Act 296 1996

Original Language Title: LEY 296 de 1996

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ACT 296 OF 1996
(July 17)
Official Gazette No. 42842 of July 26, 1996
Through which the "Supplemental Agreement Revised on the provision of technical assistance by approving International Atomic Energy agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia, "signed in Vienna - Austria on 11 January 1993. Summary

Term Notes

THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC DECREES:
having regard to the text of "Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia," signed in Vienna - Austria on 11 January 1993.
"REVISED AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE bY tHE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
tHE GOVERNMENT oF tHE REPUBLIC oF COLOMBIA
.
the Agency International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter called the "Agency" in this Agreement) and the Government of the Republic of Colombia (hereinafter "Government" is referred to in this Agreement) decide to enter into this Agreement on assistance technique by the Agency, or through you, to the Government.
ARTICLE 1o. AGREEMENT BASIC MODEL oF aSSISTANCE. the Government and the Agency apply to the technical assistance provided to the Government by the Agency, or through them the provisions of the Agreement Basic model Assistance concluded on May 29, 1974 between the Government and the United Nations Development Programme.
Article 2.
. STANDARDS AND SAFETY. The Government shall apply to operations for which the technical assistance provided under this Agreement shall be used rules and security measures defined in Agency document lNFClRC / 18 / Rev.1 (Annex 1) and the applicable safety standards established under that document, with revisions they will be subjected.

ARTICLE 3. OBLIGATION OF ENJOYMENT AND SAFEGUARDS.
1. The Government undertakes to ensure that the technical assistance provided under this Agreement shall be used solely for peaceful uses of atomic energy and especially not used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, promoting military purposes and any other use that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, such as research, development, testing or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.
2. For this purpose and to the extent that the Board of Governors requires it, they apply and maintain the prescribed rights and responsibilities in paragraph A of Article XII of the statute with respect to any project subject to this Agreement pursuant to an Agreement Safeguards applicable is in force between the Government and the Agency or, if there is no such agreement in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government and that the Agency paid before the assistance approved for the project.

ARTICLE 4. PHYSICAL PROTECTION. To the extent appropriate, the Government will take all necessary measures for the physical protection of materials, equipment and nuclear facilities directly related to the technical assistance provided by the Agency or its pipeline. The Government will be guided by the recommendations of the Agency indicated in the document INFClRC / 225 / Rev.2 (Annex 2), with revisions that will be subjected.

The 5th ITEM. OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT OR MATERIALS. Unless the parties to this Agreement agree otherwise, the equipment and materials provided to the Government by the Agency or its pipeline in connection with a project under this Agreement shall become the property of the Government when the Agency notifies the provision of technical assistance on the project is over.
Then the Government will assume full and exclusive responsibility for the equipment or materials mentioned and handling, operation, maintenance, storage and final destination. The transfer of ownership of equipment or material is made on the understanding that the Government will:
a) Because the equipment is used and preserved properly;
B) Because the equipment is made available to any expert provided by the Agency or its duct, which required for the performance of their professional duties; and
c) Because the equipment and materials, to the extent appropriate, remain subject to Article III of this Agreement.


ARTICLE 6o. DISPUTE. Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement which can not be settled by negotiation or through any other mutually agreed, be submitted to arbitration at the request of either party to this Agreement. Each Party shall appoint one arbitrator and the two arbitrators shall nominate a third party to act as President. If within the request for arbitration thirty days Party had not appointed an arbitrator or if within the appointment of the second arbitrator fifteen days had not designated the third, either party may request the Secretary General United Nations to make the corresponding appointment. Most members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum and all decisions are taken by simple majority. The arbitration procedure shall be fixed by the arbitrators and the arbitration expenses borne by the Parties as assessed by the arbitrators. The arbitral award shall contain a statement of reasons and shall be accepted by the Parties as final settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 7. ENTRY INTO FORCE. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives written notice from the Government that the constitutional requirements for such entry into force have been met.
Done at Vienna, to January 11, 1993, in
Spanish and English languages, the text in both languages ​​being equally authentic.
Annex 1 INFCIRC / 18 / Rev. 1
Annex 2 INFClRC / 225 / Rev. 2
For the Government of the Republic of Colombia,
Illegible signature.
Cargo, Ambassador.
For the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Illegible signature.
Cargo, Director General.
STANDARDS AND SAFETY AGENCY
1. Measures agency for safety and health protection were approved by the Board of Governors on 31 March 1960 pursuant to paragraph 6 of paragraph A of Article III and Article XII of the Statute of the Agency. Based on the experience gained in implementing the projects carried out by Member States under agreements with the agency, these measures were revised in 1975 and the Board of Governors approved the revised on February 25, 1976 version.
2. For information on all Member States, in this document the revised rules and security measures the agency is transcribed version.
1. Definitions.
1.1. For "safety" it means the rules, regulations, rules or codes of practice established to protect man and the environment against ionizing radiation and minimize the danger to people and property.
1.2. By "body safety standards" means the safety standards established by the agency under the authority of the Board of Governors. These standards include:
a) The basic safety standards for radiation protection agency, which prescribe maximum permissible doses and dose limits;
B) Special regulations of the organism, which are safety requirements relating to certain fields of activity;
C) Practical agency codes, which provide for specific activities, the minimum conditions that must be met in order to achieve an adequate degree of security, taking into account the experience gained and the status achieved by technology. The codes of practice are supplemented, where appropriate, with safety guidelines that recommend one or more procedures to give effect.
1.3. For "security measure" any provision, condition or procedure to ensure compliance with safety standards is understood.
1.4. By "assisted operation" means any operation undertaken by a State or group of States receiving assistance from the body, or through it, in the form of materials, services, equipment, facilities or information under an agreement between the body means and that State or group of States.
1.5. "Nuclear facility" means facilities such as manufacturing plants and fuel enrichment, reactors, reprocessing plants and fuel facilities waste management, which are part of the nuclear fuel cycle, but excluding which are intended basic materials such as mining and crushing plants.
1.6. "Radioactive substance" means any substance which spontaneously emit ionizing radiation and whose specific activity is greater than 0.002 microcurie per gram.

1.7. By "radiation source" means a radioactive substance or any device producing ionizing radiation.
1.8. "Serious incident" means any event or situation whose effect is, or may be, expose any person to a dose higher ionizing radiation to twice the maximum permissible annual dose or dose limits specified in the basic standards safety radiation protection agency.
2. Generalities.
2.1. Under its statute, the agency is authorized to establish or adopt safety standards to protect the health, people and property, and to make provisions for the application of these rules to assisted operations; the body can also, if they ask for one or more States, provide for the application of these rules to operations carried out under bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or the activities of the State in the field of atomic Energy. For the body to perform these functions, the statute states that will have certain rights and responsibilities with respect to any project for providing assistance.
2.2. The operation of nuclear facilities and the use of radiation sources in safe conditions is of great importance for all people related to such facilities and sources for the state to authorize such exploitation or employment and for other people and States that could be harmed by the use or employment in poor safety conditions. The main purpose of the agency seeks to establish safety standards and recommend security measures is to provide practical guidance and effective assistance to its Member States in the safe use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
2.3. Safety standards have to be appropriate as a means to respond to a risk and security measures must be effective to ensure compliance with applicable safety standards. With respect to an assisted operation, the State may have considerable freedom of action to implement its own set of rules and safety measures, once the agency determines that the system is adequate.
2.4. To judge the adequacy of standards and security measures to be applied to an assisted operation is necessary prior examination of those rules and security measures as well as the initial study safety and operation plans. The effectiveness of security measures can then be judged by security missions that the agency sent to the State in accordance with it.
2.5. If States Parties on a bilateral or multilateral arrangement requesting the Agency to apply safety standards or to determine safety measures applicable to that arrangement, or if a State has a similar request regarding their own activities, such application or determination shall be effected by agreement between the agency and the States or the State concerned.
2.6. The procedures prescribed in this document for the implementation of standards and safety measures give effect to the relevant provisions of the Statute. In addition:
a) they allow the State to seek assistance from the body, or through it, studying in advance what security measures are appropriate, given the type and scope of the assisted operation;
B) enable States parties to a bilateral or multilateral basis to consider what rules and security measures should be applied to that arrangement, or allow the State act similarly with respect to their own activities, whether the body presents an application for the application of the rules and safety measures.
3. Information to be provided when requesting assistance.
3.1. When requesting assistance agency, or through it, the State shall provide the Agency with the following information:
a) A description of the operation for requesting assistance, with detailed information necessary for the body to reach the conclusions referred to in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6;
B) An exhibition of safety standards that intends to apply to the operation.
3.2. in accordance with paragraph 4.6, it may be necessary to provide additional information.
4. Application of the rules and safety measures assisted operations.
4.1. In applying the rules and security measures the Agency to assisted operations, the State shall rest all responsibility for safety and the Agency will not assume any responsibility whatsoever.

4.2. Safety standards apply to all transactions concerning assisted nuclear facilities and radiation sources, possibly except in the situations described in paragraphs b) and c) of paragraph 4.5.
4.3. Safety standards applicable to assisted operation will be the Agency's safety standards and other safety rules, proposed by the State, and that the agency considers also suitable. If the Agency considers that safety standards proposed by the State are not appropriate, indicate any changes it deems necessary or stipulate the application of its own safety standards.
4.4. The agreement between the agency and the state for assistance shall specify the security standards to be applied to assisted operation and shall prescribe the application of Agency safety measures in accordance with paragraphs 4.5. to 5.10.
4.5. The Agency may waive their security measures are applied to an assisted operation if concluded, based on the information provided in accordance with paragraph 3.1. assisted operation that is unrelated to:
a) nuclear installations;
B) ionizing radiation producing devices in amount such that the dose intensity at any point, at a distance of 0.1 meters from the external surface of the device, is greater than 0.1 millirem per hour;
C) natural or artificial radioactive substances above the maximum permissible activities for exemption from the notification requirements, registration or authorization specified in the basic safety standards for radiation protection, the Agency quantities;
4.6. The Agency may request the State to submit timely information needed to judge the effectiveness of the security measures planned for an assisted operation if concluded, based on the information provided in accordance with paragraph 3.1. assisted operation that relates to:
a) nuclear installations;
B) devices producing ionizing radiation in quantities which exceed the maximum permissible dose for occupationally exposed reasons specified in the basic safety standards for radiation protection of the Agency;
C) natural or artificial radioactive substances in excess of 100 times permissible for exemption from the notification requirements, registration or authorization specified in the basic safety standards for radiation protection activities Agency maximum amounts.
4.7. The information needed to judge the effectiveness of the security measures envisaged include:
a) A description of the administrative organization created by the State for security issues and the administrative system that the State intends to use to try and ensure security assisted operation (for example, the records to be kept, the procedures for reporting, inspections and examinations by supervisory bodies);
B) An analytical report safety (4) or similar document that contains information on the following points:
i) Location of the nuclear installation;
Ii) machinery and equipment available, including details about its conception and presentation of the main characteristics;
Iii) Criteria for quality assurance;
Iv) Safety features of appliances and equipment (eg radiation monitoring systems);
V) Rules for work under normal conditions and plans for foreseeable emergencies;
Vi) amounts of radioactive waste likely to occur and waste management methods to be used;
Vii) Availability of adequately trained personnel and training programs;
4.8. Once the Agency has determined that the safety measures provided are adequate to ensure compliance with the safety standards specified in the agreement between the Agency and the State, or once the State has undertaken to apply the additional measures security ask the Agency, the Agency shall give its agreement to start the assisted operation.
4.9. The State shall promptly notify the Agency of any serious incident involving an assisted operation and will present a detailed technical report on the same, as soon as reasonably possible. Until present this report, immediately sent an initial report to the Agency, and interim reports with intervals not exceeding three months thereafter.

4.10. The State shall send the Agency copies of reports on all review by supervisory bodies that the state order with respect to any assisted operation that security measures of the Agency are applied, in order to ensure compliance with standards relevant security.
5. Security mission.
5.1. The Agency, according to the State, can send safety missions to provide advice and help to implement security measures assisted operation. The State shall be duly informed by the Agency about the results of these security missions and fully take into account the recommendations of the Agency concerning an assisted operation which Agency safety measures are applied.
5.2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5.1, the Agency may, with respect to an assisted operation and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Statute, send security missions to the territory of the State or States concerned:
a) If the State or States report that there has been a serious incident;
B) At the request of the Board of Governors.
5.3. The Director General shall conclude with the State concerned, arrangements for security missions and the state, according to the Agency will carry out, or arrange for the Agency to carry out checks and tests that the Agency considers necessary.
5.4. The provisions on security missions related to an assisted operation will be incorporated in the agreement between the Agency and the State for assistance.
6. Amendment of the rules and safety measures.
6.1. Any proposal aimed Agency to modify its safety standards are subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.
6.2. If the Agency makes changes in the rules or security measures applicable to assisted operation, or if the Agency finds that the rules or security measures initially accepted by it and implemented by the State to such an operation have longer appropriate, the Agency consult with the State in order to reach an agreement on amendments introduce appropriate standards or security measures.
6.3. If the State intends to introduce amendments to the rules or security measures accepted by the Agency and applied to an assisted operation, the Agency shall consult in order to reach agreement on the proposed amendments.
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Are reproduced for the information of all Member States, the attached recommendations that result from an update of the recommendations published by the Agency in 1977 (INFCIRC / 225Rev / 1).
Preface.
Physical protection against theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear material and against sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a source of national or international concern.
Although the obligation to create and run a complete system of physical protection for nuclear facilities and materials in the territory of a given State are fully committed to the government of that State, that obligation is fulfilled or not, and whether meets, to what extent or how far, is something that does not leave indifferent to other States. Hence the physical protection has become a matter of international interest and cooperation. The need for international cooperation is evident in cases where the effectiveness of physical protection in the territory of a State depends on other States to also take appropriate measures to prevent or thwart the hostile acts against nuclear facilities and materials, measures especially when it comes to materials being transported across national borders.
The IAEA took over early that could play a role in the area of ​​physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. His early work included the publication of the "Recommendations for physical protection of materials", prepared by a group of experts convened by the Director General and appeared in 1972. These recommendations are reviewed another group of experts in cooperation with the Secretariat IAEA, and the revised version was published in 1975 in the INFCIRC series of documents (1)
This version was modified by an advisory group in 1977. the revised document (2) was welcomed in Member States and it has since become the standard reference document.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which entered into force on February 8, 1987, is an important framework for international cooperation in physical protection "of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, when they are subject international nuclear transport. " It is expected to examine in 1992 (3)
In April and May 1989 a Technical Committee on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (4) met to assess, among other things, on the need to update the recommendations contained in INFCIRC / 225 / Rev. 1 and on amendments deemed necessary.
The Technical Committee noted a number of changes, mainly reflecting: International consensus established with respect to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the experience gained since 1977; and the desire to give equal treatment to protect against theft of nuclear materials and protection against sabotage of nuclear facilities.
The recommendations herein IAEA reflect a broad consensus among Member States about the requirements that should satisfy the systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is expected to provide useful guidance to Member States.

Director General Hans Blix.
Germany (Federal Republic of), Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Cuba, China, Egypt, USA, France, India, Iraq, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland North, South Korea, German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He also attended an observer from the Commission of the European Communities.
1. Introduction.
1.1. Measures of physical protection of nuclear material in use, transport and storage and nuclear installations, described herein, are recommended to States for use in the relevant measure their physical protection systems.
1.2. All state system of physical protection should be based on the assessment by the State of the possible dangers. They should also consider other factors, in particular the means for emergency response available to the State and the established and appropriate measures of the State system for accounting and control of nuclear materials. The recommended physical protection measures refer to all types of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials shipments.
1.3. The recommended measures be taken, in all cases, but complementary measures such as not replacing any other measures established for security in respect of nuclear material in use, transport and storage and nuclear installations.
1.4. The recommended measures are based on the current state of technology in the field of components and physical protection systems and current types of nuclear facilities. It is essential to review and update from time to time to reflect on them the technological progress achieved or the emergence of new types of facilities. Moreover, it is assumed that the organization of a physical protection system for a particular installation separate from these recommendations when prevailing circumstances indicate a need for a different degree of physical protection.
1.5. It urges States, when implementing these recommendations, develop cooperation and consultation activities, and exchange information on technical and physical protection practices, either directly or through international organizations.
1.6. On February 8, 1987, it entered into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC / 274 Rev. 1). The Convention obliges parties to:
- make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material;
- Cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material;
- Consider specific acts as crimes punishable aimed at making misuse or threat to misuse of nuclear material for the purpose of causing damage to the public; and
- Take steps to extradite or submit to prosecution of those accused of committing such acts.
The convention likewise promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical protection information.
2. Goals.
2.1. The objectives of a State's physical protection system should be as follows:

A) Create conditions that minimize the chances of unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage (1) and
b) Provide information and technical assistance in support of rapid and comprehensive measures to be taken by the State to locate and recover missing nuclear material thrown in, and to minimize the effects of sabotage (2).
2.2. The Agency's objectives are:
a) Provide a set of recommendations on standards for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, transport and storage and nuclear installations;
These recommendations for consideration by the competent authorities of the States. The recommendations can provide guidance to stop States, but have no binding between them or violate their sovereign rights;
B) To be able to advise the authorities of a State, upon its request, regarding their state system of physical protection. However, the magnitude and, form of assistance required are issues to be decided by mutual agreement between the State and the Agency.
It should be noted that not for the Agency to assume liability concerning the organization of a state system of physical protection nor as to the monitoring, control or implementation of such a system. The Agency will provide assistance only when requested by the State.
3. Elements of a state system of physical protection of nuclear materials einstalaciones.
3.1.
3.1.1 General considerations. All state system of physical protection of nuclear materials or facilities should include the elements described in Sections 3.2. 3.6:
3.1.2. The assessment by the State of the danger of unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage removal is an essential element of a state system of physical protection. The state must continually examine that possibility and assess the implications for grades and methods of physical protection of any changes occurring in such a possibility.
3.2.
Regulation 3.2.1. Responsibility, authority and sanctions.
3.2.1.1. The responsibility for the organization, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection system in the territory of a State shall rest solely to that State.
3.2.1.2. The State must enact and revise at regular intervals comprehensive regulations for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, whether they are state property as if they are privately owned.
3.2.1.3. If the various elements of the state system of physical protection are distributed between two or more authorities, provisions must be made for global coordination. A State may delegate the management of physical protection measures at a national body or duly authorized persons. In cases of delegation of authority it shall be presumed that the State has proved to his satisfaction that the arrangements for physical protection conform to the standards set by the State. In addition, persons duly authorized will be fully responsible for verifying that at all times the physical protection measures are observed in a comprehensive manner.
3.2.1.4. In the case of international transfers of nuclear materials, the responsibility for physical protection measures should be determined by agreement between the States concerned.
3.2.1.5. Sanctions aimed at enforcing standards of physical protection not themselves constitute a necessary element of the state system of physical protection, but can serve to strengthen it. The sanctions designed to prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear material and sabotage removal are important in any effective state system of physical protection.
3.2.2. Licensing.
3.2.2.1. The State must grant licenses authorizing activities only when they comply with the physical protection regulations. Please note that may also apply other regulations such as those relating to radiation safety.
3.2.3. Classification of nuclear materials into categories.

3.2.3.1. The state should regulate the classification of nuclear materials into categories to ensure proper relationship between the materials in question and the protective measures to be applied. This categorization should be based on the potential risks arising from materials which, in itself, depends on various factors such as: type of material (eg plutonium, uranium or thorium), isotopic composition (for example: content of fissile isotopes), physical and chemical form, degree of dilution, degree of irradiation and quantity.
3.2.4. Rules concerning the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transport.
3.2.4.1. The State should define requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transport.
Must take into account the corresponding category of nuclear material, the situation in which they are (in use, in transit or in storage) and the particular circumstances of the State or along the route it continues in transport.
3.2.5. Standards for the physical protection of nuclear facilities.
3.2.5.1. The State must define the rules for the physical protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage. Should take into account the potential for radioactive releases occur, the location of the nuclear facility and circumstances of the state.
3.2.5.2. Should apply appropriate measures of physical protection at nuclear facilities that may be subject to sabotage regardless of classification category of nuclear material contained therein.
3.2.5.3. There are several types of nuclear facilities that pose risks to the environment in case of sabotage due to the possibility of radioactive releases occur. The categorization of nuclear materials may not adequately reflect these risks. Consequently, it is important that the protection system of the installation also takes into account such risks.
3.2.6. Information system.
3.2.6.1. The state system of physical protection should include an information system that allows the state to keep informed of any changes that occur in a place where nuclear materials and all transport of nuclear materials, which may affect the implementation are physical protection measures.
3.2.6.2. In addition, the state system of physical protection should have access to information of the State system for accounting and control of nuclear materials.
3.2.7. Protection of detailed information on physical protection.
3.2.7.1. The State must take measures to ensure appropriate protection of specific or detailed information on the physical protection of nuclear material in use, in transit or storage, and nuclear facilities where there is potential sabotage.
3.3. Implementation of physical protection measures prescribed in the regulations
3.3.1. Physical protection measures can implement the State itself, the operator or any entity duly authorized by the State.
3.4. Control of compliance with prescribed physical protection measures
3.4.1. The state system of physical protection should provide the necessary measures for a regular review of permitted activities, and whenever a significant change takes place, in order to ensure that they comply at all times the physical protection regulations.
3.5. Quality assurance in the implementation of physical protection measures.
3.5.1. In order to ensure that physical protection measures are maintained in conditions capable of responding effectively to possible threats, the authority physical protection designated by the State must ensure that they are implemented programs quality assurance facilities and during transport. These programs should include periodic testing of detection systems, alarm and communications as well as periodic checks of the implementation of security procedures. Such programs should further comprise exercises to test the training and early intervention staff escort, guard and response forces outside the site.
3.6. State contact points for matters relating to physical protection

3.6.1. States should inform each other, either directly or through the agency, about points of contact for matters relating to physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.
4. Categorizing nuclear activities based on physical protection lasnecesidades.
4.1. Justification of precautionary measures
4.1.1. There is a possibility that the theft of plutonium, highly enriched uranium or uranium-233 reaches result in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device by a group of people who have sufficient technical competence. Theft of these materials may lead to their use as radiological contaminants. An act of sabotage at a nuclear facility or a shipment of nuclear material could create a radiological hazard to the population.
4.2. Classification of nuclear materials in categories
4.2.1. The main factor for determining the physical protection measures against unauthorized removal of nuclear material is the nuclear material itself, classified taking into account the considerations set out in the previous Section 3.2.3.1.
4.2.2. In determining the levels of physical protection in a facility, which can be composed of several buildings, it is possible that the authority physical protection designated by the State considers that part of the plant containing material different category receive therefore , a different degree of protection is provided of which the rest of the installation.
4.2.3. The table below shows a categorization of various types of nuclear materials taking into account the above considerations. This categorization has been used in the whole present document.
4.3 Potential sabotage at nuclear facilities
4.3.1. Physical protection measures to be implemented in a nuclear installation must take into account not only the incentive to provide nuclear materials to unauthorized withdrawal, but also the potential that may be subject to sabotage. In considering such an eventuality in nuclear facilities, we consider various types of facilities. Below nuclear reactors are processed, irradiated fuel storage located outside the plant, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication facilities using plutonium.
4.3.1.1. Nuclear reactors can be sabotaged because they contain radioactive materials, and the possibility of causing a deliberate dispersal of radioactivity.
4.3.1.2. The irradiated fuel storage located outside the facility provided to sabotage due to the inventory of radioactive materials and their possible release.
4.3.1.3. In reprocessing plants, the above assessment for irradiated fuel storage outside the facility is applicable to the storage of irradiated fuel belonging to the front end of the fuel cycle. The installation also contains plutonium, material that can be sabotaged.
4.3.1.4. Manufacturing plants using plutonium fuel may be sabotaged in areas in which it is used or stored plutonium.
4.3.2. The readiológicos risks depend largely on the type of threat being examined, the disedeño (sic) of the plant and its safety features. Accordingly, an assessment espeíifica (sic) of the facility in relation to the potential for sabotage in close consultation among specialists in security and physical protection must be done.
CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN CATEGORIES

Material Form Category I II III
1. af Plutonium Unirradiated (b) 2kg or more Less than 2kg 500g or less c
but
500g
2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated b d
- Uranium 5kg or more Less than 5 kg 1 kg or less c

enrichment but
20% or more of 1kg
235U
- Uranium with 1 to 10 kg or more less than 10kg c

enrichment of at least 10%
but less
20% 235U
- Uranium with an - - 10 kg or more

enrichment higher than
natural uranium
but less
10% 235U
3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated b 2 kg or more Less than 500g or less c
2kg but
more than 500g
a) All plutonium except one whose isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium - 2.3 .;
B) Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 100 rads./hora 1 meter unshielded;
C) should be excluded from this classification nuclear material radiologically not represent a significant amount;
D) Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10% 235U who have not falling in Category III should be protected in accordance with the practices prudent management;
E) Irradiated fuel should be protected as nuclear material of Category I, II or III, depending on the category that corresponded prior to irradiation.
However, when the intensity of radiation from the fuel exceed 100 rads./hora 1 meter unshielded, protection of fuel because of its original fissile material content would have been included in Categories I II may be reduced to a degree at most;
F) The competent authority of the State shall determine whether there is a credible threat to disperse plutonium with evil intentions. If so, the State must apply the requirements of applicable physical protection of Category I, II, or III of nuclear material, as it deems appropriate and without regard to the amount of plutonium specified in Table for each category, the isotopes plutonium in those quantities and forms determined by the State that can be credibly threatened with dispersion.
5. Rules on the Physical Protection of nuclearesdurante use and storage materials and nuclear facilities.
5.1.
5.1.1 General considerations. The concept of physical protection entails a planned combination of equipment and instruments (safety devices), procedures (including the organization and functions of the guards) and characteristics of the installation (including distribution within its perimeter). The physical protection system should be organized specifically for each facility after due consideration the geographical characteristics of the site and the assessment by the State of the threats that may weigh on her. They should develop emergency procedures to effectively ward off any potential threat.
5.1.2. Achieving the objectives of the physical protection system it will be facilitated by taking the following measures:
a) Limiting access to nuclear material or nuclear facilities to a minimum number of people. In pursuing this goal, the authority on physical protection designated by the State may select protected areas, inland areas and vital areas.

By designating these areas must take into account the characteristics of the plant from the point of view of safety, its location and the circumstances surrounding the threat, Access to these areas should be limited and controlled; and
b) Demanding a prior determination of the integrity of every person to regularly be allowed access to nuclear material or nuclear facilities.
5.1.3. Some types of nuclear facilities can pose risks to people and the environment due to the possibility of being sabotaged. Security specialists should evaluate the consequences of malevolent acts, considered in the context of the assessment by the State of the threat that may weigh on the installation to determine what equipment, systems or devices whose failure could endanger are, directly or indirectly, health and public safety due to radiation exposure. Equipment, systems or devices classified as vital should be protected by the designation of vital areas. It is important that physical protection issues considered in the early stages of the design of the nuclear installation.
The close cooperation between specialists in physical protection and nuclear safety is also important to ensure the physical protection system takes into account the measures incorporated in the installation for security purposes. Physical protection measures should not undermine nuclear safety in emergency situations.
5.2. Rules on materials of Class I during use and storage
5.2.1. Materials of Class I should be used or stored only within an inner area.
5.2.2. Any person entering the protected area must be provided is a pass or special badge, duly recorded in a register, shall restrict access to the protected area to the essential minimum of those people.
5.2.3. Access to inner areas should be limited to those persons whose trustworthiness has been determined beforehand and his escort. Access to inland areas must be kept to a bare minimum of those people.
5.2.4. The distribution of passes or badges to people so they can enter the protected area or inner areas should conform to the general outline follows:
Type I: Employees whose duties require or allow them access at all time to interior areas.
Type II: Other employees having access to the protected area is allowed.
Type III: Workers that temporary repair or maintenance services, and workers bouquet, construction, all of which must be escorted at all times by an employee pass or badge with Type I when can access to inland areas, and an employee with distinctive pass or Type II when only have access to the protected area.
Type IV: Visitors, who must be escorted by an employee pass or badge with Type II at all times when they are in the protected area, as well as by an employee pass or badge with Type I when access to inland areas.
Must be limited proportional ratio between the visitors and their escort. Passes and badges must be made up in such a way it extremely difficult to fake.
5.2.5. All persons and packages having input in inland areas or leaving them should be subject to search to prevent the introduction of artifacts or other means to carry out acts of sabotage or unauthorized removal of nuclear material. For such registration nuclear materials detection instruments and metal objects can be used.
5.2.6. The entry of motor vehicles owned by individuals in a protected area should be minimized and limited to authorized parking. access by motor vehicles owned by individuals in the interior areas should be banned.
5.2.7. Whenever these people are in inland areas, these areas should be under constant surveillance. This function can be performed through mutual and simultaneous observation of two or more people (for example, applying the rule of acting in pairs).
5.2.8. All employees should be frequently (once a year or so) about the importance of effective physical protection measures and be trained in the implementation of these measures. Distributed in conspicuous pair (sic) all the installation must be placed notices in this regard.

5.2.9. Should be required to all persons handling nuclear material conforms to the procedures established to entrust the custody of the nuclear material for the person who succeeds him such manipulation. In addition, persons handling nuclear material should endeavor to ascertain on reporting in the workplace, which has not been any tampering or unauthorized removal of nuclear materials, and must inform one of his superiors whenever they have reason to suspicion of an abnormality.
5.2.10. It must be a record in which shall be entered all people who have access to keys or key cards that are used in connection with the containment or storage of nuclear material or having in his possession those keys or key-cards. Measures should also be adopted for:
a) Check and custody of keys or key-cards, particularly with a view to minimizing the possibility of obtaining duplication; and
b) Change the combinations of locks at appropriate intervals.
The locks must be changed whenever doubt that can be opened is taken.
5.2.11. The inherent responsibility to the movement of nuclear materials within the interior areas and the protected area should lie with the operator, who should apply all measures of physical protection is prudent and necessary. The outputs of nuclear material from a protected area or the movement of such materials between two of them, must be made fully observing the indicated standards for nuclear material during transport, after taking into account the circumstances of each case.
5.2.12. The perimeter of a protected area must consist usually by a physical barrier in addition to the exterior walls of buildings and located outside them. However, in cases where the walls of a building are of such a solid construction that designated them as a result of a comprehensive safety study, as constituting the perimeter of the protected area must be mounted on the outside of those walls complementary surveillance system. All along the perimeter of the protected area must be left unobstructed area and equipped sufficient to observe what it happens lighting field. They should engage in detection and assessment of intrusions at the perimeter of the protected area.
5.2.13. Inner areas should be so arranged that the number of gates input or output is minimized (one would be ideal). All emergency exits must be provided with alarm devices.
All windows to the outside of a building must be permanently closed with a lock or padlock equipped with alarm devices and provided with a grille or bars firmly embedded. Inner areas should not be located in the vicinity of roads.
5.2.14. Storage areas should consist of structures of type "vault" and be located within an inner area. They must be equipped with alarm devices and locks or padlocks appropriate, strictly being controlled distribution of keys or key cards. Access to storage should be strictly limited to persons assigned to him, and should not be allowed to others only when they are appropriately escorted. In cases where overnight have to remain stored nuclear materials in work areas, or in a place for interim storage located within a work area should be followed specially authorized procedures to protect that area. This requirement may be met using alarm devices, personnel or equipment consisting round surveillance TV cameras.
5.2.15. Install a guard service 24 hours a day.
In the hours that do not work at the facility, the staff keeps preset intervals must inform the local police or other law enforcement agencies. It is appropriate for States to use guard personnel equipped with weapons, to the extent that laws and regulations permit. When staff guard is not armed, should apply compensation measures. The goal should be to have the rapid arrival of adequately armed response forces to deal with an armed attack and prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage withdrawal.
5.2.16. You install a service outside and inside by staff patrol round.

5.2.17. For activities relating to functions of detection, assessment and response to a threat, should be available transmission systems, duplicate and independent, for voice communication in both directions. This equipment must enable the link between the guards, his barracks and response forces.
5.2.18. It provides transmission systems, duplicate and independent, including supply sources equally independent electricity, among censors alarm devices and terminals in which the corresponding alarm signal (acoustic, visual or audiovisual) appears.
5.2.19. action plans for emergencies in order to deal effectively with any potential threat, including attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage must be prepared. These plans should include measures to train personnel in the installation that is to correspond committed in cases of emergency or alarm.
In addition, the staff has been well trained in the installation must be willing to meet all necessary requests for physical protection and recovery of nuclear materials, and must act in full coordination with the response forces and equipment intervention to control radiation risks, which have also to be properly trained.
5.2.20. measures to make sure that when proceeding to an evacuation in case of emergency (even in the case of organized drills to familiarize staff) does not occur any unauthorized removal of nuclear material should be taken. This unauthorized removal may be prevented, for example, by keeping people under surveillance and recording them. For these records can be used in nuclear materials detection instruments and metal objects.
5.2.21. The authority designated by the State Physical Protection should be performed at least once a year (or whenever occurs a significant change in the installation or its activities), a general safety study to assess the effectiveness of physical protection measures and determine the necessary amendments introduce such measures to optimize their effectiveness in certain situations that may arise in the installation. In addition, facility operators should make checks effective functioning at all times, of physical protection measures.
5.3. Rules concerning category II materials during use and storage
5.3.1. The Category II materials should be used or stored within a protected area.
5.3.2. Any person entering the protected area must be provided is a pass or special badge, duly recorded in a register, shall restrict access to the protected area to the essential minimum of those people.
5.3.3. Access to the protected area should be limited to those persons whose trustworthiness has been determined beforehand and those who escort.
5.3.4. The distribution of passes or badges must conform to the general scheme follows:
Type I: Employees whose duties require or allow them access at all times to the protected area.
Type II: Workers that temporary repair or maintenance services, and workers in the construction industry, all of which must be escorted at all times by an employee pass or badge with Type I when can access the protected area (except when previously determined probity).
Must be limited proportional ratio between the visitors and their escort. Passes and badges must be made up in such a way it extremely difficult to fake.
5.3.5. Occasionally you must register people and packages had entry into the protected area or leaving it.
5.3.6. All vehicles and large objects entering the protected area should be monitored or recorded to be sure that not introduced it surreptitiously unauthorized persons or artifacts to acts of sabotage.
5.3.7. The entry of motor vehicles owned by individuals in the protected area should be minimized and limited to authorized parking.
5.3.8. All employees should be frequently (once a year or so) about the importance of effective physical protection measures and be trained in the implementation of these measures. Distributed in conspicuous places throughout the facility must be placed notices in this regard.

5.3.9. Should be required to all persons handling nuclear material conforms to the procedures established to entrust the custody of the nuclear material for the person who succeeds him such manipulation. In addition, persons handling nuclear material should endeavor to ascertain on reporting in the workplace, which has not been any tampering or unauthorized removal of nuclear materials, and must inform one of his superiors whenever they have reason to suspicion of an abnormality.
5.3.10. It must be a record in which shall be entered all people who have access to keys or key cards that are used in connection with the containment or storage of nuclear material or having in his possession those keys or key-cards. Measures should also be adopted for:
a) Check and custody of keys or key-cards, particularly with a view to minimizing the possibility of obtaining duplication;
B) Change the combinations of locks at appropriate intervals.
The locks must be changed if you have doubt that can be opened.
5.3.11. The inherent responsibility to the movement of nuclear materials within the protected area should lie with the operator, who should apply all measures of physical protection is prudent and necessary. The outputs of nuclear material from a protected area or the movement of such materials between two of them, must be made fully observing the indicated standards for nuclear material during transport, after taking into account the circumstances of each case.
5.3.12. The perimeter of a protected area must consist usually by a physical barrier in addition to the exterior walls of buildings and located outside them. However, in cases where the walls of a building are of such a solid construction that designated them as a result of a comprehensive safety study, as constituting the perimeter of the protected area must be mounted on the outside of those walls complementary surveillance system. All along the perimeter of the protected area must be left unobstructed area and equipped sufficient to observe what it happens lighting field. They should engage in detection and assessment of intrusions at the perimeter of the protected area.
5.3.13. action plans for emergencies in order to deal effectively with any potential threat, including attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage must be prepared. These plans should include measures to train personnel in the installation that is to correspond committed in cases of emergency or alarm.
Appropriate intervention by guards or response forces outside the facility to deal with any attempt to penetrate the protected area should also be provided. In addition, the staff has been well trained in the installation must be willing to meet all necessary requests for physical protection and recovery of nuclear materials, and must act in full coordination with the response forces outside the facility and equipment intervention to control radiation risks, which also must be properly trained.
5.3.14. withdrawal measures be taken to be sure that when proceeding to an evacuation in case of emergency (even in the case of organized drills to familiarize staff) does not occur any, unauthorized removal of nuclear materials. This unauthorized removal may be prevented, for example, by keeping people under surveillance and recording them. For these records can be used in nuclear materials detection instruments and metal objects.
5.3.15. The authority designated by the State Physical Protection should be performed at least once a year (or whenever occurs a significant change in the installation or its activities), a general safety study to assess the effectiveness of physical protection measures and determine the necessary amendments introduce such measures to optimize its effectiveness, certain situations that may arise in the installation.
In addition, facility operators should make checks effective functioning at all times, of physical protection measures.
5.4. Rules concerning Category III materials during use and storage
5.4.1. The materials of Category III should be used or stored in an area to which access is controlled.

5.4.2. All employees should be frequently (once a year or so) about the importance of effective physical protection measures and be trained in the implementation of these measures. Distributed in conspicuous places throughout the facility must be placed notices in this regard.
5.4.3. The inherent responsibility to the movement of nuclear materials should lie with the operator, who should apply all measures of physical protection is prudent and necessary.
5.4.4. measures to detect any unauthorized intrusion should be adopted and that the guards and response forces acting outside the facility adequately against an intrusion attempt.
5.4.5. action plans for emergencies in order to deal effectively with any potential threat, including attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage must be prepared. These plans should include measures to train personnel in the installation that is to correspond committed in cases of emergency or alarm.
They must also provide adequate performance guards or response forces outside the facility to deal with any attempt at intrusion.
5.4.6. The authority designated by the State Physical Protection should be done initially and always takes place a major modification of the installation or its activities, a general safety study to assess the effectiveness of physical protection measures and determine the modifications necessary introduce such measures to optimize their effectiveness in certain situations that may arise in the installation. In addition, facility operators should make checks effective functioning at all times, of physical protection measures.
6. Rules on the Physical Protection of nuclearesurante materials transportation.
6.1.
6.1.1 General considerations. The transport of nuclear material is probably the most vulnerable to an attempted unauthorized removal of such materials or sabotage operation, which holds great importance that measures taken to address those risks conform to the criterion of "defense in depth "and that particular attention to the recovery system is provided. They should develop emergency procedures for any possible threat against effectively.
6.1.2. Achieving the objectives of physical protection it will be facilitated by taking the following measures:
a) Minimizing the duration of the transport operation of nuclear materials as a whole;
B) Minimizing the number of transfers of nuclear material and its duration, ie that of transshipment from one means of transport to another, transfers to a temporary storage or from it, and interim storage pending the arrival of the transport vehicle, etc .;
C) Protecting nuclear material in temporary storage in a manner consistent with the category of such materials;
D) Avoiding any regularity or periodicity in the movement of nuclear materials;
E) Demanding determined in advance probity of all persons involved in the transport of nuclear materials.
6.1.3. It should not be publicized transport operations if your ad may result in a decrease in the degree of physical protection. This advises act with extreme caution regarding the use of any special markings on vehicles as well as with regard to the use of non-reserved channels for transmission of messages concerning shipments of nuclear materials. When standards safeguards or radiological safety regulations require sending such messages, measures such as the use of X key sending messages along the most suitable route should be considered, as far as possible; You should be great care in processing this information. These considerations should also apply to any subsequent communications.
6.2. Rules concerning materials during transport category I
6.2.1. Prior notification to the recipient
6.2.1.1. The shipper should give the receiver advance notification of the proposed specifying in it the form do (sic) transport (road, rail, sea or air) estimated time of arrival of the shipment and the exact place of delivery expedition if it it has done at some intermediate point before the final destination itinerary.

6.2.1.2. Before the dispatch of an expedition the recipient must confirm their willingness to accept delivery immediately (and where appropriate to take charge of the expedition at an intermediate point of the previous route to the final destination) at the scheduled time.
6.2.2.
6.2.2.1 prior authorization. In cases where physical protection is duly provided for in the relevant regulations, no prior authorization for ordinary items is required.
6.2.2.2. In all cases which are not covered by the regulations in force, or where the limits specified in these regulations are exceeded, to effect a transport operation should be sought in advance the consent of a state supervisory authority. This entails the prior execution of a comprehensive safety study. The approval of the transport operation may include specific conditions and limitations depending on the circumstances in each case and any plans that have been prepared in anticipation of emergencies.
6.2.3. Selecting the mode of transport and route
6.2.3.1. When choosing the route should be given to the safe passage of nuclear material, in particular, arranging the route so that areas that are the scene of natural disasters or riots or public disturbances are avoided, the mode of transport chosen for a given issue must be that with which to minimize the number of transshipment cargo and duration of the transport operation. You must ensure advance cooperation carrier with respect to the implementation of physical protection measures.
6.2.3.2. Prior to shipment, the shipper must ensure that the measures taken for issuing comply with the provisions of the regulations applicable physical protection in the recipient State and those other States which are transited expedition.
6.2.4. Closures and seals
6.2.4.1. Except where appropriate act otherwise for imperative reasons of security, packages containing nuclear materials must be transported in covered vehicles, cargo compartments or containers with closures. However, the packages bearing devices that are locked or procintados and weighing over 2,000 kg. They may be transported in open vehicles. Subject to that warrant the security considerations, the package should be tied down or attached to the vehicle or container.
6.2.4.2. Before sending an expedition should be inspected closures and seals on the package, vehicle, compartment or container load in order to check its integrity.
6.2.5. Transport vehicle registration
6.2.5.1. Before loading the material in the transport vehicle and start the transport operation, the vehicle must be a careful record in order to check that they have not placed in the devices or devices for sabotage or has begun preparations for an act of this kind.
6.2.6. Written instructions
6.2.6.1. A transport authorities have to perform functions related to the physical protection of nuclear materials during transport must be given written instructions in which these functions are stated, and they should facilitate likewise a document, drawn up in accordance with a uniform model, certifying authority about it.
6.2.6.2. the authorities should be consulted on transport on the following issues: route, places points approved stop, measures for delivery of the expedition, identification of persons authorized to take charge of the expedition, procedures to follow in event of an accident, and procedures for reporting both in normal circumstances and in emergency situations.
6.2.7. Measures to be taken after the arrival of the expedition

6.2.7.1. The recipient must check the integrity of packages and closures and seals, and immediately accept the expedition to reach their destination. When a shipment arrives at its destination, the recipient must immediately notify the sender; You must also notify the sender, within a reasonable time interval counting from the expected time of arrival, that an expedition has not reached its destination. In addition, instructions must be given to the escort personnel or personnel guard to communicate by radio or telephone to the sender or the person designated by the sender or by the recipient, the arrival of such personnel to their destination as well as every place stop for the night and the place where they supply the expedition.
6.2.8. Media
6.2.8.1. The physical protection system within the national territory must include measures to enable continuous radio communication in both directions, or frequent telephone communication between the transport vehicle and the sender, recipient and / or the person designated by the sender or by the recipient.
6.2.9. Personal escort or guard personnel
6.2.9.1. Each shipment must be accompanied by escorts or by guards to protect materials against hostile acts. In case of road transport, staff escort or guard staff provide continuous monitoring service. If packages, vehicle, warehouse or cargo compartment are fitted with closures and seals, when the vehicle is not in motion monitoring packages may be replaced by a frequent newspaper of seals attached to a continuous monitoring of the compartment examination and load. It is appropriate for States to use guards or escort staff provided arms, to the extent that laws and regulations permit. When not used escorts or armed guard, they must adopt compensation measures.
6.2.10. Emergency action
6.2.10.1. measures to make available emergency teams composed of an adequate number of members properly trained to deal with emergency situations arising within the national territory be taken. Response forces must arrive at the scene of the incident during transport while being committed unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage to prevent them from being taken over. The goal should be to have the rapid arrival of armed response forces to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage removal and face an armed attack.
6.2.11. agreement on liability in case of international transport
6.2.11.1. In the case of a transport operation between two countries with a common border, the responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear material by a State, and the point at which that responsibility has to move from one state to another must be subject to an agreement between those States. Now as it regards the maintenance of communications regarding the integrity of the shipment at all times, and as regards the responsibility to implement physical protection measures and take action for recovery in the case of an expedition reaches misplaced or lost, the agreement between the States should provide that this responsibility will rest on the sending State in regard to transportation to the border and then go to fall in the recipient State.
6.2.11.2. When an international expedition is to cross the territory of States other than the sending State and the receiving State, in the arrangements to be concluded between the sending State and the receiving State shall indicate explicitly which States through or over the territory are there to take place this transition in order to to follow in advance for your cooperation and assistance in the application of adequate physical protection measures and recovery operations in the territory of those States in case of loss or loss in the territory of an international expedition .
6.2.11.3. States should assist each other in applying physical protection measures and especially the actions of recovery of nuclear material in those cases where such help is needed.

6.2.11.4. In the case of an international expedition that has to cross international waters or airspace, the sender State and the recipient must establish specific measures to ensure the maintenance of communications relating to integrity at all times of the expedition and guarantee same They define and fulfill the responsibilities for media planning and response.
6.2.12. Measures to be taken in case of international transport
6.2.12.1. In addition to the conclusion of international agreements that the previous section relates, contracts or agreements between senders and recipients on the international transport of nuclear materials stipulated must be stated unequivocally point to where the corresponding liability physical protection of nuclear materials will no longer lie with the sender to pass lie with the recipient.
6.2.12.2. When the contract or agreement relating to an operation of international transport provides for delivery of nuclear material in a vehicle of the sending State in a destination point located in the territory of the receiving State, the contract or agreement should provide that information be provided in advance the recipient sufficient to enable it to take appropriate physical protection measures.
6.2.12.3. States and international organizations concerned should consider using key information about the dates and exact locations of the expeditions.
6.3. Rules concerning Category I materials depending on the mode of transport
6.3.1.
6.3.1.1 General considerations. In addition to the rules set out above, it corresponds to observe other more detailed apply to Category I materials depending on the mode of transport, as indicated below.
.3.2. Road transport
6.3.2.1. The transport vehicle must be built, preferably, to withstand an attack, and it is also preferable that capability is disabling the vehicle.
6.3.2.2. For each issue a single vehicle chosen for this purpose (ie, the principle of "full load" should be applied) should be used. In the transport vehicle must be a second person acting as a staff member or staff escort guard with respect to said vehicle.
6.3.2.3. The transport vehicle must be accompanied by another in which one or more members go by guards
6.3.2.4. The guard must maintain a continuous monitoring service and check the seals and closures at each stop.
6.3.2.5. If the trip can not be done in one day measures to stay in a place approved stop should be adopted. During such overnight stops the transport vehicle must be immobilized or parked in a building or premises whose access doors are fitted with closures and monitored by guards.
6.3.2.6. It must be able to communicate via radio in both directions between the transport vehicle and the escort vehicle in addition to communication between these vehicles and the sender, recipient, and the person designated by the sender or by the recipient.
6.3.2.7. The convenience of following other possible routes must be planned in advance, so that the decision to change the route can be implemented as soon as possible.
6.3.3.
6.3.3.1 rail transport. The expedition must be transported either on a freight train or in a car specifically dedicated to it and hooked on a passenger train.
6.3.3.2. Shipments must be accompanied by one or more members of escorts or guards, which must travel in the next car that in which go the expedition and keep it under surveillance and check the closures and seals in places to stop the convoy. At the stops planned staff escort or guard personnel must be able to communicate by two-way radio or telephone.
6.3.4. Transport by sea
6.3.4.1. Each shipment must be accompanied by one or more staff members or staff escort guard.
6.3.4.2. The expedition should be available in a secure compartment or container that is closed and sealed. The closures and seals should be inspected regularly during the trip.
6.3.5. Transportation by air

6.3.5.1. Shipments must be transported on cargo aircraft specially chartered or cargo aircraft in regular service but in all cases, specifically chosen to transport the expedition, and must be accompanied by one or more staff members escort or staff guard.
6.4. Rules concerning Category II materials during transport
6.4.1. Prior notification to the recipient
6.4.1.1. The shipper should give the receiver advance notification of the proposed specifying in it the mode of transport (road, rail, sea or air) expedition, estimated time of arrival of the shipment and the exact place of delivery if it is to done at some intermediate point of the previous route to the final destination.
6.4.1.2. Before the dispatch of a consignment, the recipient must confirm their willingness to accept delivery immediately (and, where appropriate, to take charge of the expedition at an intermediate point of the previous route to the final destination) at the scheduled time .
6.4.2. Selecting the mode of transport and route
6.4.2.1. When choosing the route should be given to the safe passage of nuclear material, in particular, arranging the route so that areas that are the scene of natural disasters or riots or public disturbances are avoided. The mode of transport chosen for a given issue should be one with which minimize the number of transfers of the load and the duration of the transport operation. You must ensure beforehand collaboration carrier with respect to the implementation of physical protection measures.
6.4.3. Closures and seals
6.4.3.1. Except where appropriate act otherwise for imperative reasons of security, packages containing nuclear materials must be transported in covered vehicles, cargo compartments or containers with closures. However, the packages bearing devices that are locked or sealed and weighing more than 2,000 kg may be transported in open vehicles. Subject to that warrant the security considerations, the package should be tied down or attached to the vehicle or container
6.4.3.2. Before sending an expedition should be inspected closures and seals on the package, vehicle, compartment or container load in order to check its integrity.
6.4.4. Transport vehicle registration
6.4.4.1. Before loading the material in the transport vehicle and start the transport operation, the vehicle must be a careful record in order to check that they have not placed in the devices or devices for sabotage or has begun preparations for an act of this kind.
6.4.5. Written instructions
6.4.5.1. A transport authorities have to perform functions related to the physical protection of nuclear materials during transport must be given written instructions in which these functions are stated, and they should facilitate likewise a document, drawn up in accordance with a uniform model, certifying authority about it.
6.4.5.2. the authorities should be consulted on transport on the following issues: route, places or points approved stop, measures for delivery of the expedition, identification of persons authorized to take charge of the expedition, procedures to follow in event of an accident, and procedures for reporting both in normal circumstances and in emergency situations.
6.4.6. Measures to be taken after the arrival of the expedition
6.4.6.1. The recipient must check the integrity of packages and closures and seals, and immediately accept the expedition to reach their destination. When a shipment arrives at its destination, the recipient must immediately notify the sender; You must also notify the sender, within a reasonable time interval from the time scheduled for his arrival, that an expedition has not reached its destination.
6.4.7. Media
6.4.7.1. The physical protection system within the national territory must include measures to make frequent telephone communication between the transport vehicle and the sender, recipient and the person designated by the sender or by the recipient as possible.
6.4.8. agreement on liability for international transport

6.4.8.1. In the case of a transport operation between two countries with a common border, the responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear material by a State and the point at which that responsibility has to move from one state to another, should be subject to an agreement between those States. Now, as regards the maintenance of communications regarding the integrity of the shipment at all times and as regards the responsibility to implement physical protection measures and take action for recovery in the case an expedition reaches misplaced or lost, the agreement between the States should provide that this responsibility will rest on the sending State in regard to transportation to the border and then go to fall in the recipient State.
6.4.8.2. When an international expedition is to cross the territory of States other than the sending State and the receiving State, in the arrangements that concerten between the sending State and the recipient must indicate specifically what the states through or above whose territory they are there to take place this transition in order to get in advance for your cooperation and assistance in the application of adequate physical protection measures and recovery operations in the territory of those states, in case of loss or loss in the territory of an international expedition .
6.4.8.3. States should assist each other in applying physical protection measures and especially the actions of recovery of nuclear materials, in those cases where such help is needed.
6.4.9. Measures to be taken in case of international transport
6.4.9.1. In addition to the conclusion of international agreements that the previous section, contracts or agreements between senders and recipients on the international transport of nuclear materials stipulated concerns, indicate unequivocally the point where the corresponding responsibility physical protection of nuclear materials will no longer lie with the sender to pass lie with the recipient.
6.4.9.2. When the contract or agreement relating to an operation of international transport provides for delivery of nuclear material in a vehicle of the sending State in a destination point located in the territory of the receiving State, the contract or agreement should provide that information be provided in advance the recipient enough to ue (sic) it can take appropriate physical protection measures.
6.5. Rules concerning Category III materials during transport
6.5 1. Prior notification to the recipient
6.5.1.1. The shipper should give the receiver advance notification of the proposed specifying in it the mode of transport (road, rail, sea or air) expedition, estimated time of arrival of the shipment and the exact place of delivery if it is to done at some intermediate point of the previous route to the final destination.
6.5.1.2. Before the dispatch of a consignment, the recipient must confirm their willingness to accept delivery immediately (and, where appropriate, to take charge of the expedition in a previous intermediate point to the final destination) at the scheduled time.
6.5.2. Closures and seals
6.5.2.1. Whenever feasible, they must be equipped with closures and seals applied to vehicles or containers.
6.5.3. Transport vehicle registration
6.5.3.1. Before loading the materials into the vehicle and start the transport operation, the vehicle must be a careful record in order to check that they have not placed in the devices or devices for sabotage or have begun preparations for an act of this kind.
6.5.4. Measures to be taken after the arrival of the expedition
6.5.4.1. The recipient must immediately notify the sender arrival of the expedition; You must also notify the sender, within a reasonable time interval from the time scheduled for his arrival, that an expedition has not reached its destination.
6 5.5. agreement on liability for international transport

6.5.5.1. In the case of a transport operation between two countries with a common border, the responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear material by a State and the point at which that responsibility has to move from one state to another, should be subject to an agreement between those States. Now, as regards the maintenance of communications regarding the integrity of the shipment at all times and as regards the responsibility to implement physical protection measures and take action for recovery in the case an expedition reaches misplaced or lost, the agreement between the States should provide that this responsibility will rest on the sending State in regard to transportation to the border and then go to fall in the recipient State.
6.5.5.2. When an expedition (sic) International is to cross the territory of States other than the sending State and the receiving State, in the arrangements to be concluded between the sending State and the receiving State shall expressly indicate which States through or above are whose territory is to take place this transition in order to get in advance for your cooperation and assistance in the application of adequate physical protection measures and recovery operations in the territory of those States in case of loss or loss in the territory of a international expedition.
6.5.5.3. States should assist each other in applying physical protection measures and especially the actions of recovery of nuclear material in those cases where such help is needed.
7.
Definitions 7.1.
Alarm devices Technical devices whose purpose is to detect any intrusion or improper handling. Such devices must be independent of the general electricity supply and to function in this court case. They should also point out any attempt to prevent operation.
7.2. Personal escort or guard
personnel Persons who, upon a determination of their probity, are entrusted functions surveillance or access control. Their duties should be specified in the general safety study.
7.3.
inner zone zone included within a protected area in which nuclear materials are used or Category I
7.4 are stored.
Round staff person or persons (who may be members of the guards) whose mission is to inspect barriers, seals or other means of protection at regular or irregular intervals.
7.5.
physical barrier fence, fence or wall, or similar impediment, approved in a general safety study.
7.6.
protected area under constant surveillance area (by guards or electronic means), surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points controlled and approved in a general survey of security access. When a wall or exterior walls of a building limit all or part of the perimeter of a protected area, all emergency exits in these outer walls should be equipped with alarm devices. All windows that are on the walls on the perimeter of the area must be permanently closed with a lock or padlock equipped with alarm devices and provided with a grille or bars firmly embedded.
7.7. Sabotage
deliberate act directed against a plant, a facility, a vehicle for transporting nuclear materials or nuclear materials themselves, which can put directly or indirectly endanger the safety and health of the population as consequence of a radiation exposure.
7.8. General safety study
critical study conducted by competent officials in order to evaluate, approve and specify physical protection measures.
7.9. Close monitoring surveillance
effect carried by people, photoelectric equipment, equipment closed circuit television, ecodetectores, electronic equipment, photographic equipment or other means.
7.10.
area vital area containing equipment, systems or devices, in isolation or in combination, may be vulnerable to an act of sabotage. "
The undersigned Head of the Legal Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs , DECLARES
:
That this reproduction is faithful copy taken from the certificate text signed in Vienna "revised on the provision of technical assistance by the international Atomic Energy agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia supplemental Agreement" , Austria, on January 11, 1993, which lies in the archives of the Legal Office of the Ministry.

Given in Santa Fe de Bogota, DC, at twenty
(26) days of August 1994.
The Head of the Legal Office,
VARELA HECTOR ADOLFO Sintura. RAMA

PUBLIC POWER EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
Santa Fe de Bogota, DC, March 23, 1993. Approved
. Submit to the consideration of the honorable
National Congress for constitutional purposes.

César Gaviria Trujillo Minister of Foreign Affairs, Noemi Sanin
RUBIO. DECREES
:
ITEM 1A. Approval of the "revised on the provision of technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia Supplemental Agreement" signed in Vienna, Austria, on 11 January 1993.
ARTICLE 2A. In accordance with the provisions of article 1. 7a Act. 1944, the "Revised Supplementary Agreement on the provision of technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Government of the Republic of Colombia," signed in Vienna, Austria, on January 11, 1993, that article 1. of this Act is approved, it will force the country from the date the international link regarding the same is perfected.
ARTICLE 3A. This Law governs from the date of publication.
The President of the honorable Senate, JULIUS CAESAR
Tulena WAR.
The Secretary General of the honorable Senate,
PUMAREJO PEDRO VEGA.
The President of the honorable House of Representatives,
Rodrigo Rivera Salazar.
The Secretary General of the honorable House of Representatives, DIEGO VIVAS
TAFUR.
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA - NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
communication and publication. Run
prior review by the Constitutional Court under Article 241_10
of the Constitution.
Given in Santa Fe de Bogota, DC, on July 17, 1996.

Ernesto Samper Pizano Minister of Foreign Affairs,
RODRIGO PARDO GARCÍA-PEÑA.
The Deputy Minister of Energy, Ministry of Mines and Energy
charge of the functions of the Office of the Minister,

CROSS LEOPOLD MONTAÑEZ

FOOTNOTE 1 Transcribed in INFCIRC / 18.
1 IAEA Safety Series. No. 9, 1967 edition (STI / PUB / 147).
2 See paragraph 6 of paragraph A of Article III of the Statute.
3 See Articles XI and XII.
4 See, for example, the publication "Guiddelines for the Layout and Contents of Safety Reports for Nuclear Power Plants Stationary". IAEA Safety Series No. 34, 1970 (STI / PUB / 272).
1. INFCIRC / 225 / (Corrected).
2. INFCIRC / 225 / Rev 1. 3
. A number of Member States have proposed that the "Classification of nuclear materials in categories" box examine as soon as possible and in any event before the Review Conference of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
4. The meeting of the Technical Committee on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, held in Vienna from 24 April to 5 May 1989, was attended by participants and observers from the following countries:
1 / Underlined terms defined in Section 7.
2 / See likewise the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC / 335) and the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC / 336).


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