to potential threats, the authority on physical protection designated by the State should ensure that they are put in place. (i) practical programmes of quality assurance at the premises and during transport. These programmes should include regular testing of the detection, alarm and communications systems, as well as regular checks on the implementation of the safety procedures. These programs should also include exercises to test the training and prompt intervention of the personnel of the escort, guard and response forces from outside the site.

3.6. State contact points for issues related to physical protection

3.6.1. States should inform each other, either directly or through the agency, about the contact points for issues related to the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

4. Assigning categories to nuclear activities based on physical protection needs.

4.1. Justification for the precautionary measures

4.1.1. There is a possibility that the theft of plutonium, high-enriched uranium or uranium-233 can be translated into the manufacture of an explosive nuclear device by a group of people who have sufficient competence technique. The theft of these materials could lead to their use as radiological contaminants. An act of sabotage to a nuclear facility, or an expedition of nuclear materials, could create a radiological risk to the population.

4.2. Classification of nuclear materials into categories

4.2.1. The main factor for determining the physical protection measures against the unauthorised withdrawal of nuclear material is the nuclear material itself, classified taking into account the considerations set out in the previous Section 3.2.3.1.

4.2.2. When determining the levels of physical protection in a facility, which may be composed of several buildings, the authority in the field of physical protection designated by the State may consider that part of the installation it contains A different category material will therefore receive a different degree of protection from the one granted to the rest of the installation.

4.2.3. The table below shows a classification into categories of the different types of nuclear material, taking into account the background considerations. This classification in categories has been used in the entirety of this document.

4.3 Potential Sabotage in Nuclear Facilities

4.3.1. The physical protection measures to be applied in a nuclear facility should take into account not only the incentive offered by nuclear materials to an unauthorised withdrawal, but also the potential for them to be subject to sabotage. In considering such an eventuality in nuclear facilities, several types of facilities have to be considered. The following are the nuclear reactors, the irradiated fuel storage facilities located outside the facility, the reprocessing plants and the fuel-manufacturing facilities that use plutonium.

4.3.1.1. Nuclear reactors may be subject to sabotage because they contain radioactive materials, and the possibility of causing a deliberate dispersion of radioactivity.

4.3.1.2. Irradiated fuel storage located outside the facility is provided for acts of sabotage due to the inventory of radioactive materials and their possible release.

4.3.1.3. In reworking plants, the above assessment for irradiated fuel storage located outside the facility is applicable to the storage of irradiated fuel belonging to the initial part of the fuel cycle. fuel. The facility also contains plutonium, material that can be subject to sabotage.

4.3.1.4. Fuel-making plants using plutonium can be the subject of sabotage in areas where plutonium is used or stored.

4.3.2. The risk of the risk of readiological risks depends to a large extent on the type of threat being examined, the design of the facility and its safety features. As a result, a special assessment (sic) of the facility should be made in relation to the potential for sabotage in close consultation between security and physical protection specialists.

CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS INTO CATEGORIES

Category

Material Form I II III

1. Plutonium a.f Not irradiated (b) 2kg or more Less than 2kg 500g or less c

but more

500g

2. Uranium-235 d Not irradiated b

-uranium with 5kg or more Less than 5kg 1kg or less c

enrichment but more

of 20% or more of 1kg

on 235U

-uranium with a-10 kg or more than 10kg c

enrichment

of at least 10%

but lower

to 20% on 235U

-uranium with a--10 kg or more

enrichment

higher than the

natural uranium

but lower

to 10% on 235U

3. Uranium-233 Not irradiated b 2kg or more Less than 500g or less c

2kg but

over 500g

(a) All plutonium except that whose isotopic concentration exceeds 80% in plutonium-2.3.;

(b) Non-irradiated material in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation intensity equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at 1 meter of distance without shielding;

c) Nuclear materials that do not represent a radiologically significant amount should be excluded from this classification;

(d) Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium, as well as quantities of uranium with an enrichment of less than 10% by 235U not to be included in the Lll Category, should be protected in accordance with the prudent management;

e) Irradiated fuel should be protected as a Category I, II or Lll nuclear material, according to the category that corresponds to it before irradiation.

However, when the radiation intensity of that fuel exceeds 100 rads/hour at 1 meter distance without the shielding, the protection of the fuel which, by reason of its original content in fissile material, would have been included in Categories l or II it may be reduced by a maximum of one degree;

(f) The competent authority of the State shall determine whether there is a credible threat to the spread of plutonium with malign intent. If yes, the State should apply the physical protection requirements for Category I, II or III of nuclear material, as appropriate and without taking into account the amount of plutonium specified in the Table for each category, to the isotopes of the plutonium in those quantities and forms which the State determines may be easily threatened with dispersion.

5. Standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials during their use and storage and nuclear facilities.

5.1. General considerations

5.1.1. The concept of physical protection involves a planned combination of equipment and instruments (safety devices), procedures (including the organisation and functions of the guard staff) and the characteristics of the facility (including its distribution within its perimeter). The physical protection system should be specifically organised for each installation after taking due account of the geographical characteristics of its location and the assessment made by the State of the threat that may weigh on the installation. she. Emergency procedures should be developed to effectively conjure up any possible threats.

5.1.2. The achievement of the objectives of the physical protection system shall be facilitated by the adoption of the following measures:

a) Limiting access to nuclear materials or nuclear facilities to a minimum number of people. In pursuing this goal, the State-designated physical protection authority may select protected areas, inland areas and vital areas.

When designating these areas, account must be taken of the characteristics of the plant from the point of view of safety, its location and the circumstances of the threat. Access to these areas must be limited and controlled; and

b) Demanding a prior determination of the probity of any person to whom access to nuclear materials, or nuclear facilities, is regularly permitted.

5.1.3. Some types of nuclear facilities may pose risks to the population and the environment due to the possibility of sabotage. Security specialists should assess the consequences of malevolent acts, considered in the context of the assessment by the State of the threat that may weigh on the facility, to determine which equipment, systems or devices whose failure could endanger, directly or indirectly, public health and safety due to radiation exposure. Equipment, systems or devices rated as vital must be protected by the designation of vital zones. It is important that issues relating to physical protection be considered in the initial stages of the design of the nuclear installation.

Close cooperation between specialists in physical protection and nuclear safety is also important to ensure that the physical protection system takes into account the measures incorporated in the facility for security purposes. Physical protection measures should not undermine nuclear safety in emergency situations.

5.2. Standards for Category I materials during their use and storage

5.2.1. Category I materials should be used or stored only within an internal zone.

5.2.2. Any person who enters the protected zone must be provided with a special pass or distinctive mark, duly registered in a register, and the access to the protected zone must be limited to the essential minimum of these persons.

5.2.3. Access to inland areas should be limited to those persons whose probity has been determined in advance and their escort. Access to inland areas must be kept to the minimum necessary for these persons.

5.2.4. The distribution of passes or flags to persons so that they can enter the protected zone or in the interior zones must conform to the general scheme as follows:

Type I: Employees whose functions allow or require access at all times to the interior areas.

Type II: Other employees to whom access to the protected zone is permitted.

Type III: Operaries who temporarily work in repairs or in conservation services, and workers in the construction industry, all of whom must be escorted at all times by an employee with a pass or a type I flag when may have access to inland areas, and an employee with a pass or a Type II flag when they have access to the protected area only.

Type IV: Visitors, which must be escorted by an employee with a pass or a Type II flag at any time when they are in the protected zone, as well as by an employee with type I pass or flag when they have access to the zones interiors.

The proportional ratio between visitors and their escort should be limited. Countries and flags must be made in such a way that it is extremely difficult to falsify them.

5.2.5. All persons and packages entering or leaving the inland areas must be registered in order to prevent the introduction of artifacts or other means of carrying out acts of sabotage or the unauthorised withdrawal of nuclear materials. For such a register, nuclear material and metal object detectors may be used.

5.2.6. The entry of motor vehicles owned by private persons in a protected area should be kept to a minimum and limited exclusively to authorised car parks. The access of motor vehicles owned by private individuals in the inland areas should be prohibited.

5.2.7. Provided that persons are present in the inland areas, these areas must be kept under constant surveillance. This function can be performed by mutual and simultaneous observation by two or more people (for example, by applying the rule of action by couples).

5.2.8. All employees should be frequently (once a year, approximately) lectured about the importance of effective physical protection measures, as well as being trained in the implementation of these measures. In well-visible places distributed par (sic) the entire installation should be placed in this respect.

5.2.9. Any person handling nuclear material should be required to comply with the procedures established to entrust the custody of the nuclear material to the person who succeeds him in such handling. In addition, persons handling nuclear material should endeavour to check, when presented at their job, that there has been no undue manipulation or unauthorised withdrawal of nuclear materials, and should inform one another. of his superiors whenever they have reason to suspect the existence of a anomaly.

5.2.10. A register shall be kept in which all persons who have access to keys or key-cards which are used in connection with the containment or storage of nuclear materials or who hold such keys or keys shall be registered. Key-card. Measures should also be taken to:

a) Check and guard keys or key-keys, in particular with a view to minimizing the possibility of duplicates being obtained from them; and

b) Change the combinations of the locks at appropriate intervals.

Locks should be changed whenever you are in doubt that they can be opened.

5.2.11. The responsibility inherent in the movement of nuclear materials within the internal areas and the protected zone should be the responsibility of the operator, who should apply all physical protection measures as prudent and necessary. The outputs of nuclear material from a protected area, or the movement of such materials between two of them, should be carried out in full compliance with the standards indicated for nuclear materials during their transport, after taking into account the circumstances in each case.

5.2.12. The perimeter of a protected zone should normally be constituted by a physical barrier in addition to the external walls of the buildings and located outside them. However, in cases where the walls of a building are of such solid construction as they have been designated, as a result of a general safety study, as constituting the perimeter of the protected zone, it must be mounted by the from outside of these walls a supplementary surveillance system. All along the perimeter of the protected zone should be left an area of ground cleared and equipped with sufficient illumination to be able to observe what happens in it. Intrusion detection and evaluation activities should be performed on the perimeter of the protected zone.

5.2.13. Inland areas should have a provision such that the number of entry or exit doors is reduced to a minimum (only one would be ideal). All emergency exits must be equipped with alarm devices.

All windows that give to the exterior of a building must be permanently closed with lock or lock, equipped with alarm devices and fitted with a grille or bars firmly embedded. Inland areas should not be located in the vicinity of public roads.

5.2.14. Storage areas should consist of structures of the type of 'battleship' and be located within an internal zone. They must be equipped with alarm devices and suitable locks or locks, with the distribution of keys or key-keys being strictly controlled. Access to the warehouse must be strictly limited to the persons assigned to it, and other persons should not be allowed more than when they are duly escorted. In cases where, during the night, nuclear material is to be stored in areas of work, or in a place intended for temporary storage within a working area, specially authorised procedures should be followed. to protect that area. This requirement may be met by means of alarm devices, round staff or surveillance equipment consisting of television cameras.

5.2.15. A guard service must be mounted 24 hours a day.

In the hours when the facility is not being worked, the guard staff must report at pre-established intervals to the local police or other law enforcement agencies. It is appropriate for States to employ staff of guards with weapons, in so far as laws and regulations permit. When the guard staff is not equipped with weapons, compensation measures must be applied. The aim must be to have the rapid arrival of adequately armed response forces to deal with an armed attack and prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of nuclear materials or sabotage.

5.2.16. An external and internal patrol service should be provided by round staff.

5.2.17. For activities related to detection, assessment and response to a threat, transmission systems, in duplicate and independent, should be available for radio-telephone communication in both directions. This team should make possible the link between the guard staff, their quartelillo and the response forces.

5.2.18. Transmission systems, in duplicate and independent, including equally independent power supply sources, should be available between the censors of the alarm devices and the terminals on which the signal is displayed. corresponding alarm (acoustics, visual or audiovisual).

5.2.19. Action plans should be prepared for emergency cases in order to be able to deal effectively with any potential threat, including attempts to withdraw unauthorised nuclear or sabotage materials. These plans should include measures to train the staff of the facility in the task to be carried out in cases of alarm or emergency.

In addition, personnel who have been trained in the facility should be willing to attend all necessary requests for physical protection and recovery of nuclear materials, and must act in full coordination with the the response and the intervention teams for the control of radiological risks, which must also be properly trained.

5.2.20. Measures should be taken to ensure that when an emergency evacuation is carried out (even in the case of drills organised to familiarise staff) no unauthorised removal of materials will take place. nuclear. Such unauthorised withdrawal may be prevented, for example, by keeping persons under continuous surveillance and by registering them. For these records, instruments detectors of nuclear materials and metal objects can be used.

5.2.21. The physical protection authority designated by the State must carry out, at least once a year (or whenever a major modification of the installation or its activities takes place), a general safety study at the end of the year. assess the effectiveness of the physical protection measures and determine the changes that need to be made to those measures in order to optimise their effectiveness in certain situations that may arise in the installation. In addition, the operators of the installations must carry out checks on the effective operation of the physical protection measures at all times.

5.3. Standards for Category II materials during their use and storage

5.3.1. Category II materials must be used or stored within a protected zone.

5.3.2. Any person who enters the protected zone must be provided with a special pass or distinctive mark, duly registered in a register, and the access to the protected zone must be limited to the essential minimum of these persons.

5.3.3. Access to the protected zone should be limited to those persons whose probity has been determined in advance and to those who escort them.

5.3.4. The distribution of passes or flags must conform to the general scheme listed below:

Type I: Employees whose functions permit or require access at all times to the protected zone.

Type II: Operaries temporarily working on repairs or on conservation services, and construction workers, all of whom must be escorted at all times by an employee with a Type I pass or flag when may have access to the protected area (except where its probity has been previously determined).

The proportional ratio between visitors and their escort should be limited. Countries and flags must be made in such a way that it is extremely difficult to falsify them.

5.3.5. From time to time you must register with or leave the persons and packages that have entered the protected zone.

5.3.6. Vehicles and all large objects entering the protected zone must be checked or registered to ensure that they do not surreptitiously introduce unauthorised persons or artifacts for acts of sabotage.

5.3.7. The entry of motor vehicles owned by private persons in the protected area should be kept to a minimum and limited exclusively to authorised car parks.

5.3.8. All employees should be frequently (once a year, approximately) lectured about the importance of effective physical protection measures, as well as being trained in the implementation of these measures. In well-visible places distributed throughout the installation, notices should be placed in this respect.

5.3.9. Any person handling nuclear material should be required to comply with the procedures established to entrust the custody of the nuclear material to the person who succeeds him in such handling. In addition, persons handling nuclear materials should endeavour to check, when presented at their job, that no unauthorised manipulation or unauthorised removal of nuclear material has taken place, and should inform one another. of his superiors whenever they have reason to suspect the existence of a anomaly.

5.3.10. A register shall be kept in which all persons who have access to keys or key-cards which are used in connection with the containment or storage of nuclear materials or who hold such keys or keys shall be registered. Key-card. Measures should also be taken to:

(a) Check and guard keys or key-keys, in particular with a view to minimizing the possibility of duplication of them;

b) Change the combinations of the locks at appropriate intervals.

The locks should be changed if you are in doubt that they can be opened.

5.3.11. The responsibility inherent in the movement of nuclear materials within the protected zone must be the responsibility of the operator, who must apply all physical protection measures to be prudent and necessary. The outputs of nuclear material from a protected area, or the movement of such materials between two of them, should be carried out in full compliance with the standards indicated for nuclear materials during their transport, after taking into account the circumstances in each case.

5.3.12. The perimeter of a protected zone should normally be constituted by a physical barrier in addition to the external walls of the buildings and located outside them. However, in cases where the walls of a building are of such solid construction as they have been designated, as a result of a general safety study, as constituting the perimeter of the protected zone, it must be mounted by the outside of these walls a supplementary monitoring system. All along the perimeter of the protected zone should be left an area of ground cleared and equipped with sufficient illumination to be able to observe what happens in it. Intrusion detection and evaluation activities should be performed on the perimeter of the protected zone.

5.3.13. Action plans should be prepared for emergency cases in order to be able to deal effectively with any potential threat, including attempts to withdraw unauthorised nuclear or sabotage materials. These plans should include measures to train the staff of the facility in the task to be carried out in cases of alarm or emergency.

They should also provide for the appropriate intervention of the guard personnel or response forces outside the facility to deal with any attempt to penetrate the protected zone. In addition, personnel who have been trained in the facility should be willing to attend all necessary requests for physical protection and recovery of nuclear materials, and must act in full coordination with the response to the installation and to the intervention teams for the control of radiological risks, which must also be properly trained.

5.3.14. Measures should be taken to ensure that when an emergency evacuation is carried out (even in the case of drills organised to familiarise staff) there is no place, no unauthorised removal of materials. nuclear. Such unauthorised withdrawal may be prevented, for example, by keeping persons under continuous surveillance and by registering them. For these records, instruments detectors of nuclear materials and metal objects can be used.

5.3.15. The physical protection authority designated by the State must carry out, at least once a year (or whenever a major modification of the installation or its activities takes place), a general safety study at the end of the year. assess the effectiveness of the physical protection measures and to determine the changes that need to be made to those measures in order to optimise their effectiveness in certain situations which may arise in the installation.

In addition, the operators of the installations must carry out checks on the effective operation of the physical protection measures at all times.

5.4. Standards for Category III materials during their use and storage

5.4.1. Category III materials must be used or stored within an area for which access is controlled.

5.4.2. All employees should be frequently (once a year, approximately) lectured about the importance of effective physical protection measures, as well as being trained in the implementation of these measures. In well-visible places distributed throughout the installation, notices should be placed in this respect.

5.4.3. The responsibility inherent in the movement of nuclear materials must be the responsibility of the operator, who must apply all physical protection measures to be prudent and necessary.

5.4.4. Measures should be taken to discover any unauthorised intrusion and to ensure that the guard staff and the response forces outside the facility are acting in an appropriate manner against an attempted intrusion.

5.4.5. Action plans should be prepared for emergency cases in order to be able to deal effectively with any potential threat, including attempts to withdraw unauthorised nuclear or sabotage materials. These plans should include measures to train the staff of the facility in the task to be carried out in cases of alarm or emergency.

They should also provide for the proper performance of the guard personnel or the response forces outside the facility to deal with any attempted intrusion.

5.4.6. The physical protection authority designated by the State should carry out, initially and whenever a major modification of the installation or its activities takes place, an overall safety study in order to assess the the effectiveness of the physical protection measures and to determine the modifications to be made to those measures in order to optimise their effectiveness in certain situations which may arise in the installation. In addition, the operators of the installations must carry out checks on the effective operation of the physical protection measures at all times.

6. Rules on the physical protection of nuclear materials in the light of their transport.

6.1. General considerations

6.1.1. The transport of nuclear materials is likely to be the most vulnerable to an attempt to withdraw unauthorised materials or sabotage, and it is therefore of great importance that the measures taken to deal with these materials are not risks are in line with the "deep protection" criterion and that particular attention is paid to the recovery system. Emergency procedures must be developed to deal effectively with any potential threat.

6.1.2. The achievement of the objectives of physical protection will be facilitated by the adoption of the following measures:

(a) Reducing to a minimum the duration of the operation of transport of the nuclear material considered as a whole;

b) Reducing to a minimum the number of transhipments of nuclear materials and their duration, i.e. the number of transhipments from one means of transport to another, transfers to or from a temporary warehouse, and temporary storage pending the arrival of the transport vehicle, etc.;

c) Protecting nuclear materials in temporary storage in a manner compatible with the category of such materials;

d) By avoiding any regularity or periodicity in the movements of nuclear materials;

e) Demanding that the probity of all persons involved in the transport of nuclear materials be determined in advance.

6.1.3. Transport operations should not be advertised if their announcement can result in a reduction in the degree of physical protection. This is advisable to act with caution in terms of the use of any special marks on vehicles as well as for the use of non-reserved channels for the transmission of messages concerning shipments of materials. nuclear. Where the standards of safeguards or radiation safety regulations require the sending of such messages, measures such as the use of X keys should be taken into account, as far as possible, by sending the messages in the most appropriate way. appropriate; great care must be taken in the processing of this information. These considerations should also apply to any subsequent communications.

6.2. Rules relating to Category I materials during their transport

6.2.1. Prior notification to the recipient

6.2.1.1. The sender must give the consignee prior notification of the intended expedition specifying in it the mode of transport (road, rail, sea or air) the time of arrival of the expedition and the place exact delivery if the delivery is to be carried out at some intermediate point of the route before the final destination.

6.2.1.2. Before the dispatch of an issue is initiated, the consignee must confirm that he is ready to accept his delivery immediately (and where appropriate to take charge of the issue at an intermediate point of the route before the point of destination). final) at the time.

6.2.2. Prior authorization

6.2.2.1. In cases where physical protection is duly provided for in the relevant regulations, no prior authorisation is required for ordinary consignments.

6.2.2.2. In all cases which are not covered by the regulations in force, or where the limits specified in those regulations are exceeded, the consent of an authority must be sought in advance in order to carry out a transport operation. State of control. This involves the prior completion of a general safety study. The approval of the transport operation may include specific conditions and limitations depending on the circumstances in each case and any plans drawn up in anticipation of emergency cases.

6.2.3. Selecting the transport and route mode

6.2.3.1. When choosing the route, attention should be paid to the safety of the passage of nuclear materials, in particular by fixing the route so as to avoid areas that are the scene of natural disasters or disturbances or alterations of the order. public, the mode of transport chosen for a given issue should be that with which the number of transhipments of the freight and the duration of the transport operation are reduced to a minimum. The cooperation of the carrier should be ensured in advance with regard to the implementation of physical protection measures.

6.2.3.2. Before proceeding to a consignment, the sender must ensure that the measures taken for the issue are in accordance with the provisions of the physical protection regulations in force in the State of destination and in those other States for which the expedition is to pass.

6.2.4. Closure and seal devices

6.2.4.1. Except where otherwise necessary for imperative reasons of safety, packages of nuclear material must be transported in covered vehicles, cargo compartments or containers fitted with closure devices. However, packages fitted with closure devices or intended for use and weighing more than 2 000 kg may be transported in open vehicles. Subject to the advice of safety considerations, any package must be secured or fixed to the vehicle or container.

6.2.4.2. The closure devices and seals of the package, vehicle, cargo compartment or container must be inspected before dispatch of an expedition in order to verify its integrity.

6.2.5. Registration of the transport vehicle

6.2.5.1. Before loading the materials into the transport vehicle and starting the transport operation, the vehicle must be the object of a stopped registration in order to verify that they have not been placed on the devices or devices for the purpose of sabotage or the preparations for such an event have been initiated.

6.2.6. Written instructions

6.2.6.1. Transport authorities which have to carry out functions related to the physical protection of nuclear materials during their transport must be given written instructions detailing those functions, and should be provided with to provide a document, which is extended in accordance with a uniform format, to demonstrate its authority in this respect.

6.2.6.2. The transport authorities should be consulted on the following issues: route to be followed, places to approved stop points, measures for delivery of the issue, identification of persons authorised to take charge of the issue, procedures to be followed in the event of an accident, and procedures for reporting in both normal and emergency circumstances.

6.2.7. Measures to be taken after the arrival of the expedition

6.2.7.1. The consignee must check the integrity of the packages and the sealing and seal devices, and immediately accept the consignment when arriving at its destination. When an expedition reaches its destination, the consignee must immediately notify the sender; it must also inform the sender, within a reasonable interval of time from the expected time of arrival, that an expedition will not has reached its destination. In addition, instructions must be given to the escort staff or the guardian staff to communicate by radio or telephone to the sender or to the person designated by the sender or the recipient, the arrival of that staff at their destination as well as each place in which to stay for the night and the place where they come to the delivery of the expedition.

6.2.8. Media

6.2.8.1. The system of physical protection within the national territory must include measures to enable continuous radio communication in both directions, or frequent telephone communication, between the transport vehicle and the sender, the recipient and/or the person designated by the sender or the recipient.

6.2.9. Escort staff or guard personnel

6.2.9.1. Each expedition must be accompanied by escort personnel or guard personnel to protect the materials against hostile acts. In the case of road transport, the escort staff or the staff of the staff shall provide continuous monitoring. If the packages, vehicle, hold or load compartment are fitted with sealing devices and seals, when the vehicle is not in motion the surveillance of the packages may be replaced by a frequent and periodic examination of the seals joined to a continuous monitoring of the cargo compartment. It is appropriate for States to employ staff of guards or intended escorts of arms, in so far as laws and regulations permit. Where no escort or armed guard personnel are employed, compensation measures shall be taken.

6.2.10. Action in case of emergency

6.2.10.1. Measures should be taken in order to have emergency equipment integrated by an appropriate number of duly trained members to deal with emergency situations arising in the national territory. The response forces must arrive at the scene of the incident during transport while the unauthorized withdrawal of nuclear materials or the act of sabotage are being committed in order to prevent them from being carried out. The aim must be to be able to count on the rapid arrival of armed response forces in order to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of nuclear materials or sabotage and to deal with an armed attack.

6.2.11. Prior agreement on liability in case of international transport

6.2.11.1. In the case of a transport operation between two States with a common border, responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear materials corresponding to a State, and the point at which that responsibility has to be passed from a State to state must be the subject of an agreement between those States. However, as regards the maintenance of communications in relation to the integrity of the issue at all times, and as regards the responsibility for carrying out physical protection measures and for undertaking to carry out recovery actions in the event that an expedition is lost or lost, the agreement between the States should stipulate that such liability shall be borne by the sending State in respect of the transport to the border and, subsequently, it will be passed on to the recipient State.

6.2.11.2. Where an international expedition is to cross the territory of States other than the sending State and the State of destination, the arrangements to be made between the sending State and the State of destination shall be expressly indicated. the Member States through or over the territory of which that transit is to take place, with a view to continuing in advance their cooperation and assistance in the implementation of appropriate physical protection measures and recovery operations in territory of those States in the case of loss or loss on that territory of an issue "

6.2.11.3. States should help each other in the implementation of physical protection measures and, in particular, in the recovery of nuclear material in cases where such aid is needed.

6.2.11.4. In the case of an international expedition which has to cross international waters or airspace, the sending State and the State of destination should lay down specific measures to ensure the maintenance of communications relating to the integrity at all times of the issue and ensure that the planning and response responsibilities are defined and fulfilled.

6.2.12. Measures to be taken in the case of international transport

6.2.12.1. In addition to the conclusion of the international agreements referred to in the preceding section, in contracts or agreements between senders and consignees in which the international transport of nuclear materials is stipulated, it must be indicated in a manner (a) the point at which the responsibility for the physical protection of the nuclear material will no longer be borne by the sender in order to pass on to the consignee.

6.2.12.2. Where the contract or agreement relating to an international transport operation provides for the delivery of the nuclear material in a vehicle of the sending State at a point of destination situated in the territory of the receiving State, the contract or the agreement should stipulate that information should be provided in advance to the addressee in order to enable him to take appropriate physical protection measures.

6.2.12.3. Interested States and international organizations should consider the use of key information about the exact dates and locations of the expeditions.

6.3. Rules for Category I materials depending on the mode of transport

6.3.1. General considerations

6.3.1.1. In addition to the standards set out above, it is appropriate to observe more detailed application of Category I materials according to the mode of transport, as follows.

.3.2. Road transport

6.3.2.1. The transport vehicle must be constructed, preferably, in order to withstand an attack, and it is also preferable to be equipped with a system of inuse of the vehicle itself.

6.3.2.2. A single vehicle chosen for that purpose should be used for each expedition (i.e. the "full load" principle should be applied). In the transport vehicle a second person acting as a member of the escort staff or the staff of the guard staff with regard to that vehicle shall be a second person.

6.3.2.3. The transport vehicle must be accompanied by another vehicle in which one or more members of the staff of the staff are kept.

6.3.2.4. The guard staff must maintain a continuous monitoring service and check the seals and closing devices at each stop.

6.3.2.5. If the journey cannot be carried out in a single day, measures must be taken to stay at an approved stop. During such night stops, the transport vehicle must be immobilized or parked in a building or enclosure whose access is provided with doors with closing devices and monitored by guard personnel.

6.3.2.6. It should be possible to communicate by radio in both directions between the transport vehicle and the escort vehicle, in addition to the communication between those vehicles and the sender, the consignee, and the person designated by the sender or by the recipient.

6.3.2.7. The desirability of following other possible routes should be planned in advance, so that the decision to modify the route can be implemented as soon as possible.

6.3.3. Rail transport

6.3.3.1. The consignment must be transported either on a freight train or on a wagon expressly dedicated to it and hooked up to a passenger train.

6.3.3.2. The dispatch must be accompanied by one or more members of the escort staff or the staff of the guards, who must travel in the carriage nearest to the one in which the dispatch goes and keep under surveillance as well as check the closing devices and seals in the places where the convoy stops. At the planned stops, the escort staff or the guard staff must be able to communicate by radio in both directions or by telephone.

6.3.4. Transport by sea

6.3.4.1. Each consignment must be accompanied by one or more members of the escort staff or the staff of the staff.

6.3.4.2. The consignment must be available in a safe compartment or in a container which is closed and sealed. The closure devices and seals must be inspected periodically during the trip.

6.3.5. Transport by air

6.3.5.1. Shipments must be carried on specially chartered cargo aircraft or on regular service cargo aircraft but, in all cases, expressly chosen for the carriage of such an expedition, and must be accompanied by one or more members of the escort staff or the staff of the staff.

6.4. Standards for Category II materials during their transport

6.4.1. Prior notification to the recipient

6.4.1.1. The sender must give the consignee prior notification of the intended expedition specifying in it the mode of transport (road, rail, sea or air), the time of arrival of the expedition and the exact place of its delivery if it is to be carried out at some intermediate point of the route before the final destination.

6.4.1.2. Before the dispatch of an issue is initiated, the consignee must confirm that he is ready to accept his delivery immediately (and, where appropriate, to take over the issue at an intermediate point in the itinerary preceding the point of destination). final) at the time.

6.4.2. Selecting the transport and route mode

6.4.2.1. When choosing the route, attention should be paid to the safety of the passage of nuclear materials, in particular by fixing the route in such a way as to avoid areas that are the scene of natural disasters or disturbances or alterations of public order. The mode of transport chosen for a given expedition must be that with which the number of transhipments of the freight and the duration of the transport operation are reduced to a minimum. The cooperation of the carrier in respect of the implementation of physical protection measures should be ensured in advance.

6.4.3. Closure and seal devices

6.4.3.1. Except where otherwise necessary for imperative reasons of safety, packages of nuclear material must be transported in covered vehicles, cargo compartments or containers fitted with closure devices. However, packages fitted with closure devices or which are sealed and whose weight exceeds 2,000 kg may be transported in open vehicles. Subject to the advice of safety considerations, any package must be secured or fixed to the vehicle or container.

6.4.3.2. The closure devices and seals of the package, vehicle, cargo compartment or container must be inspected before dispatch of an expedition in order to verify its integrity.

6.4.4. Registration of the transport vehicle

6.4.4.1. Before loading the materials into the transport vehicle and starting the transport operation, the vehicle must be the object of a stopped registration in order to verify that they have not been placed on the devices or devices for the purpose of sabotage or the preparations for such an event have been initiated.

6.4.5. Written instructions

6.4.5.1. Transport authorities which have to carry out functions related to the physical protection of nuclear materials during their transport must be given written instructions detailing those functions, and should be provided with to provide a document, which is extended in accordance with a uniform format, to demonstrate its authority in this respect.

6.4.5.2. The transport authorities should be consulted on the following issues: route to be followed, places or stop points approved, measures for delivery of the issue, identification of persons authorised to take charge of the issue, procedures to be followed in the event of an accident, and procedures for reporting in both normal and emergency circumstances.

6.4.6. Measures to be taken after the arrival of the expedition

6.4.6.1. The consignee must check the integrity of the packages and the sealing and seal devices, and immediately accept the consignment when arriving at its destination. When an expedition reaches its destination, the recipient must immediately notify the sender; it must also inform the sender, within a reasonable interval of time from the time provided for his arrival, that a expedition has not reached its destination.

6.4.7. Media

6.4.7.1. The system of physical protection within the national territory must include measures to enable frequent telephone communication between the transport vehicle and the sender, the consignee and the person designated by the sender or by the recipient.

6.4.8. Prior agreement on liability in case of international transport

6.4.8.1. In the case of a transport operation between two States with a common border, the responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear materials which corresponds to a State and the point at which that responsibility has to pass from a State-to-state, they must be the subject of an agreement between those States. However, as regards the maintenance of communications in relation to the integrity of the issue at all times and as regards the responsibility for carrying out physical protection measures and for undertaking to carry out recovery actions in the event that an issue is lost or lost, the agreement between the States should stipulate that the responsibility for the issue is to be borne by the sending State in respect of the transport to the border and, subsequently, will be passed on to the recipient State.

6.4.8.2. Where an international expedition is to cross the territory of States other than the sending State and the State of destination, the arrangements to be made between the sending State and the State of destination must be expressly indicated. the Member States through or over the territory of which that transit is to take place, with a view to obtaining in advance their cooperation and assistance in the implementation of appropriate physical protection measures and recovery operations in territory of those States, in the case of loss or loss on that territory of an issue "

6.4.8.3. States should help each other in the implementation of physical protection measures and, in particular, in the recovery of nuclear material, in cases where such aid is needed.

6.4.9. Measures to be taken in the case of international transport

6.4.9.1. In addition to the conclusion of the international agreements referred to in the preceding section, in contracts or agreements between senders and consignees in which the international transport of nuclear materials is stipulated, the (i) the point at which the responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear materials will no longer be borne by the sender in order to pass on to the consignee.

6.4.9.2. Where the contract or agreement relating to an international transport operation provides for the delivery of the nuclear material in a vehicle of the sending State at a point of destination situated in the territory of the receiving State, the contract or Agreement should stipulate that information should be provided in sufficient time to the recipient for an appropriate physical protection.

6.5. Standards for Category III materials during their transport

6.5 1. Prior notification to the recipient

6.5.1.1. The sender must give the consignee prior notification of the intended expedition specifying in it the mode of transport (road, rail, sea or air), the time of arrival of the expedition and the exact place of its delivery if it is to be carried out at some intermediate point of the route before the final destination.

6.5.1.2. Before the dispatch of an issue is initiated, the consignee must confirm that he is ready to accept his delivery immediately (and, where appropriate, to take over the issue at an intermediate point before the final point of destination) in the Timing.

6.5.2. Closure and seal devices

6.5.2.1. Wherever feasible, they must be fitted with closure devices and must be sealed to vehicles or containers.

6.5.3. Registration of the transport vehicle

6.5.3.1. Before loading the materials into the vehicle and starting the transport operation, the vehicle must be the object of a stopped registration in order to verify that they have not been placed on the devices or devices for the purpose of sabotage or have been initiate the preparations for such an event.

6.5.4. Measures to be taken after the arrival of the expedition

6.5.4.1. The consignee must immediately notify the sender of the arrival of the expedition; he must also inform the sender, within a reasonable interval of time from the time provided for his arrival, that an expedition has not reached their destination.

6 5.5. Prior agreement on liability in case of international transport

6.5.5.1. In the case of a transport operation between two States with a common border, the responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear materials which corresponds to a State and the point at which that responsibility has to pass from a State-to-state, they must be the subject of an agreement between those States. However, as regards the maintenance of communications in relation to the integrity of the issue at all times and as regards the responsibility for carrying out physical protection measures and for undertaking to carry out recovery actions in the event that an issue is lost or lost, the agreement between the States should stipulate that the responsibility for the issue is to be borne by the sending State in respect of the transport to the border and, subsequently, will be passed on to the recipient State.

6.5.5.2. Where an international expedition (sic) is to cross the territory of States other than the sending State and the State of destination, the arrangements to be made between the sending State and the State of destination shall be indicated. (a) the Member States shall, in particular, ensure that, in order to ensure that their cooperation and assistance in the implementation of appropriate physical protection measures and in the operations of the Member States concerned are carried out in advance, the Member States shall, recovery in the territory of those States in the event of loss or loss on that territory of an expedition "

6.5.5.3. States should help each other in the implementation of physical protection measures and, in particular, in the recovery of nuclear material in cases where such aid is needed.

7. Definitions

7.1. Alarm devices

Technical devices intended to detect any undue intrusion or manipulation. Such devices must be independent of the general supply of electrical power and be able to operate in the event of a power outage. They must also point out any attempt to prevent their operation.

7.2. Escort staff or guard personnel

People who, after a determination of their probity, have been entrusted with surveillance or access control functions. Their obligations should be specified in the general safety study.

7.3. Inner zone

Zone within a protected zone where Category I nuclear materials are used or stored.

7.4. Round staff

Person or persons (who may be a staff member) whose mission is to inspect barriers, seals, or other means of protection at regular or irregular intervals.

7.5. Physical barrier

Fence, fence or wall, or similar impediment, approved in a general safety study.

7.6. Protected zone

A zone under constant surveillance (by guard personnel or by electronic means), surrounded by a physical barrier and with a limited number of controlled access points and approved in a general safety study. When a wall or exterior walls of a building of limited part or the entire perimeter of a protected area, all emergency exits on those external walls must be equipped with alarm devices. All the windows located on the walls of the perimeter of the area must be permanently closed with lock or lock, equipped with alarm devices and fitted with a grille or bars firmly fitted.

7.7. Sabotage

A deliberate act performed to the detriment of a plant, of an installation, of a vehicle for the transport of nuclear materials or of nuclear material itself, which may directly or indirectly endanger security and safety. health of the population as a result of radiation exposure.

7.8. General safety study

Critical study by competent officials to assess, approve and specify physical protection measures.

7.9. Surveillance

Close surveillance carried out by persons, photoelectric equipment, closed circuit television equipment, ecodetectors, electronic equipment, photographic equipment or by other means.

7.10. Vital zone

A zone that contains equipment, systems, or devices that, in isolation or in combination, can be vulnerable to an act of sabotage.

The undersigned Head of the Legal Office

from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

NOTES:

That the present reproduction is faithful photocopy taken from the certified text of the "Revised Supplementary Agreement on the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia" signed in Vienna, Austria, on 11 January 1993, which is based on the archives of the Legal Office of the Ministry.

Given in Santa Fe de Bogota, D.C., at twenty-six

(26) days of August 1994.

The Head of the Legal Office,

HECTOR ADOLFO SINTURA VARELA.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF PUBLIC POWER

REPUBLIC OF THE REPUBLIC

Santa Fe de Bogota, D.C., March 23, 1993.

Approved. Submit to the honorable consideration

National Congress for Constitutional Effects.

CESAR GAVIRIA TRUJILLO

The Foreign Minister,

NOEMI SANIN DE RUBIO.

DECRETA:

ARTICLE 1A. Approve the "Revised Supplementary Agreement on the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia", signed in Vienna, Austria, on 11 January 1993.

ARTICLE 2A. Pursuant to article 1o. of Law 7a. The revised supplementary agreement on the provision of technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia, signed in Vienna, Austria, on 11 January 1993, as provided for in Article 1 (1). of this Law is approved, will force the country from the date on which the international link with respect to it is perfected.

ARTICLE 3A. This Law governs from the date of its publication.

The President of the honorable Senate of the Republic,

JULIO CESAR GUERRA.

The Secretary General of the honorable Senate of the Republic,

PEDRO PUMAREJO VEGA.

The President of the honorable House of Representatives,

RODRIGO RIVERA SALAZAR.

The Secretary General of the honorable House of Representatives,

DIEGO VIVAS TAFUR.

COLOMBIA-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Contact and post.

Execute previous Constitutional Court review

pursuant to article 241_10 of the Political Constitution.

Dada en Santa Fe de Bogota, D.C., a 17 de july de 1996.

ERNESTO SAMPER PIZANO

The Foreign Minister,

RODRIGO PARDO GARCIA-PENA.

The Minister of Energy of the Ministry of Mines and Energy

in charge of the Minister's Office functions,

LEOPOLDO MONTANEZ CRUZ

FOOTER

1 Transcrites in INFCIRC/18 document.

1 IAEA Security Collection. No. 9, 1967 edition (STI/PUB/147).

2 See paragraph 6 of paragraph A of Article III of the Staff Regulations.

3 See Articles XI and XII.

4 See, for example, the publication "Guiddelines for the Layout and Contents of Safety Reports for Stationary Nuclear Power Plants". IAEA Security Collection, No. 34, 1970 (STI/PUB/272).

1.      INFCIRRC/225/ (Corrected).

2.      INFCIRC/225/Rev 1.

3.      A number of Member States have proposed that the table "Classification of nuclear material in categories" should be examined as soon as possible, and in any case, before the Conference on the Review of the Convention on Protection of Nuclear Material physical material of nuclear material.

4.      The meeting of the Technical Committee on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which was held in Vienna from 24 April to 5 May 1989, was attended by participants and observers from the following countries:

1/The underlined terms are defined in Section 7.

2/See also the Convention on the Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents (INFCIRC/335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (INFCIRC/336).

Ir al inicio