On the Conclusion of the Seimas Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission into Possible Threats to Lithuania's National Security

Published: 2003-02-12

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2 December 2003 No. IX-1868 Vilnius
The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania r e s o l v e s:
Article 1.
To approve the conclusion of the Seimas Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission into Possible Threats to Lithuania’s National Security (appended), and to declare that the Commission has completed its work
Article 2.
The Resolution shall enter into force on the passing of it.
OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA                                       ARTŪRAS PAULAUSKAS
The Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania into Possible Threats to Lithuania’s National Security,
guided by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as acting on the instruction of the Seimas;
assessing threats to the national security of Lithuania in accordance with the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security, the National Security Strategy and other legal acts;
realising that publicity offers citizens a possibility of their direct involvement in the public life of the state, which is the basis of democracy;
seeking to judge the reliability of the information submitted and to evaluate whether current circumstances pose a threat to the state of Lithuania from a state’s perspective;
emphasising that the criteria to be applied for the assessment of threats to the state and the respective political responsibility are broader and stricter than those applicable for the legal evaluation of the situation;
regretting that the President of the Republic did not co-operate with the Commission,
S T A T E S:
the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, being acquainted with the facts laid out in the Note of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 October 2003 No. (03)-19-1155s-397s “On Negative Trends Posing a Threat to the State National Security” and taking into account the Decision of the Seimas Board of 31 October 2003 No. 1805, guided by the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania Article 71 and 73 and its Resolution of 3 November 2003 No. IX-1802, set up the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania into Possible Threats to Lithuania’s National Security (hereinafter referred to as the Commission).
The Commission is comprised of the following Members of the Seimas:
1)     Dailis Alfonsas Barakauskas;
2)     Algis Kašėta;
3)     Stasys Križinauskas;
4)     Andrius Kubilius;
5)     Zenonas Mačernius;
6)     Alvydas Sadeckas;
7)     Aloyzas Sakalas;
8)     Vaclovas Stankevičius;
9)     Gintaras Steponavičius.
Aloyzas Sakalas was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission. The preliminary findings of the Commission were due by 1 December 2003.
Instructed by the Seimas, the Commission approved the Inquiry Guidelines consisting of four parts: “A. President”, “B. Advisors (Public Advisors included), “C. Other individuals” and “D. Revision and improvement of legal documents”.
The Commission heard the explanations of 44 different level public officials and civil servants, as well as individuals, got acquainted with the documents and other data submitted by the State Security Department, the Prosecutor’s Office and other institutions and authorities.
Invited by the Commission, the President refused to participate in the open meeting of the Commission and to answer Commission members’ questions.
The Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Seimas Ad Hoc Inquiry Commissions Article 7 Paragraph 6 was amended by the Law of 6 November 2003 No. IX-1806. Upon the amendment of the former, since 13 November 2003, the meetings of the Commission were open, with the exception of those that treated the issues related to a state secret.
The Seimas approached the President by its Protocol Resolution of 13 November 2003 which contains a request to the President to refrain from inviting top state law enforcement officials during the pre-trial investigation and the work of the Seimas Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission and a proposal to the top state law enforcement officials to refrain from comments on the work of the Commission and its decisions.
For the purpose of this Conclusion, the “President’s Office” means the President and his Advisors.
Acting under the instructions of the Seimas, the Commission sought to find answers to the following questions:
1.    Was influence exercised on the President’s Office by foreign states’ individuals and organisations of dubious reputation, that could pursue interests contrary to the national security of Lithuania, and by representatives of Lithuania’s criminal world and shadow business structures?
2.    Did the influence and actual acts by the individuals of dubious reputation pose a threat to the national security of Lithuania?
3.    Did the President’s Office seek to exert influence on privatisation and other business processes?
4.    Did the President control the activities of his Advisors, or did his Advisors exceed their competence, interfere with the work of other institutions unlawfully and abuse their powers?
5.    Was and does the President continue to be vulnerable?
Having become acquainted with the information submitted and received additionally, the Commission states that the information contained in the Note of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 October 2003 No. (03)-19-1155s-397s “On Negative Trends Posing a Threat to the State National Security” is reliable and correct.
M. Laurinkus, Director General of the State Security Department, testified before the Commission that all the wiretapping had been authorised in compliance with the provisions of the legislation of the Republic of Lithuania. The Prosecutor General’s Office, the Police Department and the Customs Department confirmed the lawfulness of the wiretaps.
The Commission delivers its assessments and findings, which are in no competition with evaluations by legal institutions.
Influence on the President Exerted by Y. Borisov, Paksas' Main Financial Supporter during the Election Campaign
The parliamentary Commission has ascertained that Y. Borisov exerted and continues to exert special influence on the President.
Y. Borisov, the main financial supporter of R. Paksas’ election campaign, officially contributed LTL 1.205,000 to R. Paksas’ presidential campaign. The study carried out by UAB SIC Gallup Media as well as the materials seized from Y. Borisov during the searches suggest that the amount spent on the election campaign was larger than that officially declared. The Commission possesses information about documents authored by Y. Borisov stating that at least one million dollars rather than one million litas had been spent to fund R. Paksas’ election campaign. The documents also reveal Y. Borisov’s plans to recover the sums invested by being appointed to an official post and granted privileges, awards, cash, assistance in harming business rivals and other favours from the President in return for his financial support.
In the course of the inquiry, the Commission familiarised with the material that serves as firm background to believe that Y. Borisov not only gave financial support to R. Paksas’ pre-election campaign but also took an active and often decisive role in organising the campaign. Y. Borisov offered consultations and advice on a regular basis to the heads of R. Paksas’ electoral board; besides, Y. Borisov had several meetings and conversations with R. Paksas, the then presidential candidate. As a result of Y. Borisov’s efforts and mediation the Russian public-relations company Almax was able to actively assist R. Paksas’ pre-election campaign. There is some evidence that the company Almax might be related to Russia’s special services. Several times during 2002-2003, Almax representatives A. Zatonskaya and A. Potnin entered the territory of Lithuania and met with Y. Borisov and with R. Paksas as well as the persons directly involved in organising R. Paksas’ pre-election campaign.
The Commission is aware of the fact that a plan ciphered as Strekoza likely authored by the company Almax was discovered on Y. Borisov’s computer during the search of his house. In the Commission’s opinion, the plan Strekoza is a preparation to divert public attention from scandalous relations between Y. Borisov and R. Paksas and their coverage by the Lithuanian media. The plan was aimed at generating a fictitious scandal about the work of the Government thus destabilising the situation in Lithuania.
A. Potnin and A. Zatonskaya legally crossed the state border and entered the territory of Lithuania on 22 November 2003. The above-mentioned persons stayed at Y. Borisov owned villa in Vainiai Village, Trakai District. A search conducted in Y. Borisov’s villa on 26 November 2003 resulted in seizing material that proved Y. Borisov's attempts to influence Lithuania’s current political situation.
The Commission has found that Y. Borisov-managed UAB Aviabaltika directly paid for the special edition of 300 000 copies of the paper Vakaro Žinios of 3 January 2003. The payment was not done through the special election account, which constitutes a breach of the provisions of Article 6 of the Law on Control of Funding of Political Campaigns. The Vakaro Žinios edition of 3 January 2003 contained information about an alleged crisis at Vilniaus Bank, where such information could have caused financial crisis in Lithuania and posed a threat to national security. The future National Security Adviser R. Ačas got acquainted with the preliminary copy of the above-mentioned paper on 1 January 2003. On the same day, later, the presidential candidate R. Paksas also familiarised with this edition of the Vakaro Žinios. Neither of the above-mentioned persons cancelled the deal concerning 300 000 copies but (R. Ačas) promptly demanded Y. Borisov to pay for the edition. Moreover, on 1 January 2003 R. Ačas advised Y. Borisov to transfer his bank accounts from Vilniaus Bank to some other bank as the publication might have caused panic.
The Commission also established that after the elections Y. Borisov made attempts to influence the staffing of the President’s Office by bringing forward insistent proposals on the structure of the President’s Office and the candidates for the President’s entourage. The company Almax also offered consultations on the structure of the President’s Office; it drafted job descriptions for the Advisers to the President and worked out a plan how to discredit one of the Advisers to the President.
The search conducted in Y. Borisov’s villa yielded documents that contained plans prepared by Y. Borisov. Y. Borisov, the main financial supporter of R. Paksas’ pre-election campaign, had a good reason to expect gaining power and being appointed to the position of an Adviser to the President; this fact is yet another proof of existence of the career plans. Y. Borisov believed he could blackmail the President and exert control over the President by pointing to the President’s commitments and by uncovering his own true role in the presidential pre-election campaign.
Shortly after the President took oath and assumed office, Y. Borisov started taking active measures aimed at exerting influence over the President and thus implementing his plans. During the conversations with A. Zatonskaya, representative of company Almax and A. Drakšas, Manager of UAB Restakas, that took place on 17 March 2003, Y. Borisov sought advice on what should be done as R. Paksas was not fulfilling his commitments given to him in writing. Y. Borisov expressed profound dissatisfaction with R. Paksas’ failure to fulfil his commitments and threatened to submit materials discrediting R. Paksas to adverse foreign intelligence services if R. Paksas continues to ignore his demands. Y.Borisov was trying to persuade A. Drakšas to meet R. Paksas without delay and influence him. The President was concerned about Y. Borisov’s demands and was seeking to calm Y. Borisov down through A. Drakšas’ mediation.
On the eve of 17 March 2003 M. Laurinkus, Director General of the State Security Department, visited the President and provided him with classified information about Y. Borisov’s illegal activity (transcripts of 5 wiretapped conversations) in person. M. Laurinkus also warned the President about Y. Borisov posing a threat to the reputation of the President’s Office and Lithuanian national security. Y. Borisov met the President on 17 March 2003 and during their conversation Y. Borisov came to understanding that his telephone conversations were being tapped. On 18 March 2003 Y. Borisov communicated this information by phone to A. Zatonskaya and his lawyer V.Sirvydis.
During the telephone conversation with A. Drakšas on 17 March 2003, Y. Borisov mentioned that R. Ačas, on behalf of the President, had promised him a “roof” (protection from legal prosecution), provided that he gave up his demands on the President.
Following his conversation with the President on 18 March 2003, Y. Borisov obtained a passport of a Russian citizen, which he needed for his business in Russia, thus losing citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania.
On 25 March 2003 Y. Borisov applied to the President for citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania by way of exception. When considering Y. Borisov’s as well as other persons’ applications for citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania, on 28 March 2003 the Citizenship Committee, according to the established procedure, requested information about all the persons in question (including Y. Borisov) from the State Security Department. The Commission has found that the State Security Department received an enquiry from the President’s Office that very day, and the State Security Department was given a telephone call requesting to remove Y. Borisov’s name from the enquiry agenda. After the State Security Department asked to submit such a request in writing, the other enquiry sent by the President’s Office no longer contained Y. Borisov’s name. A. Meškauskas, Chancellor of the President’s Office, confirmed that the instruction to remove Y. Borisov’s name from the enquiry was given by one of the Advisers to the President (A. Meškauskas said he did not recall who exactly had given the instruction). Citizenship by way of exception was granted to Y. Borisov with haste; the established procedure was not followed and the competent services were ignored. On 10 and 11 April 2003, during his telephone conversations with A. Drakšas, Y. Borisov insisted on him influencing the President so that he signed the documents on granting of citizenship as soon as possible. The President signed the Decree on Granting Lithuanian Citizenship to Y. Borisov by way of exception on 11 April 2003. The procedure of granting citizenship by way of exception normally lasts for two to three months from the day of submitting an application. Y. Borisov was granted citizenship in three weeks. The fact that Y. Borisov was granted citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania, ignoring the warning issued by the head of the State Security Department, enables the Commission to conclude that Y. Borisov can exert considerable influence over the President.
The Commission has found that on 21 May 2003 the staff of Y. Borisov-managed Aviabaltika holding arranged and signed an agreement on the supply of helicopter parts for military and dual use to the Ministry of Defence of Sudan, and traded in spare parts for military helicopters with the countries entered in the list of countries supporting terrorism (Sudan, Libya). Responsible Lithuanian officials informed the President about that, which was also confirmed by the Minister of National Defence L.A. Linkevičius when he testified before the Commission.
However, when the facts about Y. Borisov’s illegal activity emerged, the President failed to disassociate himself from Y. Borisov. Based on the recorded conversations between A. Drakšas and the President on 27 October 2003, the Commission notes that even now the President knows that Y. Borisov may blackmail him and thus influence the President’s activity.
Influence of Individuals of Dubious Reputation on the President’s Office
The Commission has established that the President’s Office was also influenced by other individuals of dubious reputation.
T. Barštys, a controversial businessman and active supporter of the election campaign of R. Paksas, maintains contacts with organised criminal groups as the material available to the Commission shows. After R. Paksas’ victory in the presidential election, in his conversations, T. Barštys expressed no doubts about his ability to influence the President because of the latter's indebtedness to him as well as to exercise his effect on law enforcement institutions, thus avoiding their attention.
Linked with the President’s entourage (with the former Adviser to the President on National Security R. Ačas) is R. Smailytė who was under observation by the State Security Department. Through her, certain persons of questionable reputation came into contact with senior officials and sought to exert influence with a view to having the top law enforcement officials replaced. For instance, even prior to the start of the notorious “spying scandal” of April 2003, which, allegedly, was the responsibility of the Commissioner General of the Police of Lithuania V. Grigaravičius, in her conversation with T. Barštys, R. Smailytė referred to an intended replacement of V. Grigaravičius by the Chief of the State Border Guard Service A. Songaila. This was confirmed by the subsequent development of events, all of which show that R. Smailytė had received the information on the intended replacement of V. Grigaravičius from the President’s Office.
R. Smailytė maintained relations with A. Aksentyev, the actual Manager of the Association Aнзopи – XXI вeк, who, to the knowledge of the special services, engages in illegal activities. Owing to his influence on Russian and international criminal structures, he is included into the list of persons denied entry to the Republic of Lithuania, the USA and a few other states. A. Aksentyev, via R. Smailytė, attempted to influence the Adviser to the President on National Security R. Ačas as well as other senior Lithuanian officials in order to get himself established in Lithuania, obtain a permit of permanent residence in Lithuania and legalise his activities.
It has been found that R. Smailytė stayed in contact with V. Jakutis, a business partner of the Manager of the Association Aнзopи – XXI вeк A. Aksentyev. According to the Lithuanian and foreign special services, V. Jakutis is linked to one of the largest international organised criminal groups involved in cigarette smuggling that used to finance international terrorist organisations. R. Smailytė put V. Jakutis in contact with the President’s Office. From R. Ačas, through R. Smailytė, V. Jakutis used to receive confidential information of interest to him concerning the privatisation of alcohol enterprises while he supplied the President’s Office with information compromising his competitors. Returning the favour, V. Jakutis provided financial support to persons who maintained close political ties with the President’s Office.
A. Songaila, Chief of the State Border Guard Service, as well as officials A. Žymančius and G. Kuznetsov, at R. Smailytė’s request, used to allow individuals of dubious repute to cross the state border without waiting in the queue.
The Commission has found that the activities of R. Ačas attracted the interest of the special services of the NATO countries who consider his activities dangerous in terms of decision-making in national security. R. Ačas' activities gave cause for concern to the diplomats of foreign countries who informed A. Valionis, Minister of Foreign Affairs. A. Valionis, in his turn, informed the President on four occasions since the second half of August 2003.
The Commission has also found that the Adviser to the President on State Security E. Vaitkus had discussions with S. Guliyeva, the wife of I. Guliyev (citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan, deported from Lithuania on the basis of a court decision as he posed a threat to Lithuania's state security and public order), about E. Vaitkus' possible influence on the Department of Migration under the Ministry of the Interior with a view to obtaining a permission for I. Guliyev to reside in Lithuania. S. Guliyeva and I. Guliyev, in their conversations, mentioned that the matter would be settled once the Director General of the State Security Department M. Laurinkus was replaced.
It has been found that the persons of questionable reputation who exercised influence over the President’s Office were in frequent mutual communication, thus shaping the entourage of the President’s Office. R. Ačas constantly communicated with Y. Borisov and R. Smailytė, the latter – with A. Aksentyev as well as with A. Griboyedov and M. Žukauskas who are associated with organised criminal groups engaged in the smuggling of goods across the border of the Republic of Lithuania, with T. Barštys and V. Jakutis, and V. Laurinavičius who keeps contact with A. Aksentyev. Some of the individuals referred to above (R. Smailytė, S. Guliyeva, V. Laurinavičius) used to pay visits to the President’s Office.
The President knew about the links of his Advisers with the persons of dubious repute. He gave a warning to R. Ačas not to have contacts with Y. Borisov and R. Smailytė. The President himself, however, did not sever relations with Y. Borisov (took part in the wedding of Y. Borisov’s son). R. Ačas did not break off links with Y. Borisov either.
Impact of the President’s Office on the Process of Privatisation and Other Business Processes as well as Company Activities
The Adviser to the President on National Security R. Ačas, personally or through R. Smailytė and sometimes – in the name of the President, sought to exert unlawful influence on privatisation.
On 2, 22 and 26 May 2003 the Director General of the State Security Department M. Laurinkus handed classified reports on the privatisation of Stumbras and other alcohol companies to the President personally. On the same day of 26 May, R. Smailytė had a conversation with the Public Adviser to the President V. Sutkus from the concern MG Baltic, who was interested in the results of the privatisation of Stumbras, and informed him about three classified reports by the State Security Department, and they also discussed whether the reports matched the interests of MG Baltic.
The Commission has found that R. Ačas exerted influence on the procedures of the tender organised by the Transport Investment Directorate under the Ministry of Transport and Communications for the procurement of construction works at the Lavoriškės Border Inspection Post, by promoting UAB Kortas, while the Public Procurement Office violated the Law on Public Procurement by following R. Ačas’ instructions.
The Commission has also found that, in the name of R. Ačas and with his knowledge, active promotion of AB Ūkio Bankas (Economy Bank) was launched by instructing the heads of institutions under R. Ačas' and his associates' influence to open accounts with Ūkio Bankas. After the account of Viandrė, formerly R. Ačas owned company was transferred to Ūkio Bankas, under R. Ačas' personal arrangement Ūkio Banko Lizingas purchased the car, an asset of company Viandrė, formerly R. Ačas' private car.
It has been found that on 10 October 2003 the President had a conversation with A. Drakšas, Manager of UAB Restakas, about the transfer of AB Šiaulių plentas shares. A. Drakšas and other individuals were interested in acquiring shares of AB Šiaulių plentas and turned to R. Paksas for support. R. Paksas spoke about the need for “extraordinary measures”, promised to turn to R. Ačas and V. Račkauskas for assistance, and later on mentioned that the process of the acquisition of AB Šiaulių plentas shares had been affected, as requested by A. Drakšas.
V. Maigys, Chief Commissioner of the City of Šiauliai, testified that V. Račkauskas, Advisor to the President of the Republic on Law Enforcement Affairs, had inquired him about AB Šiaulių plentas. In his turn, V. Račkauskas testified before the Commission that he had been interested in the issues related to AB Šiaulių plentas. Moreover, on 20, 21 and 23 October 2003 the Economic Crime Investigation Division of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Criminal Police of the Šiauliai Chief Police Commissioner's Office conducted a check on the accounts management of AB Šiaulių plentas, and on 27 October 2003, acting on the basis of an anonymous complaint, the Financial Crime Investigation Division initiated the audit of the company. All of the above may be considered as pursuit of private interests with the help of law enforcement institutions.
Abuse of Status, Unlawful Interference with the Work of Other Institutions and Excess of Competence by the President’s Advisors
The Commission has also found that R. Ačas, even though no longer the owner of the company Viandrė, stayed in contact with its staff who had been encouraging him to exercise his influence on the situation at the border. Following the instructions of R. Ačas, the services in charge of border crossing control had to inform him on a regular basis about queues at border crossing points even though these matters were outside R. Ačas’ competence.
It is noteworthy that the wording of job descriptions of Advisors to the President of the Republic is vague, thus leaving ample room for free interpretation. For an extended period of time the President’s Advisors had no job descriptions to rely on at all, as they were approved only in July 2003. R. Ačas testified before the Commission that sometimes he acted on the basis of the provision of his job description that authorised him to “carry out other instructions given by the President” and gave no reference to a field of activity. Taking advantage of the above, Advisors to the President R. Ačas, V. Račkauskas, E. Vaitkus, V. Vinickienė would issue unlawful instructions to different state institutions, whereas the position assumed by the Advisor to the President on Foreign Policy and Integration Affairs A. Medalinskas would sometimes differ from that of the President.
The Commission has found that even though it was twice that M. Laurinkus, Director General of the State Security Department, personally informed the President about relations between R. Ačas and R. Smailytė and "leakage" of confidential information from the President’s Office, the process was not brought to a stop. R. Ačas also testified for the Commission that the rules governing handling confidential information were not always observed in the President’s Office. Even though the President was aware of such law disobedience and violations, he tolerated that and did not take any substantial measures to change the situation.
1.  The Russian-registered company Almax, who has alleged links to the Russian secret services, has been and still is exerting influence on the President’s Office, seeking to influence and control political processes in Lithuania, shaping the structure of the President’s Office and determining the choice of its staff, as well as trying to gain more influence over the President, in pursuit of its own and Y. Borisov’s interests.
2.  The President’s relations with Y. Borisov are specific. Driven by political, economic and personal motives and with support from the Russian company Almax, Y. Borisov had an influence on the activities of the President’s Office and on the President’s decisions. Thus Y. Borisov has secured favourable conditions for his business, which, among other things, includes trading in spare parts for military helicopters with the countries supporting terrorism. So far, the President has failed to publicly disassociate himself from Y. Borisov and has implicitly vindicated him by his actions. The extent of Y. Borisov’s influence on the President is made clear by the fact that the President, aware of Y. Borisov’s threats, granted him citizenship under an accelerated procedure.
3.  Individuals of dubious reputation and ties with the criminal world and shadow business structures, have exerted influence on the President’s Office and sought to have the top law enforcement officials replaced.
4.  The President and some Advisors to the President have used unacceptable influence on privatisation and certain private business operators.
5.  The President has tolerated his advisors’ excess of competence, interference with the activities of other public institutions and abuse of their status, which disturbed state administration.
6.  Classified information leaked, through the President and his Advisors, to those individuals who were not authorised to know it, including individuals under operational investigation.
The Commission has found that the President has been and still is vulnerable. Taking into account the special status and responsibility of the President, and his role in domestic and foreign policies, this poses a threat to Lithuania’s national security.
Enclosed: A list of Annexes to the Conclusion of the Commission, which are an integral part thereof. (ANNEX No. 1).
1.  Law No. IX-1806 (ANNEX No. 2), 1 copy, 1 page.
2.  Resolution of the Seimas No. IX-1802 (ANNEX No. 3), 1 copy, 2 pages.
3.  Inquiry Guidelines for the Commission (ANNEX No. 4), 1 copy, 1 page.
4.  Note on the correspondence of the Commission with institutions, individuals and the persons invited to testify (ANNEX No. 5), 1 copy, 4 pages.
5.  Chronological order of events (ANNEX No. 6), 1 copy, 3 pages.
6.  Copies of the main documents of the Commission’s correspondence with institutions – 1 file (ANNEX No. 7), 1 copy, 373 pages.
(Annexes No. 3 – 6 are kept in the Secretariat of Plenary Sittings)
7.  Files of confidential documents (kept in the Secretariat of the Seimas Commissions, to be transferred to the Special Office of the Reception of the Seimas Office) – 1 file.
8.  Audio recordings of Commission meetings behind a closed-door (kept in the Special Office of the Reception of the Seimas Office), 15 CD.
9.  Files of the originals of the Commission’s correspondence documents (kept in the Secretariat of the Seimas Commissions, to be transferred to the Seimas Archive).
10.      Video recordings and transcripts of open meetings of the Commission on the internet at the address: http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_viewer.ViewTheme?p_int_tv_id=2631&p_kalb_id=1&p_org=0 (http://www.lrs.lt/komisijos/laikinosios komisijos/Laikinoji tyrimo komisija dėl galimų grėsmių nacionaliniam saugumui).