Provisions Against Price Fixing

Original Language Title: 反价格垄断规定

Subscribe to a Global-Regulation Premium Membership Today!

Key Benefits:

Get a Day Pass for only USD$19.99.
Provisions against price fixing

    (7th December 29, 2010, the national development and Reform Commission announced as of February 1, 2011) first in order to prevent and suppress acts of price monopoly, to protect fair competition in the market, safeguarding the interests of consumers and the public interest, in accordance with the People's Republic of China anti-monopoly law (hereinafter referred to as antitrust law), these provisions are formulated.

    Article People's Republic of China territory of acts of price monopoly in economic activity, these provisions apply; People's Republic of China outside the acts of price monopoly, have effect of eliminating or restricting competition in the domestic market, these provisions shall apply.

    Article III acts of price monopoly in these rules include:

    (A) the operators ' price-fixing agreements reached;

    (B) operators using price means to have a dominant market position, to eliminate or restrict competition.

    Administration and legal and authorized rights to administer public affairs functions of the abuse of administrative power, eliminating or restricting competition in terms of price behavior, these provisions shall apply.

    Fourth State-owned economic controlling status of lifelines and national security industries, as well as in accordance with exclusive industry State to protect its legitimate business operators, and operator business, its product and service price supervision and control according to law, safeguarding the interests of consumers, promote technological progress.

    Business operators shall operate in the preceding paragraph, be honest, self-disciplined and subject to public oversight, shall not use their dominant or exclusive positions harm the interests of consumers.

    Price in the fifth article of the rules of monopoly agreement, refers to the price to eliminate or restrict competition agreements, decisions or concerted practices.

    Article sixth other concerted actions should be based on the following factors:

    (A) the operator's pricing behavior is consistent;

    (B) the operators have had contact;

    Finds that concerted action should also take into account changes in market structure and market conditions.

    Seventh prohibits price monopoly agreement with rival operator on the following:

    (A) fixing or changing products and services (hereinafter referred to as product) price levels;

    (B) fixing or changing price range;

    (C) fixing or changing procedures which have an impact on prices, discounts or other fees;

    (D) using the agreed price as the basis for transactions with third parties;

    (E) agreed to adopt the formula used to calculate the price of a standard;

    (F) the agreement without consent of the other operators participating in the agreement may not be changed price;

    (VII) through a disguised form of price fixing or changing in other ways;

    (VIII) other price-fixing agreement identified by Department in charge of price under the State Council.

    Eighth prohibits operators price monopoly agreement with trading partners to achieve the following:

    (A) fixed the price of commodities for resale to a third person;

    (B) limit the minimum price for resale to a third person;

    (C) the price Department of the State Council found that the other price-fixing agreements.

    Nineth prohibit trade associations from engaging in the following conduct:

    (A) the formulation of rules to exclude, to limit price competition, decisions, notifications and so on;

    (B) organize the operator on the price-fixing agreement prohibited under the provisions;

    (C) Organization business operators or carry out other acts of price monopoly agreement.

    Tenth business operator can prove that the conclusion of the agreement in line with antitrust law provisions of the 15th, not provided for in these provisions shall apply to the seventh, eighth.

    11th operators with dominant market status shall not be unfair to sell goods or purchase goods at unfairly low prices.

    Deemed "unfair price" and "unfairly low prices", you should consider the following factors:

    (A) the sales price or the purchase price is significantly higher or lower than the selling or buying of other operators of the same commodity prices;

    (B) cost stable situations, whether the sales price above the normal rate of increase or reduction of the purchase price;

    (C) price increases are significantly higher than the cost of merchandise sold increases, or purchase price is significantly higher than that of trading partners to lower costs;

    (D) other relevant factors to be considered.

    12th have a dominant market position of operators without good reason shall not sell goods at below-cost prices.

    This section, the term "legitimate reasons" include:

    (A) price fresh merchandise, seasonal goods, merchandise and Overstock goods validity period is about to expire;

    (B) debt, converting business sale of goods;

    (C) to promote new product promotions;

    (D) to prove that other reasons to justify.

    13th operators with dominant market status is not justified, not by setting high prices or too low purchase price, rejected transactions with trading partners in a disguised form.

    This section, the term "legitimate reasons" include:

    (A) trading partners to have serious adverse credit history, or operating conditions worsen conditions, may cause a greater risk to trade security;

    (B) trading relative to other operators at a reasonable price to buy the same goods, alternative, or selling goods at a reasonable price to other operators;

    (C) to prove that other reasons to justify.

    14th operators with dominant market status without good reason shall not be limited by means of price discounts and other trading partners exclusively with transactions or trading only with designated operators.

    This section, the term "legitimate reasons" include:

    (A) in order to ensure product quality and safety;

    (B) in order to maintain the brand image or improve the level of service;

    (C) can significantly reduce costs and improve efficiency, and enable consumers to share the resulting benefits;

    (D) to prove that other reasons to justify.

    15th having dominant market operators shall not trade in prices unreasonable additional cost.

    16th operators with dominant market status without justifiable reasons shall be placed on the same trading partners to trade on the price differential treatment.

    17th a dominant market position in these rules refers to operators in the relevant markets with the ability to control commodity prices, quantities or other trading conditions, or be able to obstruct, affect the ability of other operators to enter the relevant market and market position.

    Other terms and conditions, refer to commodity prices, quantities in addition to other factors that have real impact on the market, including rank, terms of payment, delivery, service, trading options and technical constraints, and so on.

    Obstruct, influence of other operators to enter the relevant markets, are excluded, delaying other operator entering the relevant market, or lead to other operators can enter the market entry costs increased significantly, unable to compete effectively with the existing operators.

    Article 18th the operator having a dominant market position should be defined on the basis of the relevant market, based on the following factors:

    (A) the operators in the relevant market share, as well as the State of competition in the relevant market;

    (B) the operator's ability to control the sales market or raw material procurement market;

    (C) the financial and technical conditions of the operator;

    (D) other operators dependent on the operator on the transaction;

    (E) the ease of entry into the relevant market;

    (F) the determination of the other factors related to market dominance.

    The 19th under any of the following circumstances, it can be assumed that the operators have a dominant market position:

    (A) operators in the relevant market share reached one-second;

    (B) the two operators in the relevant market share totals up to two-thirds;

    (C) three operators in the relevant market share totals up to three-fourths.

    Second and third cases as provided for in the preceding paragraph, some operators ' market share is less than one-tenth, and should not be presumed that the operator having a dominant market position.

    Are presumed to have a dominant market position of the operator, there is evidence that does not have a dominant market position, should not be determined as having a dominant market position.

    20th administrative organs and laws and regulations organization authorized to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power to the following acts, hinder the free movement of goods:

    (A) the product setting discriminatory fees on the field;

    (B) the discriminatory fees imposed on foreign goods;

    (C) provide for discriminatory prices for commodities from outside;

    (D) the obstacles to the free movement of goods other prices or fees payable under the Act.

    21st administrative organs and laws and regulations organization authorized to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power to force operators engaged in prohibited acts of price monopoly.

    22nd the administrative organ shall not abuse their administrative power, including provisions to eliminate or restrict price competition.

    23rd operators have set out in these provisions of acts of price monopoly, price departments and authorized by the State Council of province, autonomous region and municipalities price Department under antitrust law section 46th, 47th and 49th of the regulations will be punished.

    Industry associations in violation of these provisions, and organize the business operator on price monopoly agreement, in accordance with the 46th and 49th of anti-monopoly law shall be punished.

    24th administrative organs and legal and authorized rights to administer public affairs organization is abuse of administrative powers set out in this provision, to eliminate or restrict competition, according to 51st article dealing with antitrust law.

    25th survey of Government price departments according to law, refused to provide materials, information, or provide false materials, information, evidence or conceal, destroy, transfer, or other refuse or obstruct the investigation, 52nd of the rules shall be punished in accordance with the anti-monopoly law.

    26th business operator in accordance with the relevant intellectual property rights laws and administrative regulations of the exercise of intellectual property rights, this provision shall not apply, however, operator abuse of intellectual property rights, acts of price monopoly of eliminating or restricting competition, these provisions shall apply.

    27th agricultural producers and rural economic organizations in agricultural production, processing, sale, transport, storage and other business activities in the implementation of joint or concerted practice, these rules do not apply.

    28th article of the rules by the national development and Reform Commission is responsible for the interpretation. 29th these provisions come into force on February 1, 2011. June 18, 2003, the national development and Reform Commission published the Convention for the Suppression of acts of price monopoly tentative provisions repealed simultaneously.

Related Laws